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Middle East / North Africa and the Millennium
Development Goals:
Implications for German Development Cooperation

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Foreword

This study is the English version of the original German report that has been published back in June 2005. Only a very small number of amendments have been made for the purpose of this English version.

The study examines the progress that the countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have made so far in implementing the international Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the Middle East and North Africa (the MENA region) and focuses on whether and to what extent Germany is currently contributing to the process and what consequences may be derived from this state of affairs for German development cooperation with the region. For the purposes of the study the following countries are defined as part of the region: all of the Arab countries (including Mauritania, Sudan, and the Palestinian Territories) as well as Iran.¹

The initiative for this study has been made by the German Development Institute/ Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) itself. However, it has been highly appreciated by the responsible divisions of the Federal German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ). Its aim is to contribute, with a view to the MDGs, to a critical analysis of German policy toward the MENA countries. The BMZ must reflect what role the MDGs shall play in Germany's development policy: to what extent German DC is presently meeting the challenges posed by the agenda; and how this issue should best be dealt with in the future.

A first draft of the study served as a background paper for a workshop conducted by the BMZ at the DIE in March 2005. The aim of the workshop was to review the contribution of German DC to achieving the MDGs in the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia) and to identify potential needs for adjustment. The workshop participants included representatives of the BMZ, the GDI, the Deutsche Gesell-

1 This definition includes all countries – excepting Turkey – covered by the BMZ's current regional concept "Middle East / Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Region": Egypt, Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, the Palestinian (Autonomy) Territories, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

schaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), and the KfW Development Bank. The final draft was published in German language in June 2005.

The study is based at large on existing documents such as e.g. the statistical databases provided by international organizations (World Bank, UNDP, WHO, UNICEF, UNSD, UNAIDS), the national MDG reports presented by the governments of the MENA countries, UNDP's regional MDG report, and BMZ strategy papers. However, the author has also conducted several interviews with representatives of the BMZ, the KfW, and the GTZ. In addition, prior to, during, and after the BMZ workshop mentioned above, many participants made comments and proposals for improvements that have been taken into account in the present, revised version of the study.

The author wishes to take this opportunity to express his gratitude to the interview partners from the BMZ, the GTZ, and the KfW for their valuable suggestions and comments as well as for the fact that they took their time to talk with the author and to read the draft version of the study. He also wishes to extend his thanks to his colleagues in the DIE, in particular to Susanne Neubert, Guido Ashoff, and Oliver Schlumberger, all of whom contributed numerous comments for the study.

Bonn, August 2006

Markus Loewe

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Abbreviations

AFESD	Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Cairo
AHDR	Arab Human Development Report
ALO	Arab Labour Organisation / Arab Labour Office, Cairo
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung/ Federal German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Bonn
CAS	Country assistance strategy
CFC	Chloro-Fluoro Carbon
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, Paris
DALE	Disability-adjusted life expectancy (an arithmetic value: life expectancy in full health, i.e. life expectancy minus expected years of health life lost due to disability)
DC	Development cooperation
DIE	Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik/ German Development Institute, Bonn
EFA	Education for All initiative
ESCWA	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Beirut, New York
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome
FC	Financial cooperation
FCND	Food Consumption and Nutrition Division of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, DC
FDI	Foreign direct investment
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, Berlin
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GDI	Gender development index (arithmetic measure developed by UNDP; calculated in a way similar to the HDI, the GDI measures differences in the human development of the genders, ranking them on a scale that ranges from 0 to 1)
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNI	Gross national income
GNP	Gross national product

GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, Eschborn
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
HICs	High-income countries (countries with a per capita income of more than US\$ 9076 in purchasing-power parities for the year 2002)
HIPC	Heavily indebted poor countries
IEA	International Energy Agency, Paris
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC
ILO	International Labour Organization / International Labour Office, Geneva
IMF	International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC
InWEnt	Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH / Capacity Building International, Bonn
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva
ITU	International Telecommunication Union, Geneva
IUCN	The World Conservation Union (originally International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources), Gland (Switzerland)
KfW	KfW Development Bank (originally 'Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau'), Frankfurt/Main
LDCs	Least developed countries
LICs	Low-income countries (countries with a per capita income lower than US\$ 735 in PPP for the year 2002)
LLDCs	Land-locked developing countries
MDGR	Millennium Development Goals (Progress) Report
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MENA	Middle East and North Africa region
MFI	Micro-finance institution
MICs	Middle-income countries (countries with a per capita income between US\$ 735 and US\$ 9076 in PPP for the year 2002)
n.a.	No author cited
n.d.	No date available
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
ODA	Official development assistance

OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris
PA	Palestinian (National) Authority, Ramallah, Gaza
PARC	Public Administration Research & Consultation Center, Cairo
PAT	Palestinian Authority Territories (areas of the Palestinian Territories/ West Bank and Gaza Strip that are administered by the PA)
PCI	Per capita income (GDP per inhabitant)
PPP	Purchasing power parities (concept used to translate exchange rates into so-called international or PPP US\$; factors in differences in the real value of monetary variables in different countries – e.g. the purchasing power of incomes – that result from the heterogeneity of the prices for nontradable goods)
PPP US\$	International US\$ (national currencies are converted into international US\$ on the basis of PPP)
PRB	Population Reference Bureau, Washington, DC
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSP	Priority strategy paper
PT	Palestinian Territories (the parts of the former British mandate territory of Palestine that were occupied by Israel in 1967, i.e. the Gaza Strip and the so-called West Bank, including East Jerusalem)
SAP	Structural adjustment program
SF	Social fund
SME	Small and medium-size enterprise
TB	Tuberculosis
TC	Technical cooperation
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations, New York, Geneva
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, Geneva
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, New York
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, New York
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Paris
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn

UN HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Nairobi
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund, New York
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Gaza, Vienna
UNSCO	Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Israeli Occupied Territories, Jerusalem
UNSD	United Nations Statistics Division, New York
US	United States of America
US\$	US dollar
USAID	United States Agency for International Development, Washington, DC
VENRO	Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen e.V., Bonn
WHO	World Health Organization, Geneva
WiRAM	Wirtschaftsreform und Aufbau der Marktwirtschaft/ Economic Reform and Market Systems Development (BMZ country priority area)
WTO	World Trade Organization, Geneva
ZEF	Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung/ Center for Development Research, University of Bonn

Key to the tables

n.a.	No data available
...	Item positive, but no exact data available
–	Item exactly zero or meaningless
0	Item only approximately zero (rounded to zero)

Executive Summary

In September 2000, the so-called United Nations Millennium Summit, which was held in New York, unanimously adopted the Millennium Declaration. It contains, inter alia, eight goals, which, in 2001, were further specified to include 18 so-called targets, and 48 indicators (see Overview 1 at the end of this summary) and became later known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Most of them are supposed to have been implemented in every single country worldwide by the year 2015. The goals include: (i) worldwide reduction of income poverty and hunger; (ii) access for all children to a full course of primary schooling; (iii) elimination of gender disparities in all countries; (iv and v) worldwide reduction of maternal and child mortality rates; (vi) reversal of the spread of HIV/Aids and containment of the spread of malaria and other infectious diseases; (vii) improvement of environmental and resource protection; (viii) building of a global partnership for development between industrialized and developing countries.

The present study is concerned with the Middle East / North Africa and the Millennium Development Goals: Implications for German Development Cooperation. On the one side, the study asks what progress the MENA countries have made in implementing the MDGs and what the most important impediments are. On the other side, it discusses what contribution Germany is currently making to support the implementation of the MDGs in the MENA region, whether and to what extent this contribution is conceptually well-founded and documented, and what consequences the foregoing implies for future German DC.

What the study finds is that the MENA countries are faced with major deficits in their efforts to reduce income poverty and hunger (MDG1), improve the quality of and access to primary-school education (MDG2), eliminate gender disparity (MDG3), protect natural resources and the environment (MDG7), improve political and economic governance (MDG8), reduce youth unemployment (also MDG8), and further develop information and communications infrastructure (likewise MDG8). The study also notes that the reason for this state of affairs must be sought not least in the insufficient commitment of and the disinterest shown by the governments of the region.

German DC is presently positioned in such a way as to be able to provide its partner countries in the region with support in relevant areas in their efforts to achieve the MDGs. But it is impossible to say with certainty whether or not German DC is in fact doing so, since thus far (i) not one of the BMZ's country concepts and only a limited number of its priority strategy papers state what precisely the German contribution to implementing the MDGs consists of and what measures are being used to reach the objective; and (ii) as yet no impact analyses have been conducted to determine the effects of DC on the implementation of the MDGs.

Millennium Declaration and Millennium Development Goals

The Millennium Declaration results from a paradigm shift in the international development debate. The declaration is in effect a summation of resolutions and declarations of intent adopted by a series of world conferences that were held during the 1990s and signaled – at least in part – a break with the Washington Consensus of the 1980s. A one-sided focus on economic growth was superseded by the model of a *sustainable human development* marked, among other things, by the following points:

- Poverty is an ‘*unacceptable global problem*’. Reducing poverty is thus the central goal of all development policies. While other goals, like economic growth and price stability, which dominated the development policy of the 1980s, continue to be relevant, they are now expected, in their ultimate consequence, to serve the end of reducing poverty.
- Poverty is a *multidimensional problem*. It manifests itself not only in inadequate incomes and assets but also in a lack of access to education, healthcare, political rights, the means of social integration, and social protection.
- There are a great number of *interdependencies* between the various aspects of poverty. This is why poverty reduction invariably includes efforts to promote democracy and good governance, the development and expansion of systems of social protection, environmental and resource protection, and gender equality.

- Economic growth can contribute to *reducing poverty*. However, there is no automatism involved here, in particular as far as the non-economic dimensions of poverty (education, healthcare, political participation, social integration) are concerned.
- The sine qua non for any lasting reduction of poverty is that development, with all its economic, ecological, and social aspects, prove *sustainable*.
- One essential condition is a liberal economic system geared to competition and equality of opportunity. In many cases, however, there is a need for targeted government intervention to sustain such economic systems (*institutions matter!*).

It is on this holistic approach to development that the Millennium Declaration rests. The MDGs, on the other hand, are based on only two of the four central chapters of the declaration (III ‘Development and poverty eradication’ and IV ‘Protecting our common environment’) The goals laid out in the chapters ‘Peace, security and disarmament’ (II) and ‘Human rights, democracy and good governance’ (V) were not included in the list of MDGs.

This must be seen as problematic inasmuch as the MDG agenda is not wholly in line with the newly established, *comprehensive notion of poverty*. None of the MDG indicators measure deficits in human and civil rights, participation, and rule of law, in social integration and acceptance, or in social protection. Even *environmental problems* have been *backgrounded* to the extent that they are referred to in only one of the 18 targets.

Furthermore, the MDGs are designed above all to measure *quantitative, not qualitative, dimensions*. To cite an example, MDG2 measures school enrolment, but not the quality of the education provided.

As to the *sustainability of development*, the MDGs may even have adverse effects. This entails a danger that all development-related efforts may be geared solely to a timely implementation of the MDGs, but without paying due heed to their long-term implications. It would, for instance, be possible to develop generous social welfare systems with a view to reducing by half the proportion of income poverty among a population in the key year, 2015, compared with the year 1990. Even if this should prove successful,

it would not be sustainable, because the success would not be rooted in structural change. It would, together with the resources invested for the purpose, vanish without a trace as soon as these social welfare systems turned out to be unaffordable.

A further risk is that the MDG agenda awakens *unrealistic expectations*. At the moment it appears unlikely that all developing countries will achieve the MDGs. Still, they are a reasonable and promising means of spurring all relevant actors to accept the greater commitment and to mobilize the additional resources needed to at least come closer to achieving the goals agreed on. If, however, the public gets the impression that the MDGs are realistic for all countries of the world, a lack of success could entail a major loss of credibility for DC – particularly if it turns out in 2015 that a good number of developing countries have failed to achieve the MDGs. By the same token, markedly development-minded governments in the developing world could find themselves faced with a delegitimization problem if they disappoint the exaggerated hopes that have been awakened among their populations.

Still, the MDG agenda does offer chances. It amounts to the first *common goal system* ever adopted for all actors involved in development policy, one that has been agreed upon by donor countries and international organizations alike:

- The eight goals are a frame of reference in which all actors can be expected to seek orientation in their development policy. They should bundle their development-related efforts (as to benefit from synergies) and coordinate (harmonize) them each of them with the others. In the process, however, the actors involved would be well advised not to lose sight of the political and other goals set out in the Millennium Declaration.
- The common goal system can contribute to a more pronounced *outcome orientation* in both development policy and cooperation. Looked at against the background of the MDGs, the question of what inputs are provided by individual actors is a secondary one. The crucial question is what impacts these actors achieve (individually or jointly). This is the measure by which they will be gauged. They should, however, be careful not to stick too doggedly to the exact targets set out in the MDG agenda. It would for the most part be prefer-

able to interpret these targets as an orientation framework; otherwise the relevant actors would be running the risk of awakening unrealistic expectations and jeopardizing the sustainability of development.

- One effect of the MDG agenda may be to induce all actors – governments of developing countries, the private sector, civil society, and donors – to mobilize *additional resources* and to undertake *greater efforts* to ensure that the MDGs are implemented – as far as possible (and reasonable) – by the year 2015. In parallel, however, it is essential that all actors undertake whatever efforts they can to optimize the efficiency of their funding modalities.

The MDG agenda has the following implications for German DC:

- German DC must ensure that it is providing a *significant contribution to implementing the MDGs*. There is no reason whatever to subordinate all German DC to the MDGs, or for German DC to contribute to achieving each and every MDG. But it should, in one way or another, support every one of its partner countries in their efforts to reach the MDGs. Furthermore, Germany must provide its contribution to achieving MDG8, a goal for which the donor countries are principally responsible – i.e. it should work, among other things, for trade liberalization and debt relief and seek to increase the level of the official development assistance (ODA) it provides.
- German DC must also pay more heed to its *effectiveness and efficiency* – starting with the planning phase and ending with the development of instruments designed to analyze the actual effects of DC on the implementation of the MDGs.
- Finally, German DC must, above all, gear its activities to *partner priorities* and its *own strengths*. It should support mainly measures that have priority for the developing countries themselves, even though they may be unable to carry them out without external support. In addition, German DC should be coordinated with other donors in such a way that each donor takes on tasks in which it has comparative strengths of its own.

The current state of the MDG process in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa

Thus far, the MENA countries have made sufficient progress on only a

limited number of MDGs. Like countries in other regions of the world, the MENA countries are faced with problems in implementing MDG1 and MDG7. But – unlike the situation e.g. in Latin America – the most serious deficits encountered here have to do with the quality of primary education (MDG2), economic and legal gender equality (MDG3), and improvement of economic and political governance (a sub-aspect of MDG8).

One country that has proven relatively successful is Tunisia, which is likely to reach five to seven of the eight MDGs. It is having difficulties in implementing MDG5 and MDG7, but also, and in particular, in meeting the call for good governance set out under MDG8. Egypt, Libya, Qatar, and Kuwait are likely to reach at least four to five of the MDGs, although these countries also have very serious deficits in good governance. Major problems have been noted for Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, and the Palestinian Territories – and in particular for Iran, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Oman. The situation looks very bad for the three low-income countries Yemen, Sudan, and Mauritania as well as for Iraq. Iraq and Yemen may possibly fail to reach all eight MDGs, while Mauritania and Sudan are likely to miss six.

Alleviation of income poverty and hunger (MDG1)

The majority of the MENA countries will not reach MDG1 if they do not step up their efforts substantially. While the proportion of those that are affected by hunger or live on less than 1 US\$ per day is lower than in other world regions, the figure has not declined since 1990, indeed it has risen. In the past 15 years, only Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Mauritania have made any progress in reducing income poverty. At the same time, the proportion of people affected by income poverty has risen drastically in Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, and, above all, Yemen. The proportion of undernourished persons has declined in Tunisia, Egypt, and Mauritania, while it has risen in Iraq, Jordan, Algeria, Lebanon, and Morocco.

Universal primary education (MDG2)

Since 1990, the MENA countries have failed to make sufficient progress in the field of education, and accordingly they are highly unlikely to reach

MDG2 as a whole. Numerous children in the MENA countries have yet to attend primary school. Thus far, only South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa have made less progress on MDG2. In particular, Iran and the UAE, where net enrolment ratios in primary education have actually declined, will fail to reach MDG2, as will, in all likelihood, Sudan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Kuwait. On the other hand, the Palestinian Territories, Tunisia, Algeria, Qatar, Jordan, and Egypt are quite likely to reach the goal, assuming that present trends continue in these countries. The same is also conceivable for Morocco, Bahrain, and Syria.

School education in the region is furthermore of poor quality and does little to prepare students for their later working life.

Gender equality (MDG3)

The MENA countries have made more progress in achieving gender equality in education. Nearly all of these countries have succeeded in substantially increasing school enrolment rates for girls at all levels of their educational systems, and enrolment rates for girls are now approaching the figures for boys. This means that the MENA region as a whole is very likely to reach MDG3. The only exceptions are Yemen and Iraq.

All the same, however, even in 2015 the MENA countries will still be far removed from any comprehensive gender equality. While it is true that improved educational opportunities for girls are translating out into declining illiteracy rates among women, the latter's chances to find gainful employment have nevertheless shown a downward trend. The percentage of women in the nonagricultural working population has declined in most countries in the region; only in Algeria, Oman, and Bahrain has the figure risen. Moreover, the average income of working women in the MENA countries – with the exception of the Palestinian Territories – is still only a fraction of what men earn.

Looking at their political and legal situation too, we find that women continue to be disadvantaged compared with men. In the Gulf states (excepting Bahrain) women still do not have the right to vote, and in the ministries and parliaments of all other MENA countries women are conspicuously underrepresented. Almost everywhere in the region, even civil law (above all laws covering civil status, inheritance, and citizenship) confers

fewer rights on women than on men. Finally, women are also disadvantaged in the administration of justice since there are informal (mainly social) barriers in place that hinder their access to justice and administration.

Reduction of child and maternal mortality (MDG4 and MDG5)

Most of the MENA countries have made great strides in health policy. They have succeeded in appreciably reducing infant, child, and maternal mortality rates, which means that they are likely to reach MDG4 and MDG5. This likewise appears to be the case for Jordan, Algeria, Syria, and Lebanon, provided that they step up their efforts in the coming years. On the other hand, Mauritania, Sudan, and Yemen, the region's three low-income countries, and Iraq are very likely to fail to reach MDG4 and MDG5.

Reversal of the spread of HIV/Aids and reduction of the prevalence of malaria and other infectious diseases (MDG6)

At present, it is impossible to make any exact statements on the implementation of MDG6 in the MENA countries, since no reliable data are available on the spread of HIV/Aids and malaria in the region. One of the reasons for this is that HIV/Aids continues to be a taboo issue in the region. The figures for both HIV infections and the number of Aids cases are likely to be considerably lower than in other parts of the world. One exception here is Sudan, where more than 2 % of all adults are infected. However, there are also indications that the number of new infections has increased drastically in all MENA countries over the past five years. This goes in particular for southern Sudan, southern Algeria, Mauritania, and the coastal plain of Yemen.

Malaria is endemic in eight MENA countries, although it does not constitute a major health risk in any of them.

Improvement of the environmental sustainability of country policies (MDG7)

MDG7 sets out three targets that are only loosely interrelated and may even lead to goal conflicts. These are environmental sustainability (Tar-

get 9), sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation for a larger proportion of the population (Target 10), and improvement in the lives of slum dwellers (Target 11).

Six indicators have been designed to measure the implementation of Target 9. The first indicator (proportion of land area covered by forests) is not especially meaningful for a region that – with the exception of Sudan, Morocco, and Lebanon – has long been without any significant forest cover. But all of the other indicators show that the MENA countries will still have to make substantial efforts to reach Target 9. Soil, air, and water in the region have been affected by growing levels of pollution. For example, averaged across the region, CO₂ emissions have risen by 50 % since 1990, and the MENA countries have made far less progress in reducing Chloro-Fluoro Carbon (CFC) emissions than other parts of the world. Furthermore, many MENA countries have yet to ratify some important international environmental conventions, including e.g. the Kyoto Protocol. And per capita energy consumption has risen substantially almost everywhere in the region, although some progress has been made in improving energy efficiency (net domestic product per unit of energy consumption).

The MENA region has made major progress in implementing Target 10, but it still may not reach the target by 2015: Mauritania, Libya, Oman, and Yemen are likely not to reach it. Tunisia and Morocco will have to step up their efforts substantially. According to the official statistics, Egypt, Bahrain, Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian Territories have already reached Target 10. However, these statistics indicate only the number of households connected to the public water mains, not whether they are regularly supplied with water and quality this water has. Moreover, the statistics mask the fact that the greatest problem facing the MENA region is overuse of scarce water reserves by intensive irrigated agriculture, which accounts for 60-80 % of overall water consumption in the region.

Some MENA countries have made good progress since 1990 in expanding their wastewater disposal systems. Egypt and Jordan, for instance, have already reached the target of halving the proportion of people without sustainable access to sanitation, and Tunisia, Syria, and Oman are also likely to reach it by 2015. Sudan, Yemen, and Libya, however, have thus far made very little progress in developing their sanitary infrastructure.

Global partnership for development (MDG8)

MDG8 consists of a large number of targets, most of which fall under the primary responsibility of the industrialized countries. Some of them, though – as in the case of MDGs 1–7 – are mainly the responsibility of the developing countries. This goes above all for (i) improvement of economic and political governance at the national level, (ii) reduction of youth unemployment, (iii) access of the population to medicines, and (iv) access of the population to modern communications and information technologies.

The economic governance of the MENA countries continues to be poor. These countries use a mix of numerous legal regulations and informal barriers to seal off their goods and financial markets to potential new market entrants from abroad, but also to competitors of established domestic suppliers. Those interested in investing or producing here are forced endure protracted, costly, and too little transparent approval procedures without any predictable outcome. And when it comes to legal disputes, it is very difficult to say how courts will decide. Intellectual property rights are not given adequate protection, competition laws (assuming they exist in the first place) are either poorly crafted or regularly ignored by the competent authorities.

Political governance in the MENA region is in an even worse state. No other world region (with the possible exception of Central Asia) suffers from comparably large deficits with respect to political participation, government accountability, civil rights, and other liberal freedoms of the inhabitants. As to transparency and the rule of law, the MENA region does not rank much better. But worst of all – and in contrast to the situation in all other parts of the world – not even the smallest improvement has taken place in these regards in the MENA countries over the past fifteen years.

And since 1990 the MENA countries have also made as good as no progress in *reducing youth unemployment*. In Egypt and Bahrain, for example, youth unemployment ratios have even increased drastically. Although there are no data available for the other countries of the region, they have generally been faced with rising unemployment, and the actual rates are far higher than the official figures indicate. In other words, it is safe to assume that youth unemployment rates have increased as well. This goes in particular for the Palestinian Territories, Yemen, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Lebanon.

Access of the population to affordable essential drugs has improved in the MENA countries. For instance, the populations of Algeria, Jordan, Libya, and the Gulf states have access to all essential medical drugs. On the other hand, however, only half the populations of Mauritania, Morocco, and Yemen, and an even smaller percentage of the population of Sudan, are adequately supplied with essential medical drugs.

The *communications and information infrastructure* in the MENA countries is badly underdeveloped. Only in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are there fewer telephone subscriptions per 1000 population, and this includes mobile phone networks. The figure is especially low both for the MENA region's low-income countries and for Algeria, Libya, and Syria: The situation is similar when we look at personal computers and Internet connections. Here the MENA region lags far behind Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. In this regard the situation in the Gulf states, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iran is relatively good, while the figures for Yemen, Sudan, and Mauritania, but also for Egypt, Morocco, and Syria, are very low.

Acceptance of the MDGs in the Middle East and North Africa

The question now is whether and to what extent the MDG agenda is finding acceptance in the MENA countries, or to what extent the region's political decision-makers are prepared to commit to the agenda. This is not at all simply a matter of course. Those in power in countries that have already made good progress in relevant areas may find the MDG agenda to their liking, since they are after all in a position to cite successes they have posted as an additional argument to shore up the legitimacy of their regimes in the eyes of both their own populations and the international community. The picture is different in countries that are faced with severe difficulties in implementing the MDGs. The governments of these countries can of course still attempt to reach the goals, although this would require them to set aside substantial funds in their budgets. This could mean that they then lack funds for other purposes that may appear more opportune to them, e.g. for strategic efforts to consolidate their power. On the other hand, though, politicians in the countries concerned can simply ignore the MDGs and make an all-out effort to prevent their populations

from learning about and discussing the MDGs. The challenge posed by such strategies is to convince the donors that the government is, in spite of all, doing everything in its power to reach the MDGs.

There are reasons to believe that the majority of rulers in the MENA region are not wholly committed to the MDGs, although this is difficult to prove for lack of sound and reliable evidence.

In formal terms, all MENA countries have accepted the MDGs. All of them were represented at the Millennium Summit (indeed most of them by heads of state or government). They voted for the Millennium Declaration, expressly welcoming it individual statements and comments. The governments of the MENA countries have also taken every opportunity to make official reference to the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs. However, official documents and communiqués of this kind seldom reflect the actual intentions of the politicians making them.

A more instructive gauge is whether and to what extent ruling politicians have informed their societies about the MDGs and involved their citizens in the preparation of national MDG reports. In most MENA countries this has – with few exceptions – not been the case, and the MDG agenda has played as good as no role in public discourse, not even among intellectuals. While some individual themes of the MDG agenda have received attention, the MDGs themselves are not touched upon, at least not explicitly. Furthermore, the themes that are addressed are restricted to issue areas that pose no danger to the region's rulers (school enrolment, child mortality, etc.). Even a number of scientists, NGOs, and ministry officials concerned with MDG-relevant issues have yet to hear anything about the goals. Only Egypt and Morocco may possibly differ somewhat from the rest of the region, although the information currently available is highly contradictory.

Another source of information is the national MDG reports, most of which indicate that the MENA countries lack a supportive environment (i.e. level of motivation and commitment of the relevant actors are seen as very little conducive to the implementation of the MDGs). However, the overall picture we get here is neither uniform nor intuitively plausible, especially in view of the fact that, of all countries, Saudi Arabia and Syria have received highly positive assessments for their supportive environments.

The governments of the MENA countries are fully aware of the fact that they will be unable to completely ignore the MDG agenda. Yet this leads them to draw highly different conclusions. Countries such as e.g. Syria, Egypt, or Jordan emphasize that they unreservedly welcome the MDG agenda, though this is for them no reason to embark on a fundamentally new course, since, as they claim, the MDGs, have, in essence, always been central goals of their respective governments. In some cases they may not even be all that wrong. Even before the Millennium Summit, Tunisia, for instance, had made considerable progress in several MDG-relevant areas (reduction of income poverty, improvement of gender equality, etc.), while in other areas, including good governance, the country has made no progress whatever, even since the summit. By comparison, there is no reason of any kind for the complacency displayed by many other governments in the region.

Still, for some years now these countries have been drawing up a growing number of development plans and sector strategy papers whose objectives, though they may not explicitly refer to the MDG agenda, do coincide in large measure with individual MDGs (especially often with the MDGs 4, 5, and 7). But whether and to what extent these documents are taken seriously and in fact implemented remains to be answered. It is also conceivable that these efforts are designed mainly to curry favor with donors.

The situation is different with countries such as Mauritania, Yemen, or Algeria. These countries frankly admit that they have in the past neglected certain MDG-relevant areas and are now obliged to make substantial corrections in the policies they have been pursuing. Their planning documents make explicit reference to all of the MDGs, specifying them as national development goals. However, the actions undertaken by these countries have lagged even further behind their own stated goals than they have among the first group of countries named above.

Orientation of German development cooperation

German DC is positioned both geographically and sectorally in such a way that it is able to provide important contributions to implementing the MDGs in the MENA region. However, neither the partner countries nor the German side are undertaking sufficient efforts to analyze and document these contributions.

German DC engaged intensively in what is referred to as its priority partner countries. In the MENA region these are Egypt, Yemen, Morocco, and the Palestinian Territories. But Germany also engages in cooperation with Algeria, Jordan, Mauritania, Syria, and Tunisia. In essence, this orientation would also appear reasonable and appropriate from the perspective of the MDG agenda. There are justifiable political grounds for the fact that Germany does not engage in DC with Iran, Sudan, and Iraq. Libya and the Gulf states, on the other hand, have sufficient financial resources of their own and are thus in a position to solve their problems without DC. One noteworthy fact in this connection is that Mauritania, a low-income country that, because of its poverty, is faced with substantial problems in implementing all of the MDGs, and will be unable to reach them without outside assistance, is what is known as a ‘simple’ partner country – whereas Egypt and Morocco, both middle-income countries, have the status of priority partner countries, even though they have been making better progress in implementing the MDGs, have sizable financial and organizational capacities of their own, and are not marked by any conspicuous willingness to seek solutions to the problems facing them.

Germany’s cooperation with the MENA countries, mainly in the field of ‘economic reform and market systems development’/ ‘Wirtschaftsreform und Aufbau der Marktwirtschaft’ (WIRAM) as well as in the water sector is also wholly justifiable – especially with a view to the MDA agenda. German DC in WIRAM and the water sector can contribute to reaching MDG1 and MDG7, respectively. A large number of MENA countries are faced with major problems in reaching these two goals, although it must be said that they are also not making sufficient progress in other MDG-relevant areas and that official German DC is much less heavily engaged in the latter areas. These include above all the promotion of democracy and good governance, gender equality, and improvement of the quality of primary education – fields that, according to the Arab Human Development Reports, constitute the major obstacles to overall development in the MENA region.

In its dialogues with the governments of the partner countries in the MENA region the BMZ now regularly addresses the issue of the MDGs. However, thus far, hardly any of Germany’s Arab partner countries have explicitly raised the issue, a disquieting state of affairs.

But the most serious weaknesses in Germany's DC with the MENA countries must be seen in its conceptual underpinning and documentation. The BMZ's country concepts and priority strategy papers have hardly a word to say about the MDGs and Germany's contribution to implementing them. While it is true that many of the goals set out in these documents are in line with the general thrust of the MDG agenda, they are not sufficiently clear about this. Moreover, many BMZ papers do not adequately indicate the extent to which the projects and programs of German DC serve higher-level goals. This is not even looked into ex post; thus far German DC has not been subjected to an MDG-specific impact analysis in one single partner country.

There is also good reason to take a critical view of the German contribution to implementing MDG8 (although this goes not specifically for Germany's commitments in the MENA but for the whole of German DC, or indeed for all of Germany's external policies). While the German government is highly committed to the interests of developing countries in many different fields (trade, international financial markets, debt relief, etc.), German ODA still lags behind the target level of 0.7 % of GNP, which was set in the 1970s. Furthermore, Germany earmarks considerably smaller shares of its ODA than other donors for (i) the least-developed countries (LDCs) and (ii) basic social services (primary education, primary health care, food, drinking water, and sewage disposal).

Recommendations for the future

The German government has declared that "the MDGs and the Millennium Declaration constitute the binding frame of reference for German development policy" (Bundesregierung 2004, 1). This permits us to derive the following recommendations for future German DC with MENA countries:

- The BMZ's strategy papers should better document how the German DC is contributing or expected to contribute to the implementation of the MDGs in its partner countries.
- MDG-specific impact analyses should be carried out regularly to check whether a given contribution to implementing the MDGs has in fact been achieved. This goes above all for WiRAM, where it would be important to examine critically and to document in more depth the poverty-related impacts of German DC.

- The dialogue with partner countries must be focused more than in the past on implementing the MDGs. This should mean above all calling for (i) a greater measure of poverty orientation in economic policy, (ii) reforms in the field of governance, and (iii) a greater commitment in the field of gender equality.
- German DC should concentrate more on countries and sectors in which problem urgency is especially marked while the situation is otherwise characterized by a sufficiently high problem-solving disposition and limited problem-solving capacities on the part of partner countries. What this could mean in effect is that German DC might consider e.g. stepping up its engagement in Mauritania (as well as in other countries) in the fields of (i) democratization and good governance, (ii) gender equality, and (iii) quality of primary education.
- Finally, it is important not to lose sight of MDG8. This means to raise the German ODA quota substantially and to direct a greater share of the funds provided to the LDCs as well as to basic social services.

Overview 1: The MDGs, with targets and indicators	
Goals and targets	Indicators <i>(with the international organization/s responsible for collecting the statistical data)</i>
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	
Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Proportion of population below \$1 (PPP) per day (<i>World Bank</i>) <i>(For monitoring country poverty trends, indicators based on national poverty lines should be used, where available)</i> 2. Poverty gap (<i>World Bank</i>) <i>(Mean distance of the poor below the poverty line as % of the poverty line. This mean is taken over the entire population, counting the non-poor as having zero poverty gap.)</i> 3. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption (<i>World Bank</i>)
Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age (<i>UNICEF / WHO</i>) 5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (<i>FAO</i>)
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education	
Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education (<i>UNESCO</i>) 7a. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5 (<i>UNESCO</i>) 7b. Primary completion rate (<i>UNESCO</i>) 8. Literacy rate of 15–24 year-olds (<i>UNESCO</i>)
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women	
Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 9. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education (<i>UNESCO</i>) 10. Ratio of literate women to men, 15–24 years old (<i>UNESCO</i>) 11. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector (<i>ILO</i>) 12. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (<i>IPU</i>)

<i>(Overview 1: The MDGs, with targets and indicators, continued)</i>	
Goals and targets	Indicators <i>(with the international organization/s responsible for collecting the statistical data)</i>
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality	
Target 5: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate	13. Under-five mortality rate (<i>UNICEF / WHO</i>) 14. Infant mortality rate (<i>UNICEF / WHO</i>) 15. Proportion of 1 year-old children immunized against measles (<i>UNICEF / WHO</i>)
Goal 5: Improve maternal health	
Target 6: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio	16. Maternal mortality ratio (<i>UNICEF/ WHO</i>) 17. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel (<i>UNICEF / WHO</i>)
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	
Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS	18. HIV prevalence among pregnant women aged 15–24 years (<i>UNAIDS / WHO / UNICEF</i>) 19. Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate (<i>UNAIDS / UNICEF / UN Population Division / WHO</i>) 19a. Condom use at last high-risk sex (<i>UNICEF / WHO</i>) 19b. Percentage of population aged 15–24 years with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS (<i>UNICEF / WHO</i>) 19c. Contraceptive prevalence rate (<i>UNICEF / WHO</i>) 20. Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school attendance of non-orphans aged 10–14 years (<i>UNAIDS / WHO / UNICEF</i>)

<i>(Overview 1: The MDGs, with targets and indicators, continued)</i>	
Goals and targets	Indicators <i>(with the international organization/s responsible for collecting the statistical data)</i>
Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases	<p>21. Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria (<i>WHO</i>)</p> <p>22. Proportion of population in malaria-risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures (<i>UNICEF / WHO</i>)</p> <p>22a. Percentage of children under 5 sleeping under insecticide-treated bed-nets (<i>UNICEF / WHO</i>)</p> <p>23. Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis (<i>WHO</i>)</p> <p>24. Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under the internationally recommended TB control strategy DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment Short Course) (<i>WHO</i>)</p>
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability	
Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources	<p>25. Proportion of land area covered by forests (<i>FAO</i>)</p> <p>26. Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area (<i>UNEP / IUCN</i>)</p> <p>27. Use of kg oil equivalent per \$1 GDP (PPP) (<i>IEA / World Bank</i>) <i>(A measure for the efficiency of energy use)</i></p> <p>28. Carbon dioxide emissions per capita (<i>UNFCCC / UNSD</i>)</p> <p>28a. Consumption of ozone-depleting CFCs (ODP tons) (<i>UNEP</i>) <i>(indicator included 2002 during Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development)</i></p> <p>29. Proportion of population using solid fuels (<i>WHO</i>) <i>(indicator included 2002 during Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development)</i></p>

(Overview 1: The MDGs, with targets and indicators, continued)	
Goals and targets	Indicators <i>(with the international organization/s responsible for collecting the statistical data)</i>
Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation	<p>30. Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source: (a) urban and (b) rural (<i>UNICEF / WHO</i>)</p> <p>31. Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation: (a) urban and (b) rural (<i>UNICEF / WHO</i>) <i>(indicator included 2002 during Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development)</i></p>
Target 11: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers	32. Proportion of households with access to secure tenure (<i>UN-HABITAT</i>)
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development	
<p>Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system. <i>(Includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction – both nationally and internationally)</i></p> <p>Target 13: Address the special needs of the LDCs <i>(Includes tariff and quota-free access for LDCs exports;</i></p>	<p>Some of the indicators listed below are monitored separately for the least developed countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)</p> <p>Official development assistance (ODA):</p> <p>33. Net ODA, (a) total and (b) to LDCs, as percentage of OECD / Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors' gross national income (GNI) (<i>OECD</i>)</p> <p>34. Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation) (<i>OECD</i>)</p> <p>35. Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors that is untied (<i>OECD</i>)</p> <p>36. ODA received in landlocked developing countries as a proportion of their GNIs (<i>OECD</i>)</p> <p>37. ODA received in small island developing States as proportion of their GNIs (<i>OECD</i>)</p>

(Overview 1: The MDGs, with targets and indicators, continued)	
Goals and targets	Indicators <i>(with the international organization/s responsible for collecting the statistical data)</i>
<p><i>enhanced program of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction)</i></p> <p>Target 14: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing states <i>(through the Program of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly)</i></p> <p>Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term</p>	<p>Market access:</p> <p>38. Proportion of total developed country imports (by value and excluding arms) from developing countries and from LDCs, admitted free of duty <i>(UNCTAD / WTO / World Bank)</i></p> <p>39. Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products and textiles and clothing from developing countries <i>(UNCTAD / WTO / World Bank)</i></p> <p>40. Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as percentage of their GDP <i>(OECD)</i></p> <p>41. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity <i>(OECD / WTO)</i></p> <p>Debt sustainability:</p> <p>42. Total number of countries that have reached their Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) decision points and number that have reached their HIPC completion points (cumulative) <i>(IMF / World Bank)</i></p> <p>43. Debt relief committed under HIPC initiative <i>(IMF / World Bank)</i></p> <p>44. Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services <i>(IMF / World Bank)</i></p>

<i>(Overview 1: The MDGs, with targets and indicators, continued)</i>	
Goals and targets	Indicators <i>(with the international organization/s responsible for collecting the statistical data)</i>
Target 16: In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth	45. Unemployment rate of young people aged 15–24 years, each sex and total (<i>ILO</i>) <i>(An improved measure of the target for future years is under development by the International Labour Organization).</i>
Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries	46. Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis (<i>WHO</i>)
Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications	47. Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population (<i>ITU</i>) 48. Personal computers in use per 100 population and Internet users per 100 population (<i>ITU</i>)
Source: Website of the United Nations Statistics Division: http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_goals.asp (17 May 2004)	
Note:	
a The poverty gap refers to the money needed to completely erase poverty, if it were perfectly targeted and each poor person were given exactly the value of his or her income shortfall below the poverty line.	

1 Introduction

In September 2000, the Millennium Declaration was adopted at the so-called Millennium Summit, held in the framework of the 55th General Assembly of the United Nations (UN). The summit was attended by the heads of state or government of nearly all UN member states. Never before had a similarly large number of highest-ranking representatives of independent states come together on one occasion. This, and the fact that all of the representatives attending made statements of their own on the Millennium Declaration, are a clear indication of the importance attached to the declaration even before it had been adopted.

The Millennium Summit is the culmination of a development that began after the end of the Cold War and has entailed a paradigm shift in the international development debate. The Millennium Declaration, for instance, sums up numerous resolutions and declarations of intent, which were adopted by the international community during the 1990s and have placed good number of new issues and goals on the international agenda.

In the wake of the Millennium Summit, a joint working group was constituted with representatives from the UN, the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and other international organizations. It extracted a number of measurable targets from the Millennium Declaration. The result was a list of eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that are further specified by 18 targets and 48 indicators. Most of the goals are set to be implemented by 2015. They include:

- 1 the reduction of income poverty and hunger,
- 2 the achievement of universal primary education for boys and girls,
- 3 the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women,
- 4 the reduction of child mortality,
- 5 the improvement of maternal health,
- 6 the combat of HIV/Aids, malaria and other infectious diseases,
- 7 the observance of ecological sustainability by country policies, and
- 8 the development of a global partnership for development.

In 2001, the MDGs were approved by the 56th UN General Assembly. The international community is thus in possession of a common goal system that has been agreed upon by all relevant actors and that is both measurable and set to be implemented by a fixed date. The intention is that both, the international community as a whole and each individual country, should achieve all of the MDGs.

This study looks into the degree to which the MDGs are relevant for the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (the so-called MENA region), most of which are classified as middle- or, in some cases, even high-income countries. It explores specifically whether the adoption of the MDGs has already found expression in changed national policies, what successes have been made thus far on individual MDGs, and where the principle implementation-related problems must be sought.

It furthermore discusses what relevance the MDGs have for German development cooperation (DC): What contributions Germany, as a bilateral donor, is in fact making toward the implementation of the MDGs in its partner countries, whether and to what extent this contribution is based on preliminary conceptual-analytical considerations, how well the contribution is documented, and what implications all this may have for the future.

The study shows that the MDGs are highly relevant for the MENA region. All MENA countries approved the MDGs in September 2000, but they have made only inadequate progress towards implementing the goals since then. This goes above all for MDG1 (reduction of income poverty and hunger), MDG7 (ecological sustainability of country policies), and several targets of MDG8 (good governance, reduction of youth unemployment, improved access to modern information and communications technologies). Substantial deficits, however, have also been noted for the quality of education and the social, economic, legal, and political equality of women. One of the reasons for this situation, especially in the region's low-income countries, must be seen in both financial bottlenecks and management failures. In addition, political decision-makers in the region also lack adequate commitment for the MDG agenda.

German DC is generally relatively well positioned to support its partner countries in the MENA region in their efforts to reach the MDGs. In its main priority sectors, "economic reform and market systems development," "water management," and "environmental policy, German DC is in

a position to provide important contributions to implementing the MDGs that are proving especially difficult for the countries in the region to reach. At present, however, neither the partner side nor the donor side is paying sufficient heed to the need to analyze and document these contributions: Most of the country concept and priority country strategy papers prepared by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development / Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) provide no information either on the concrete contribution German DC is providing to implement the MDGs or on the measures being used to this end.

The present study breaks down as follows:

- Chapter 2 goes at more length into the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs and their historical background, looks into the strengths and weaknesses of this international goal system, and discusses the latter's significance for German DC.
- Chapter 3 is devoted to the Millennium process in the MENA countries. It deals with the question of what significance the indicators designed for the MDGs have in the MENA region and what progress the region's countries have made thus far in reaching the MDGs.
- Chapter 4 analyzes, from a more general perspective, the extent to which the MDGs have influenced national development policies and public discourse in the Middle East and North Africa.
- Chapter 5 looks into the orientation of German DC. It asks what contribution Germany is making toward implementing the MDGs in its MENA partner countries, whether and to what extent this contribution is based on preliminary conceptual-analytical considerations, and how well the contribution is referenced and documented.
- Chapter 6 concludes the study with a number of recommendations for the governments of the Middle East and North Africa as well as for German DC.

2 Millennium Declaration and Millennium Development Goals

2.1 Historical background and genesis of the Millennium Declaration

The Millennium Summit is the outcome of a development that entailed an at least partial departure from the so-called Washington Consensus, which dominated the international debate during the 1980s and rested squarely on neoliberal economic theory (Gsänger 1996a; Eberlei 2000). It found expression above all in the stabilization and structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank that provided for consolidation of the current accounts and budgets of indebted developing countries, continuous and noninterventionist monetary and fiscal policies, and structural market reforms (market opening, deregulation, and privatization). Poverty reduction was largely equated with higher economic growth, the assumption being that such growth would, sooner or later, benefit the poor through trickle-down effects (Decker 2003, 488).

In the early 1990s, however, it gradually became apparent that this assumption was, at least in its then current form, not tenable. Indeed, in many developing countries – above all in Africa, but also in Latin America – poverty had even worsened under the SAPs (Decker 2003, 488; Betz 2003, 456). As early as the mid-1980s UNICEF, the UN Children’s Fund, voiced criticism of the high costs exacted by the SAPs and called for “adjustment programs with a human countenance.” This demand was underpinned programmatically by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which, in 1990, released its first Human Development Report (HDR), a counter piece to the World Bank’s World Development Report. The HDR argued that economic growth did by no means automatically come along with social development (e.g. on education and health indicators) (UNDP 2000). The report further noted critically that the development debate was largely dominated by a one-dimensional, purely economic understanding of poverty. Based on the capabilities approach pioneered mainly by Amartya Sen (Sen 1981; Sen 1999), poverty was now defined as multiple deprivation of capabilities, i.e. as a lack of means that are needed to carry out the activities one cherishes and to live a life of self-determination (Lipton / Ravallion 1995).

Overview 2: The decade of world conferences		
Year	Conference	– Most important results
1990	The World Summit on Education for All (Jomtien)	– Agenda Education for All (EFA)
1990	World Summit for Children (New York)	
1992	UN Conference on Environment and Development / “Earth Summit” (Rio de Janeiro)	– Rio Declaration – Agenda 21 – UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – Statement of Forest Principles – UN Convention on Biological Diversity
1993	2nd World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna)	– Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
1994	World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction (Yokohama)	
1994	3rd International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo)	– ICPD Programme of Action
1994	Conference on Small Island Developing States (Barbados)	–
1995	World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen)	– Copenhagen Declaration – Copenhagen Programme of Action
1995	4th World Conference on Women (Peking)	
1996	2nd UN Conference on Human Settlements / “Habitat” (Istanbul)	
1996	World Food Summit (Rom)	– Rome Programme of Action
2000	Millennium Summit (New York)	– Millennium Declaration
2001	World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Durban)	– Durban Declaration and Programme of Action
2001	UN General Assembly (New York)	– “Road Map Towards the Implementation of the Millennium Declaration” (contains the MDGs)
2002	International Conference on Financing for Development (Monterrey)	– Monterrey Consensus: affirmation of the MDGs, PRSP process; enlargement of the HIPC Initiative (1999 Cologne G8 summit); increase of ODA
2002	World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg)	– Enlargement of the MDG agenda to include two more targets concerned with sustainable development
Source: author of the present study		
Note: The column on the right contains only important results that go beyond the issue complex discussed at the conference in question.		

Five groups of capabilities can be distinguished:

- *economic capabilities* (on the basis of income and assets),
- *human capabilities* (health, education, and access to food, water, and habitation),
- *political capabilities* (freedom, voice, influence, power),
- *sociocultural capabilities* (status, dignity, belongingness, cultural identity), and
- *protective capabilities* (protection against risks).

The HDRs, which have been released annually since 1990, seek to measure some of these capabilities with the Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a composite indicator of prosperity that includes, for the population of a given country, per capita income (as the key figure for economic capabilities) and data on levels of education and health (as criteria for human capabilities) (El Masry 2003, 472).

The disappointing balance of development in the 1980s also led to the calling, in the early 1990s, of a number of international conferences in the UN framework that dealt with various aspects of social and ecological development (see Overview 2). The first of these conferences was the 1990 Summit on Education for All in Jomtien (Thailand), which was organized by UNESCO; at it the international community defined a number of educational goals, including an important one calling for access, for all children – girls and boys alike – by the year 2000, to a complete course of primary education. This conference was followed by the World Summit for Children in 1990 in New York and the ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, which adopted four landmark declarations. One conference of particular importance for what was to come was the 1995 Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development. Among other things, the conference adopted a 10-point Declaration on Social Development that later formed the basis of the MDGs.

These world conferences were as such nothing really unprecedented. Earlier decades had also experienced some international conferences that adopted declarations of intent and commitments on various issues. What was new, however, was (i) the large number and close sequencing of the world summits, (ii) the detailed and binding character of the resolutions adopted, and (iii) the high political importance attached to the conferences.

Even though this certainly is due at least in part to the end of the bipolar international system, it also has to do with the dissemination of new information and communications technologies, the ongoing process of globalization, and the sense for networked thinking that the latter development has entailed: In many countries a consciousness had matured that numerous socioeconomic, ecological, and human rights problems are not accessible to national solutions and are in need of international arrangements, and that these problems are marked by a high level of interdependence. One reflection of this is the fact that the declarations and agreements adopted at the world summits take a holistic view of global problems and underline the causal links between them (Gsänger 1996b; Martens 2005; Satterthwaite 2004, 8).

At the end of the decade, there was a large measure of consensus on numerous development-related issues, and it was this that paved the way for the adoption of the Millennium Declaration. In particular, the conferences served to establish a broad consensus on a common goal system as well as on strategic approaches for translating it into practice.

It should be borne in mind here that this goal system is nothing fully new; indeed, it very largely reflects the goals that led, in 1945, to the foundation of the United Nations and that are laid out in the UN Charter. However, the multidimensional goal system of the new development paradigm contrasts in many respects with the one-sided focus of 1980s development policy on economic target dimensions (economic growth, income, containment of inflation). The new consensus was soon to find support among a broad alliance of actors: the UN system, the OECD, and, finally, the IMF and the World Bank.

In 1996, the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) released its report "*Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation*" (Clemens / Kenny / Moss 2004, 5). In it, the DAC took up the central goals defined by the earlier world conferences and proposed a global development partnership geared to achieving these "*ambitious but realisable goals*" (OECD/DAC 1996, 2) by the year 2015. These

so-called International Development Goals² were to be pursued and implemented by each country on its own. The key consideration here was

“qualitative factors in the evolution of more stable, safe, participatory and just societies. These include capacity development for effective, democratic and accountable governance, the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law. We will also continue to address these less easily quantified factors of development.” (OECD/DAC 1996, 2).

In return, the industrialized countries were to offer the developing countries broad and effective support in their efforts to reach the goals: on the one hand by boosting their official development assistance, but on the other hand also by improving the coordination of their development cooperation both among one another and with the orientation and planning activities of the developing countries:

“Effective international support can make a real difference in achieving these goals. This is far from saying that they can be achieved by aid alone. The most important contributions for development, as in the past, will be made by the people and governments of the developing countries themselves. But where this effort is forthcoming it needs and deserves strong support from the industrialised countries. We commit ourselves to do the utmost to help.” (OECD/DAC 1996, 2).

Then, in September 2000, the Millennium Summit adopted the Millennium Declaration. It consists of eight chapters: The first has the character of a preamble, while all others are programmatic in nature. Four chapters are devoted to the themes “Peace, security and disarmament” (Chapter 2), “Development and poverty eradication” (Chapter 3), “Protecting our common environment” (Chapter 4), and “Human rights, democracy and good governance” (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 is concerned with “the vulner-

2 The International Development Goals are: (i) a reduction by one half in the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015; (ii) universal primary education in all countries by 2015; (iii) demonstrated progress toward gender equality and the empowerment of women by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005; (iv) a reduction by two-thirds in the mortality rates for infants and children under age 5; (v) a reduction by three fourths in maternal mortality, all by 2015; (v) access through the primary health-care system to reproductive health services for all individuals of appropriate ages as soon as possible and no later than the year 2015; (vii) the current implementation of national strategies for sustainable development in all countries by 2005, so as to ensure that current trends in the loss of environmental resources are effectively reversed at both global and national levels by 2015.

able” and Chapter 7 with “the special needs of Africa”. Chapter 8 finally addresses the reform of the United Nations (UN 2000a).

In Chapters 3 and 4, the Millennium Declaration takes up the International Development Goals of the OECD/DAC, coming close to citing them. However, because of the massive resistance of the US, one of the International Development Goals (“improved access for all people to reproductive health services”) was not incorporated into the Millennium Declaration. Instead, another goal was added: To combat and halt the spread of HIV/Aids, malaria and other severe diseases (UN 2000a).

In turn, almost all of the MDGs were derived from these two chapters. One reason for this is that most of the goals set out in Chapter 2 (*Peace, security and disarmament*) and Chapter 5 (*Human rights, democracy and good governance*) would be very difficult to operationalize. The latter, for example, includes the calls to combat global drug problems and for all countries to undertake efforts to improve freedom of the press and to curtail trade in small arms. Another reason was the expected opposition by many governments against a codification of these rather political goals.

In 2002, the MDGs were for the first time affirmed by both the International Conference on Financing for Development (Monterrey, Mexico) and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg). Furthermore, MDG7 was enlarged to include two targets and several indicators (Bundesregierung 2004, 20; BMZ 2004i; Radke 2002). In September 2005, all UN member states stressed once more

“our determination to ensure the timely and full realization of the development goals and objectives agreed at the major United Nations conferences and summits, including those agreed at the Millennium Summit that are described as the Millennium Development Goals, which have helped to galvanize efforts towards poverty eradication.”
(UN 2005b).

2.2 Significance of the Millennium Declaration

The Millennium Summit and the world conferences of the 1990s have vitally shaped the course of the international development debate. They have led to a paradigm shift that may be outlined here in five keywords:

New development consensus: In the course of the 1990s, a certain rapprochement came about between the basic positions of the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) and the UN system. This paved the way for a new development consensus, which is sometimes called the “post-Washington consensus”. The Millennium Declaration and the MDGs address the need to reduce poverty – labeled as an “unacceptable, global problem” – in all its dimensions as the objective of the new consensus.

Sustainable human development instead of a one-sided focus on economic growth: One characteristic feature of the new development consensus is its comprehensive concept of poverty, which includes the poor’s lack of human capital (education, health), political rights (participation, civil rights, transparency of administrative and judiciary systems, etc.), and possibilities to manage risks (social protection). The consensus furthermore attaches greater importance than past conventions to the sustainability of development in its ecological, social, and economic dimensions. Accordingly, since the mid-1990s national and international development strategies have focused increasingly on the promotion of democracy and good governance, building and further development of systems of social protection, and improving environmental and resource protection, without losing sight of the need for participation and gender mainstreaming. A liberal economic system geared to competition and equal opportunity continues to be seen as a central precondition for development and poverty reduction, although it is at the same time also emphasized that, if they are to be sustained, competition and equal opportunity may often require targeted government intervention.

Outcome orientation: Development policy and development cooperation are expected to be geared to and measurable in terms of the common goal of poverty reduction – as are all other external policies of the industrialized countries. The main concern here is not what inputs are provided by individual actors but what impacts these inputs achieve altogether. To measure the impacts, the MDGs can be used as indicators (Radele 2004).

Coherence: In view of the scarcity of the resources available to it, DC must, if it is to generate the maximum possible impacts, be coherent, i.e. all relevant actors must join forces and subordinate their activities to the common goal system. This involves three different dimensions: *First*, donor DC must be coherent with other external policies. DC should, for ex-

ample, not be allowed to be counteracted by donor trade or agricultural policies harmful to the developing countries. *Second*, DC must be designed in such a way as to support partner-country policies, although DC should be provided only in cases in which partners are unable to meet, on their own, these goals which they themselves have formulated (principle of subsidiarity). *Third*, donors should not compete with one another for prestigious projects and should instead undertake whatever efforts are necessary to coordinate and harmonize their DC with partner countries (Ashoff 2002; Ashoff 2004; Fues 2005).

Global partnership for development: The industrialized and developing countries bear joint responsibility for reaching the MDGs. At the national level, the focus is on the responsibility of every individual developing country, and each such country must do its utmost to ensure that MDGs 1-7 are achieved. Donors should provide only support for these efforts. This is why the developing countries are expected to define, in a participatory process, their own development priorities and approaches and set out them out in PRSPs or other national development plans. The donors should, for their part, concentrate on providing support for the implementation of these plans. The aim here is to free developing countries from their dependence on DC and to assign more responsibility to their political decision-makers. On the other hand, it is the economically dominant industrialized countries that are chiefly responsible for MDG8 – shaping a global framework conducive to development (Baulch 2004; Bundesregierung 2004; Radke 2002; Wolff 2004).

2.3 Evaluation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

While the MDGs do offer major chances, they also entail risks. If these risks are to be avoided, it is essential to approach the MDGs more as a frame of reference than as a rigid corset, and it is also important to bear in mind that the goals do not map depict all dimensions of development. The risks involved here include in particular the following:

A too narrow concept of development: The Millennium Declaration springs from a highly comprehensive view of development, based on a concept of poverty that also includes nonmaterial aspects. Yet these aspects are not depicted adequately by the MDGs. None of the MDG indica-

tors measure political deprivation (lack of human and civil rights, means of participation, rule of law, or administrative transparency), social deprivation (marginalization of social groups, insufficient cohesion and unifying forces in society), or vulnerability (lack of social protection). In other words, it is important to look at the MDGs against the background of the Millennium Declaration; otherwise it would be possible to lose sight of some very important targets included in the Millennium Declaration but in the MDG agenda such as e.g. democratization and good governance or the strengthening of the protective capabilities of low-income groups (Hermle 2005; Martens 2005; Maxwell 2005; Satterthwaite 2003; UN 2005).

Quantity at the expense of quality: What can be said in general of indicators that are easy to measure applies for the MDGs as well: They lend themselves to measuring quantitative aspects of development, not qualitative aspects. This may, for instance, mean that while efforts that are undertaken to improve school enrolment ratios are successful, the quality of education is neglected. It is therefore important not to lose sight of potential non-quantifiable deficits (Martens 2005; Satterthwaite 2004, 9).

Optimizing inputs at the expense of efficiency: Even though the MDGs are an instruments well suited to establishing a more marked outcome orientation in development policy, the ongoing international debate about the MDGs is rather focused on inputs. Numerous academic studies are concerned with the issue of how far official development assistance (ODA) will have to be increased if the MDGs are to be reached by 2015. These studies focus e.g. on how many schools will have to be built and how many additional teachers to be employed if all boys and girls are to be able to attend a full course of primary schooling. Many of the studies fail to note that implementing the MDGs hinges not only on more ODA but also on a more efficient use of the available funds, the absorptive capacity of the developing countries, the administrative and organizational capacities of their institutions, and, not least, greater efficiency and transparency in the system of DC itself. In fact, increasing ODA may not even be the most important of these factors (Baulch 2004; Clemens / Kenny / Moss 2003, 4; Fues 2005; Satterthwaite 2004, 12; Wolff 2004).

Neglect of the process dimension: Another much-discussed topic is what countries are likely to reach the MDGs and which are not. It would, however, be far more important to ask why certain countries are unlikely to

reach the MDGs and what measures might be taken to correct the situation (Maxwell 2005; Radele 2004).

Short-term planning is closely associated with another problem. If individual countries fully gear their efforts to reaching the MDGs by 2015, come what may, the danger is that the success they meet with may not prove sustainable. To cite an example, fixation on the year 2015 may induce developing countries to hire more teachers, and to pay their salaries with ODA funds, in order to raise school enrolment rates. Even if the strategy proves successful, the success will not be sustainable because it is not based on structural change. And finally, who is to pay the newly hired teachers when the year 2015 has come and gone? It is, in other words, more important for developing countries to make progress on the MDGs, and, at the same time, not lose sight of the need to ensure sustainability from the very start.

Insufficient underpinning for the idea of sustainability: One development that generally deserves to be criticized is that the idea of sustainability, which, in a difficult process, earned its place on the international agenda during the 1990s, and has now found expression in the Millennium Declaration, has been shunted into the background of the MDG agenda. While it is true that the MDG agenda also includes environmental targets, these range toward the end of the list under MDG7, and, viewed purely in terms of the number of targets involved, they tend to be overshadowed by the economic and social targets (Martens 2005).

Furthermore, environmental and resource protection is only one component of sustainable development. It is at least equally important to ensure that the idea of sustainability, with all its ecological and economic aspects, is firmly entrenched as an action-guiding (i.e. cross-cutting) principle in all fields of development policy. What this means is that – put in simple terms – when any and all measures are being planned, it is essential to factor in the longer-term (positive and negative) impacts (Hermle 2005).

Neglect of multicausalities: Another risk is that the MDGs may be regarded in isolation, with measures designed to implement them being taken only in the most obvious sectors. One of the great merits of the world conferences of the 1990s was of course that they pointed to the interdependencies between income poverty, education, health, environmental protection, etc. and placed emphasis on cross-cutting issues.

Concentrating on individual MDGs may, for instance, lead decision-makers to equate the implementation of MDG4 (reduction of maternal mortality rates) with a need for measures in the health sector (Wolff 2004). But empirical studies show that health indicators depend less on supply-side than on demand-side factors. It has turned out quite often that building healthcare stations and hiring new medical personnel does not lead to the intended results. No use has been made of the additional capacities because the target group is not properly aware of the need for preventive healthcare (especially prenatal/natal and for newborn children) (Clemens / Kenny / Moss 2003, 12 ff.). It is simply not possible to use health-policy instruments to influence this awareness. Indeed, this awareness correlates far better with household prosperity and maternal educational level. Implementation of the MDGs 4–6 may therefore be said to hinge in large measure on progress made on MDGs 1, 2, 3, and 7.

Unrealistic expectations: The ongoing discussion on what conditions must be given if the MDGs are to be reached and how much additional funding will be required involves the risk that the Millennium process awakens unrealistic expectations. Numerous developing countries – especially in sub-Saharan Africa – will probably not reach all of the MDGs, regardless of how much ODA flows are increased. The experiences of the past indicate that, in the social sectors in particular, development is a protracted and complex process that hinges more on structural reforms than on the amount of financial resources available. Setting concrete goals is a good idea in that it serves to boost the motivation and commitment of relevant actors. If, however, there is a widespread belief that all of these goals can actually be reached everywhere in the world, this may entail serious consequences. If it turns out in 2015 that the goals have not been reached, DC will suffer another credibility setback, and extensive frustration is likely to be the result. The citizens of donor countries will have even less understanding for the fact than they do at present for the fact that their governments are spending tax revenues for development-related purposes (Clemens / Kenny / Moss 2003, 1 f.).

Undifferentiated assessment: In addition, any failure to reach the MDGs may have undesirable impacts in developing countries as well. The main reason for this is that the MDGs specify the same percentage targets for all countries. However, countries in which over half of the population is living in absolute poverty are in any case faced with far greater difficulties in

halving this percentage than countries in which ‘only’ one in ten of the population is forced to live on less than one US\$ per day. The reason why this constitutes a problem is that development-minded governments that have made some successes, but without reaching the MDGs, may find themselves delegitimized (Clemens / Kenny / Moss 2003, 31; Satterthwaite 2003).

Planning and evaluation conducted on the basis of incomplete or irrelevant data: Finally, there is also a risk that the determination of whether or not a country has reached to MDGs will be based solely on the indicators defined for the purpose. This would be problematic in several respects:

- Some indicators are not equally viable for all countries. For example, the MENA region has not had one major forest in the last centuries. This means that Indicator 25 of the MDG agenda is largely irrelevant for the region.
- Also, the MDG indicators measure outcome at entirely different levels. For MDGs 4–6 impact indicators have been defined (including child and maternal mortality rates) that in fact reveal much about the population’s health status. Other indicators, however, including e.g. school enrolment rates and completion rates – measure outputs. They do not provide any information on outcomes because they do not measure the actual quality of education. And they certainly cannot be used to determine the impacts of education, which may consist, inter alia, in better employment and earnings potentials, in the fact that school graduates are better able to exercise their rights and thus lead more self-determined lives, or in the fact that education as such may be seen as important for a fulfilled life. Finally, some of the environmental indicators are pure input factors, e.g. the proportion of land set aside as conservation areas or nature reserves.
- Also, the data used for some indicators are very fragmentary. For the base year, 1990, which is the reference year for most of the targets, numerous data are missing for the indicators of MDG 1, 5, 6, and 7.

All of these risks are manageable. But this of course presupposes awareness about them. Whether the effects on global development generated by the agenda turn out to be exclusively positive or in part negative as well will depend above all on how the agenda is interpreted by the international community in the years to come:

“The MDGs might be better viewed not as realistic targets but as reminders of the stark contrast between the world we want and the world we have, and a call to redouble our search for interventions to close the gap.” (Clemens / Kenny / Moss 2003, 1).

It is, though, absolutely essential not to waste the major opportunities afforded by a goal system which has been recognized and welcomed by all relevant actors:

Uniform frame of reference: The MDGs provide, for the first time ever, a common goal system for all actors in development policy, one that has been agreed on by developing countries, donor countries, and international organizations alike and is thus well suited as the basis of a global partnership for development. All of the actors involved are now able to key their efforts and contributions to this goal system, and in this way to improve their coordination. This not only makes it possible to concentrate forces, it also sets the stage for greater continuity in international development policy – at least up to 2015 (BMZ 2004i).

Outcome orientation: Furthermore, a good chance exists that DC may now opt for a more pronounced outcome orientation. Viewed against the background of the MDGs, what contributions (inputs) are provided by individual donors is a matter of secondary importance. The crucial factor is the impacts achieved by all relevant actors working together (Maxwell 2005; Radele 2004; UNDP 2004b).

Mobilization of energies and resources: Finally, the commitments undertaken by the international community at the Millennium Summit can serve to encourage and motivate all relevant actors in developing countries – governments, civil society, the private sector and donors – to mobilize additional resources and redouble their efforts to make progress toward reaching the goals (Vandemoortele 2004a). Between 2000 and 2003 the overall ODA provided worldwide rose already by almost 10 % per annum from US\$ 52 to US\$ 69 billion in constant prices (Herfkens 2005).

2.4 The Millennium process

The fact that the Millennium Declaration is seen as having a new quality different from that of previous declarations and commitments becomes clear, for instance, when we look at the degree to which the follow-up

process has been institutionalized. The UN system has e.g. developed a highly diversified set of instruments designed to advance the Millennium process at the global and national level: to heighten awareness of the MDGs among political decision-makers and the public, to set in train a discussion on the implementation of the MDGs, to measure how much progress has been made, and to identify possible obstacles.

At the international level there are four principle instruments are being used to promote and support the Millennium process:

- the annual report of the UN Secretary-General on the state of implementation of the MDGs;
- the Millennium Campaign, an organizational unit headed by Eveline Herfkens and dedicated to raising awareness for the MDGs; and
- the Millennium Project, a working group made up of scientists and experts and headed by Jeffery Sachs; the project, which reports directly to the Secretary-General, has the task of acquiring and processing data on best practices suited to implementing the MDGs as well as information on the experiences made by selected countries.

At the national level the country MDG reports are the central instruments used to make the MDGs known, to raise awareness for them, to urge politicians to work to implement them, to monitor the present state of implementation, to identify deficits, and to come up with approaches to overcoming such deficits: Like PRSPs, national MDG reports are expected to be developed at regular intervals (ideally once a year) by the governments of all UN member countries in participatory processes which involve civil society and the private sector, assign tasks to all relevant actors, and critically review the engagement shown thus far by these actors.

In the national context the MDG country reports are well suited to

- creating awareness for the MDGs;
- establishing consensus on (i) appropriate indicators to measure progress in implementing the MDGs and (ii) action-guiding principles for aligning national policies and projects to the MDG agenda;
- securing for the MDGs an ownership that is sustained by national governments, but also civil society and the private sector;
- mobilizing, at home and abroad, *additional resources*;

- creating crosslinks to other conceptual strategy papers like e.g. PRSPs or national development plans; and
- providing support for the monitoring of the Millennium process (Vandemoortele 2004b).

2.5 Implications for German development cooperation

In its Programme of Action 2015, a national strategy paper prepared in 2001, Germany reaffirmed, as one of the first donor countries, the commitments it had made nine months earlier at the Millennium Summit (BMZ 2001a). The program was adopted not only by the BMZ but by the German government as a whole, and it is therefore binding for all of Germany's ministries and external policies (Bundesregierung 2004, 1).

The greatest challenge for the immediate future will be to anchor the spirit of the Millennium Declaration and the Programme of Action 2015 at all levels of German policy and to provide for *more coherence between development policy and other external policies*, including security policy, trade policy, environmental policy, and agricultural policy. These policy fields are also expected to contribute to reducing global poverty and implementing the MDGs (Ashoff 2002; Gsänger 2002; BMZ 2004i; BMZ 2005a; Bundesregierung 2004).

Above and beyond this, the MDG agenda has three central implications:

Poverty focus of DC: The priorities, approaches, and instruments of German DC must be reviewed with a view to their relevance for the MDGs. There is no need for the donor countries to align all of their DC to the MDGs. Nor are they expected to provide a contribution to each and every MDG. But they should be able to demonstrate that they are, in one way or another, supporting the Millennium process in each of their partner countries, and thereby contributing to the ultimate goal of overall poverty eradication.

Effectiveness of DC: The MDGs are forcing donors to pay more heed to the effectiveness of their DC. First, even in the planning phase the donors are, in this sense, forced to optimize the inputs they provide. Second, they will have to develop evaluation systems to keep track of the impacts of their DC. Third, they have to optimize their contributions to MDG8, for

which they bear the main responsibility – by, inter alia, increasing their ODA and by taking action on trade liberalization and debt relief.

Alignment and donor coordination in DC: Finally, the need for a more efficient use of resources also implies that donors must more closely align their activities to both partner priorities and their own comparative strengths. Their planning should be based on the development priorities of partner countries, which means in effect that they should support developing countries in fields which the latter themselves regard as priorities, even though they may be unable to make headway in them without outside support (principle of subsidiarity). Furthermore, the donors must step up their efforts to improve the harmonization of their own DC measures and to coordinate them in such a way as to ensure that every donor takes on tasks in which it has comparative strengths (Ashoff 2004; BMZ 2004i; BMZ 2005a; Bundesregierung 2004; Fues 2005; Gsänger 2002; Radke 2002; Wolff 2004).

3 State of the Millennium process in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa

Compared with other world regions, the MENA countries have, on average, made sufficient progress only on a limited number of MDGs – at least if it is taken into consideration that most of them are middle-income countries, while South and Southeast Asia as well as sub-Saharan Africa is dominated by low-income countries.

The MENA countries are faced with particular problems in implementing MDG1 and MDG7. In this respect the region does not differ substantially from other parts of the world. Excepting East Asia and the Pacific region (and possibly South Asia), these two goals may not be reached in any developing region (see Overview 3).

In addition to this, however, the MENA countries have also made insufficient progress on MDG2 and on some of the targets of MDG8 (especially on good governance, the reduction of youth unemployment and the population's access to information and communications technologies). Other world regions have made much more progress on these goals.

Since 1990, only a few countries in the MENA region have succeeded in appreciably reducing the proportion of their populations affected by in-

come poverty and hunger. In some countries, poverty has even further spread. Nor has there been sufficient progress on efforts to increase school-enrolment and literacy rates. Many countries of the region still lack modern technologies, and all MENA countries are far from reaching the goal of environmental sustainability (MDG7) as well as from achieving the goal of good economic and political governance (MDG8).

At the same time, however, the countries of the region have made good progress in implementing MDG3. As in other regions – excepting sub-Saharan Africa – nearly all MENA countries have succeeded in raising school enrolment ratios for girls, in this way reducing the gap between the educational chances of girls and boys – although this development has not yet found expression in improved vocational, political, and legal equality for women in the region.

The MENA countries have also made some progress in the field of public health. Many of them have succeeded in appreciably reducing infant, child, and maternal mortality rates, which means that they are likely to reach MDG4 and MDG5. Only for the three low-come countries in the region, Mauritania, Sudan, and Yemen, are there reasons to fear that these two goals may not be reached by 2015.

At present not much can be said about MDG6, since there are no reliable data available on the number of persons who have been infected or have come down with HIV/Aids. One reason for this is that a taboo continues to hang over this immune-deficiency disease. All in all, the prevalence of HIV/Aids is likely to be lower than in other parts of the world, but the number of new infections has risen considerably during the last few years.

One country in the region has proved particularly successful with regard to the MDGs: Tunisia is more than likely to reach at least six of the eight goals. It has encountered some difficulties in implementing MDG5 and MDG7 – although its main problem is meeting the good-governance target in MDG8. As far as human rights, freedom of the press, and the participation of the population in political decision-making are concerned, the situation in Tunisia has even deteriorated since 1990.

Overview 3: State of MDG implementation in the Middle East and North Africa compared with other world regions									
World region	MDG1		MDG2	MDG3		MDG4	MDG7		MDG8
	Income poverty	Hunger	School enrolment	Gender equality in education	Gender equality on the labor market	Child mortality	Access to safe drinking water	Access to sanitation	Good governance
MENA	-	-	-	+	-	+	0	+	-
EAP	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	0	+
EECS	-	n.a.	+	+	0	-	+	n.a.	+
LAC	-	0	+	+	+	+	0	0	+
SA	+	-	-	0	-	0	+	0	0
SSA	-	-	-	n.a.	0	-	-	-	+

Notes:

The data available for MDG5, MDG6, MDG7 /Target 9 and most of the targets for MDG8 are not adequate.

MENA Middle East and North Africa
 EAP: East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific
 EECA: Eastern Europe and Central Asia
 LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean
 SA: South Asia
 SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa

+ Region will reach MDG if the trends from 1990-2001 continue. *For MDG8*: Average Freedom House Index ranking has improved for the countries of the region.

0 Region can reach MDG if it intensifies its efforts. *For MDG8*: Average Freedom House Index ranking is stagnant.

- Region unlikely to reach MDG, since it will prove very difficult to improve appreciably on the 1990-2001 trend. *For MDG8*: Average Freedom House Index rating has deteriorated.

Source: *For MDG1-7*: BMZ (2004m); ESCWA (2005); UNDP (2003a); World Bank (2004e).
For MDG8: see Figure 21

The situation is similar for Egypt, Libya, Qatar, and Kuwait, each of which is very likely to reach four, possibly seven, of the eight MDGs. All four countries have their main deficits in good governance (MDG8).

Major problems in implementing the MDGs have been noted for Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco (MDG8, but also MDG1), Bahrain (especially with respect to MDG2, and MDG8), and the Palestinian Territories (MDG1, MDG7, and MDG8).

Iran, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Oman are faced with even greater difficulties in reaching most of the MDGs by 2015 (see Table A1, Annex).

The prospects of the region's three low-income countries, Yemen, Sudan, and Mauritania, are particularly poor. The way it looks at the moment, Iraq and Yemen are likely to miss all eight goals, and Mauritania and Sudan are not expected to reach more than one or two of the eight MDGs (Mauritania probably MDG3 and conceivably MDG8, Sudan possibly MDG1 and MDG3).

These findings will be discussed in more detail in the following sections, which address all eight MDGs in turn. The statistical data cited stem nearly exclusively from international organizations such as UNDP, the World Bank, the WHO, and UNESCO. Only in a very limited number of cases use has also been made of the data given by the national MDG reports. In very many cases, these data diverge sharply from the figures cited by the international organizations. The data presented by the World Bank, UNDP, and UNESCO are by no means always in agreement, which goes above all for the indicators used for MDG2, MDG5, and MDG7, but the international organizations are at least at pains to cite only data that are based on similar standards (definitions, classification criteria, and survey methods). In other words, these data on different countries are more useful for purposes of comparison. Another striking fact here is that the data presented in national MDG reports show, almost invariably, positive deviations from the statistics published by the international organizations. This would seem to indicate that many governments in the Middle East and North Africa have succumbed to the temptation to use their MDG reports to brighten up the situations in their countries.

3.1 Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger (MDG1)

Most of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa will not reach MDG1 if they do not undertake substantial additional efforts in the coming years. While it is true that the percentage of the population that is affected by hunger or lives on less than 1 US\$ per day is lower here than in other regions of the world, since 1990 the relevant average regional figures have not declined, indeed they have risen.

Income poverty

In 1990 only 2.1 % of all people in the MENA region had incomes lower than 1 US\$ per day in purchasing power parities (PPP). This percentage was lower than in all other parts of the developing world, which led UNDP to conclude, in its 2003 HDR, that the MENA region had already reached Target 1 (to halve income poverty) of the MDGs (UNDP 2003a, 33).

But implementation of the MDGs also depends on trends, and the trend for the percentage share of income poverty among the population of the Middle East and North Africa has not declined. Instead, between 1990 and 2001 the figure even rose slightly to 2.2 %. The respective share of income-poor people in 2001 was 3 % in Egypt, 7 % in Lebanon, 2 % in Morocco, 46 % in Mauritania, and 4 % in Jordan. There are no recent data available for the other countries of the region (see Table A2, Annex).

Furthermore, the one-dollar indicator is appropriate only in a limited sense for the MENA region (ESCWA 2005). *First*, most countries in the region are middle- and low-income countries whose wage and price levels are so high that people there cannot, even over the short term, live from 1 US\$ per day (Martens 2005). The practice of converting sums of money into PPPs does not do full justice to this state of affairs. Conversion is based on a market basket reflecting the composition of a country's gross national product. A market basket of this kind may reflect the consumption patterns of the average citizen, but the corresponding basket of poorer households is made up quite differently. Poor households mainly consume staple foods and other essential goods (Bhalla 2004; Pogge / Reddy 2003a; Pogge / Reddy 2003b; Satterthwaite 2003; Zapado 2003). *Second*, several MENA countries have oil resources and are thus able to sell gasoline, heating oil, and other oil derivatives at low prices. These play a substantial role in calculating PPPs; and when 1 US\$ is converted into a national currency, this


in turn results in very low figures indicating that only a very low percentage of the population is living in absolute poverty. The problem here is that very poor households neither need gasoline (because they are without cars) nor purchase heating oil or gas (because they cannot afford to heat with gas or oil).

In a certain sense, every poverty line is arbitrary. This is illustrated by the fact that the incomes of many people in the MENA region are only slightly below or slightly above the one-dollar-per-day-line, and many are slightly above the line in one year and below it in the next. Replacing the one-dollar-line with a two-dollar-line would therefore make one little sense. It would appear more reasonable to use national poverty lines for identifying poverty trends. These national lines are as a rule based on empirical studies that indicate what income a national in fact needs to secure his or her survival over the short or long term (Fair 2003; OECD/DAC 1998).

The drawback of national poverty lines is that it is not possible to calculate average regional data based on them. Furthermore, while there are data available for far more countries of the region indicating figures for income poverty based on national criteria rather than on the one-dollar criterion, this is, unfortunately, not the case for all countries of the region.

Still, based on the data available, we can state that the problem of income poverty has shown an upward trend in the region. This is especially true for Yemen, where national criteria indicate that in 1990 roughly 30 % of the population were living in absolute income-poverty, and 42 % in 2000. But the figures for other countries are also noteworthy: In Algeria the share of income-poor by national criteria has risen from 12 % (1987) to 15 % (2000), in Iraq from 30 % (1987) to 45 % (2000), in Morocco from 17 % (1990) to 19 % (2000), and in the Palestinian Territories from 19 % (1995) to 46 % (2000). The only countries in which, according to the figures available, the share has declined are Egypt (1990: 25 %, 2000: 20 %), Iran (1990: 26 %, 2000: 21 %), Mauritania (1995: 50 %, 2000: 46 %), and Tunisia (1990: 7 %, 2000: 4 %). The data available for the other countries in the region are either inadequate or unreliable (see Table A2, Annex).


Figure 1 shows that of all the countries, for which we have reliable data, only Tunisia is making headway towards reaching Target 1 of MDG1. Between 1990 and 2000, it was able to cut nearly by half the percentage of its income-poor. Egypt and Jordan might also reach Target 1.



Most of the MENA countries, however, will not reach this target if they do not succeed in reversing present trends (ESCWA 2005). This goes in particular for Algeria, Yemen, Iraq, Oman, and Mauritania, which have been classified by UNDP as ‘high-priority countries’ with regard to MDG1 – Algeria, Yemen, Iraq, and Oman because they have as yet made no progress at all in reducing income poverty, and Mauritania because income poverty is so widespread in the country that it will be as good as impossible to further step up efforts to reduce it (UNDP 2003a, 43 and 53).

3 This and the following figures show – for reasons of clarity – only relative changes: The initial level has been normalized to 0. This is problematic in the way that the diagrams do not show what absolute changes have occurred and how large the differences are between the absolute base values for the individual countries. Still, this form of presentation is justified in that the MDGs themselves refer to relative changes.

**Figure 2: Trends in the implementation of MDG1 / Target 2
(Halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger)**



Source: Designed by the author on the basis of data in Table A3, Annex

Note: Countries for which the available data are either markedly contradictory or unreliable are omitted.

But the situation is also critical in the Palestinian Territories, where the percentage of the population affected by income poverty has more than doubled since 1995 – largely because of Israel’s policy of occupation and border closures. It would be possible to reverse this trend, but only if Israel withdraws from the Palestinian Territories, opens their external borders for the movement of goods and capital, and issues Israeli work permits for as many Palestinians as possible – at least during a transitional period.

Hunger

As to Target 2 of MDG1, the situation in the MENA countries is even worse: On average, the percentage of people that suffer from quantitative malnutrition has risen from 6.8 to 8.5 % (see Figure 2). One exception is Tunisia, which has already succeeded in halving the proportion of its un-


dernourished population. Egypt and Syria could also succeed in reaching this target until 2015 (see Table A1, Annex). In Egypt, for example, the proportion of people suffering from hunger has declined from 5 to 4 % between 1990 and 2001.

At the same time, however, at least seven countries in the region are unlikely to achieve Target 2 of MDG1. Two of them – Yemen and Iraq – have even been categorized by UNDP as “top-priority countries” because they have made hardly any progress since 1990 in eradicating hunger (UNDP 2003a, 43). Indeed, the proportion of undernourished families in Yemen has declined only slightly from 36 % in 1990 to 33 % in 2001, while it has risen sharply in Iraq from 7 % (1990) to 27 % (2001). Likewise, the indicator has deteriorated in Jordan (from 4 to 6 %), Iran (from 4 to 5 %), Algeria (from 5 to 6 %), Lebanon (from 2.5 to 3.0 %), and Morocco (from 6.5 to 7.0 %), while it has slightly improved in Mauritania (from 14 to 12 %) and in Sudan (from 31 to 21 %).

Nor has the region fared much better on the other official indicator for Target 2, the prevalence of underweight among children under five years of age (see Table A3, Annex). Between 1990 and 2001, this figure has declined in Egypt (from 10 to 4 %), in Tunisia (from 10 to 4 %, as well), and in Algeria (from 10 to 6 %), but also in Mauritania (from 48 to 32 % and in Sudan (from 34 to 11 %). In some countries, however, it has risen very sharply – e.g. in Iraq from 12 to 16 % and in Yemen from 30 to 46 % – which means that it is likely that the average figure for the whole region has risen as well (UNDP 2003b).

3.2 Achieving universal primary education (MDG2)

Since 1990, the MENA region as a whole has not made enough progress with respect to educational levels. Many children have never attended a primary school, so that, assuming that present trends continue, the region as a whole will fail to reach MDG2. In addition, the education provided by schools in the region is of poor quality and therefore of only limited use for their graduates. Since 1990, only South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa have made less progress on MDG2 than the MENA countries.



School enrolment and literacy

Six countries in the MENA region have good chances of reaching MDG2 by 2015. Their school enrolment rates rose substantially between 1990 and 2001 and have now reached levels of over 90 %: the Palestinian Territories (88 %), Tunisia (98 %) Algeria (97 %), Qatar (95 %), Jordan (94 %), and Egypt (92 %). Syria does also have a net primary-school enrolment rate of 96 %, but the country has made no progress on this indicator since 1990 (see Figure 3).


Morocco, Kuwait and Yemen have also achieved considerable progress with respect to MDG 2: The primary-school enrolment rate has risen from 58 to 75 % in Morocco, from 45 to 66 % in Kuwait, and from 53 to 67 % in Yemen. In view of the persistently low rates in these countries, however, there is reason to fear that they will not be able to maintain their present pace until 2015.

Generally, it should be borne in mind here that political interventions may not be able to do much to improve school enrolment rates. Comparative time-series analyses conducted by Clemens, Kenny, and Moss (2004, 15f.) indicate that, starting from a given point of time, school enrolment rates throughout the world move within a relatively narrow, seemingly naturally given corridor (see Figure 4). Regardless of the year in which this development commences, school enrolment rates start rising very slowly, when the first public schools are opened, in order then to accelerate over the course of time. The development slows down again after a period of 100 to 150 years, when more than 50 % of the children attend school regularly, and it entirely loses steam when the goal of 100 % school enrolment has almost been achieved. The last 5 to 10 % of children not yet enrolled in school are the most difficult to integrate into a school system. In other words, it may take years or even decades to close the gap between the day on which the enrolment rate has reached a threshold of 90 or 95 % and the day on which MDG2 has been fully attained. Many countries can thus be seen as having made excellent progress if at least 95 % of all primary-school-age children are regularly attending school in 2015.

A total of seven MENA countries will in all likelihood fail to reach MDG2. This goes in particular for Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where primary-school enrolment rates declined between 1990 and 2001 from 97 to 75 % and from 94 to 78 % respectively, but also for Sudan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, where, during the same period, primary-school enrolment rates stagnated at around 45 % (Sudan), 65 % (Oman), and 58 % (Saudi Arabia). As reported above, Yemen and Kuwait are also unlikely to reach MDG2. On the other hand, Morocco, Bahrain, and Syria still have a chance to reach the goal, if but only if they undertake substantial additional efforts (see Tables A1 and A4. Annex).

This situation is similar for preschool and secondary-school enrolment rates. Only in a limited number of MENA countries are these rates rising at the rates that would be required to reach MDG2. This is the case above all for Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE. In Syria and Bahrain, on the other hand, secondary-school enrolment rates have declined, as have preschool enrolment rates in Iran, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia (see Table A4, Annex). For a good number of MENA countries, data are not available.

Figure 4: Comparative time-series analysis of school enrolment rates in different countries



Note: The year in which the countries under consideration reached a school enrolment rate of 50 % was normalized to 0.

Source: Clemens / Kenny / Moss (2004, 16), Figure 1

One indicator for the efficiency of a school system is the primary-school completion rate. It covers the proportion of students who start grade one and finish school after about six years with a formal certificate. This proportion is relatively high in Egypt, Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, Tunisia, and the UAE – an indication that these countries' primary schools are in a position to teach their students the required curricula. The primary-school completion rates of Morocco and Yemen are distinctly lower, although these countries have succeeded since 1990 in increasing their respective rates appreciably – Morocco from 75 to 84 % and Yemen from 65 to 86 %. If this trend continues, both countries will reach figures of over 95 % in 2015 for both targets. The picture is different in Syria, Mauritania, and Sudan, where primary-school completion rates declined, in some cases appreciably, between 1990 and 2001 (in Syria from 94 to 92 %, but in Mauritania from 75 to 61 %; see Table A4, Annex).

Illiteracy rates have declined in all MENA countries. At present, the figure for Jordan is below 10 %, and the corresponding figures for Bahrain, Iran, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the UAE are below 25 %. On the other hand, over half the population of Iraq, Yemen, and Mauritania can still neither read nor write (see Table A4, Annex), and the illiteracy rate for the MENA region as a whole is distinctly higher than the average for all developing countries (UNDP / AFESD 2002, 52).

It is, however, more informative to look at the development of the illiteracy rate for youths and young adults, who were at primary-school age only a number of years ago. If the present trends continue, nearly all 15- to 20 year-olds (i.e. at least 95 %) in at least 14 countries of the region will be completely literate by the target date. While this is also possible for Egypt, it is unlikely for Iraq, Morocco, Yemen, Mauritania, and Sudan (see Table A4, Annex).

Quality of schooling

It must be noted here that the qualitative shortcomings of formal education in the Middle East and North Africa are even more serious than the deficits found for the purely quantitative education indicators discussed to this point. These shortcomings are of course far more difficult to identify. Still, there is sufficient evidence that the education provided in the region's public schools is not of especially high quality, even by comparison with other developing countries. This has been pointed out by the three Arab Human Development Reports that have appeared to date (UNDP / AFESD 2002; UNDP /AFESD 2003; UNDP /AFESD 2004). The MENA countries have given clear-cut priority to expanding their educational systems instead of improving their quality / UNDP /AFESD 2003 (Lloyd et al. 2003; Weiss 2004b, 6).

In 1995 Kuwait was the only Arab country to participate in the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TRIMSS): The study tested the mathematics and science skills of students at the end of their primary education (grade eight). Even though Kuwait's educational system is relatively good by regional comparison, it came in on place 39 only within a field of 42 participants. Out of 1000 possible points, the average Kuwaiti student received just 292 in mathematics and 430 in science. The international average was 513 points in mathematics and 516 points in science.

Students in Singapore (which ranked place one) earned 643 points for mathematics and 607 points for science (UNDP / AFESD 2003, 55).

Three other Arab countries – Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco – participated in the TRIMSS follow-up study, which was conducted in 1996. In mathematics they ranked as follows: Tunisia 29th (448 points), Jordan 32nd (428 points), and Morocco 37th (337 points). Singapore came in first once more with 604 points, and South Africa last with 275 points. The ranking was similar for sciences, except that in this case Taiwan placed first (*ibid.*).

Nor would Arab secondary-school and university students be likely to fare better on comparable studies. This may be inferred from a study of some 2000 masters theses submitted at different Lebanese universities. By regional comparison, Lebanese universities are regarded as relatively good. Still, only 16 % of these theses were in line with international standards. Most of them were not independent research, and instead of coming up with new findings, they tended more to reiterate established doctrines (Gardiner 2002; Weiss 2004a, 87).

Another indicator for the quality of education is the student-teacher ratio. In eight MENA countries (Algeria, Iraq, Yemen, Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, the Palestinian Territories, and Sudan) the ratio is over 25 primary-school students per teacher; in Mauritania the figure is as high as 45. Only the Gulf states and Libya do well in this regard. In Libya, for instance, a primary-school teacher is responsible for only eight students. The corresponding figure for the OECD countries ranges between 10 and 15. We find a similar picture for other school levels as well (see Table A4, Annex).

One important reflection of the inadequate quality of education in the Middle East and North Africa is the fact that students cannot do much with what they have learned (Gardener 2003). Education does little to improve the employment chances of workforce entrants, and this, in the end, translates out into large numbers of unemployed graduates (the issue will be discussed in more detail below, under MDG8). The region suffers from a serious lack of engineers and scientists and a plethora of graduates in the humanities and cultural sciences. In addition, they lack skilled workers with practice-oriented training (UNDP / AFESD 2002, 54). Unlike the picture in other parts of the world, education in the MENA region contributes

very little to improving the socioeconomic situation of disadvantaged population groups (i.e. to improving their social mobility):

“Problems of quality and relevance have led to a significant mismatch between the labour market and development needs on the one hand and the output of education systems on the other. This situation leads to poor productivity, a distorted wage structure and a meagre economic and social return on education. The prevalence of unemployment among the educated and the deterioration in real wages for the majority of them exemplify this problem. Poor quality has become the Achilles heel of education in the Arab world, a flaw that undermines its quantitative achievements.” (UNDP / AFESD 2002, 54).

In addition, the knowledge imparted by education and the methods used to teach it are not suited to encouraging students to become independent and creative. School curricula are taught with frontal methods, and students are expected to learn by heart. Critical thinking and the ability to engage in discussions are not an aim. Instruction is typically marked by authoritarian and patriarchal behavior patterns which leave no room for questions, or indeed contradictions, raised by curious students. Students are not taught, or even motivated, to focus on what really counts – learning to learn, independent acquisition of knowledge, development of creative, problem-oriented thinking (Gardener 2003; Salehi-Isfahani 2004; Weiss 2004b).

According to the 2003 Arab Human Development Report, the problems start in the phase of informal, preschool child-rearing in the family:

“The most widespread style of child rearing in Arab families is the authoritarian mode accompanied by the over-protective. This reduces children’s independence, self-confidence and social efficiency, and fosters passive attitudes and hesitant decision-making skills. Most of all, it affects how the child thinks by suppressing questioning, exploration and initiative.” (UNDP / AFESD 2003, 3).

According to the Arab Human Development Reports, lack of culture of lifelong learning keyed to intellectual curiosity, innovative thinking, and critical, problem-oriented thinking, and not simply memorizing traditional doctrines. What is needed is an ‘enlightened model of knowledge’ that rests on independent thought, creativity, and the capacity to interpret and judge – and not least on a diversity of methods and opinions (Salehi-Isfahani 2004; Weiss 2004a, 80 f.).

However, a model of this kind would run counter both to the traditional patriarchal social structures in the MENA countries and the interests of the dominant elites. According to the 2003 Arab Development Report, the main reason for the present state of affairs is an implicit alliance between the authoritarian regimes and conservative Islamists who have no interest whatever in seeing the emergence of the critically thinking citizen:

“An alliance between some oppressive regimes and certain types of conservative religious scholars led to interpretations of Islam, which serve the governments, but are inimical to human development, particularly with respect to freedom of thought, the interpretation of judgements, the accountability of regimes to the people and women’s participation in public life.” (UNDP / AFESD 2003, 6).

One consequence is that research and development appear not to be highly valued in the MENA countries. Averaged across the region, the MENA governments spend not more than 0.2 % of GDP for research and development activities (UNDP / AFESD 2003, 6). The equivalent for the countries of East Asia and the Pacific is 1.5 % (UNDP 2003). Per one million residents there are only 317 scientists and engineers in the Middle East and North Africa (UNDP / AFESD 2003, 6), while there are 619 and 2554, respectively, in the East Asia and Pacific region and in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (World Bank 2004e). Only 0.8 % of all books published worldwide appear in one of the Arab countries, which account for 5 % of the world population. Turkey alone publishes more books, even though the country has only one quarter of the population of the Arab countries. And in the Arab countries less than one translation of foreign-language books is published per million population and year – the figures for Hungary and Spain are 519 and 920, respectively. Moreover, 17 % of all books published in the Arab world are religious in content – a far higher percentage than anywhere else in the world (UNDP / AFESD 2003, 6).

3.3 Promoting gender equality and empowering women (MDG3)

The MENA countries have made good progress in improving the educational chances of girls. Since 1990 nearly all of them have substantially increased the enrolment rates of girls at all stages of their school systems. The region as a whole is therefore likely to reach MDG3 (World Bank

2004 f.). All the same, the region is still far from any real gender equality if the countries that make it up do not undertake substantial efforts to improve the economic, political, and legal situation of women.

Education


A good number of MENA countries have already largely reached MDG3. In some of them (Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestinian Territories, Tunisia, and the UAE) girls are even in the majority in primary and secondary schools. Algeria and Oman (possibly also Iran, Morocco, and Mauritania) will follow suit by the next years. The only countries in the region that are unlikely to have reached MDG3 until 2015 are Yemen, Iraq, and Sudan (see Figure 5 and Table A1, Annex).

The progress made by Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania between 1990 and 2001 was particularly impressive. This is measured as the ratio between school enrolment rates for girls and boys. 100 % means that equally large percentages of girls and boys are enrolled in school – but without taking into consideration how high these percentages in fact are. In Egypt the ratio of the combined enrolment rates for girls and boys in primary *and* secondary schools rose, between 1990 and 2001, from 78 to 94 %; the corresponding rises for other countries were: Algeria from 80 to 99 %; Morocco and Mauritania from 82 to 92 and 93 %, respectively; Tunisia from 82 to 100 % (see Table A5, Annex).

At the same time Jordan, Syria, and the UAE have hardly made any progress. According to UNDP (2003a), the primary enrolment percentages for girls and boys have remained nearly unchanged at levels of roughly 95 % (Jordan and Bahrain), 92 % (UAE), 88 % (Syria), and 80 % (Iraq). UNESCO has found similar figures for secondary education in Iran.

The progress made in increasing school enrolment rates for girls has also been reflected in declining illiteracy rates for women. If in 1990 the average literacy rate for young women aged 15 to 25 was 75 % in the MENA region as a whole, by 2002 the percentage had risen to 87 %. In Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE the figure has now reached levels of over 100 %; i.e. the proportion of illiterate women between the ages of 15 and 25 is lower than for men of the same age cohorts. In Qatar and the UAE this even holds for the overall population (see Table A5, Annex).

Figure 5: Trends in the implementation of MDG3 (Gender equality in education)



Source: Designed by the author on the basis of data in Table A5, Annex

Yemen (from 34 to 60 %), Oman (from 79 to 98 %), and Sudan (from 72 to 89 %) have made striking progress in improving the relation between the literacy rates for young women and young men between the ages of 15 and 25. On the other hand, the progress made thus far by Iraq (from 44 to 50 %) and Mauritania (from 65 to 73 %) must be seen as inadequate.

Health and life expectancy

The MENA countries have also made major progress in improving the health of women and girls. Between 1980 and 1990, the life expectancy of women rose by five years, and between 1990 and 2001 the figure rose by another five years (see Table A7, Annex). Maternal mortality rates have declined appreciably (see below), and, on average, fertility rates have also declined from 6.2 to 3.3 children per woman (World Bank 2004 f.).

Labor-force participation and income


The main problem facing the region is that the improvements that have been reached on women's education and health have not yet found expression in improved opportunities for employment, income, and labour-force participation of women (UNDP / AFESD 2002, 28); Weiss 2004b, 8 f.; World Bank 2004 f.).

The average labor-force participation rate of women in the MENA countries is lower than the respective rate of all other world regions, and it is also far below the level that would be expected in view of the literacy rates, life expectancy, and fertility rates of women in the region. Figure 6 clearly illustrates this. According to these data, the labor-force participation rate of women in sub-Saharan Africa is roughly as low as in the MENA region. However, the diagram shows only the proportion of women working outside agriculture. In sub-Saharan Africa, a larger percentage of women (and men) are employed in the agricultural sector. As a consequence, on the whole, the labor-force participation of women in the MENA region is roughly 30 %, while the corresponding figures for Latin America (45 %), sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (60 %), and the Pacific region (75 %) are far higher (ESCWA 2005; World Bank 2004 f.).

Figure 6 furthermore shows that the employment chances of women in the MENA region have even deteriorated since 1990. Only in Algeria, Oman, and Bahrain has the percentage of women among all nonagricultural workers risen, while it has declined in Yemen (from 9 to 7 %), Jordan (from 23 to 21 %), Saudi Arabia (from 19 to 14 %), and Morocco (from 37 to 27 %). The same is probably true for Kuwait and Mauritania, where the labor-force participation rate of women has declined markedly since 1990 (see Table A5, Annex).

Moreover, on average women engaged in gainful employment in the MENA region earn lower incomes than men (Salehi-Isfahani 2000; World Bank 2004 f.). Palestinian women are in a relatively good position in this regard; on average they earn 73 % of their male colleagues. At the same time, the situation in Saudi Arabia and Oman is especially bad, with women earning wages and salaries that amount not even to one quarter of the average earnings of men (see Figure 7 and Table Table A5, Annex).

Figure 6: Trends in the implementation of MDG3 (Gender equality on the labor market)




Source: Designed by the author, based on data in Table A5, Annex

Notes on the abbreviations:

- MENA = Middle East and North Africa
- EAP = East Asia and Pacific
- EECA = Eastern Europe and Central Asia
- LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean
- SA = South Asia
- SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa

One reason for this among others is that an above-average number of working women in the MENA countries have jobs that are generally poorly paid and are employed in economic sectors in which jobs are being shed and wages are declining in relation to average incomes: Most such women are employed in the public sector or the manufacturing sector, above all in the textile industry.



Political participation

As regards opportunities for political participation as well, women continue to be disadvantaged in comparison with men – even in formal terms (Weiss 2004b, 8 f.). The World Economic Forum (2005) has made an attempt to quantify how unequal the opportunities of men and women are in 58 countries of the world. From the MENA region, the study covered only Egypt and Jordan – two countries in which the situation of women is still much better than in many other countries of the region. The two countries still landed in the last and fourth-to-last place among all the countries included in the study. Egypt and Jordan did still relatively well on education, life expectancy, and general employment opportunities for women. But the study came up with an extremely poor assessment of the actual labor-force

participation and rights of political participation of women in these two countries.

In most countries of the region women gained the right to vote – if at all – only at a very late stage. Indeed, in the Gulf states – with the exception of Bahrain – women even today lack the right to vote. But even in the countries in which women have had the right to vote for some time now, the proportion of women members of parliament has remained low. In Egypt, for example, women were granted suffrage and eligibility to run for political office as early as 1956, and in 1957 the first women were elected to parliament. But far from rising, the percentage of women members of parliament has declined over the course of decades, even decreasing from 4 to 2 % between 1990 and 2002. The picture is similar in Yemen, where the percentage of women members of parliament declined from 4 to 1 % between 1990 and 2002. The figures for Algeria, Iran, Lebanon, and Mauritania are also below 5 %. Only in Tunisia and Jordan did the share of female members of parliament rise between 1990 and 2002 from 4 to 12 % and from 1 to 6 %, respectively. But this does not mean that women's interests have been pushed through by the electorate, it means in effect that a larger number of women have been placed on slates of candidates or named to contest certain election districts, i.e. that such candidates owe their positions to decisions from the top (see Table A5, Annex).

Women are equally underrepresented in the executive (ESCWA 2005). In 2000, the cabinets of Algeria, Jordan, Qatar, and Kuwait had not a single woman minister. Only in Libya, Mauritania, Syria, and Tunisia did the share of female ministers amount to over 10 % (see Table A5, Annex).

Legal status

Also, the legal status of women in the MENA countries is inferior to that of men. For one thing, in most MENA countries, women face explicit discrimination in the legislation. For another, they are forced to contend with informal discrimination in seeking recourse to the law, since they are limited in their access to administration and the judiciary (Würth 2004, 1 f.).

Nearly all of the constitutions in the region contain a ban on gender-based discrimination. At the same time, however, all of these constitutions (with the exception of the Lebanese document) make explicit reference to the *shari'a* as the main source of legislation. This results in constant tension

between legislation and interpretation of the law, because the *shari'a* provides for 'equivalent' but not 'identical' rights for men and women. Under the *shari'a*, women have, in practice, inferior rights, particularly as far as civil-status and inheritance laws are concerned. Yet, nearly all MENA countries have integrated these areas of Islamic law into their national laws, while their commercial, contract, public, and social welfare laws go back to European roots (Abou-Habib 2003, 67; Elsadda 2004).

This is why women continue, in many regards, to be explicitly discriminated against by national law in the countries of the region. This goes in particular for women's rights when they marry, during the course of their marriage, when they are divorced, in child-rearing and education, in cases of inheritance, in passing on their nationality to their children (see Box 1). This discrimination is especially pronounced in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, and in Iran. Tunisia and Morocco in particular, but also to a lesser extent Egypt and Algeria, have gone much further toward liberalizing their civil-status law than the other countries of the region (see Table A6, Annex, for a number of examples).

But women also suffer discrimination in other spheres of law. To cite a few examples: For example, in some of the MENA countries, women are not allowed to run an enterprise or borrow funds from banks without the permission of their husband or father; and, in some cases, women are not allowed to travel without male escorts. Iranian women are even not allowed to sit next to men at work or in busses (Salehi-Isfahani 2004).

But just as serious if not more serious is the discrimination against women in legal practice, which may deviate substantially from statutory law. One reason for this is that beside national legislation and Islamic law (*shari'a*) the customary law of individual tribes or population groups continues to play an important role in the administration of justice. As examples here, Würth (2004, 11) cites the practices of female genital mutilation still common in some countries of the region and 'honor killings,' which, while officially outlawed and condemned by most Islamic legal scholars, still continue to be tolerated in many cases.

Box 1: Discrimination against women in the civil-status codes of Arab countries

Women's rights when they marry

Only the Hanafi school of Islamic law permits women to decide autonomously on marriage. In the MENA region, it is only Moroccan law that largely reflects this doctrine. In other Arab countries, women are in need of a male guardian to marry. As a rule, this will be the father or a brother, otherwise the closest male relation in patrilineal succession. Women who have been married and divorced are in some cases allowed to remarry without a guardian. In many countries consent of a male guardian has become a formality that can be bypassed by having a court appoint a 'formal guardian.' Still, it is important not to underestimate the consequences that this guardianship arrangement and the social constraints it entails may have on women's actual freedom of choice in entering in marriage. Only in Yemen is marriage concluded not by a women but by a guardian acting in her name.

But in some countries under-age women can be married off by their guardian even against their will, indeed sometimes even without their knowledge. The reason for this is that the age of marriageability for women is for the most part lower than it is for men; in Tunisia and Syria, for example, women are considered legally marriageable when they have reached the age of 17 and 16 years, respectively, while in both countries the age for men is 20 years. But in all such countries the legal age of majority and criminal responsibility is 18 years. In Yemen, there is no minimum age for women to marry, and only the consummation of marriage (15 years of age) is regulated by law.

Only in Tunisia is polygamy prohibited by law, whereas in Morocco it is conditioned explicitly on the approval of a judge and the consent of the first wife. In all Arab countries women have the right to demand a marriage contract that lays down in detail the marital rights and obligations of husband and wife and may e.g. exclude the husband's option to marry another women. But in practice very few women make use of this option. Moreover, a marriage contract does not in effect permit a wife to prevent her husband from marrying a second wife. If the contract is broken by the husband, the wife is only entitled to petition a divorce court to have her marriage dissolved.

Women's marital rights

A woman's marital rights include an absolute right to support by her husband, while the husband has a right to demand obedience from his wife. In some Arab countries this explicitly includes a husband's comprehensive and exclusive sexual rights vis-à-vis his wife. In Tunisia and Morocco there is no legal provision

Box 1 continued: Discrimination against women in the civil-status codes of Arab countries

on a wife's duty to obey her husband. Both men and women are entitled to sue to enforce their mutual claims. If a court recognizes a husband's claim that his wife has been negligent in her duty to obey, the husband may refuse his financial support for her.

However, the wife's right to support has drawbacks for her as well, because it is often interpreted in the way that there is no need for women to seek gainful employment. Indeed, in some countries the fact that a wife seeks employment is sometimes interpreted as a disobedience toward her husband – as long as the husband has not given his explicit approval. This, however, is often difficult for husbands for social reasons – a husband's approval of his wife's wish to work may be interpreted as meaning that the husband is unable to provide adequate support for his wife.

Except for employment or continuation of training, husbands are permitted to forbid their wives from traveling unaccompanied abroad or even within the country. While women can use marriage contracts to protect themselves against such measures, the only option they have if their husbands break the agreement is, again, recourse to a divorce court, which may then dissolve the marriage – with all the social and economic consequences that this may entail for the wife.

Right to divorce

A husband has the right to terminate his marriage at any time, even without the consent of his wife and without a need to cite his grounds. He just has to declare, in the presence of his wife, that he repudiates her (*jalaq*). In this case, the husband remains unconditionally obliged to support his former wife.

More recent Islamic law has made it possible to apply for a no-contest divorce; this takes on the form of a repudiation of the wife by the husband after the wife has agreed to pay a certain amount of compensation to the husband (*hul'*). What this means is that the wife is required to pay the husband a certain sum, which should as a rule not exceed the value of the wife's claim to support from her husband; in other words, in this case the wife would, in the extreme case, fully relinquish her claim to support.

Without her husband's consent, the only option a married woman has is to petition a court to terminate her marriage, i.e. she has the right to sue for divorce (*taḥlīq* or *tafrīq*). However, a divorce court is permitted to grant a divorce petition only in certain cases, for instance if a husband (i) fails to meet his duty to support his wife; (ii) has deceived or willfully deserted his wife; (iii) is serving a prison sentence; (iv) has violated a marriage contract (assuming one has been

Box 1 continued: Discrimination against women in the civil-status codes of Arab countries

concluded); or (v) is married to several wives to whom he does not provide equal support. Furthermore, a married woman can at any given time petition a court for dissolution of her marriage (*fasiḥ*) if her husband does not consummate the marriage (e.g. for the reason of impotence).

However, in nearly all countries of the MENA region the burden of proof for both divorce and dissolution of a marriage is on the women concerned. The consequence is a large number of protracted and grueling divorce suits, many of which are, in the end, decided in favor of the husband for lack of evidence. This has induced some countries of the region to adopt simplified divorce procedures. In Egypt e.g. a court can grant a divorce if two court-supervised attempts at reconciliation have failed and the wife declares her willingness to renounce her claims to support and to restore her dowry (*mahr*) to her husband. Legislative reforms in Morocco are headed in a similar direction. In Jordan a similar initiative was rejected by the parliament in 2003.

Right to post-marital support

Wives who have been repudiated by their husbands are generally entitled to three months of post-marital support, unless they were pregnant when they were repudiated, in which case they are entitled to support until the child is born. Furthermore, in cases of repudiation or divorce, the husband must pay support for children whom he has fathered and who are still living with the mother.

Furthermore, some countries of the region have adopted legislation providing for post-marital support payments beyond the traditional three months – but this is for the most part referred to as ‘compensation for (arbitrary) repudiation,’ and must only be paid if the wife has been repudiated for no fault of her own.

However, a divorced wife is entitled to retain all of the assets that she has brought to the marriage or received from her husband. The principle of separation of goods is firmly entrenched in Islamic law. Only Tunisian and Moroccan law provide for the option of joint marital property.

Right to child custody

In matters of child custody Islamic law distinguishes between physical care for a child and actual guardianship of a child. Up to a certain age, a child’s care is generally in the hand of its mother. This also applies in cases of divorce, as long as the mother does not remarry. In that case the father can petition a court to have custody of a child removed from the mother and transferred to a close female relation of the father (or, in a few countries, to the father himself).

Box 1 continued: Discrimination against women in the civil-status codes of Arab countries

When it comes to actual guardianship for a child, however, the matter is different. In Egypt, for instance, married mothers are not allowed to travel abroad without their husband's consent. Only the husband can apply for a passport for his children or register them for school. This may lead to major problems if the father e.g. works abroad or has 'left' his family. Under Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian law full child custody reverts to the mother only when the father has died. In Yemen, on the other hand, child custody is in this case transferred to the father's closest male relation.

Right to pass on nationality to children

In nearly all MENA countries, a child inherits her / his father's nationality. This means that women who are married to foreigners cannot pass on their nationality to their children, except in cases where children are born out of wedlock or the father is a stateless person. The only exception to this is Yemen. However, Jordan and Egypt are planning legislative reforms that would permit mothers to pass on their nationality to their children as well.

The legal arrangements presently in place entail serious consequences for the children of foreign fathers. Sometimes they are refused official registration, classified as stateless persons, or refused cost-free admission to schools and universities or free access to health services or employment in the civil service. If such children travel abroad with their parents, they need a visa to return to their own country.

Source: Abou-Habib (2003, 66 f.); Elsadda 2004; Schirmacher (2004, 12–14); Würth (2004, 16–23).

The provisions of customary law are not always and everywhere disadvantageous for women. In Algeria, for instance, there are tribes whose customary law accords to women far greater rights than they enjoy under national legislation or *sharia* (Würth 2004, 11).

The problem is, instead, that women find it more difficult than men to enforce their claims under customary law. In many countries conflict-mediation arrangements under customary-law are recognized by the government and judiciary, at least if they do not fundamentally contradict the spirit of national law. The problem hereby is that women often lack adequate access to informal institutions of customary conflict mediation be-

cause all these institutions are made up of men only (like e.g. the tribal councils of elders in Jordan).

The situation is similar for national legislation and jurisdiction. In the end, it is national parliaments and governments that decide on how best to resolve the above-mentioned tensions between the constitutional principle of equal treatment and the inclusion in most constitutions in the region of a reference to *ṣarīʿa*. These institutions must decide whether or not a law discriminates against women. At the same time, though, these institutions are composed wholly or chiefly of men. In Yemen, for instance, in 2001 this led to a situation in which a parliamentary committee introduced a bill which would have authorized the police to return back to their husbands wives that are living in separation. Conversely, the Jordanian parliament has for years now declined to stiffen penalties for the so-called honor-killings (Würth 2004, 13).

Many courts are also dominated by men. This goes in particular for the civil-status courts of individual religious groups. It is true that only the minority religions (Christians, Jews, Druze) have civil-status courts of their own, while the official authorities are responsible for Muslims. But the members of these courts are as a rule appointed only after consultations with religious legal scholars and tend therefore to be made up of men only (Elsadda 2004; Schirmacher 2004, 10 ff.).

Finally, women's access to the judiciary is also hampered by the latter's lack of transparency. Many cases have become known of corruption and inequitable enforcement of legal norms and court decisions in numerous countries of the region. In addition, women wishing to file a legal suit find themselves faced with substantial bureaucratic obstacles. And seldom are there lawyers and legal assistant available to aid illiterate persons in filling out required forms. All this means that recourse to the law involves numerous uncertainties for anyone seeking it. However, the persons most in need of recourse to the law are women, since in matters of civil status men are, in cases of doubt, invariably in the stronger position – especially when it comes to questions of divorce (see Box 1).

3.4 Reducing child mortality (MDG4)


Most MENA countries have succeeded in reducing infant mortality. Here they have made greater progress than e.g. Eastern Europe and Central Asia, sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia. As a whole, the region could therefore succeed in implementing MDG4, although there continue to be marked disparities between single countries.

Four MENA countries have already reached MDG4: In Egypt child mortality declined between 1990 and 2002 from 104 to 39 per thousand live births, while in the Palestinian Territories the corresponding figure declined from 53 to 24. By 2001, Libya had reduced child mortality from 42 to 19 per thousand, the corresponding figure for Oman being 30 to 13 (see Table A7, Annex). Iran, Qatar, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and the UAE are also likely to reach MDG4 (see Figure 8). This is also conceivable for Algeria, Bahrain, and Jordan – but only under the condition that these countries step up their efforts. Over the past ten years these countries have not made sufficient progress in implementing MDG4, but their child mortality rates are already relatively low by international and regional comparison (UNICEF 2004, 10).

On the other hand, it is unlikely that Iraq, Mauritania, Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen will reach MDG4 until 2015. In Iraq, child mortality has even risen since 1990 from 50 to 125 per 1000. In Mauritania and Lebanon, the figure has remained almost constant at 180 and 35 per 1000, respectively. Yemen and Sudan have succeeded in reducing their infant and child mortality rates; however, looked at it realistically, the progress they have made does not appear sufficient to reach MDG4 by 2015, especially in view of the fact that their child mortality rates stand very high at 114 and 97 per 1000 live births, respectively (see Diagrams 8 and 9).

Moreover, there is no reason to assume that the trends of the past 15 years will necessarily continue unabated until 2015. Not unlike the case of efforts to raise school enrolment rates, efforts to reduce infant and child mortality rates are restricted to a relatively narrow, predefined path. This is also pointed out by Clemens, Kenney, and Moss (2004, 20 ff.), who compared the child mortality rates of 176 countries for the years between 1980 and 2000. They found that this development has a relatively uniform course: At first, child mortality rates decline at a relatively rapid pace. However, the trend levels off once a threshold of roughly 30–40 per 1000


Figure 8: Trends in the implementation of MDG4 (Reduction of child mortality rates)



Source: Designed by the author on the basis of data in Table A7, Annex

live births has been reached. From this point on, the trend line approaches, at an increasingly decelerating rate, an – apparently natural – lower limit value of roughly five per 1000 live births. Figure 10 is taken from Clemens, Kenny, and Moss (2004, Figure 5). It shows the available figures for 176 countries between 1980 and 2000. The year in which these countries reached a level of 35 per 1000 live births was normalized to zero.


Most MENA countries have also made progress in raising their vaccination rates. In seven or eight of the countries of the region over 95 % of all one-year-olds have now been vaccinated against tuberculosis (TBC) and measles. Since 1990 the proportion of infants vaccinated against measles has risen on average in the region from 84 to 93 % (see Table A7, Annex).



Vaccination rates are at present still far too low in Mauritania (where only 58 % of the one-year-olds are vaccinated against measles and 70 % against TBC), in Yemen (79 % against measles and 73 % against TBC), and in Sudan (67 % against measles, TBC vaccination rate unknown).

At the same time, between 1990 and 2002 life expectancy rose in the on average from 64 to 69 years. Egypt and Oman have achieved particularly impressive successes in this regard, with life expectancy rising from 63 to 69 years in Egypt and from 69 to 74 years in Oman. Insufficient progress has been reported for Iraq (increase in life expectancy from 61 to 63 years), Iran (from 65 to 69 years), and Mauritania (from 49 to 51 years).

Figure 10: Comparative time-series analysis of the development of the child mortality rates of 176 countries between 1980 and 2000




Note: The year in which the countries under consideration lowered their infant mortality rate from 350 per 10,000 live births was normalized to 0 by the authors.

Source: Clemens / Kenny / Moss (2004, 22, Figure 5).

3.5 Improving maternal health (MDG5)

Nearly all MENA countries are well on their way towards reaching MDG5 (ESCWA 2005). According to UNSD (2004), maternal mortality rates have declined substantially everywhere in the region since 1990: Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have already implemented MDG5 (see Figure 11). Six other countries are very likely to reach the goal during the coming ten years: Egypt, Oman, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Lebanon.



It should, however, be noted in this connection that the data presented by UNSD (2004) are based at large on estimates and model calculations. These figures are far less viable than most other data cited in this study.

Based on these statistics, all that can be stated with some certainty is that Egypt, Bahrain, the Palestinian Territories, and Morocco are very likely to reach MDG5. The data for 1990–2001 indicate that maternal mortality per 100,000 births declined from 174 to 84 in Egypt and from 332 to 220 in Morocco. It can furthermore be noted that Qatar and Kuwait have already reached MDG5. The maternal mortality rates of these two countries, 7 and five deaths per 100,000 births respectively, are approximately as low as they are in industrialized Western countries (see Table A7, Annex).

Sudan and Iraq, on the other hand, are faced with considerable problems in implementing MDG5. The maternal mortality rates in both countries, 590 and 250 per 100,000 births, continue to be extremely high. This goes as well for Yemen, Mauritania, and Morocco, although these countries –

unlike Sudan and Iraq – have in recent years markedly reduced their maternal mortality rates. Tunisia and Algeria, on the other hand, have made insufficient progress here, and since 1990 their maternal mortality rates have only declined from 75 to 57 (Tunisia) and 170 to 117 (Algeria) per 100.000 births. The case is similar for Syria, which – if we can believe the figures released by UNSD (2004) – has only managed to reduce its maternal mortality from 180 to a figure today of 160.


Some MENA countries have also achieved successes on the second indicator for MDG5: the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel. This indicator is quite evidently measures inputs, not outputs, but it is nevertheless very meaningful. The presence of doctors and skilled midwives may play a crucial role for the course of a birth. Alongside the nutrition of pregnant women, pre- and postnatal health checks, and the availability of adequate medicines, it is one of the most effective measures to reduce both maternal and infant mortality (OECD / DAC 1998). In Egypt the number of births carried out by medically trained personnel rose between 1990 and 2001 from 37 to 61 %, in Bahrain from 94 to 99 %, in Mauritania from 40 to 57 %, in Algeria from 77 to 91 %, in Jordan from 87 to 99 %, and in Tunisia from 69 to 90 % (see Table A7, Annex).

3.6 Combating HIV/Aids, malaria, and other diseases (MDG6)

Not much can be said about the implementation of MDG6 in the MENA because only very limited data are available on the spread of HIV/Aids and malaria in this world region. Practically nothing is known, for example, about the number of HIV infections in 1990, the reference year.

HIV/Aids

UNAIDS and WHO (2004) estimate that in 2004 some 540,000 persons were infected with HIV. Even if this figure appears to be high, it means that the prevalence rate is not higher than 0.3 % of the adult population, a figure that is lower than the ones noted for all other world regions (see Figure 12). Among women between the ages of 15 and 24 years the figure was roughly 0.3 %, while the corresponding figure for men of the same age group was roughly 0.2 % (UNAIDS / WHO 2004, 65).



In addition, over 80 % of all infected persons in the region are found in only one country, namely in Sudan. There, at the end of 2003, some 2 % of all adults were infected with HIV (a total of some 400,000 persons), with infection figures largely concentrated in the country's southern provinces. HIV prevalence there is approximately eight times higher than it is in the capital Khartoum – a phenomenon relatively unusual for developing countries (ibid.). This may be due to differences in sexual morals, since Khartoum is largely Islamic while the southern provinces are mainly inhabited by Christians and animists.

Compared with other world regions, the number of persons in the MENA region reported to have died from Aids-related causes was likewise very low – even though this “low” figure translates out into an estimated, appalling total of 28,000 deaths (ibid.).

One major reason for concern, though, is that some 92,000 inhabitants of the region were newly infected in 2004 alone. This amounts to a rise in the infection rate of some 15 %. Here, in turn, southern Sudan accounted for a substantial proportion of these cases. However, the number of new cases has also risen dramatically in recent years in southern Algeria (in the area around Tamanrasset), in Mauritania, in Libya, and in the Tihama (the coastal region) in Yemen (Republic of Yemen 2002a; UN 2004a; UNDG 2002). In Libya alone, 90 % of all new cases have occurred since 2000 (UNAIDS / WHO 2004, 66). In Iran the number of new cases is rising by an annual rate of 15 % (UNAIDS / WHO 2004, 67), the corresponding figure for Jordan being 14 % (Jordan MOPIC / UN 2004). In 2000, 1.7 % of all prostitutes in Tamanrasset (southern Algeria) were infected with HIV. In 2004 the figure had already risen to over 9 % (UNAIDS / WHO 2004, 67).

With the exception of Mauritania and Sudan, Aids is still in a very early phase in the MENA countries. This means that the region is still in a position to use awareness campaigns and other means to combat its spread.

There are, however, fears that this opportunity may be missed. Many of the countries in the region are paying far too little attention to statistically recording cases of HIV infection. This deprives them of the possibility of identifying the main causes of the spread of Aids, i.e. the most important paths of transmission, a step that would be important for selecting instruments adequate to combating the immunodeficiency disease there.

Three factors are responsible for this faulty response to the disease. First, the statistical and analytical capacities in the MENA countries are generally not very effective. Second, the region continues to be dominated by the idea that HIV/Aids cannot spread in places where no drugs are consumed and where sexuality is restricted to morally unobjectionable activities. Furthermore, the illusion is widespread in the region that Islam provides protection against HIV/Aids. Third, the fact that it is widely assumed among the general population that HIV/Aids is linked with drug addiction, homosexuality, and unsteady sexual partnerships or sexual unfaithfulness often means that persons who suspect they might be infected with HIV

fear, indeed do not dare, to take an HIV/Aids test. They are reluctant to look up a doctor for fear that they may find themselves publicly labeled and marginalized.

In fact, HIV/Aids is far more widespread than average among drug addicts and prostitutes – while the figures for homosexuals are only slightly above average. In Morocco, where only 0.2 % of all adult men and less than 0.1 % of all women are infected, the rates for prostitutes and prison inmates are 2.3 % and 0.8 %, respectively. In Libya 90 % of all newly infected persons are drug addicts. In Iran 4 % of all drug addicts are infected. On the other hand, no more than 1 % of all homosexuals appear to be infected in any country of the region – with the possible exception of Sudan (UNAIDS / WHO 2004, 67).

Thus far most infections have resulted from the use of contaminated syringes. The government of Iran has evidently recognized this fact and has authorized all of the country's pharmacies to dispense sterile syringes and needles free of charge. Libya on the other hand restricted their sale in the late 1990s, and this has led to a sharp rise in the use of contaminated syringes. In the neighboring country of Tunisia, where every infected person, regardless of nationality, is eligible for free retroviral treatment, has subsequently noted a rapid increase in the number of persons infected with HIV (*ibid.*).

There is, however, reason to fear that the region will, in the coming years, be faced with a surge of new cases that are transmitted mainly through sexual contacts. A second wave of infections would mean increased risks chiefly for prostitutes, but also for the spouses of infected persons. In Iran 50 % of all drug addicts are married and 30 % have occasional extramarital sexual intercourse.

Even today the number of persons infecting themselves through unprotected heterosexual intercourse is on the rise. The reason for this is that the topic of Aids continues to be taboo in the MENA countries and for this reason far too few people take appropriate preventive measures. In one of Sudan's southern provinces (Rumbek), where HIV/Aids is especially widespread, a survey found that not even 2 % of those who engage in occasional sexual intercourse with different partners used a condom. Only 20 % even knew what a condom is and what it is used for. Even in the Egyptian capital Cairo only one third of sexually active persons have ever

used a condom. And an even more serious fact is that very few prostitutes take adequate protective measures. A study conducted in Kermanshah (Iran) found that all prostitutes working there – and their customers – are well informed on the use of condoms, but more than half of the prostitutes interviewed had never used one. The main reason cited for this was the high price of condoms (UNAIDS / WHO 2004, 65 ff.).

Malaria and other diseases

Malaria is endemic in eight countries of the MENA region: Sudan, Mauritania, Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. In Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories malaria was eradicated long before 1990. In the Gulf states, Libya, and Tunisia the disease has never posed a significant threat (see Table A8, Annex).

Malaria is particularly widespread in Sudan and Mauritania. More than one in ten inhabitants of these two countries contracted malaria in 2000, and one in every thousand dies of the disease (the figure for children being as high as 0.5 %). There are no signs whatever that either of these countries has made any success since 1990 in combating this disease; and in Mauritania at least the number of new infections is still growing (UNDG 2002).

However, malaria also appears to have begun to spread again in Yemen and Algeria. The areas affected in Yemen include above all Tihama – due mainly to its low elevation, its proximity to the African continent, and the dense shipping traffic in the area – and the region around Aden (Republic of Yemen 2003). In Algeria it is the southern provinces that are mainly affected (UN 2004a). However the risk of dying of malaria in Yemen or Algeria is still far lower than it is in Sudan or Mauritania. In 2000 only 22 people died of this disease or its effects per 100,000 inhabitants, while the corresponding figures for Mauritania and Sudan were 108 and 70, respectively (see Table A8, Annex).

Morocco and Syria have made progress here. In Morocco the number of new cases declined between 1990 and 2001 from 7 to 1 per 100,000 inhabitants. In Syria the figure is now close to zero; in Mauritania and Sudan, on the other hand, the number of cases was over 10,000 in 2001; in Yemen the figure rose between 1990 and 2001 from 1263 to 1532; and even in some of the Gulf states a relatively high share of the population

contracted malaria in 2001: 27 per 100,000 population in Oman and 32 per 100,000 in Saudi Arabia. The reason for this is the relatively high number of migrant workers in the Gulf states. These people may already have the disease when they arrive or they may return infected when they travel home on vacation leave (ESCWA 2005).

Some countries in the region are also affected by leishmaniasis (Aleppo boil, kala-azar), a disease which is also transmitted by mosquitoes. These countries mainly include Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, and Sudan, although the disease also broke out again in Syria a number of years ago, where attempts to get it under control have not yet proven successful. In 2001 the number of new cases countrywide was 135 per 100,000 population (Syrian Arab Republic 2003).

By international comparison, tuberculosis constitutes a minor health risk in the MENA region. Only three countries are seriously affected by the disease: Mauritania (per year 209 new infections and 51 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants), Sudan (142 new cases and 51 deaths per 100,000), and Iraq (89 new cases and 27 deaths per 100,000). No information is available on how the disease has developed in these three countries in recent years (see Table A8, Annex).

The incidence of tuberculosis is in decline in most countries of the region. This can be shown clearly for Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco, although there is also information available that indicates the same trend for Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia (PARC 2002; Kingdom of Bahrain / UN 2002; Jordan MOPIC 2004; UN 2003a; UN 2002b; UN 2003b).

Hepatitis B and C continue to be endemic in all countries of the region. In recent years Syria and Egypt appear to have been faced with particular problems with these diseases (Syrian Arab Republic 2003; PARC 2002).

Finally, the Palestinian Territories experienced an epidemic of viral meningitis in 1997. The infection rate was 117 per 100,000 population, a figure that was reduced to 22 per 100,000 population by 2002. However, bacterial meningitis continues to spread (UN 2002a).

3.7 Ensuring environmental sustainability (MDG7)

MDG7 has three targets that are only very loosely interconnected and that may, in some areas, even result in goal conflicts. The focal point here is Target 9, i.e. to “integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources.” Target 10 sets out to “halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation.” Target 11, finally, provides for efforts to achieve a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers worldwide.


Environmental protection

Target 9 is one of the few points on the MDG agenda that has not been quantified as such. In order to be able to measure progress in the implementation of the target, six indicators were chosen which were thought to be able to model the broadest possible spectrum of environmental policy. The first indicator – proportion of land area covered by forests – is not particularly relevant for the countries of the MENA region. With the exceptions of Sudan, Morocco, and Lebanon, none of these countries has had any major forest cover since the period of classical antiquity. Nor is it likely that the region’s forest cover will grow appreciably in the future. However, one alarming fact is that, according to World Bank data (World Bank 2004e), Sudan’s forest cover declined from 30 % to roughly 26 % of the country’s overall land area between 1990 and 2001.

On the other hand, the MDG agenda lacks an indicator designed to measure soil degradation. Soil degradation poses a major environmental threat precisely for the MENA countries, one that will entail serious problems for the region’s future social and economic development.

However, the other five indicators included in the MDG agenda show that the MENA countries will have to undertake substantial efforts if they are to implement MDG7 by 2015 (ESCWA 2005).

The percentage of land set aside as conservation areas in the MENA region has grown since 1990 from roughly 2 to over 10 %. The main reason for this, though, is that during the 1990s Saudi Arabia set aside 38 % of its land area as a nature reserve. Only Oman and Saudi Arabia have placed more than 10 % of their land area under protection (see Table A9, Annex).




But one far more important consideration here is that in the MENA countries re dedication of land areas as nature reserves is often a purely legal act. Many conservation areas that have been created in recent years lack appropriate administrative and financial resources and adequate official commitment for the protection and maintenance of the land areas in question. Very few people in the region, and only a minority of its politicians, have developed a marked awareness of the fact that biospheres constitute a value as such (UN 2004a; Jordan MOPIV / UN 2004; UN 2003a).

Air and water in the MENA region are increasingly exposed to man-made pollutants. One symptomatic development in this regard is the dramatic rise in carbon dioxide emission. On average, they have increased by 50 % since 1990 and 2001, i.e. by 3.8 % per annum. The rate of increase has been especially dramatic in Egypt, Qatar, Lebanon, and Yemen. Between 1990 and 2001 carbon dioxide emissions in Qatar rose from 28 to 92 cubic tons per inhabitant, a more than threefold increase. Only Mauritania, the

UAE, Algeria, and Libya have managed to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions since 1990 (see Figure 13 and Table A9, Annex).

Even in their efforts to reduce chloro-fluoro carbon (CFC) emissions, the MENA region has made far less progress than other parts of the world. In 2001 Syria, Lebanon, and – above all – Iran and Libya even emitted far more CFC than they did in 1990. In Libya CFC emissions rose to levels 13 times above the level of 1990. Only Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Algeria, and Kuwait have managed to reduce their CFC emissions to rates comparable with those of the industrialized Western countries (see Figure 14).

At the same time, most countries in the MENA region have been successful in their efforts to improve energy efficiency. Electricity consumption has increased considerably almost everywhere in the region, with average 2001 consumption figures reaching levels three times as high as those noted for 1990. Overall energy consumption, however, grew at rates below GDP growth, which means that today the value-added per kilogram of oil




equivalent consumed is higher than in 1990. With other words: for each unit of GDP, less energy is used (see Figure 15).

As regards international conventions, Tunisia may be seen as a role model. Not only has it (like all the other MENA countries) ratified the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Rio Biodiversity Convention (1992), it has also signed and ratified the Cartagena Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol. Other than Tunisia, a smaller number of MENA countries have at least signed these two protocols (Egypt, Algeria, Iran, Yemen, and Libya). Iraq, the Palestinian National Authority (PA), and Sudan have not even signed the Framework Convention on Climate Change or the Biodiversity Convention (see Table A9, Annex).

Sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation

Goal conflicts may emerge between Target 9 and Target 10 of the MDG agenda. This scenario would e.g. be given in the following case: While a




country is already fully utilizing its renewable water resources, nowhere near all of its population has access to safe drinking water – a situation typical of many MENA countries. The risk that this situation entails is that such countries may tap fossil groundwater reserves to supply their populations. The measure would certainly contribute to reaching Target 10 (access to safe drinking water), but it would not be consistent with Target 9 (improvement of environmental and resource protection).

Efforts to implement Target 10 must therefore seek to ensure that the measures taken are in every respect sustainable. Otherwise improvements in access to drinking water may be of short duration (i.e. possibly until 2015, after which date a country's renewable water resources may be exhausted). As an alternative to the use of groundwater reserves, thought should therefore be given to improving water management or – if need be – to desalinization of sea water.

There is a considerable amount of contradictory and misleading information available on the implementation of Target 10 in the MENA region. In particular, the data published by UNDP (2003a; 2003b; 2004a) and those from the World Bank (2004e) are in some cases marked by sharp discrepancies. In addition, on many countries of the region no information is available at all and in most countries implementation of Target 10 is measured only quantitatively. The statistics indicate only whether e.g. a household is connected to a water source or – in rural areas – whether there is a well or public water tap with safe water in the immediate vicinity. Often too little attention is paid to whether or not the well or the public water tap are in fact regularly supplied with water and what quality this water has.

In any case, many MENA countries will have difficulties in reaching Target 10. Since 1990 too many of them have made too little progress in improving their population's water supply. In Jordan the proportion of households connected to the public water supply even declined slightly between 1990 and 2001 – even though it remained at a high level (declining from 97 to 96 % of the population). The data available indicate that the supply situation has deteriorated in rural areas in particular (see Table A10, Annex). Even so, Jordan could – thanks to its relatively good initial data – reach Target 10 of the MDG agenda within the period envisioned, assuming it loses no time in taking the measures needed.

Figure 16: Trends in the implementation of MDG7 / Target 10 (Access to safe drinking water)




Source: Designed by the author, based on data in Table A10, Annex

Note: Countries for which the available data are either markedly contradictory or unreliable are omitted.

It is above all Egypt, Bahrain, Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian Territories that have made good progress in improving their population's water supply. All five countries have already more or less reached Target 10 – at least if we use number of water-mains connections as a measure. Between 1990 and 2001 the latter rose from 94 to 97 % in Egypt, from 67 to 80 % in Syria, and from 81 to 90 % in the Palestinian Territories. According to the official statistics, Bahrain and Lebanon have even reached a supply level of 100 % of the population (see Table A10, Annex).

Sudan has also made great progress. If it was able to maintain its present pace, it could halve, by 2015, the number of household without access to a water source. However, in view of the country's size and the many and diverse problems facing it, this seems unlikely.

Figure 17: Trends in the implementation of MDG7 / Target 10 (Access to sanitation)



Mauritania, Libya, Oman, and Yemen are also unlikely to reach Target 10. Thus far they have not succeeded in significantly improving the access of their population to safe drinking water (see Figure 16). Mauritania, Libya, and Oman have therefore been classified “top-priority countries” by UNDP (2003a). The situation in Iraq is probably very similar.

The data available on Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are too sparse to permit any assessment of trends in the improvements of access to water since 1990. The second indicator for Target 10 is the share of households with sustainable access to sanitation. The goal is to halve the proportion of people who do not have improved sanitation in their houses.

Saudi-Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan have already reached this goal. In Saudi-Arabia and Lebanon, according to international statistics, all inhabitants have access to sanitary facilities, and Egypt and Jordan have

been able to halve, between 1990 and 2001, the proportion of households without sanitation. The respective shares have dropped from 13 to 2 % in Egypt and from 2 to 1 % in Jordan (see Figure 17 and Table A10, Annex).

Oman, Syria, and Tunisia will also reach Target 10 if they manage to continue their present path until 2015. In Oman the proportion of people with access to improved sanitation has risen from 84 % in 1990 to 92 % in 2001, in Syria from 55 to 72 %, and in Tunisia from 76 to 84 %.

Some other countries in the MENA region will, however, most probably not be able to halve the proportion of people without access to improved sanitation until 2015. Especially the three low-income countries Sudan, Yemen, and Mauritania have made until now only very limited progress towards this goal. The share of households with sanitary facilities has risen only slightly from 58 % (1990) to 62 % (2001) in Sudan, from 32 to 38 % in Yemen, and from 30 to 33 % in Mauritania. These three countries are therefore listed as top-priority countries by UNDP as far as this specific target is concerned.

Living conditions of slum dwellers: improved sanitation and secure tenure

Target 11 is in fact also a fully independent target. There is a clear link between Targets 10 and 11, but the improvement of the living conditions of slum dwellers (Target 11) is at utmost indirectly correlated with the goal of environmental sustainability (Target 9). The indicator used for Target 11 is the share of people with access to secure tenure and the implicit goal is to halve the share of those who do not have secure tenure.

As to the MENA region, there are practically no data available on the progress achieved so far towards this goal. For most countries, nothing is known about the number and living conditions of slum-dwellers, although their share on the total population is probably very small with the possible exceptions of Sudan and Mauritania.

Only for three of the MENA countries can we say anything about their prospects to reach Target 11 of the MDG agenda until 2015. These countries are Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, and Morocco. The proportion of people without secure tenure decreased, between 1990 and 2001, from 28 to 24 % in Jordan, and from 16 to 14 % in the Palestinian Territories. In Morocco, the respective share was 12 % in 1990; how it developed since then is however unknown (see Table A10, Annex).

3.8 Developing a global partnership for development (MDG8)

The MDG agenda breaks up the goal of a global partnership for development (MDG8) into a large number of targets, which are, however relatively vague in their formulation. Most of them have been quantified or assigned target dates. Some were specified by measurable indicators, but even these indicators cover only small sections of what the respective targets actually refer to. In addition, only one of the 16 indicators for MDG8 is effectively linked to a concrete time-horizon like all the indicators for MDGs 1–7 (see Overview 1).

This section deals only with some of the targets and indicators of MDG8. Its focus is on aspects that can be verified on the national and not only the global level (i.e. for which data are available for individual countries). This includes:

- the development of an open, rule-based, and nondiscriminatory trading and financial system (Target 12);
- the issue of good governance at both the global and the national level (which is generally seen as an aspect of Target 12);
- the ODA provided to the least-developed countries (LDCs) (which is an aspect of Target 13) and the cancellation of their official bilateral debts (Target 15);
- the development and implementation of strategies for decent and productive work for young people (Target 16);
- the provision of affordable essential drugs for the population in developing countries (Target 17); and
- the improvement of access to modern information and communications technologies for all people worldwide (Target 18).

It is important, though, to bear in mind that the main responsibility for the implementation of MDG8 is generally attributed to the donor countries.

Rule-based, nondiscriminatory national trading and financial systems

Target 12 of the MDG agenda provides for the development of “an open, rule-based, predictable, nondiscriminatory trading and financial system” (see Overview 1). It thus refers primarily to the *international* trading and

financial system. However, if the developing countries are to benefit from such a system, their own trading and financial systems will also be open, rule-based, predictable, and nondiscriminatory.

Many of the countries in the MENA region are far removed from meeting this condition. Their financial and product markets are clearly overregulated and protected against potential market entrants by legal regulations and informal barriers. The actors affected by this include both foreign suppliers and potential competitors of established domestic firms. Anyone interested in investing or producing goods in these countries must be prepared to submit to protracted, complicated, and cumbersome approval processes that entail high costs and risks. Until the end of the process it is impossible to predict whether or not an application will be approved. And even then, new stumbling blocks may turn up or be placed in the path of an investor (Loewe et al. 2006; UN 2004a, 33). In addition, intellectual property rights are not adequately protected. Competition laws are either weak or simply ignored – assuming that there are any in the first place. In legal disputes it is difficult to predict how courts will decide, i.e. whether they will apply the law and in what ways they may interpret them. All this means uncertainty and high transaction costs. The result is that in many MENA countries hardly any investments are made in productive capital assets. Savings are invested almost exclusively in real estate or financial capital, or they are moved abroad (Bennet 2003; World Bank 2003).

The main beneficiaries of these opaque bureaucratic structures are a small group of persons with good connections to political decision-makers. Most applicants are simply unable to predict whether or not the administrations responsible will approve their applications. Decisions often depend to a very large extent on an applicant's situation, social status, and personal connections (GTZ 2003, 4; Loewe et al. 2006).

In view of the fact that within the authoritarian context given in the MENA countries, all political institutions are dependent on centers of power, there is no instance that could review whether or not decisions are in conformity with given rules, or indeed that could correct and penalize infractions of these rules. Corruption is widespread, political and legal decision-making processes are cumbersome, and economic actors are unable to rely even on written legal norms (Loewe et al. 2006). The Arab Human Development Reports point in unmistakable language to these governance deficits (UNDP / AFESD 2002; UNDP / AFESD 2004).

The MDG agenda does not contain an indicator that measures how open, transparent, rule-based, and nondiscriminatory the trading and financial systems of individual developing and industrialized countries in fact are. Indicators from other sources therefore have to be used in this study.

One set of such indicators is offered by the World Bank. It was developed by a team from the World Bank Institute under the leadership of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) and consists of six composite indicators, which measure (i) voice and accountability, (ii) political stability, (iii) government effectiveness, (iv) the regulatory quality, (v) the rule of law and (vi) the control of corruption in almost every country of the world (Bennet 2003; Kaufmann / Kraay / Zoido-Lobaton 1999).

According to the World Bank indicator for market regulation, only the countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia (SA) are doing on average a little worse than the MENA countries. At the same time, the markets in Latina America and the Caribbean and in East Asia and the Pacific region are much less or at least better regulated.

Within the MENA region, the density of market regulation is especially high in Libya and Syria, but other countries, such as Sudan, Yemen, the Palestinian Territories, Algeria, and Egypt are not doing much better. Saudi-Arabia, Morocco, and Tunisia are do also still fall short of the international average. The situation is better in Oman, Jordan, and Kuwait.

According to the World Bank indicator for the control of corruption, the MENA region is doing better than sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and East Asia and the Pacific. The problem is, however, that this indicator measures the use of bribes rather than other forms of corruption such as favouritism, which are much more common in the MENA countries. Nevertheless, what Figure 18 shows on intra-regional differences is most likely right: Sudan, Yemen, Libya, and Syria are probably the most corrupt countries in the region, while significant improvements have taken place in some other countries such as Oman, Jordan, and Kuwait.

Figure 18: Trends in the implementation of MDG8 / Target 12 (Regulation of the trading and financial systems, based on World Bank indicators)




Figure 18 cont'd: Trends in the implementation of MDG8 / Target 12

Source:

For the indicators: see Kaufmann / Kraay / Zoido-Lobaton (1999)

The date used are taken from the website of the World Bank Institute at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2004/tables.asp> (27 June 2006).

Abbreviations:

MENA = Middle East and North Africa

EAP = East Asia and Pacific

EECA = Eastern Europe and Central Asia

LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean

SA = South Asia

SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa

Notes on the indicators:

The indicators may take on values ranging from -2.5 (very poor) and +2.5 (very good). They are made up of numerous indicators from 13 different research institutions, NGOs, and commercial rating agencies (including UNDP, the World Competitiveness Yearbook, Gallup International, Freedom House, the Heritage Foundation, the Economic Intelligence Unit, and Standard and Poor's). The World Bank Institute staff who designed the indicators emphasize themselves that these indicators can be used at best to come up with trends, since the individual components are based on subjective expert assessments.


Still, entrepreneurs in all Arab countries – including, e.g. Jordan – point to inefficiency and corruption in administrations, overregulated markets, a lack in the rule of law, and complicated government approval procedures as major problems with which they have to contend – in addition to other factors like difficult access to capital or inadequate workforce qualification. They indicate, though, that they have less problems with inflation, crime, infrastructure, and stability (Loewe et al. 2006; Lopez-Claros / Schwab 2005, 179 ff.).

The fact that the markets in the region are anything but open, and nondiscriminatory is also evident in the low volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing into the MENA countries – although, of course, numerous other factors of course also play a role here. Only a fraction of global FDI goes to the MENA region (UNDP AFESD 2003, 102). In no other part of the world – except sub-Saharan Africa – is the volume of FDI anywhere near as low as here. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia the figure amounts

to 3.5 % of GDP, in Latin America and the Caribbean 2.7 %, in East Asia and the Pacific 2.6 %, and in South Asia 2.4 % – while the corresponding figure for the MENA is no higher than 0.6 % (UNDP 2004a). In fact, FDI to MENA countries has even declined since 1990. The level of FDI is especially low in the Gulf states, Yemen, the Palestinian Territories, and Libya. In these countries it accounts for less than 0.1 % of GDP, and it therefore not presented in the diagram. On the other hand, Tunisia has attracted remarkably high levels of FDI, with figures rising from 0.6 % of GDP in 1990 to 3.8 % in 2001. In contrast to the regional trend, FDI has also risen in Syria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Lebanon (see Figure 19).

Good governance

The “Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration” (UN 2001) points out explicitly that Target 12 also implies a commitment to good governance both, at the national and at the



international level. Unfortunately, no indicators have been defined to measure progress in implementing this goal.

Indicators from other sources will therefore have to be used here. Here again, the World Bank composite governance indicators are a good bet. In what follows, we will look into the indicators for (i) voice and accountability and (ii) the rule of law (see Figure 20 and Table A12, Annex).

Figure 20 clearly indicates that by international comparison the MENA region has by far the worst record on general liberties, popular voice, political participation and government accountability (Bennet 2003; Schlumberger 2004; UN 2004a; World Bank 2003). It is followed only with a large gap by South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The countries in east Asia and the Pacific region are on average doing much better, and the Latin American and Caribbean countries do even have positive marks.



Within the MENA region, differences are not very big. According to the World Bank indicator, the situation is especially poor in Sudan, Libya, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, but the other MENA countries follow closely. Not one single of them does well on voice and accountability.

The MENA region does somewhat better on the World Bank indicator for the rule of law. On average, the countries in East Asia and the Pacific and in Latin America and the Caribbean rank much higher than the MENA countries, but the South Asian and sub-Sahara African countries are doing worse (see Figure 20).

According to the World Bank indicator for the rule of law with large discrepancies do exist within the MENA region. Again, Sudan, and Yemen, rank last, followed by the Palestinian Territories, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, and Syria. Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, and Tunisia, on the other hand, have a rather good record.


The drawback associated with the World Bank governance indicators is that they were developed only in 1996 and can therefore not be used to measure changes since 1990 (Betz 2003, 457). For this purpose, we can use the Freedom House Index, which, however, does not distinguish between different aspects of governance, but focuses exclusively on its core dimension, i.e. democratic participation and civil liberties.

Figure 20: Trends in the commitment to good governance (based on World Bank indicators)



Source and notes: see Figure 18

Figure 21: Trends in the commitment to good governance (based on Freedom House Index)



Notes on the Abbreviations: see Figure 18.

Source: designed by the author, based on data published by Freedom House. See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/FIWrank7305.xls> (27 June 2006)

According to the Freedom House Index, the MENA region is the only world region (with the possible exception of Central Asia) in which – far from improving since 1990 – the political situation has in fact deteriorated (see Figure 21). The unweighted median of the indicator values for the individual countries in the MENA region has risen between 1990 and 2000 from 5.7 to 5.8 (on the Freedom House Index, the lower a country's rating, the more liberal it is). At the same time, the median values for sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia have improved radically. The average score of the Latin American and Caribbean countries has also improved, but less markedly. South Asia is the only region whose rating has stagnated. Within the MENA region, the political situation has improved in Kuwait, Yemen, Jordan, Mauritania, and Oman but it has worsened in most other MENA countries.


Cancellation of official bilateral debt and provision of additional ODA

Target 13 is relevant for only three of the MENA countries. It calls for the provision of additional ODA to low-income countries as well as for the cancellation of their external debt. Within the MENA region, only Mauritania, Yemen, and Sudan are concerned by this goal (see Figure 22).

Mauritania and Sudan are so-called heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and thus principally eligible for debt relief within the framework of the HIPC initiative that was initiated at the 1998 G8 summit in Cologne and ultimately adopted at the Monterrey Conference in 2002. The precondition for such debt relief is that the eligible country (i) prepares a poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) that meets the criteria of the World Bank and the IMF, (ii) applies for at least one year the strategies set out in the paper, and (iii) carries out macroeconomic, sectoral, and institutional reforms. Mauritania was the sixth country worldwide that has qualified for the HIPC initiative. It was granted debt relief amounting to 1 US\$.1 billion, roughly half of its foreign debt (UNDG 2002, 7). Sudan, however, has thus far failed to meet the conditions set down for debt relief.

Yemen has also prepared a PRSP, even though it was never given any prospect of debt relief. The country has managed to reduce its foreign debt appreciably in the course of the 1990s, a development in which relatively high ODA, but even more so the country's oil exports, has played a major role. Some major oilfields were discovered in Yemen in the early 1990s.


Figure 22: Trends in the implementation of MDG8 / Targets 13 and 15 (Solution of debt problems)



Aside from Mauritania and Yemen, it is above all Jordan and the Palestinian Territories that benefit from generous ODA (respectively have benefited from it during the last ten years, i.e. before the Hamas won the 2006 parliamentary elections in Palestine). Most of the other countries in the MENA region have seen their ODA inflow drop dramatically in the course of the 1990s. This goes in particular for Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, and Morocco. Figure 23 shows that ODA transfers to the MENA region are coming more and more to be concentrated on the region's LDCs (and to the Palestinian Territories, which is due to fact that Figure 23 does not show the most recent trends after the election in Palestine). One exception is Sudan, which – thanks to its present regime as well as to the civil war raging there – now receives less ODA than 15 years ago.

Productive employment for youth

Target 16 is to develop and implement – in cooperation with developing countries – strategies for decent and productive work for young people.



The indicator for this target is the unemployment rate among 15- to 24-year-olds.

Productive employment for youth

Target 16 is to develop and implement – in cooperation with developing countries – strategies for decent and productive work for young people. The indicator for this target is the unemployment rate among 15- to 24-year-olds.

For most MENA countries no information is available on progress made towards this target, but the very few data that have been published are alarming. In Egypt, the official unemployment rate among 15- to 24-year-olds rose from 26 to 34 % between 1990 and 2001, and in Bahrain from 6 to 13 %. In 1990 youth unemployment in Algeria had already reached a level of 39 %, which has most probably risen since then, because the overall unemployment has also increased sharply. The situation in Morocco is

similar: there 31 % of the 15- to 24-year-olds were jobless in 1990. In 2001, the country had a youth unemployment rate of 37 %, the figure for Mauritania was 45 %, and for Syria 73 %. No data exist for the 1990 situation in these three countries. On average, roughly 50 % of the 15- to 24-year-olds in the MENA region are likely to have been without work in 1990 and the figure has most probably risen since then (see Table A11, Annex).

Unemployment in general is very widespread in the MENA region. Ali and Elbadawi (2000) estimate that one person out of five potential labor-force participants in the region is unemployed. At the end of the 1990s the official unemployment rate in Tunisia, Syria, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman was roughly 15 %; 20 % in Morocco and Lebanon, and over 25 % in Algeria, Libya, and Yemen. The smaller Gulf states have official unemployment rates of something between 3 and 8 %. In fact, however, it is likely that a far larger share of the labor force is looking for work. In Bahrain e.g. the percentage is apt to be closer to 16 than 3 %. Likewise, in Jordan the unemployment rate is likely to be above 30 % rather than 14 %, as official statistics say. In Egypt, it is closer to 25 than to 12 %, and the Palestinian Territories are assumed to have a rate of more than 50 %, not the 18 % officially stated (Loewe 2004, 430).

During the 1990s a high number of jobs were created in the MENA region. The growth elasticity of job creation was 0.7. This means that the growth in the number of jobs per percentage point of economic growth was 0.7. A similarly high ratio was otherwise noted only for Latin America. The figure for the European Union was 0.3, for the US and for South and East Asia (without China) 0.4, and for China 0.1 (Gardner 2003).

All the same, unemployment in the MENA countries rose appreciably during the 1990s: from an average of 15 % in 1990 to 20 % in 2001. On average the number of jobs rose by 2.6 % per annum; but at the same time, the labor force was growing by 2.9 % per annum. The reason for this is that cohorts with high birth rates were entering the labor market. Birth rates are, however, now showing a downward trend, which means in effect that population growth is declining in nearly all countries in the region. This new trend, however, has not yet translated into lower labor force growth rates. This will happen only in some years, and the decline will, at least initially, be slow. Until then, millions of school graduates will be entering the labor market, and the labor force of all MENA countries will grow

from 110 million persons in 2005 to 160 millions in 2015. In other words, some 5 million new jobs have to be created each year until the in order to keep unemployment rates at least at their present levels (ibid.).

Access to essential medical drugs

In its World Health Report 2000 (WHO 2000) estimates the proportion of people in various countries with access to essential medical drugs at affordable prices. These estimates are presented in Figure 24. Accordingly, nearly the entire population of Algeria, Jordan, Libya, and the Gulf states have access to affordable medical drugs, the figures for Egypt, Lebanon, Oman, and Syria are only 80-90 %, and those for Yemen, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia are no higher than 50-70 %. The figure estimated for Sudan even ranges between 0-50 % (Loewe 2004c; see also Table B3).


Access to modern technologies

The MDG agenda measures the access of the population of developing countries to modern technologies on the basis of two indicators: (i) telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 1000 population and (ii) personal computers per 1000 population. A third indicator, which is also often used, is the number of Internet users per 1000 population.

The MENA countries have not done well on any of these indicators. While their average values for the three indicators are higher than those reached by sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the MENA region is at a far higher level of economic development than these two other world regions. Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and East Asia and the Pacific have recorded far higher values.

In the MENA region, only 152 telephone lines exist per 1000 population (land lines and cell phone subscriptions together). The corresponding figure for Eastern Europe and Central Asia is 376, for Latin America and the Caribbean 324, and for East Asia and the Pacific 207. The Gulf states do relatively well on this indicator; their values range from 213 in Oman to 956 in the UAE. Lebanon (407), and Jordan (295) have also got a comparatively dense communication infrastructure. The values for the region's three low-income countries, however, as well as for Algeria (64), Libya (118), and Syria (115) are very poor (see Table A11, Annex).


Figure 24: Trends in the implementation of MDG8 / Target 14 (Access to affordable medical drugs)



As far as the number of personal computers in use per 1000 population is concerned, the MENA region (32) ranks below Eastern Europe and Central Asia (52) and Latin America and the Caribbean (59), but ahead of East Asia and the Pacific (19). Good figures are reported from the Gulf countries (ranging from 32 in Oman to 164 in Qatar), Lebanon (56), and Jordan (33), while the figures for Morocco (14), Algeria (7), Egypt (16), and Syria (16) are just as poor as those for the three low-income countries Yemen (2), Mauritania (10), and Sudan (14) (see Table A11, Annex).

The situation is similar for the use of the Internet (see Figure 25). The average number of web users per 1000 population in the MENA region as a whole is 16, which is far less than the figures for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (43), Latin America and the Caribbean (59), and East Asia and the Pacific (41). Relatively good figures for Internet access per 1000 population have been noted for the UAE (315), Bahrain (203), Kuwait (88), Lebanon (78), and Qatar (66), although the figures for Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Libya, Mauritania, and Syria are all lower than 10 (see Table A11, Annex).

Figure 25: Trends in the implementation of MDG8 / Target 18 (Access to modern information and communication technologies)



Abbreviations: see Figure 18.

Source: by the author, based on the data in Table A11, Annex

4 Acceptance of the MDGs in the Middle East and North Africa

The question now is whether the MENA countries have embraced the MDGs as development goals of their own:

- How well known and accepted is the MDG agenda in the region?
- To what extent are the region's political decision-makers willing to commit themselves to implementing the MDGs?

- Are the goals reflected in national development plans and have they had any influence on the actual orientation of policy?

There is some evidence indicating that most rulers in the MENA region are not especially committed to implementing the MDGs.

It is, however, not possible to answer these questions with any degree of certainty for lack of sound evidence. Official documents and communiqués are not particularly reliable in that they do not necessarily reflect the actual opinions and intentions of those responsible for them. They may be bound up with strategic goals. They are often addressed to specific circles – e.g. populations or constituencies, certain interest groups within a given country – or to the international community. In these cases they serve to boost the internal or external legitimacy of individual governments, i.e. their intention is to cast government policy in a favorable light among the populace or to curry favor among external donors (or both at the same time).

Even proven facts are not necessarily hard evidence. One indication that the MDGs have met with acceptance might e.g. be that a demonstrable change of political course has taken place in favor of social and ecologically compatible development or that trends for certain MDG indicators have accelerated significantly since the Millennium Declaration. In itself, however, this is not solid evidence for any acceptance of the MDGs or commitment on the part of political decision-makers to implementing them. Neither changes of political course nor social or environmental progress need necessarily be due to the Millennium Declaration. Such progress might have come about even in the absence of the declaration – and been triggered by quite different factors. A country may e.g. have reached a certain phase of development at which its social and economic indicators improve for reasons that have little to do with politics, or it may be reaping a harvest sown in earlier decades.

4.1 Level of awareness and acceptance of the MDG agenda

Formally, all countries of the MENA region have accepted the MDGs. Indeed, they themselves have set the goals, together with all other UN member states, at the Millennium Summit in New York.

It has often been claimed by critics that the MDGs were developed without any involvement of the developing countries, by an undiluted donor club, the OECD. How, then, could they be expected to develop ownership for the MDG agenda!? It is even claimed that the OECD enticed the developing countries to accept the goals by adding MDG8 to the OECD-DAC's seven International Development Goals. It is further claimed that this eighth goal, for which the donors are chiefly responsible, is far less concrete than the others. It is also noted that the UN did not even vote on the MDG agenda, but that it was only presented to the General Assembly in 2001. Furthermore, it is said that the MDG agenda takes up only the goals formulated in two of the four central chapters of the Millennium Declaration.

None of this does anything to change the fact that the MDGs are contained in the Millennium Declaration itself and that the declaration was adopted and expressly welcomed by all UN member countries. The fact that many of the targets and objectives of the declaration are not contained in the MDG agenda is no obstacle to implementing at least the MDGs.

All MENA countries were represented by high-ranking persons at the Millennium Summit in New York. Not only did all MENA representatives vote for the Millennium Declaration, they explicitly welcomed the declaration in individual statements. Indeed, Algeria, Iran, Yemen, Jordan, Qatar, the Palestinian Authority, Sudan, and Tunisia were represented by their heads of state. Mauritania was represented by its prime minister, Saudi Arabia by Crown Prince ^cAbdullah, Libya by the Secretary of the People's Congress, and the UAE by Emir Fujaira. Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Syria, on the other hand, were represented by their foreign ministers, Morocco by Prince Moulay Rachid, and Oman by the cultural affairs minister. Finally, Iraq sent only its deputy foreign minister to the summit, and Lebanon was represented by the chairman of its UN delegation. Statements were furthermore made by the secretaries-general of the Arab League and the Islamic World Conference (see Table A15, Annex).

During other opportunities as well, the leaders of the MENA countries have referred time and again to the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs, explicitly welcoming them. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the region have also expressed highly positive opinions of the Millennium Declaration. They see in the MDG agenda a list of the same demands they have been addressing to their governments for many years (ANND 2004; Farag 2004; Satterthwaite 2004).

Whether and to what extent the political decision-makers in the region are in fact committed to the MDGs continues to be uncertain (DFID 2004; Hermle 2005). The goals may prove quite opportune for rulers of countries that have already made good progress in implementing them. These rulers can cite the fact that they are likely to reach most MDG within the given timeframe, both to their own population and to the international community, as an additional argument for the legitimacy of their regimes. The situation is, however, different for rulers for whom pursuit of the MDGs is bound up with major problems and high opportunity costs. If they are in fact serious about the MDGs, they will have no choice but to spend a higher share of government revenues to implement them. In this case the funds may be lacking in other areas where they may be needed urgently for power-strategic reasons. Such governments are therefore not very likely to be interested in seeing their citizens learn all too much about the MDG agenda and start discussing it. And they are also apt to do their best to ensure that their citizens are not properly informed about the MDGs.

What this means is that government information policy may provide a – to be sure vague – indication of the degree to which rulers in the region are aware of and accept the MDGs. Whether or not these rulers are in fact interested in informing their population on the MDG agenda is reflected not least in how often and how exactly they refer to the agenda in their official pronouncements and how much room they accord in them to the details of the implementation processes in their countries.

For this reason, we have evaluated, for the purpose of this study, the official websites of governments in the MENA region. Four countries were selected as an example: two each from the Maghreb and the Mashriq, two monarchies and two republics, and two countries with marked French and with English influence. These countries are: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. The assessment was based on the following criteria:

- How many sites contain the keywords “Millennium Goals”, “MDGs”, or “Millennium Declaration”?
- How intensively are these sites dealing with the issue?
- Do they address the national implementation of the MDGs?

The results are sobering. A search with Google turned up over 400,000 hits using the extensions “.gov.ma” for Morocco, “.nat.tn” or “.ministeres.tn” for Tunisia, “.gov.eg” for Egypt, and “.gov.jo” for Jordan. But on all these

sites we found only 143 hits for the search terms “Millennium Goals”, “MDGs”, or “Millennium Declaration” (for Egypt 77 hits in a total of 197,000 pages; for Jordan 20 hits in 68,000 pages, for Tunisia three hits in 37,000 pages; and for Morocco 43 hits in 106,000 pages). 57 of these hits were doubles and 14 hits referred to websites pages that no longer exist. The remaining 72 pages (including 37 from Egypt, eight from Jordan, three from Tunisia, and 24 from Morocco) only mention the MDGs or the Millennium Declaration in passing. Only 22 such pages deal mainly with the Millennium process (21 from Egypt, one from Jordan, and not one single page from Tunisia or Morocco), and only 13 of these pages (all of them from Egypt) deal with national development.⁴

4 The Google search was conducted on 12 Dec. 2004. The search term used for Egypt and Jordan was (MDGs OR millennium goals OR millennium declaration site:.gov.eg/jo). For Morocco and Tunisia the corresponding term was (OMD OR ODM OR objective millénaire OR déclaration millénaire site:.gov.ma/tn).

The search under Egypt turned up 147 hits; 29 were doubles, 11 pages were no longer available, and 70 pages had no references to the MDGs, i.e. the terms sought, (millennium) and (goals), simply happened to be on the same site. 16 of the pages found only mentioned the MDGs in passing. Five appeared in connection with the World Summit on the Information Society 2002, two were associated with the Earth Summit 2002 in Johannesburg, and one had to do with the Millennium Summit itself.

Only 13 sites dealt with the Millennium process in Egypt itself. Nine of these sites dealt with the 4th annual conference of the Egyptian National Council for Women on the topic “Women and the Millennium Development Goals,” which took place in Cairo from 13-16 March 2004. One hit was a ppt-presentation on environmentally sustainable development (MDG7). Two sites contained speeches by Suzanne Mubarak, the wife of the president, and one contained a press release by the Egyptian foreign ministry.

The search on Jordan turned up 29 hits, ten of which were doubles, two were no longer available, and nine had no relevance to the MDGs (see above). Seven sites made passing reference to the MDGs. Two of them dealt with water-management issues, four were print versions of speeches held by the king on development in the Arab world, and one contained a speech held by Prince Talal at the World Summit on the Information Society 2003. Finally, one hit, from the Jordan Department of Statistics, referred to a working group concerned with efforts to standardize statistics on development indicators (including the MDG indicators).

The search on Tunisia turned up nine hits. Two of these pages mentioned, in passing, the Millennium Declaration and one referred to the MDGs. None of the others made any reference to the MDGs (see above).

Finally, the search on Morocco turned up 124 hits, 18 of them doubles. One page was no longer available and 81 had no relevance to the MDGs. The remaining 24 pages mentioned the MDGs only in passing. Eight of them were print versions of speeches

Many observers confirm the impression that the population of the MENA countries is largely unfamiliar with the MDGs. In contrast to other development-related issues such as e.g. the EUROMED free-trade area, the MDGs play as good as no role in the public debate.⁵ The Palestinian Authority is even reported to have openly expressed its disinterest in a debate over the MDGs. Even scientists and NGOs actively concerned with MDG-relevant issues (such as health, social welfare, microcredits, or women's empowerment) have yet to hear anything about the MDGs. The same goes even for many ministerial officials and – above all – politicians at the municipal or province level (GTZ/ KfW 2005c, 2). While leading government officials are of course familiar with the MDGs, they are for the most part only superficially informed about the background and details of the MDG agenda. Indeed, in these circles more time is devoted to discussions on the Arab Human Development Reports.⁶

NGOs in the MENA region mainly blame the information policy of the region's governments for this state of affairs (ANND 2004; Farag 2004; WFUNA / NSI 2004, 10 ff.). They also complain about being excluded just about everywhere from participation in preparing national MDG reports. In some countries they learned only from third-party about the findings of these reports. In fact, though, UNDP (2003) recommends that

made by the king, six speeches by the foreign minister, four speeches by the health minister, three were international declarations, and two were foreign ministry press releases.

- 5 An additional, second Google search was conducted on this question. The search looked into *all* Jordan and Egyptian websites pages for the exact combination 'millennium development goals': ("millennium development goals" site:.eg) and ("millennium development goals" site:.jo). For Jordan the search found 31 sites – without any doubles – that could still be accessed. Thirty of them mentioned the MDGs only in passing. One site dealt explicitly with the MDGs.

But these combinations did turn up 93 hits on Egyptian websites – without any doubles on one site. Although 61 of these pages dealt with the MDGs only in passing, 28 of them were centrally located and dealt with them relatively intensively. 13 of these pages were in the government domain, 8 on the UNDP website, three with other UN organizations, six with Al-Ahram Weekly, and two with the Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey.

- 6 Various websites refer to this problem, such as e.g. <http://www.ckc-undp.org.jo/newsletter/newsletter.htm> (12 Dec. 2004), which has also been confirmed by representatives of German development cooperation (see the list of interview partners in the Annex). In talks with various scientists from the region, the author also found that many of his interviewees were not aware of the MDGs.

MDG reports be worked out by governments in cooperation with civil society and representatives of international organizations and bilateral donors (ANND 2004; Fariz 2003; WFUNA / NSI 2004, 15 f.).

Egypt and Morocco may differ somewhat from the other MENA countries in this regard; but this too is assessed very differently by different observers. Some persons interviewed in connection with this study claimed that the governments of Egypt and Morocco have again and again spoken of the MDGs in addresses to their populations, noting that the media in both countries report more or less frequently on the national MDG implementation (GTZ / KfW 2005b). Others, though, denied this categorically.

4.2 Commitment of the MENA governments to the MDGs

Whether and to what extent political decision-makers are really committed to the MDG agenda is of course the crucial question here – not least for decisions on the role that development cooperation (DC) can play in the implementation of the MDGs. DC can of course not achieve much if its partner governments are not really committed to tackling the problems involved. Unfortunately, we cannot say much about this because we have no hard evidence but only rather vague indications.

One such indication is whether a country has already presented a national MDG report and whether this report was prepared by the country itself. For reasons of national ownership, all developing countries are actually expected to prepare their own national MDG reports – with international organizations at best providing advisory and technical support.

Thus far 13 of the 20 MENA countries have prepared MDG reports – and Egypt has already presented its second one (see Table A14, Annex). A report on Sudan is in preparation. The same cannot be said of Iraq, of Libya or of the four Gulf countries Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE. The reports on Iran, Syria, and Yemen were issued by the national governments. Egypt commissioned a government institute to prepare the national report. But the reports on Algeria, Mauritania, the Palestinian Territories, and Saudi Arabia had to be prepared by a UN institution. The Palestinian Authority has even been reported not to have any interest in preparing and releasing a national MDG report.

Additional indications are presented in the national MDG reports. According to the guidelines drawn by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG 2003) every national MDG report should assess the quality of the so-called “supportive environment” for the implementation of every single MDG in the respective country. What this means is the level of motivation and commitment of the relevant actors (i.e. the government, but also civil society) to implementing the MDGs. The only reports that contain no such assessment are the Algerian and Tunisian ones.

The assessments of the other MDG reports differ substantially. The supportive environment in Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Syria has in general been assessed rather positive, while the assessments for Mauritania, Iran, Yemen, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories have been more negative (see Table A13, Annex).

These divergences can in part be explained. The MDG reports with a more or less critical tenor have as a rule been prepared by UNDP or another neutral institution. The reports presented by Morocco, Syria, Bahrain, and Egypt, however, have been prepared by the respective national government or by a quasi-governmental research institutions. The rulers of these countries are of course interested (for reasons of internal and external legitimacy) in seeing the MDG reports present their commitment to implementing the MDGs in a positive light.

However, it is difficult, on intuitive grounds, to accept the fact that Saudi Arabia, whose MDG report was released by UNDP, should have received a better assessment than any other MENA country, especially in view of the fact that the kingdom has shown substantial deficits in implementing several of the MDGs.

There are also contradictions between the assessments of various observers of developments in the MENA countries. Some praise in particular the commitment of the governments of Syria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco to the MDGs while others note that all statements made by politicians of these countries are nothing more than lip service.

4.3 Influence of the MDG agenda on national policy

It is also not yet possible to say definitively to what extent the MDG agenda has led to policy changes in the MENA countries. It is true that they are

producing a growing number of strategy papers that contain goals very similar to individual MDGs, but this may also be due to chance. In addition, we do know whether these strategy papers are taken seriously and to what extent they are being translated into practice (Hermle 2005).

The MENA countries, for sure, will not be able to fully ignore the Millennium process. The MENA countries have now realized that they will have to come to terms with the discussions and international comparisons inspired by the MDG agenda. However, the individual MENA countries are dealing quite differently with this challenge. In essence, we can identify two basic modes of response:

A first group of countries welcomes the MDGs, but not without emphasizing that they have, basically always, pursued the MDGs. Their governments announce – it might be said, already with a certain pride – that they see no reason to modify their policies in view of the MDG agenda. This group of countries includes above all Syria and Tunisia, but also, perhaps to a lesser extent, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco.

In part at least, these countries are not all that wrong in arguing along these lines. Tunisia especially can rightly claim that it has, already in the past, achieved some noteworthy successes in MDG-relevant areas. Its government has, for example, managed to reduce income poverty substantially by a prudent social policy which it insisted on retaining against the resistance of the IMF and the World Bank (Hamza 2002; UN 2003b). The country also laid the foundation for its present, very active women's promotion policy in the 1960s (Morrison / Friedrich 2004). And Egypt and Morocco, several years ago, put the measures in place that have ultimately led to an appreciable rise in school-enrolment and literacy rates in these two countries (PARC 2002; Royaume du Maroc 2003).

In other cases, though, the only explanation for the complacency of the governments concerned is a deliberate failure to take cognizance of the conditions actually given in their countries. One extreme example here is Syria. In the introduction to its national MDG report, the Syrian government let it be known that “*Development in Syria takes place in a democratic system which protects freedom, equality, justice and human rights. The system was built [...] on political and economic pluralism.*” (Syrian Arab Republic 2003, 4) Elsewhere it claims: “*Syria's development experience is characterized by the provision of free and democratic education at*

all educational stages [...]. In this way, the country provides education to the entire population.“ (Ibid: 4) The Jordanian MDG report claims: „*The Government of Jordan has been paying attention to environmental issues since the 1960s.*“ (Jordan MOPIC / UN 2004, 48) Morocco notes: “*Le message délivré par sa Majesté le Roi Mohammed VI [...] à New York en Juin 2001, et l’inauguration par sa Majesté de l’Hôpital de Jour, pour la prise en charge des cas de VIH/SIDA [...] prouvent l’engagement politique au plus haut niveau dans la lutte contre le SIDA au Maroc.*“ (Royaume du Maroc 2003, 36)

None of these countries deny that they need to step up their efforts in individual areas. However, the governments are not prepared to acknowledge publicly that even more incisive policy changes are called for. After all, this would amount to acknowledging that mistakes and failures have been made in the past.

There are also indications that the governments of the MENA countries have nevertheless been influenced by the MDG agenda (and/or by the Millennium Summit and the world conferences that preceded it). For some years now they have been preparing a growing number of development plans and strategy papers whose goals largely coincide with individual MDGs (above all MDGs 4, 5, and 7) – even though the MDGs are rarely referred to explicitly (GTZ / KfW 2005d; see also Overview 4). According to some observers, this goes in particular for Morocco, and this is the reason why the Sachs Report (Sachs 2005) cites the country as a potential candidate for fast-tracking, i.e. as a country that meets the conditions for major investments geared to an accelerated implementation of the MDGs (GTZ / KfW 2005b).

On the other hand, it is questionable whether and to what extent these planning documents have led to changes in political practice. Some reports on Tunisia indicate that government representatives at different levels and in different fields very often make reference to individual MDGs, affirming their will to implement the goals. Tunisia is also reported at least to be very serious about its five-year national development plans. Other observers, though, have a more differentiated assessment of this state of affairs. In their opinion, even the statements made by the Tunisians are at least in part no more than lip service. It is furthermore noted that it is easy for the Tunisians to show commitment since they are in any case on the way to reaching most of the MDGs.

Overview 4: Strategy papers of selected MENA countries that may have been prepared under the influence of the MDGs or the world conferences of the 1990s	
Country	Strategy papers and the goals they set out
Egypt:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – <i>National Health Plan 2000–2010</i>: Improvement of rural health infrastructure, promotion of family planning and safe contraception, restriction of the spread of HIV/Aids, reduction of maternal mortality rates by 50 % – <i>Poverty Reduction Strategy</i> (2004): Reduction of income poverty <i>Agenda for the empowerment of women</i> (in preparation) – <i>Strategy for education-sector reform</i> (in preparation): Promotion of girls' education, increased government expenditures for education
Jordan:	<p><i>National Strategy for the Environment</i> (1992) <i>National Agenda 21</i> (2000)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – <i>National Population Strategy 2000–2005</i>: Reduction of fertility, child, and maternal mortality rates, improvement of medical attendance for births, increase in the average marriage age of women as well as intervals between births, promotion of safe methods of contraception
Lebanon:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – <i>National Multi-sector reproductive health program</i> (n.d.): Improvement of the health of (expecting) mothers – <i>National HIV/Aids Program</i> (n.d.): Improvement of HIV/Aids prevention and medical care for Aids patients – <i>Code of Environment</i> (2002): Expansion of <i>natural</i> reserves, reforestation, lowering of fuel consumption and car emissions, improvement of water and wastewater management
Morocco:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – <i>Charte de l'éducation et de la formation</i> (1999): Increased school enrolment and literacy, improvement of schooling – <i>Plan de développement économique et social 2000–2004</i>: Promotion of women and their participation in economic life, improvement of <i>access</i> to medical drugs, improvement of rural healthcare, decentralization of the healthcare system, development of a national health-insurance system – <i>Plan Stratégique National de lutte contre le SIDA 2002–2004</i>: Aids prevention, reduction of Aids prevalence rates by 50 %, improved treatment of Aids patients – <i>Plan d'Action National pour l'environnement</i> (n.d.): Environmental protection, improvement of resource management

Overview 4 continued: Strategy papers of selected MENA countries that may have been prepared under the influence of the MDGs or the world conferences of the 1990s	
Country	Strategy papers and the goals they set out
Palestinian Territories:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – <i>National Plan of Action for Palestinian Children</i> (1995): Translation of the Declaration of the World Summit for Children into national goals – <i>National Health Strategic Plan 1999–2003</i>: Improvement of the quality of the healthcare system, improved healthcare with a special focus on reproductive health and the health of children and youths – <i>The Five-year Education Plan 2000–2005</i>: Development of capacities in the education sector, improvement of school curricula, improvement of school enrolment rates for girls
Syria	
Tunisia:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – <i>Stratégie Nationale de développement durable / Agenda 21 national</i> (1995): Improved water management, protection of biodiversity, desert protection, air pollution control – <i>Stratégie Nationale pour la réduction de la mortalité maternelle</i> (1999): Accelerated reduction of maternal mortality rates (first positive effects already visible)
Source: <i>Egypt</i> : PARC (2002). <i>Jordan</i> : Jordan MOPIC / UN (2004). <i>Lebanon</i> : UN (2003a). <i>Morocco</i> : Royaume du Maroc (2003). <i>Palestinian Territories</i> : UN (2002a). <i>Syria</i> : Syrian Arab Republic (2003). <i>Tunisia</i> : UN (2003b)	

As far as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Morocco are concerned, observers note that what is lacking is less official ambition in formulating goals than resolve when it comes to translating them into practice (ESCWA 2005; PARC 2002; Republic of Yemen 2003; UN 2003a; UN 2003b). As early as in 2003 e.g. the Moroccan government presented a national MDG report, repeatedly emphasizing the great importance it attaches to the Millennium process in Morocco. But the implementation process is proceeding at a far slower pace than many observers would have expected (GTZ / KfW 2005b). To cite an example, Morocco's recent literacy program was very slow in getting underway. The case is similar in Jordan, where several initiatives aimed at improving the legal status of women ran out of steam before they had reached their objectives. In many cases official planning documents are prepared purely for strategic reasons and are

meant primarily for the eyes of donors. In other words, they contain what the donors are interested in reading.

Another typical development is that in 2004, four years after the Millennium Summit, the Egyptian government, together with the World Bank, presented a poverty reduction strategy which, in the 53 pages of which it consists, not once mentions the MDGs and continues to view poverty merely as income poverty. The nonmonetary aspects of poverty (lack of education, health, participation, etc.) are not even addressed in the paper (Egypt / World Bank 2004).

Much the same can be said of a World Bank Poverty Report on Morocco (World Bank 2004g) which mentions the MDGs only in a footnote, likewise equating poverty with income poverty.

The second group of countries includes Yemen in the Middle East and Algeria and Mauritania in North Africa. It is certainly not by chance that two of these countries are low-income countries and that they have prepared PRSPs. All three countries are typified by a public discourse that is quite transparent by regional comparison, and all three are – though for different reasons – highly dependent on the benevolence of donors.

The countries of the second group have explicitly translated all of the MDGs into national development goals. They furthermore differ from the countries of the first group in that they engage in far more self-criticism. In official communiqués and documents the governments of these countries state relatively frankly what strategic errors and omissions they have made in the past and what major policy changes they see as necessary. Their strategy papers contain long lists of highly precise and very ambitious goals, which also include the MDGs.

One particularly typical case here is Mauritania, which presented a PRSP as early as 2001. All of the MDGs are addressed in it, although the PRSP in some cases goes far beyond the targets set out under the MDG agenda. To cite an example, under the PRSP, the proportion of income-poor as a percentage of the population is set to be reduced from 57 % in 1990 to 19 % by 2015 – and not ‘only’ to 28 %, as targeted in MDG1. Furthermore, the PRSP provides for an upper limit of 1 % of the overall population for the country’s HIV prevalence rate. And another of its PRSP goals is to lower the illiteracy rate to 0 % by 2015 – an objective that appears highly unrealistic in view of today’s illiteracy rate of nearly 60 % (UNDG 2002).

Overview 5: The MDG agenda and Yemen's official development goals: a comparison	
MDGs	Yemen's official development goals
MDG1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Reduce the share of income poor by national criteria from 47 % in 1990 and 42 % in 1998, to 36 % in 2005 and to 2 % in 2015 (PRSP; five-year plan). – Halve the proportion of people without secure access to food from 18 % (1998) to 9 % (2015) (PRSP). – Reduce the share of people living on less than 1 US\$ per day from 11 % (1998) to 5 % (2015) (PRSP). – Reduce the proportion of underweight children from 46 % (1997) to 35 % (2015) (PRSP).
MDG2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Increase the enrolment rate in primary education (PRSP). – Increase the completion rate in primary education to 100 % (2015) (EFA-FTI; Strategic Vision 2025). – Increase government spending on education by 10 % (PRSP).
MDG3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Overcome gender disparities in primary education by 2015 (PRSP). – Increase girls' primary-school enrolment rates to 69 % (2005) (PRSP). – Increase the proportion of literate women to 48 % (2002) (EFA-FTI). – Increase the proportion of women among the working population to 23 % (2001) (PRSP).
MDG4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Reduce infant mortality to 60 per 1000 live births in 2005, and to 27 in 2015 (PRSP). – Reduce child mortality to 82 per 1000 live births in 2005, and to 37 in 2015 (PRSP). – Provide access to primary healthcare for at least 80 % of the rural population by 2005 (Public Health Sector Strategy).
MDG5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Reduce maternal mortality from 850 (1995) to 213 per 100,000 births (PRSP).
MDG6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Halt the spread of HIV/Aids by 2005 (National Aids Program). – Halve the number of annual new HIV cases by 2010 (Public Health Sector Strategy). – Increase the use of safe contraceptives (National Aids Program). – Reduce the number of malaria cases (National Malaria Framework).

Overview 5 continued: The MDG agenda and Yemen's official development goals: a comparison	
MDG7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – By 2015, connect 100 % of all urban households to the public drinking-water supply (PRSP). – Increase the proportion of the rural population with access to safe drinking water from 25 % (1998) to 50 % (2015) (PRSP). – Increase the share of households with sewage disposal from 7 % (1998) to 60 % (PRSP).
MDG8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Provide for good governance and administration as a means to ensure that available resources are used optimally and all members of society are able to participate in political decision-making processes (PRSP). – Improve the quality of governance and security (five-year plan). – Extend the percentage of paved roads from the present 9 % of all roads to 11 km per 1000 km² (PRSP, five-year plan).
Source: By the author, based on Khan / Chase (2003, 2, Table 1); supplemented with data from Republic of Yemen (2002); Republic of Yemen (2003)	

Yemen's strategy papers also show the clear-cut influence of the MDGs. While the country's 1996–2000 five-year plan focused on economic growth and efforts to secure the country's economic stability, the 2001–2005 five-year plan specifies poverty reduction and sustainable development as priority goals. Yemen has also prepared a PRSP, even though it has no prospects of being granted debt relief under the HIPC initiative. Its PRSP notes only in passing that the goals it sets out are in conformity with the MDG agenda (Republic of Yemen 2002). The country has nowhere explicitly embraced the MDGs as national development goals. However, nearly all of the MDGs are contained implicitly in the country's PRSP or in other national strategy papers (see Overview 5).

However, the action taken by Mauritania, Algeria, and Yemen still lags further behind the ambitious targets set than the first group of countries named above. In some areas Mauritania has already taken the measures provided for in its PRSP (e.g. in implementing the *Plan Directeur National pour la santé* in the health sector). In other areas, though, the government is still lagging behind its planning targets. Thus far neither the *Programme d'Action National pour l'environnement et le développement*

durable of 2003 nor the *Plan d'Action National pour la nutrition* of 1995 have been implemented (UNDG 2002; GTZ / KfW 2005c).

The case of Algeria is similar. Its 2001–2003 central development plan refers to all of the MDGs as important national goals. The country has made appreciable progress in its efforts to reform the education sector and increase school enrolment rates. On the other hand, the country has yet to reform its 1984 civil-status law, to implement a program designed to improve waste management, and to pass the legislation needed to translate international environmental conventions into national law. While the country's goods and factor markets have, formally, been opened and liberalized, informal structures continue to scare off both domestic and foreign investors. The procedures and decisions of administration and judiciary continue to be protracted, complicated, opaque, and hence have a clear-cut anti-business bias (GTZ / KfW 2005a; UN 2004a).

5 Orientation of German development cooperation

The 2004 German government report on the contribution provided by Germany to implementing the Millennium Development Goals states: “*The MDGs and the Millennium Declaration constitute the binding orientation framework for German development policy.*” (Bundesregierung 2004, 1). The German government, it goes on, provides “***concrete measures designed to reach the MDGs in relevant countries, and it supports initiatives designed to improve the framework for development, as called for in the Millennium Declaration.***” (Ibid: 1; emphasis in original). The report continues: “*The joint international goals, including the MDGs, serve as a guideline for the BMZ's medium-term policy formulation.*” (Ibid: 3).

In this chapter we will look into whether and to what extent the aims defined by the BMZ and the whole German government as a whole are reflected by the practice of Germany's development cooperation (DC) with partner countries in the MENA region. We will focus successively on (i) the geographic and (ii) the sectoral orientation of German DC, (iii) the measures supported by it within individual sectors, (iv) the political dialogue with partner governments, and (v) the progress made until today in implementing MDG8, for which the donors bear principal responsibility.

The conclusion will be that, viewed against the background of the MDG agenda, both the geographic and the sectoral orientation of German DC can be seen as reasonable and appropriate. The German government has also come to concentrate more and more on implementation of the MDGs as an issue in government-level negotiations with its partner countries.

But the German contribution to MDG8 must be assessed more critically. In addition, there is also room to improve the Germany's contribution to the implementation of the other goals in the MENA region. German DC should concentrate more than in the past on countries and sectors that are characterized by (i) significant problems that have to be solved, (ii) the political will of the partner country to solve these problems, and (iii) the inability of the partner country to solve the problem because of financial, technical, or administrative reasons.

The most important deficit, however, must be seen in the conceptual foundation and documentation of German DC. The BMZ's country concepts and priority strategy papers devote hardly any attention to the MDGs and the German DC's contribution to their implementation. Many of the goals that are mentioned in these documents are in line with the thrust of the MDG agenda, but the papers are not clear about this. Many of them do not even explain how the measures supported by German DC serve to implement the higher-level goals with which they are associated. This is also not looked into ex post, and thus far German DC has not been subjected to an MDG-specific impact analysis in even one partner country.

5.1 Country concentration

Viewed against the background of the MDGs, Germany's country programming within the MENA region may on the whole be assessed as reasonable and appropriate. The only point that would call for discussion is the classification of Morocco and Egypt as priority partner countries. In addition, it might make sense to intensify the German DC with Mauritania, presupposing that such a decision is taken solely from the perspective of the MDGs. This issue will be addressed in more detail in what follows.

Even if a given developing country is faced with major deficits in implementing the MDGs, DC does not necessarily have to be expanded, because quite a num-

ber of reasons can be responsible for the country's insufficient progress: The success of any country in pursuing the MDGs depends on three kinds of factors.

The first is the *urgency to solve the existing problems* of the country, i.e. the dimensions of the social problems depicted by the MDG indicators. It has already been noted in Chapter 3 that e.g. enrolment rates in primary education are much easier to raise by a few percentage points when they have not exceeded levels of around 50 % than in the case that nearly every child is already enrolled in primary school.

The second factor is the country's *capacities to solve its problems*, i.e. the ability of the relevant actors within the country to take adequate measures against these problems. These capacities are determined by the availability of financial resources, but also by the know-how, the political creativity, and the administrative-organizational capacities of the relevant actors.

The third factor finally is the country's *disposition or readiness to solve its problems*, i.e. the will and resolve of the relevant political decision-makers to seek and find solutions and act (Lampert 1994, 145; Loewe 1999; Loewe 2000a, 7; Loewe 2004c, 394).

This constellation of factors gives rise to an economic and a political dilemma. The economic dilemma is that countries which are characterized by a very high urgency to solve their problems are usually at the same time lacking the capacities needed to solve these problems. Most of them are in an early phase of development where problems are still very severe but financial, administrative and organizational capacities to solve them are also still limited.

The political dilemma, on the other hand, is given when the main actors in a country have the capacities to solve existing problems, but are – for whatever reasons – not ready to do so – because, for example, they prefer to spend government revenues for other purposes (e.g. to fill their own pockets).

If the economic dilemma is noted for a developing country, then there is good reason to engage in DC with it. The main point of DC is to help developing countries to escape from just this economic dilemma: to support them in precisely the areas in which they are faced with very serious stumbling blocks to their development, bottlenecks that they are virtually unable to overcome on their own.

The case is a different one when a developing country is faced with the political dilemma, when, in other words, a developing country's government

is able but not willing to solve the problems facing its population. In this case DC will not be able to accomplish much, because it depends – as the term indicates – on the existence of a partner which perceives the problems at hand, shows interest in tackling them, and is willing to contribute whatever it can to solving them.

In other words, the optimal conditions are given when a developing country is faced with a very high urgency of problem-solution, when its government is highly disposed to tackle these problems, and when at the same time its capacity to solve existing problems is markedly low. A model like the one presented in Overview 6 might be used to review the extent to which such conditions are given in any of the partner countries of German DC. The overview presents a hypothetical case, which does not resemble any real country. As a consequence, the goal orientation subscribed to the German DC at present is also entirely hypothetical. The third to seventh column reflect the partner country's urgency, capacity, and disposition to solve its problems. The last column, finally, makes proposals for a reorientation of German DC with the model partner country.

In looking at the urgency and capacity to solve given problems, we have to distinguish here between two different aspects. We can speak of a high urgency to take measures against a problem if the country's absolute MDG indicator values are especially low (if e.g. a large proportion of the population is suffering from hunger). Against the background of the MDGs, however, we can also speak of a high urgency to solve a problem if – regardless of initial levels – the relative change in a country's indicator values is unsatisfactory (if e.g. its child mortality rate has not improved much over the past years).

The capacity of a country to solve its own problems, on the other hand, depends on (i) the capacities and possibilities of its institutions, but also (ii) the capacities and possibilities that have been opened to the country through its DC with the donors. The point of factoring in this last aspect is to prevent German DC from becoming active in countries or sectors where many other donor countries are already providing support while at the same time overlooking countries and sectors that are neglected by all other donors as well.

Overview 6: Model for comparing the urgency, capacity and disposition of the partner governments of German development cooperation to solve the development problems of their countries							
Model country	Present orientation of German DC	Urgency to solve the problem		Capacity to solve the problem		Disposition (commitment) of government to solve the problem	Possible future orientation of German DC
		Absolute level of MDG indicators	Relative improvement of MDG indicators	Administrative and financial capacities	Engagement of other donors		
MDG1 (income poverty)	+++	moderate (0)	high (+)	small (+)	strong (-)	strong (+)	+
MDG1 (hunger)	0	moderate (0)	high (+)	moderate (0)	strong (-)	moderate (0)	0
MDG2-3 (education)	+	high (+)	moderate (0)	moderate (0)	weak (+)	strong (+)	+++
MDG3 (gender)	+	high (+)	high (+)	high (-)	weak (+)	strong (+)	+++
MDG4 (child mortality)	0	high (+)	low (-)	moderate (0)	moderate (0)	moderate (0)	0
MDG5 (maternal mort.)	0	high (+)	moderate (0)	moderate (0)	strong (-)	moderate (0)	0
MDG6 (HIV/Aids)	0	low (-)	moderate (0)	moderate (0)	strong (-)	strong (+)	0
MDG6 (malaria)	0	low (-)	moderate (0)	large (-)	moderate (0)	strong (+)	0
MDG7 (environment)	+++	moderate (0)	moderate (0)	small (+)	weak (+)	moderate (0)	+
MDG7 (drinking water)	+++	moderate (0)	moderate (0)	small (+)	strong (-)	moderate (0)	0
MDG7 (sanitation)	+++	moderate (0)	moderate (0)	small (+)	moderate (0)	moderate (0)	+++

Overview 6 continued: Model for comparing the urgency, capacity and disposition of the partner governments of German development cooperation to solve the development problems of their countries

Model country	Present orientation of German DC	Urgency to solve the problem		Capacity to solve the problem		Disposition (commitment) of government to solve the problem	Possible future orientation of German DC
		Absolute level of MDG indicators	Relative improvement of MDG indicators	Administrative and financial capacities	Engagement of other donors		
MDG8 (open markets)	+	high (+)	low (-)	small (+)	strong (-)	moderate (0)	0
MDG8 (governance)	0	high (+)	high (+)	large (-)	weak (+)	weak (-)	0
MDG8 (unemployment)	+++	high (+)	high (+)	moderate (0)	strong (-)	strong (+)	+
MDG8 (medical drugs)	0	moderate (0)	low (-)	moderate (0)	moderate (0)	moderate (0)	0
MDG8 (technologies)	0	high (+)	high (+)	moderate (0)	strong (-)	weak (-)	0

Notes:
 + Strong reason for engagement of German DC (*columns 2 and 8*: DC takes place / might take place).
 0 Less strong reason given for engagement of German DC (*columns 2 and 8*: DC does not / should not take place).
 – No good reason given for engagement of German DC.
 Source: By the author

Four countries in the MENA region are faced with an especially *urgency to solve their socioeconomic problems*: Yemen, Sudan, Mauritania, and Iraq. Chapter 3 has already pointed out that since 1990 these four countries have made very little progress in implementing the MDGs: On the one hand, their values on the MDG indicators have not improved much in *relation to their initial levels*. On the other hand, the *absolute values* for these countries are also very low. On some MDGs, the situation is somewhat similar in Egypt, Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, and Syria, – though nowhere near to the same extent as in the three countries named above.

Yemen, Sudan, Mauritania, the Palestinian Territories and Iraq have very low *capacities in solving problems*, as well. Yemen, Sudan, and Mauritania lack, first of all, the financial resources needed both to implement measures geared to implementing the MDGs and to acquire the expertise required for the purpose. In the Palestinian Territories and Iraq, however, the main bottleneck is not a lack of financial means. Instead, the scopes of these two countries are restricted by political givens: (i) the Israeli occupation and the uncertain legal status of the Palestinian Authority in the case of the Palestinian Territories; (ii) and the continuing presence of US troops there and the country's security situation in the case of Iraq.

Chapter 4 was unable to fully answer the question whether and to what extent the rulers in the MENA region are *disposed to effectively solve the problems* of their countries. We can, however, assume that most of them have no interest whatever in implementing all of the MDGs. This goes, above all, for the issue of good governance (an aspect of MDG8), but in part also for MDG1 (eradication of extreme poverty and hunger), MDG3 (gender equality), MDG7 (environmental sustainability), and MDG3 (improved school education).

Therefore, we limit ourselves at large to assessing the urgency and capacities within the different MENA countries to solve their socioeconomic problems when we analyze in what follows the country programming of German DC with the MENA region.

Within the MENA region, Germany cooperates mainly with four priority partner countries (Egypt, Yemen, Morocco, and the Palestinian Territories) and – to a lesser extent – with five partner countries (Algeria, Jordan,

Mauritania, Syria, and Tunisia).⁷ DC with Iran and Sudan are under consideration for the future (see Table A16, Annex).

The intensive engagement of Germany's DC with Yemen and the Palestinian Territories would appear reasonable from the perspective of the MDG agenda and against the background of the criteria and considerations outlined above. Both countries are hampered by limited capacities to solve problems, and Yemen at least is faced with a very high urgency to solve its problems as well. By regional comparison, Yemen's government also shows, at least in tendency, an above-average disposition to solve socio-economic problems (see Chapter 4).

This line of argument would also speak in favor of classifying Sudan, Iraq, and Mauritania as priority partner countries of German DC.

But the MDG agenda is not – and should not be – the only criterion used to define the orientation of DC. The German government has good, though different, reasons for not cooperating with Sudan, Iran, and Iraq: poor human rights situation, insufficient protection of minorities, lack of internal security, violations of the norms of international law, etc..

Yet none of these arguments would speak against expanding German cooperation with Mauritania. On the contrary, viewed from the perspective of the MDG agenda, many good reasons exist for making Mauritania a priority partner country of German DC: it suffers a far higher urgency and more limited capacities to solve its problems than most other MENA, and

7 In June 2000 the BMZ decided to improve the effectiveness and significance of German DC by moving toward a policy of regional and sectoral concentration. For one thing, the ministry reduced the number of its cooperation partners from an original 118 to 70 countries, 32 of which have been declared partner countries, 30 of which now have the status of priority partner countries, and eight of which are regarded as potential partner countries for the future. For another, with a view to enhancing the significance of development cooperation, German DC was restricted to one of a total of 10 so-called sectors in the partner country and three sectors in each priority partner country.

Sectors in this sense are (i) democracy, civil society, and public administration; (ii) peace-building and crisis prevention; (iii) education (excl. vocational training); (iv) health, family planning, HIV/Aids; (v) drinking water supply, water management, wastewater and waste disposal; (vi) food security and agriculture (incl. fisheries); (vii) environmental policy, protection and sustainable use of natural resources; (viii) economic reform and market systems development; (ix) energy (incl. energy efficiency and renewable energies); (x) transportation and communication (see BMZ 2004a).

the Mauritanian government's disposition to become active is at least not lower than that of other governments in the region.

At the same time, it is not entirely clear from the perspective of the MDGs why Morocco and Egypt should keep their present status of priority partner countries. Both are middle-income countries that have far greater capacities to solve their own problems than e.g. Yemen or Mauritania, and their problems are not quite as urgent to be solved as those of some other countries in the region (see Chapter 4).

The reasons again why Algeria, Jordan, Syria, and Tunisia do not have the status of priority partner countries are convincing. Just like Egypt and Morocco, they are middle-income countries with moderate socioeconomic problems and average capacities to solve them. The intention of the BMZ is to restrict DC with these four countries to only one sector in each country, although in practice this is only the case in Jordan and Syria. In both countries, the priority field of German DC is the water sector. In Tunisia, German DC takes place in two sectors (environmental policy; economic reform and market systems development, and in Algeria, it even extends to three sectors (environmental policy; the water sector; economic reform and market systems development). One could ask why Tunisia is still receiving support in the form of DC at all. The fact that Tunisia is likely to reach almost all of the MDGs would be a convincing argument for discontinuing DC support for the country. One reason for not proceeding this way is that termination of DC with a country like Tunisia might seem to be a punishment for the development successes the country has achieved, and this could prove to be a negative incentive for the commitment of other countries. Furthermore, DC with countries already on the road to success can sometimes achieve more than DC with poor countries that are far more reliant on external support, even though they are without the requisite institutional structures and their politicians may lack commitment.

5.2 Definition of sector priorities

Against the background of the MDGs, the sectoral orientation of German DC with the MENA countries can also be seen as very largely reasonable. In its priority areas German DC is in a position to provide important contributions to the achievement of the MDGs. However, it is not engaged in all fields that are crucial for this purpose.

The priorities set by the German government for its DC with the MENA region include above all two sectors: ‘economic reform and market systems development’ (“WiRAM”), and ‘drinking water, water management, and sewage/waste disposal’ (“water”). Germany cooperates with a total of nine countries from this regions: with seven it cooperates in the field “WiRAM”, with six in the water sector, and with five in the protection of resources, the nature and the environment. The education, health, and rural development sectors are defined as priority areas of German DC only in one MENA country each. The promotion of good governance is a priority area in two MENA countries; in addition, it is the object of a regional project of cooperation with Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (see Table A16, Annex).

In fact, it is neither possible nor permissible to equate DC in individual sectors with a contribution to implementing specific MDGs. DC in the education sector, for instance, may help a partner country to reach MDG2 and MDG3. At the same time, though, it may also contribute to implementing other goals, such as e.g. MDG4, MDG5, or MDG6, by strengthening the awareness of students for the need for preventive measures designed to maintain and improve health or facilitate access to medical drugs; and it may contribute to MDG1 by improving the employment and income opportunities of school graduates, in this way helping to reduce income poverty, hunger, and unemployment; or it may contribute to MDG7 by awakening an understanding for the need to deal more carefully with the environment and with scarce natural resources.

Likewise, DC can also contribute to reaching one of the MDGs when it is not conducted in a sector that appears immediately relevant to that goal. It is e.g. conceivable that efforts to implement MDG4, MDG5, and MDG6 could fail less for a lack of health infrastructure than for the demand for it. Even if rural regions are sufficiently supplied with health services, it is possible that the population may not make use of them because most households lack adequate awareness of the significance of appropriate preventive healthcare or because they are too poor to seek medical treatment, which might force them to miss work. What would in this case hold more promise than DC for expanding or reforming the health-care system is measures that would contribute to enhancing health awareness among the population.

Nevertheless, what follows will attempt to check the priorities set by German DC in the MENA region against the present state of the Millennium process in the individual partner countries, the aim being to go on from here to formulate propositions on a different future orientation of German DC towards sectors as viewed from the perspective of the MDG agenda. The following assumptions were made for this purpose:

- The MDG agenda is a consistent system of goals that are closely interrelated (Satterthwaite 2004). This means that measures conceived to help implement one MDG usually have positive impacts on several of the other MDGs as well. It is therefore important to distinguish between direct and indirect effects. What follows will start out by focusing on the direct effects of DC. Indirect effects of DC are not unmistakably indicated by its sectoral orientation. Only a detailed portfolio analysis of individual priority areas could provide the necessary information for that.
- As a rule, DC in the health sector entails direct effects on MDGs 4, 5, and 6 – although these impacts may differ substantially in their significance. Indirect effects are possible mainly for MDG1, MDG2, and MDG3.
- Much the same can be said for DC in the education sector, which contributes principally to implementing MDG2 and MDG3, although it may also have indirect effects on all other MDGs.
- DC in the environmental sector is of course keyed to MDG7 / Target 9. Whether this also entails positive impacts on other goals is a question that can be answered only for concrete cases. The most likely assumption would be more or less long-term effects on MDG1.
- It is less clear which goals are furthered by DC in the water sector. It has already been pointed out in Chapter 3 that in the water-poor MENA countries a conflict may arise between the goal of providing accesses to drinking water for as much of the population as possible (Target 10) and the goal of making sustainable use of available water resources (Target 9). As it has itself stated, German DC remains committed to the goal of sustainability in the water sector (Arce 2004). It is therefore assumed below that German DC in this sector too provides a direct contribution not only to Target 10 but also to Target 9 (however great this contribution may in fact be). Furthermore, there is good reason to expect significant indirect impacts on MDG4 and MDG5, since improved access to drinking water as a rule translates out into improved health and, above all, lower child mortal-

ity rates. Whether DC in the water sector also contributes to other MDGs depends on the concrete shape given to the measures it uses. There is, though, evidence that in most cases positive indirect effects are achieved over the short or long run for nearly all of the MDGs (Bliss 2004; Neubert / Horlemann 2005).

- It is more difficult to state with any degree of certainty which MDGs may be positively affected by DC measures in the WiRAM priority sector. A good number of very different measures are subsumed under WiRAM, and they may be targeted directly on poverty reduction, restructuring and improvement of the functioning of markets, enhancement of competition in markets, or privatization of publicly owned enterprises. In other words, the indirect purpose of these measures is to boost growth and to reduce poverty. Success here will depend above all on whether the measures taken (i) are appropriate to the situation in the partner country in question, (ii) are keyed to actual problems, and (iii) are implemented consistently. Nevertheless, the following reflections are based on the assumption that in its WiRAM priority sector German DC may, at least in general terms, provide a direct or indirect contribution to reducing income poverty (Target 1). If this in fact succeeds, there is good reason to anticipate positive effects on the proportion of the population suffering from hunger. In addition, the concrete measures taken by German DC in the priority sector of WiRAM also aim, in all MENA countries, at reducing unemployment and improving the market-regulation picture.

Overview 7 is based on these assumptions. It compares the priorities of German DC in the MENA region with the state of the Millennium process in the individual partner countries.

The overview first looks at the *economic problem solving-capacity* of these countries, distinguishing between low-income countries (Yemen, Mauritania) and middle-income countries (Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia). In addition, it lists separately the potential priority partner countries and partner countries of German DC in the MENA region (Iraq, Iran, Sudan). It omits the countries which, thanks to their high per capital incomes, are in possession of very pronounced capacities to solve their problems of their own and are therefore not seen as potential partner countries for German DC.

Overview 7: MDG orientation of German DC with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa																	
	MDG 1		MDG 2	MDG 3		MDG 4	MDG 5	MDG 6		MDG 7			MDG 8				
	In- come pov- erty	Hun- ger	Basic educa- tion	Gender (educa- tion)	Gender (em- ploy- ment)	Child mor- tality	Ma- ter- nal mor- tality	HIV/ Aids	Ma- la- ria	Envi- ron- ment	Drink- ing water	Sani- tation	Open mar- kets	Gov- ern- ance	Youth unem- ploy- ment	Medi- cal drugs	ICTs
Low-income countries (only partner / priority partner countries)																	
Yemen	■	x	■	■	x	■	■	x	x	x	■	■	■	■	■	x	
Mauritania	x	x						x		■				■			
Middle-income countries (only partner / priority partner countries)																	
Egypt	■	x	■	■	x	x	x			■	■	■	■		■		
Algeria	■	x			x	x	x			■	■	■	■	■	■		■
Jordan	■		■	■	■	■	x			x	■	■					■
Lebanon	■		■														■
Morocco	■	x	x	■	■	■	■	■	x	■	■	■	x	■	■		■
Palest. Terr.	■	x	■	■	x	x	x			x	■	■	■	■	■		
Syria	x	x	x	x		x	x			x	■	■	■	■			
Tunisia	■			■	x	x	x			x	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Potential partner / priority partner countries																	
Iraq																	
Iran																	
Sudan																	

Overview 7 continued: MDG orientation of German DC with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa

Source: Table A1 in Annex; BMZ (2004a)

Notes:

Black background: MDG will probably not be reached under the given framework conditions.

Gray background: MDG may possibly be reached.

White background: MDG like to be reached.

- In priority countries German DC is in a position to provide a direct contribution to implementing the MDG in question.
- Discontinued projects, projects outside the priority sectors, or regional projects contributing to implementing the respective MDG.
- x German DC is in a position to provide an indirect contribution to implementing the MDG in question.

Palest. Terr.: Palestinian Territories

Overview 8: Ongoing German DC measures in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 2004					
WiRAM	Primary education	Health	Water	Environment	Governance
<p>Egypt: Promotion of small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) in the informal and formal sector; promotion of adapted financial services; job-creation; vocational training</p> <p>Algeria: Improvement of competitiveness via promotion of SMEs new business startups (esp. women); promotion of associations; vocational training reform</p> <p>Yemen: Adapted vocational training and financing for informal SMEs; financing of the country's social fund;</p>	<p>Egypt: Decentralized construction and funding of schools; German university</p> <p>Yemen: Institutional capacity-building at all levels; community dev't; teacher training; promotion of girls' education; construction and equipment of schools and school authorities</p> <p>Jordan: Primary school construction; improvement of school buildings in informal town districts and refugee camps</p>	<p>Yemen: Policy advice on sector reforms; decentralization and budget planning; awareness-raising activities; institutional capacity-building; advanced management training, chiefly for women; provision of health and family-planning infrastructure</p> <p>Morocco: Healthcare system decentralization; reproductive health / support for national anti-Aids campaign</p> <p>PT: Hospital equipment; rehabilitation of social infrastructure;</p>	<p>Egypt: Poverty-oriented water provision; organizational reforms; optimized irrigation management; maintenance of water quality;</p> <p>Algeria: Integrated water management, incl. groundwater protection; treatment of drinking water; organizational development; agricultural irrigation</p> <p>Yemen: Affordable drinking-water supply and sewage disposal; awareness-raising work on wasteful use of water;</p>	<p>Egypt: Legal advice on environmental standards for air and water conservation; construction of wind and water power plants</p> <p>Algeria: Environmental legislation; integrated environmental management; monitoring systems; local environmental protection; awareness campaigns</p> <p>Yemen: Waste removal and disposal; affordable sewage disposal</p> <p>Jordan: Waste disposal; wind-energy park</p>	<p>Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia: Regional projects "good governance" (regional dialogue on participation, pluralism, transparency, government accountability; support for civil society and government reform processes)</p> <p>Mauritania: Support for decentralization / promotion of local authorities and self-determination, flanking support for municipal elections; development of corruption-free administrations;</p>

<i>Overview 8 continued: Ongoing German DC measures in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 2004</i>					
WiRAM	Primary education	Health	Water	Environment	Governance
<p>promotion of chambers of industry and commerce; promotion of women as a cross-cutting task; advisory services for government planning and supervision</p> <p>Lebanon: Vocational-training system promotion</p> <p>Morocco: Advisory services for professional and trade associations; trade promotion; SME promotion; improvement of the vocational training; promotion of social dialogue</p> <p>Mauritania Advice for the PRS process</p>	<p>Morocco: Promotion of functional literacy in connection with WiRAM measures</p> <p>PT: Labor-intensive construction and rehabilitation of school buildings</p>	<p>promotion of juvenile health based on school awareness-raising campaigns</p>	<p>sustainable water basin management; policy advice on legislation and water-tariff systems</p> <p>Jordan: Sewage disposal and treatment; preservation of groundwater quality; irrigation management</p> <p>Morocco: Drinking-water supply in small towns and rural areas; drinking-water protection areas; irrigation management</p> <p>PT: Policy advice on water and development of an institutional framework; improvement of water management;</p>	<p>Morocco: Industrial environmental protection (air and water); reduction of resource consumption; policy advice on anti-desertification measures, protection of biodiversity, resource protection, development of national parks, and protection of water catchments areas; promotion of renewable energies; municipal environmental protection</p> <p>Mauritania: Sustainable fishery; promotion of NGO anti-desertification work; biodiversity project Senegal; national parks administration</p>	<p>strengthening of the National Assembly and the state auditing authority; improvement of the employment opportunities and the legal and political rights of women</p> <p>PT: Capacity-building for ministries and the national statistics office, NGOs, and municipal administration -priority sectors; promotion of democracy, human rights, water consumption and management, women and young people; promotion of municipal self-government</p>

<i>Overview 8 continued: Ongoing German DC measures in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 2004</i>					
WiRAM	Primary education	Health	Water	Environment	Governance
<p>PT: Labor-intensive measures in infrastructure expansion, conceived as measure to reduce unemployment and poverty; promotion of associations and businesses; improvement of the vocational training system</p> <p>Tunisia: SME promotion based on credit and advisory services; development and expansion of the 'dual system' of vocational training</p>			<p>elimination of water losses; wastewater treatment and disposal for agriculture; provision of drinking water</p> <p>Syria: Sewage and waste disposal: elimination of leaks in water-supply and sewage disposal systems, conceptual advice on water management</p> <p>Tunisia: Management of irrigation; water supply in undersupplied regions; wastewater treatment plants</p>	<p>PT: Institutions and infrastructure for a waste-disposal system; construction of wastewater treatment plants</p> <p>Tunisia: Institutional capacity-building; strengthening of regional structures; support for coordination between government, municipalities, NGOs, etc.; dev't of a waste-disposal system; industrial environmental protection (air and water conservation, reduction of resource consumption)</p>	<p>Syria: Policy advice; National Planning Commission</p>
<p>Source: BMZ (1997); BMZ (2000a); BMZ (2002b); BMZ (2002c); BMZ (2002d); BMZ (2003a); BMZ (2003b); BMZ (2003c); BMZ (2004b); BMZ (2004c); BMZ (2004d); BMZ (2004e); BMZ (2004f); BMZ (2004g); BMZ (2004h); BMZ (2004j); BMZ (2004k); BMZ / Ägypten (2003); BMZ / Algerien (2003a); BMZ / Algerien (2003b); BMZ / Marokko (2000); BMZ / PA (2004a); BMZ / PA (2004b); BMZ / Tunesien (2003); GTZ / KfW (2005a); GTZ / KfW (2005b); GTZ / KfW (2005c); GTZ / KfW (2005d)</p>					

The overview then indicated the *urgency of problem-solution* as regards the individual MDGs in the countries listed. The shaded boxes indicate that a country is faced with major problems in implementing one of more MDGs. This makes it clear for the reader which MENA countries are especially reliant on external support, and in which sector this support is needed: For Iraq and the low-income countries Yemen, Mauritania, and Sudan, this is the case in nearly all sectors; only in Iran is the situation somewhat better. But it is possible to identify clear-cut priorities for the remaining MENA countries. All of them have major problems in implementing MDG1 (alleviation of poverty and hunger) and several targets of MDG8 (good governance, reduction of youth unemployment, access of the population to modern technologies). Most of these middle-income countries also have deficits with regard to MDG7 (environmental protection) MDG3 (political and social equality for women), and quality of primary school education – an aspect that the overview does not show clearly because no clear-cut indicators have been developed for it.

The entries in the boxes of Overview 7 show, in keeping with the assumptions made above, the MDGs to which German DC is in a position to provide contributions within its priority sectors. However, the *disposition* of individual partner countries and priority partner countries to solve problems could not be shown in the overview since this would have impaired the clarity of the presentation – and because no reliable data are available.

The comparative presentation clearly shows that German DC with the MENA region is conducted primarily in sectors in which it is in a position to contribute to reaching MDG1 and MDG7 in particular. Thus far most of the MENA countries have made insufficient – or no – progress on these two goals. On the other hand, German DC is hardly engaged at all in sectors like e.g. health, where it could contribute above all to reaching MDG4 and MDG5, two goals that the MENA countries might well achieve.

However, Overview 7 also shows that as a donor Germany has only a limited level of engagement in sectors marked by a high urgency to solve existing problems. Only in a few countries, for instance, is German DC supporting measures aimed at

- promoting democracy and good governance (one target of MDG8);

- improving the access of private households and microenterprises to modern information and communications technologies (one target of MDG8);
- promoting gender equality and empowerment of women (MDG3); and
- improving the quality of primary schooling in the region.

The Arab Human Development Reports that have appeared thus far argue that the most serious impediments to the development of the Arab countries must be sought in these four areas (UNDP / AFESD 2002; UNDP / AFESD 2003; UNDP / AFESD 2004; see also Chapter 3).

If we look at Overview 7, focusing on the individual countries there, we come to a similar conclusion. In all of its partner countries German DC is engaged almost exclusively in sectors in which little real progress has been made in reaching the MDGs. While German DC is, of course, not active in all areas marked by deficits, it is striking that in most partner countries these same fields have been ‘left out’: governance, gender equality, information and communications infrastructure, and quality of education.

There are only two countries that deviate from this rule. In them German DC is likewise not engaged in other sectors marked by a high urgency to solve problems. These countries are Jordan and Mauritania. In Jordan, German DC is not providing a direct contribution to reaching MDG1, even though income poverty and hunger continue to be major problems there. Mauritania, on the other hand, is forced to rely on external support to reach nearly all of the MDGs, including MDGs 1–6, to which German DC is providing – at best – indirect contributions.

However, no donor country is obliged to support all of its partners in implementing all of the MDGs. Indeed, there are good arguments for a sectoral focus. The *first* would be that every donor country should become engaged only in sectors in which it has comparative strengths. The *second* is that donor specialization of this kind would facilitate the coordination and harmonization of DC in that each donor would in this case be active only in a small number of sectors, and this would require only a limited number of donors to coordinate their activities in each sector. The *third* is that individual donors can in this way boost the effectiveness and visibility of their DC by restricting their efforts to a limited number of sectors, and it is in this case easier to monitor and document their DC contributions. The

fourth is that donors can more easily follow, and gain influence on, the strategies of their partner countries when they are active in only a limited number of sectors, which they are then free to deal with more intensively. And *fifth*, having to negotiate with only a few donors in each sector also eases the burden on partner countries.

Moreover, it may be wholly rational for donors to refrain completely from engagement in given sectors, even though levels of urgency to solve problems may be very high in them. The reason for this is that development problems may have very different causes. It is, for instance, conceivable that a developing country would be entirely able to solve a given problem on its own, and that it simply lacks the willingness to do so. In situations of this kind DC is neither called for nor reasonable.

It may e.g. be assumed that at least the middle-income MENA countries have capacities sufficient to improve their population's access to modern information and communications technologies. And to do so they need neither financial nor administrative support from donors. They have, however, evidently set other priorities. Whether or not it makes sense to engage in DC in the sector information and communications technologies will depend on how reasonable these priorities may appear to be.

The question is quite similar when we look at the three other sectors named above, in which there is at present very little DC, namely the sectors governance, gender equality, and quality of education. It is entirely conceivable that DC could at least facilitate or accelerate reforms in these three sectors. However, there are doubts as to whether the governments of the MENA countries are in fact interested in such reforms. These being sensitive sectors, it is essential that this question be answered before any thought is given to DC in the sectors governance, gender, or education. DC conducted against the express will of the rulers in partner countries will tend to be more or less powerless DC, and it may even entail negative impacts. On the other hand, these are three very important sectors, and DC cannot simply dodge engagement in them by pointing to the inadequate disposition of partner countries to solve their socioeconomic problems. In government-level talks, donors must regularly and persistently address the problems encountered in these three sectors, emphatically calling for reforms. Furthermore, it is essential for donors to look for subsectors in which partner countries have no objections to reforms and to DC and which hold promise of at least partial improvements. If need be, though,

donors should consider retrenching their DC with such countries – precisely because democracy and good governance, gender equality, and quality of education are of great importance for a country’s development and for the wellbeing of its population.

5.3 Measures engaged in by German bilateral DC

The greatest problem involved in German DC with the MENA countries is, however, that there is no adequate documentation of its actual or its intended impacts. The available strategy papers provide insufficient concrete information on how German DC intends to contribute to implementing the MDG agenda in the region. Nor is there any information available on whether German DC is in fact providing this contribution, since, at least to date, no MDG-specific impact analyses have been conducted in a country of the region.

The sectoral orientation of German DC permits us to draw conclusions only on its potential contribution to implementing the MDGs. To come up with reliable information on the contributions German DC is in fact making, it is necessary to take a detailed look at the portfolio of the measures in which it is engaged at the levels below its individual priority sectors. For this purpose the present study has subjected the BMZ’s country concepts and priority strategy papers (PSPs) to an exact analysis.

The country concept papers and PSPs are the central instruments of the BMZ for planning and steering German DC. The country concept papers are used to outline the situation in the partner countries: They specify the main development problems and potentials, the course of Germany’s engagement to date, and the contributions of other donors. Based on this analysis, they derive and justify the future orientation of German DC. The PSPs build on these country concepts. They specify deficits in a given sector and point to development bottlenecks in other sectors that may affect the sector in question, analyze the (potential) contributions provided by the partner country itself, whatever development plans it may have for the priority sector in question, and the contributions provided by other donors for development in this sector. This is used to derive what individual measures are given support by German DC. One intention here is to clarify what strategic approach is used by German DC in the sector in question, whether and to what extent the individual measures are interlinked and re-

sult from a cross-cutting project-support concept, how a structure-building impact may be achieved through concentration, and whether and to what extent German DC has managed to intensify the sectoral dialogue (Rodenberg 2001, 1).

A BMZ guideline of October 2000⁸ on the preparation of PSPs furthermore points out that the papers are expected to illustrate whether and to what extent the measures taken in a given priority sector contribute to reaching the goals of German DC. Since April 2001, when the German government adopted its Program of Action 2015, the chief priority sector has been poverty reduction (based on a broad understanding of poverty). There are, under the umbrella defined by the overarching goal, other goals, including social and economic development (pro-poor growth, social equity, decent living conditions), political development (stability, peace, human rights, democracy), ecological development (environmental and resource protection), and the cross-cutting tasks of participation, gender equality, and sustainability (Rodenberg 2001, 2).

The present study examined the BMZ's MENA country concepts and PSPs with a view to determining whether and to what extent they outline the engagement of German DC for the global goal of poverty reduction with specific reference to the concrete contributions it is providing toward reaching the individual MDGs. The strategy papers have in this connection been examined with a view to their relation to the questions listed in Overview 9; in other words, all strategy papers were expected to provide answers to these questions. There is no other place where German DC outlines more concretely and in more detail the contributions it is providing to help implement the MDG agenda in its partner countries (BMZ 2005a).

In analyzing the available strategy papers⁹, it was noted that the goals and approaches of German DC are broadly congruent with the MDG agenda and that the measures that German DC promotes in the MENA region may in fact contribute to its implementation, which is, however, not sufficiently documented. On the other hand, the partner countries, which bear the main responsibility here, should also provide documentation on the measures they have taken to reach the MDGs, and which may be supported by DC.

8 Cited verbatim in Rodenberg (2001, 31–38.).

9 All of the strategy papers evaluated in this connection are cited in Table A16, Annex.

Even a first, purely quantitative evaluation of the strategy papers demonstrates that the MDG agenda plays hardly any role at all in the strategic planning process of German DC. Country reports were available for seven of the total of nine partner countries / priority partner countries of German DC in the MENA region. In addition, a country brief was available on an eighth country (Mauritania). In not one of these papers was found any reference to the MDGs or to the Millennium Declaration. Country concept papers have been prepared only for the four priority partner countries of German DC. Two of these likewise lack any reference to the MDGs, and the third addressed the MDG agenda only in passing. Only the country concept for Yemen goes into the MDG agenda in a central passage and at some length. The experience made in evaluating the available PSPs or PSP drafts turned out to be much the same. Ten of 13 papers¹⁰ do not even address the MDGs and only one of them convincingly derives the goals and measures of German DC from partner-country development plans, which in turn make reference to the MDG agenda (see Table A17, Annex).

The second, qualitative evaluation of the PSPs did little to temper the impression made by the first, purely quantitative evaluation. It shows that even within its priority sectors, German DC is aligned in such a way as to be able to contribute significantly to implementing the MDG agenda. Many of its goals are largely congruent with individual MDGs, and the measures it supports appear to be target-oriented. However, the papers neither make reference to the MDGs nor outline plausibly the anticipated chains of cause and effect between individual measures and the results aimed for by German DC and the overarching goals of German DC. In many of these papers this problem could probably be corrected without any major difficulties. In any case, though, German DC is, at least as far as the present form of its strategy papers is concerned, missing an excellent opportunity to appropriately outline and present the contribution it is actually making to implementing the MDG agenda. This can be shown with reference to the questions listed in Overview 9:

10 There should actually be 20 PSPs for all countries of the region. But when the evaluation was conducted, six of them were not yet available and a seventh had been prepared but was not available.

Overview 9: Questions as to the MDG relevance of DC strategy papers

Do they deal with the state of the MDG process in partner countries?

- Do they point out clearly where the major deficits and problems lie in efforts to implement the MDGs?
- Do they analyze these deficits and problems?
- Do they explain why a partner country is unable to solve its problems on its own?

Do they point out clearly the MDGs to which German DC is seeking to provide a contribution?

- Do they point concretely to the goals pursued by German DC?
- Do they state why it is precisely these goals that are being pursued?
- Do they specify the MDGs / individual MDGs as goals of German DC?
- *If the answer is no:* What measure of conformity is there between the concrete goals of German DC in a partner country and the MDGs?
- Are these the MDGs that present especially urgent difficulties for a partner country?
- *If not:* Do they explain why the German contribution to implementing a given MDG may nevertheless be important for a partner country?

Do they plausibly explain the anticipated cause-and-effect relation between the approach and/or the measures of German DC and the MDGs / its other goals?

- Do they explain the assumptions and the approach on which German engagement is based?
- Do they explain whether and how the approach used by German DC is contributing to reaching the MDGs aimed for?
- Do they present a sufficiently detailed description of the measures in which German DC is engaged?
- Do they derive these measures from the conceptual approach of German DC?
- Do they explain why precisely these measures are reasonable and appropriate – and why others might not do as well?
- Do they convincingly outline the cause-and-effect relation between the measures and the goals of German DC?

Do they explain why an engagement of DC is both called for and reasonable?

- Do they explain why a partner country is unable to take such measures on its own / without external support?
- Do they note whether or how German DC is assisting a partner country in overcoming the crucial bottlenecks facing its efforts to reach the MDGs?
- Do they explain what comparative advantages German DC has in conducting given individual measures?

Do they explain whether and why German DC may also pursue goals other than the MDGs?

- Is German DC (also) pursuing other goals in addition to the MDGs?
- Do they explain why they see these goals as reasonable?

Source: By the author

- *State of the MDG process*: Most of the PSPs deal relatively precisely with the progress a partner country has made in recent years in MDG-relevant sectors. Many of them also cite figures for MDG indicators. However, only one paper notes specifically that it is dealing with an MDG-relevant sector or an indicator from the MDG agenda. Furthermore, most of these papers do not express adequately which development problems are more serious than others and what factors these problems may be due to.
- *Goals of German DC*: Nearly all of these papers define the specific sectoral goals of German DC, and in most cases they largely coincide with individual MDGs. These are almost without exception MDGs that a partner country is experiencing serious difficulties in implementing. This, however, is not stressed. Even in cases where the priorities of German DC largely coincide with the thrust of the MDG agenda, the relevant MDG is not mentioned. Furthermore, few papers justify why German DC is pursuing one particular goal instead of other goals which a partner country may be having similar problems reaching.
- *Links between goals and measures of German DC*: Most PSPs not only specify the goals of German DC, they also describe relatively precisely the approach involved and the measures supported by German DC. There is no question here that nearly all of these measures are helpful and appropriate for a partner country. But only in a small number of cases is the anticipated causal nexus between the measures and the goals of German DC outlined in sufficient detail. The assumed cause-impact chains are often long, and most of the papers fail to deal with crucial links of these chains. This often means a lack of clarity as to the mechanisms which concrete DC measures use in pursuit of relatively highly aggregated goals. Rodenberg (2001, 12) came to a similar finding in her analysis of a far higher number of PSPs on partner countries in all parts of the world. As regards the goal of contributing to alleviating poverty, she notes in an exemplary passage:

“While PSPs often mention poverty reduction straight off as a reference point, e.g. in the form of a reference to a country’s PRSP process, there are no further references to it when it comes to deriving support strategies and concrete approaches. They remain at the level of the sectoral analysis. Only rarely do they succeed in outlining, in a coherent strategy, poverty orientation from the analysis to the given initial situation [...], from the means / mechanisms used [...] to direct forms of participation.” (Rodenberg 2001, 13).

Furthermore, only in relatively few cases do these papers state why German DC is supporting certain measures instead of others that might just as well contribute to reaching the goals set, i.e. why the instruments selected are assumed to be superior to others. This can give rise to the impression that instead of being derived from the goals of German DC, the measures receiving support have been defined *a posteriori*, as a means of creating a strategic framework broad enough to cover a number of individual DC projects. Rodenberg (2001, III) comes out in favor of formulating PSPs without any unduly unspecific statements of the following kind: "... provides a contribution to the country's economic development and thus contributes to reducing poverty."

- *Meaningfulness of and need for a German engagement:* Numerous PSPs on MENA countries fail to explain why a given partner country is especially reliant on external support for the measures being conducted by German DC, i.e. where, precisely, they see a bottleneck in partner capacities that can be bridged with the aid of German DC. And seldom do these papers state precisely whether and to what extent Germany, as a bilateral donor, has comparative advantages over other donors and what these advantages consist of. Many papers get no further than the assertion that there are such advantages.
- *Goals not congruent with the MDG agenda:* In most countries of the MENA region German DC also pursued goals that, while they may not run counter to the MDGs, are nevertheless not congruent with them. For instance, one aim pursued by German DC together with the Maghreb countries is to improve the latter's international competitiveness and in this way to 'get them in shape' for the Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area. There can hardly be any objections to additional goals or reference systems.¹¹ Most PSPs plausibly state why they may be regarded as reasonable goals and how the measures supported may contribute to achieving these goals. However, German

11 Alternative reference systems of German DC with the MENA countries would include e.g. (i) the goal system of the EU's Mediterranean policy and policy of good-neighborly relations, set out in the Barcelona Declaration, the Common Strategy, and the agreements on a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area; (ii) the Arab Human Development Reports; and (iii) the Broader Middle East Initiative (BMENA). These systems differ markedly in the terms of the weight they assign to individual goals and their degree of concretization and the obligations they entail, but not in terms of their rough orientation. What this means is that they are, in the end, congruent; see Erdle / Trautner (2005); Poselt / Buchmüller (2005a).

DC should be far more frank and assertive in dealing with this issue. It should clearly admit, and own up to, fact that several of the measures it supports have no reference to the MDGs. This would create more transparency, without detriment to the matter itself.

However, documenting what German DC in fact contributes to the international goal system would require more than establishing clear-cut links between the PSPs and the MDG agenda. Since the documents in question are planning papers that are formulated *ex ante*, they can provide information only on the anticipated (supposed) impacts of German DC. Whether these impacts have in fact materialized can only be determined *ex post*, on the basis of appropriate MDG-specific analyses (Neubert 2004).

Although it is entirely feasible to conduct such targeted impact analyses of German DC's contributions to implementation of the MDG agenda at the national level (*idem*), thus far no systematic analyses have been performed in any partner country of German DC. The fact that other donors have not made much progress here either is no excuse. However, at present the BMZ's MDG representative is working together with the MDG coordinators of the German implementing agencies to "*align the planning and monitoring of development programs and measures to the MDGs*" (Bundesregierung 2004, 5). In this connection there are also plans to align the BMZ country concepts and priority strategy papers more closely to the MDGs with a view to improving the poverty relevance of German programs and projects (Bundesregierung 2004, 6).

5.4 Policy dialogue

The German government regularly addresses the MDG agenda in the framework of its political dialogue with the governments of partner countries in the MENA region. However, no efforts are made in that context what consequences the partner country governments might have to face if their efforts in implementing the MDGs prove inadequate. For their part, these partner governments do their best to avoid addressing the issue.

At present the BMZ has no guidelines governing whether and in what language the MDG agenda or the state of the Millennium process should be addressed in government-level consultations and negotiations with partner countries. There is such standardized official language regarding both the

German government's Program of Action 2015 and certain other issues, including e.g. anti-corruption efforts, human rights, etc.

But this situation may perhaps even have its good sides: Simply delivering standardized formulations may well give partners the impression that what they are hearing is nothing more than a dispassionate exercise in diplomacy. It may make more sense to frankly address the specific deficits in a partner's approach to implementing the MDGs, clearly expressing the fact that Germany is serious about the mutual obligations assumed in connection with the Millennium Declaration and intends to factor them into the planning for its future engagement in given partner countries.

And the German side now in any case, and without any agreed official language, regularly addresses the MDGs in many government-level consultations and negotiations – at least vis-à-vis the governments of its partner countries in the MENA region.¹² To cite an example, the Moroccan side was, in effect, informed that in view of the 'Major Event' in the fall of 2005 both sides should be interested in using their cooperation as a platform to provide a contribution to implementing the MDGs – and in stating this openly. Often however, this simply involves using the formula that the German government has, in its Program of Action 2015, translated the MDG agenda into national goals, and that it expects a similar sign of ownership for the MDGs from its partners as well.

On the other hand, none of the persons interviewed for this study reported that representatives of partner governments had, in any official talks, even mentioned the MDGs. Some interview partners even stated that in some cases representatives of Arab of governments were extremely annoyed when either of the MDGs (e.g. implementation of them in the partner country in question) were addressed. Apart from governance issues, this was also reported to be the case when the topic of quality of schooling and school curricula was addressed.

12 According to Claudia Arce (KfW), Dr. Michael Grewe (BMZ), Sabine Riegert (BMZ), Dr. Eefje Schmid (BMZ), Georg Schüller (BMZ), and Dr. Bernhard Trautner (BMZ), this has been the case at least in recent government-level consultations/negotiations with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, the Palestinian Authority.

5.5 Implementation of MDG8

The balance of German policy with respect to implementing MDG8 is a mixed one. On the one hand, Germany is strongly committed to the interests of the developing countries. On the other hand, Germany still has much work to do in adapting the scope and orientation of its ODA to the commitments made in recent years.

The industrialized countries bear the chief responsibility for most of the targets of MDG8. There are limits to what bilateral DC can do to reaching them. All of German's external policies are therefore called upon to do their part. More than in the case of all other MDGs, MDG8 calls for coherence between all of the external policies of the donor countries, mutual coordination between them, and complementarity between their policies and the policies of developing countries. The member countries of the European Union (EU) must also take steps to ensure that their policies are coherent with the policies pursued by the Commission.


Accordingly, Germany's contribution to reaching MDG8 cannot be analyzed for individual developing countries or regions (e.g. for the Middle East and North Africa; it instead must be viewed exclusively in the larger context, i.e. with all its impacts at the global level.

In some sectors Germany has made crucial contributions to ensuring that progress is in fact made in implementing MDG8. This goes in particular for international environmental policy and debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs):

- *Debt relief (Targets 13 and 15)*: The German government, which has since repeatedly come out in favor of accelerating and enlarging the debt-relief process, played an instrumental role in bringing about the HIPC Initiative adopted by the G7 at the 1999 Cologne debt summit. In the MENA region Mauritania has benefited from the initiative. Above and beyond the HIPC Initiative, Germany has cancelled its bilateral debt with a good number of countries, which means that today most HIPCs are without debt with Germany. The main beneficiaries in the MENA region have been Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, which have been relieved of a substantial share of their German debt (Bundesregierung 2004, 15).
- *Good global governance (Target 12)*: Germany has come out emphatically for an efficiency-oriented reform of the UN system. It has

in particular contributed to advancing the cause of global public environmental goods. The German government is still involved in the further development of the UN forest dialogue, the Cartagena Protocol, and the Kyoto Protocol. It furthermore played an instrumental role in having the linked issue of poverty and the environment placed on the agenda of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, in working for a better balance between the interests of the industrialized and developing countries in the international system, and in creating forums (like the G20, which goes back to a German initiative) that serve to enhance the participation of developing and newly industrializing countries in the international debate (Fues 2005).


- *Access of developing countries to essential medical drugs (Target 17):* The German government also played an important role in ensuring that developing countries would be provided, within the TRIPS framework, better and cheaper access to vital medical drugs – above all for HIV/Aids (Bundesregierung 2004, 18).



- *Focus on partner countries with frameworks conducive to development*: Since the mid-1990s Germany has come to focus far more on cooperation with countries with good political governance. German DC with such countries amounts to an average of 1 US\$.3 per capita and year, while the figure for countries with poor governance is only US\$ 0.8 per capita and year (see Figure 26). However, as the examples of Denmark, the US, and Japan show, it would be entirely possible to set more clear-cut accents (Nunnenkamp 2004).


In other areas, though, Germany has yet to meet its obligations – above all as far as the aim of raising its ODA is concerned:

- *Increasing German ODA (Target 15)*: German ODA payments have not risen during the 1990s; they have even declined from US\$ 93 per German inhabitant in 2000 to US\$ 62 in 2004. If, in the mid-1980s, German ODA amounted to little less than 0.5 % of Germany's gross national product (GNP), the corresponding figure for 1998 was only 0.26 %, a figure that has risen only slightly until 2004 to 0.28 % but then much faster in 2005 to 0,35 % of GNP (see Table A18, Annex). As early as 1968, the donor countries had declared in UNCTAD their intention to raise their total ODA to 0.7 % and their ODA to the least-developed countries (LDCs) at least to 0,15 % of GNP – although a binding commitment was made only at the 2002 Financing for Development conference in Monterrey. In this connection, Germany committed itself to raising its ODA to 0.33 % of GNP by the year 2006. In May 2005 the EU adopted its multistage plan that committed the 15 'old' member states to raise their ODA to 0.51 % of GNP by 2010 and to at least 0.7 % by 2015. The 'new' member states, on the other hand, have committed themselves to raising their ODA shares to 0.17 % of GNP by 2010 and to 0.33 % by 2015 (Alliance2015 2005; Fues 2005; Herfkens 2005). In 2002, the MENA region accounted for about EUR 500 million in German ODA commitments (roughly 10 % of overall German commitments), but only for EUR 180 million of net disbursements (BMZ 2004a).
- *Increase of the share of ODA for LDCs (Target 13)*: German ODA for LDCs also declined between 1990 and 2001. Its share in overall German ODA declined from 28 to 24 %, with the corresponding GNP-related share declining from 0.12 to 0.06 % (see Figure 27 and Table A18, Annex). Other donors – including e.g. the UK, the World Bank, or the Netherlands – provide a far higher share of their overall ODA to the poorest developing countries (Alliance2015 2005).


Figure 27: Share of ODA provided to the poorest 25 % of developing countries between 1999 and 2003

Source: Baulch (2004); Nunnenkamp (2004, Figure 1)

- *Increase of the share of ODA for basic social services:* The share of German ODA for basic social services (primary education, primary healthcare, food, access to drinking water, and sewage disposal) has stagnated since 1996 at a figure of 10 % (see Figure 28 and Table A18, Annex). The MDG agenda does not provide for any increase in this share, but it does contain an indicator to measure it. One reason for this is the logic of the MDG agenda itself, which focuses above all on the situation of the poorest segments of society; the other is a 1995 OECD/DAC proposal to raise the share of ODA targeted to basic social services to at least 20 %, provided that the developing countries themselves earmark a minimum of 20 % of their overall government expenditure for basic social services. Nearly all other donors have dedicated a higher share of their ODA to social infrastructure in developing countries than Germany (Alliance2015 2005; Fues 2005).
- *Elimination of aid ties:* The share of ODA that German provided without any aid ties was increased from 62 to 85 % between 1900 and 2001 (see Table A19, Annex).

Figure 28: Share of ODA dedicated to basic social services

- *Financing of multilateral DC:* While Germany is the world's third largest contributor to the general UN budget, its engagement in UN development work is modest compared with that of other countries. For instance, since 1990 Germany's annual contribution to UNDP has declined in nominal terms from EUR 70 to 26 million. This certainly has not recommended Germany for its wish to have a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (Fues 2005; Herfkens 2005).
- *Awareness-raising for the MDGs at home:* DC is a task that is in need of support by the population of donor countries. One means of reaching this objective is awareness campaigns in the media. This is also true for the MDGs, the central goals of international development policy. However, only 13 % of all German citizens have even heard of the MDGs. In Sweden the corresponding figure is nearly one third, while the figure for France is no higher than 4 % (see Figure 29).



6 Recommendations for the future

It has been shown in the preceding chapters how relevant the MDGs are for the MENA region. Most of the MENA countries have problems in implementing MDG1 (income poverty and hunger), MDG2 (the quantity, and even more, the quality of education), MDG7 (mainly ecological sustainability), and MDG8 (mainly good political and economic governance, reduction of youth unemployment, and access to modern technologies). At present it even appears that some of these countries will not be able to meet at least one single of the MDGs by 2015. This goes above all for the low-income countries Sudan, Mauritania, and Yemen, but also for Iraq. The main reasons for the deficits encountered thus far in implementing the MDG agenda in the region are financial, institutional, and organizational bottlenecks on the one hand, but also a lack of willingness on the part of some of the governments in the region to work for the international goals.

German DC should take this state of affairs well into account. In both geographic and sectoral terms it is oriented in such a way as to be able to provide support, in key places, for efforts to implement the MDGs in the region. Nevertheless, it remains unclear what contribution it is in fact providing. One reason for this is that German DC does not adequately document what impacts it has (or is intending to have) on the MDGs. The other reason is that neither the German side nor the MENA countries have ever thoroughly analyzed their cooperation and its impacts on the MDGs.

The German government has signed the Millennium Declaration, and it acknowledges that “*the MDGs are binding goals, though not comprehensive terms of reference, for the whole of development cooperation. They indicate what is to be accomplished, although they leave open how these goals are to be realized*” (Bundesregierung 2004, 5). This is certainly correct. In addition, there is no reason why the whole of DC should have to be subordinated to the MDG agenda. But every donor should be able to state that he is at least providing a relevant and significant contribution to reaching the MDGs in his partner countries (BMZ 2005a).

It is getting to be time for German DC to live up to this statement. We can therefore derive the following recommendations for future German DC with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa:

6.1 Regional orientation of bilateral German DC

Generally speaking, it is important to ensure that the limited resources of DC in such a way that they achieve the maximum possible impacts. This will usually be the case in countries and sectors where the *urgency to solve the existing problems* is high and the partner country’s *capacities* are limited, i.e. where DC can make a good contribution to overcoming bottlenecks. It is furthermore important to be sure that a partner government has a certain *disposition to solve the problems of the country*, since DC is not likely to achieve much – or its effects may prove highly vulnerable – if the relevant decision-makers in a partner country are not seriously interested in reaching the goals set by DC.

Seen against the background of the MDGs, it is not immediately evident why Egypt and Morocco should be priority partner countries of German DC while e.g. Jordan does not have this status. All three countries are

middle-income countries with a moderate urgency, an advanced level of capacities, and an intermediate disposition to solve the existing problems. In addition, it is more than difficult to see why Mauritania, a low-income country, should not have the status of a priority partner country.

There may be good reasons for this. But if there are, they cannot be derived from the MDG agenda. In the name of transparency these reasons should therefore be named in the BMZ's strategy papers. Otherwise the intensive German engagement in Egypt and Morocco should be reviewed once again, and Mauritania should be given consideration as a priority partner country. It is e.g. conceivable that Egypt should be given generous support because of the key role it plays for the stability of the Middle East. Morocco and Tunisia in turn must likewise be seen as important partner countries for the simple reason that year for year large numbers of refugees depart from their shores for Europe. These may all be reasons to engage in especially intensive DC with them. Yet all this has at best very little to do with the MDGs and the BMZ should frankly confess to such considerations

6.2 Sectoral orientation of bilateral German DC

The rough sectoral orientation of German DC with the MENA region is compatible with the MDG agenda. The current priorities of German DC are entirely congruent with the priority needs of the MENA countries in pursuing the MDGs.

However, German DC might consider intensifying its engagement in three sectors in which the solution of problems is at least equally urgent (GTZ 2003, 6, 8). This would be support for

- democracy promotion and improvements in governance;
- social, economic, political, and legal equality for women; and
- improved quality of schooling in the region.

In these three sectors nearly all of the MENA countries have – if at all – made no more than insufficient progress in implementing the MDGs. According to the Arab Development Reports, these three sectors must be seen as the central bottlenecks for development in the region (AFESD / UNDP 2002; AFESD / UNDP 2003; AFESD / UNDP 2004).

A recent IMF working paper¹³ also comes to the conclusion that higher expenditure for education and governance reforms is at once essential for the implementation of MDG2 and MDG8 and the most effective and efficient approach that can be used to (i) accelerate economic growth, (ii) to alleviate income poverty and hunger, (iii) to contribute to gender equality (MDG3), and (iv) to reduce child mortality rates (MDG4).

Improving political and economic governance in the MENA countries is especially urgent (GTZ 2003, 5 f.). According to IMF calculations, qualitative differences in the institutional framework can explain almost three quarters of the income differentials between the developing countries (Bundesregierung 2004, 34).

But it would also be important to improve the *quality of schooling* in the MENA countries. It is the kind of education they receive (and not the number of school years completed) that determines whether and to what extent school graduates will be able to make use of their education. It is only education designed to teach children to learn on their own, to think critically, and to develop their creative skills that enables them to take charge of their own lives, to process information adequately, and to take a hand in shaping the political, economic, cultural, and technological development of their country (AFESD / UNDP 2003; Weiss 2004b, 5).

Any more intensive commitment of DC to *gender equality* should not consist of women's-promotion measures that are simply added on to existing projects or programs (e.g. in the sectors education, microfinance, SME promotion). This must instead be seen as a cross-cutting task. As early as in the planning phase of DC projects it is important to factor in potential impacts on gender relations. It should never be assumed a priori that a given DC measure is gender-neutral. Women can always be promoted or disadvantaged by a given measure as such, and in the formulation of mea-

13 The authors of the paper (Baldacci et al. 2004) present the results of a regression analysis based on panel data on 120 developing countries, and they look into the direct and indirect effects of five possible government interventions: (i) an increase of spending for education amounting to 1% of GDP, (ii) an equal rise in spending for health, (iii) a reduction of government spending equivalent to 1% of GDP, (iv) a 10 % reduction of the inflation rate, and (v) significant improvement of performance on the governance indicators. The dependent variable used in the model included in particular (a) level of economic growth, (b) the proportion income-poor persons among the population, (c) school enrolment rates for boys and girls, and (d) the child mortality rate.

sure it is essential to ensure that the former will be the case. In addition, promotion of women should not be restricted to individual fields (e.g. education) and should always work for comprehensive legal, political, social, and economic equality (Rodenberg 2001, 15 ff.).

Whether or not an intensification of German DC engagement in these three sectors is in fact advisable depends, among other things, on

- whether the problems encountered in them could be solved by the MENA countries themselves without any external support;
- whether the MENA countries are in fact prepared to tackle these problems;
- whether German DC has comparative strengths in providing support for reform measures in the three sectors; and
- whether there are not already numerous other donors engaged in them.

Furthermore, it is important to keep track of the countries and sectors in which other donors are active or plan to become active in the future. Only timely coordination can lay the groundwork for a functionally specialized donor approach or ensure that a given contribution turns out to be focused and thus all the more intensive. Donor coordination furthermore proves important in cases where it turns out that conditionality is required.

6.3 Orientation of bilateral German DC within the priority sectors defined for it

One highly important aspect that must be kept in mind in defining the orientation of German DC within its individual priority sectors is the consequences that result from the MDG agenda (see Chapter 2):

The poverty focus of DC: It is essential to ensure the DC has a stringent poverty orientation. This goes in particular for German DC measures in the WiRAM sector. This is not at all to say that DC should support only projects geared directly to poverty reduction. In fact, indirect poverty-reduction measures that focus on the right points may, in the long term, cost less (input) or even achieve greater effects on the situation of the poor (impacts). However, the impact chains associated with these measures are often very long, and the priority strategy papers of the BMZ sometimes

analyze and describe them only in a fragmentary manner. It is simply not enough to declare that by promoting growth in a partner country German DC is automatically contributing to poverty reduction. Lines of argumentation of this kind are based on the premise of an automatic trickle down of growth to the poor, an untenable assumption. Of course economic growth is conducive to efforts to reduce income poverty. But it must be pro-poor growth, i.e. it must benefit the poor (BMZ 2005a). Whether and to what extent this is in fact the case, and German DC is providing a contribution to this end, is something that should be better documented by partner countries in their planning papers, but also by the BMZ in its PSPs.

Furthermore, it is essential not to equate poverty with income poverty. Many PSPs are based on a purely monetary understanding of poverty, even though a far broader definition of poverty has long since established in the international debate. If the poor are simply assumed to be the people whose incomes are below a certain line, this should be expressed in precisely this way. If, however, the aim is poverty reduction in the broader sense, the PSPs should state how and in what ways German DC is improving the capabilities of the poor and reducing social imbalances.

In the water sector German DC should continue to pay attention to the social, but also, and above all, to the ecological sustainability of the measures it supports. In view of the scarcity of the renewable water resources available in the region, partner countries must take measures to ensure that water is used efficiently and effectively. This would call, among other things, for measures designed to reduce losses in water mains, to treat and reuse process water, to make more efficient use of water in agricultural irrigation, and to introduce more efficient tariff systems that offer incentives to save water and at the same time ensure that poor people will be able to afford drinking water (Bliss 2004). Another important point is to ensure that water users actually pay their water fees. And it is also important to continue to point out to partner countries that the MDG agenda calls for more than simply connecting the largest possible number of households to the water supply. It is also important to ensure that water mains also deliver water regularly and reliably and that the water provided is of sufficient quality (Satterthwaite 2004, 41).

Effectiveness of DC: Moreover, it is also essential to pay close heed to the efficiency of German DC. It is not enough to document that German DC is providing a contribution to implementing the MDGs. It must also ensure

that the impacts it achieves bear a reasonable relation to the inputs involved (BMZ 2005a). If this is not the case, thought will have to be given to alternative approaches and instruments. Under certain circumstance thought should even be given to completely terminating DC in a sector or country if the insufficient effectiveness noted for DC is due not to the inefficiency of the measures taken but to structural problems or a lack of the will needed on the partner side to engage in meaningful reforms.

Alignment and donor coordination of DC: Finally, it is also essential to give due consideration to the priorities of partner countries and the activities of other donors (BMZ 2005a). In some countries – e.g. in Yemen – this is already working very well (BZ 2005b). In others, though, coordination between donors is still very unsatisfactory. One reason for this is that some of the MENA partner countries have yet to work out national development or poverty-reduction strategies keyed to the MDGs. Another, though, is the fact that the donors are not always prepared to coordinate their activities and then to key their approaches to a meaningful division of labor or to improve their cooperation in a given sector. Indeed, sometimes donors even compete for especially prestigious projects, a state of affairs that permits partner countries to play one donor off against another and thereby evade any conditionalization of DC (Loewe 2000a, 53 f.).

6.4 Policy dialogue

Moreover, the German government should make intensive use of the possibilities afforded by its political dialogue with the governments of partner countries. This dialogue is, for several reasons, an important instrument in pursuing the MDGs. First, government-level negotiations and consultations offer a good opportunity to coordinate the development strategies of partner countries with the contributions of donor countries to implementing MDGs 1–7. Second, they also offer an opportunity to negotiate over donor measures designed to implement MDG8. Third, the dialogue offers both sides the opportunity to remind their partners of the obligations both of them have assumed under the Millennium Declaration and to call for more, and more efficient, engagement.

What this implies is that the German government should continue to address the MDGs in talks with governments of the MENA countries, inquiring about the state of the ongoing implementation process. The German

government should also call on partner governments to explain in detail how or with what measures they intend to implement the MDGs and to name the sectors in which they need DC support and to spell out the reasons involved and the kinds of support required. One especially important factor here is a coordinated, joint approach agreed on with other donors.

This should not, in any case, be expressed in set phrases. It is essential to make it perfectly clear to dialogue partners that Germany is serious about the MDGs and expects its partners to do whatever their capacities permit them to reach all of the MDGs. This has three different consequences. First, if it is to appear credible, the German government must meet its own obligations and, in particular, provide a significant contribution to MDG8. Second, what the German government demands of partner countries should never seem to be empty talk. To ensure that such demands have the intended effects, it may be necessary – possibly in coordination with other donors – to announce that there will be consequences if a partner government fails to work for the implementation of the MDGs. Third, concrete consequences announced for certain cases should, if need be, actually be imposed, because otherwise such announcements are unlikely to be taken seriously – in other partner countries as well.

The MENA countries should be called upon to meet three principal demands:

- A more clear-cut poverty orientation of their economic and social policies;
- democratization of their political systems and improvement of their economic and political governance; and
- a real commitment to improving the social, economic, political, and legal situation of women (DFID 2004).

Reform measures in these three areas are absolutely central to the implementation of all MDGs and for overall development in the MENA region, and for this reason both German DC in the sectors WiRAM, governance, and gender and, in some countries, the very continuation of DC should be made contingent on such reforms.

Moreover, German DC should, among other things, make every effort to ensure that

- the markets in the MENA countries are liberalized;

- poorer households have access to social protection instruments;
- the goals pursued in the education sector are keyed to improving both the quantity *and* the quality of the education;
- efforts are undertaken to advance research and development and to build scientific capacities;
- support is given to an open, critical culture of learning and questioning;
- gender equality is not only measured in terms of improvement of the educational chances of girls;
- restructuring in the health sector is not accomplished at the expense of the poor;
- measures are taken to increase the willingness and the possibilities of the population to engage in family planning and in this way to contribute accelerating the present decline in population growth;
- efforts are undertaken to remove the stigma attached to HIV/Aids and to compile more realistic statistics on the prevalence of the disease;
- reforms in the water sector are not conducted at the expense of ecological and social sustainability;
- the need for environmental and resource protection is better anchored in the consciousness of both the population and national policy; and
- access of poorer social groups to transportation, supply, communications, and information infrastructure is improved (Boughton / Qureshi 2004; Weiss 2004b).

6.5 Documentation and analysis of the German contribution to implementing the MDGs

The present study's most urgent recommendation is that German DC should better document its anticipated and actual contribution to implementing the MDG agenda (BMZ 2005a). All donors should provide information on how the measures they support contribute to reducing poverty in the sense of the MDGs (Satterthwaite 2004, 13). Most of the BMZ country concepts and priority strategy papers presently available do not live up to this demand. They should, in particular, provide answers to the questions listed in Overview 9 by:

- dealing explicitly with the state of the MDG process in given partner countries;
- documenting the MDGs to which German DC aims to contribute and in fact contributes;
- explaining why German DC aims to support the implementation of precisely these MDGs;
- consistently derive the approach and the measures of German DC from its stated goals;
- outline in detail and in understandable language the anticipated causal nexus between the measures it supports and the goals it seeks to implement;
- explain why German engagement in the measures it supports is reasonable and meaningful, i.e. (i) that they help to bridge a crucial capacity bottleneck in the partner country and (ii) that German DC is in possession of comparative strengths vis-à-vis other donors; and
- deal more transparently and assertively with goals outside the MDG agenda: admit frankly that some German DC measures may have no immediate relevance to the MDGs and yet be meaningful in view of the overall situation in a given partner country.

It would furthermore be important to review regularly whether and to what extent the measures supported by German DC in fact generate the expected effects. The problem here is that the impact-analyses presently used in German DC are not well suited to the purpose. They measure only the effects of individual projects and in part trace impact chains back only to the level of immediate outcomes. It is therefore necessary either to further develop the instruments presently in use to the point where they are also able to measure impacts at the MDG level or to create new instruments. A BMZ working group, which includes representatives of the German implementing agencies, is already working on a solution to this problem.

6.6 Contribution to multilateral DC

Like bilateral German DC, multilateral DC also has to take account of the MDG agenda. Germany is one of the major contributors to many international organizations, a fact that permits it to exert considerable influence on their development work. Even though this possibility entails substantial

responsibility, very little use has been made of it thus far. From now on the German government should become more involved in the planning for multilateral DC and seek to ensure that the IMF, the World Bank, the UNDP, and UNICEF pay proper heed to the MDGs in the practice of development policy. On the other hand, it would be important for Germany to ensure that its appropriations for international development cooperation again show an upward trend.

6.7 German measures aimed at implementing MDG8

Finally, it is essential not to lose sight of MDG8. However, many international reports on the implementation of the MDG agenda do just that, the main reason being that the developing countries themselves are chiefly responsible for MDG8. But precisely for this reason it is essential that the German government not lose sight of this goal (BMZ 2005a). It should in particular

- increase German ODA;
- earmark a greater share of German ODA for basic social services;
- increase the share of German ODA for LDCs;
- devote more effort to debt relief for developing countries, to alternative or additional approaches to the financing of DC, and to the creation of a new international development facility;
- push for an implementation of the TRIPS accord that is more in line with the interests of the developing countries;
- work for longer transition periods for LDCs in the process of trade liberalization in the WTO context;
- vote for an extension and enlargement of the arrangements concerning facilitated access for developing countries to low-costs medical drugs; and
- step up its efforts in favor of a rapid opening of the agricultural markets of the industrialized countries for exports from the developing countries (Baulch 2004; Boughton / Qureshi 2004; Bundesregierung 2004; Fues 2005).

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- Wolf Lehmann-Richter*, Counselor, Head of Development Cooperation Department, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Rabat (Morocco), Interview by phone call, 15 December 2004
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Annex

Table A1: Prospects to achieve MDG1-7 until 2015 according to different institutions												
All MDGs	MDG1		MDG2	MDG3		MDG4	MDG5	MDG6		MDG7		
	Target 1 Income poverty	Target 2 Hunger	Target 3 Basic education	Target 4 Gender (edu- cation)	Gender (employ- ment)	Target 5 Child mortality	Target 6 Maternal mortality	Target 7 HIV/AIDS	Target 8 Malaria	Target 9 Environ- mental protection	Target 10 Access to improved water	Target 11 Sanitation
Algeria	--1	-	+	+	+	0/+ ⁵	0	0/+ ⁵	0	0	+	-
Bahrain	0	0/+ ⁵	-	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+
Egypt	0	0/+ ⁵	0/+ ⁵	+	+	+	+	-	+	0	+	+
Iran	--1	--2	--2	+	+	+	+	-	0	-	-	-
Iraq	--2	--2	--2	--2	--2	--3	-	-	0	-	-	-
Jordan	0	-	+	+	-	0	+	+	+	0	0	+
Kuwait	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	0	0	+
Lebanon	-	-	+	+	-	--1	+	+	+	-	+	+
Libya	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	--2	0
Mauritania	--2	0	-	+	+	--2	-	-	-	0	--2	--2
Morocco	-	-	0/+ ⁵	+	-	+	0/+ ⁵	0	0	0	0	0/+ ⁵
Oman	--1	-	--2	+	-	+	+	0/+ ⁵	0/+ ⁵	-	--2	+
Palest. Territ.	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-
Qatar	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
Saudi-Arabia	-	+	--2	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+
Sudan	--1	+	-	0	-	--2	-	-	-	-	0	--2
Syria	0/+ ⁵	0/+ ⁵	-	+	+	+	0	-	0	0	+	+
Tunisia	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	0	+
UAE	--1	--2	--1	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-
Yemen	--3	--2	-	-	-	--1	-	-	-	-	-	--2
MENA	--4	-	-	+	-	0/+ ⁵	0/+ ⁵	+	+	-	0	+

Table A1 continued: Prospects to achieve MDG1-7 until 2015 according to different institutions

Explanatory notes:	
+	The goal will <i>probably</i> be met: Much progress has been achieved between 1990 and 2001 so that, if the trend continues, the goal will be reached.
0	The goal can <i>possibly</i> be met: Progress has been made between 1990 and 2001, but it does not suffice. As a consequence, if the goal shall be reached until 2015, current trends must be accelerated.
-	The goal is unlikely to be met. Past achievements were very little satisfactory so that all relevant actors must do whatever they can to catch the last chance of reaching the goal until 2015.
	Empty spaces signal that there is too little information to judge the probability of reaching the goal. .
	MENA Middle East and North Africa
	UAE United Arab Emirates
Source:	
	BMZ (2004m); UNDP (2003a), Chapter 2 and Annex; UNDP (2003b); UNICEF (2004); World Bank (2004e).
Annotations:	
1	The country has been classified a 'high priority country' by UNDP (2003a) as regards the respective goal.
2	The country has been classified a 'top priority country' by UNDP (2003a) as regards the respective goal.
3	As opposed to other sources, the World Bank believes that the goal can still be met.
4	UNDP (2003a) considers the target as already achieved, because only 2 % of all people in the MENA region have an income below 1 US\$ a day. However, this share has grown during the last fifteen years.
5	Different sources give different estimations on the probability of reaching the goal in the respective country.

Year	Implementation of MDG1 / Target 1 (halving the share of people whose income is less than one dollar a day)																	
	Proportion of population below 1 \$ a day (%)			Proportion of population below 2 \$ a day (%)			Proportion of population below national poverty line (%)			Poverty gap ratio according to 1 \$-poverty line (%)			Gini index			Share of poorest 20 % in national income or consumption (%)		
	1990	1995	2001	1990	1995	2001	1987	1990	1995	2000	1990	1995	2001	1990	1995	2000	1990	1995
Algeria	...	1.8	...	8.1	14.1	10.0	12	...	23	15 ³	...	0.5	...	35.3	37.0	6.5	6.8	7.8
Bahrain	0.6	12	9.3
Egypt	3.1	39.5	44.0	25	23	20 ²	...	0.4	...	34.4	37.8	8.7	...	8.6
Iran	...	2.0	12.4	...	30	26	21	21	...	0.6	...	43.0	6.8	...
Iraq	30	...	45
Jordan	2.0	6.6 ¹	4.0 ¹	...	7.4	...	19	15	12	0.5	...	40.0	36.4	...	7.3	7.6
Kuwait
Lebanon	...	6.3	7.1	...	18.0	...	15	43.5	4.0	...
Libya
Mauritania	56.6	50.5	46.3	...	69.0	50	46	15.9	9.1	7.9	...	38.9	37.3	4.6	5.0
Morocco	2.0	...	14.0	...	13	17	...	19	0.5	39.9	...	39.5	6.6	6.5
Oman	6
Palest. Territ.	65.0	19	46
Qatar
Saudi-Arabia	38.5
Sudan	90 ⁴
Syria
Tunisia	...	2.0	...	11.6	10	7	8	4	...	0.5	...	40.2	41.7	40.9	5.9	5.7
UAE
Yemen	...	15.7	47.0	30	...	42	...	4.5	...	39.5	34.4	...	7.4	...
MENA	2.1	...	2.2	21.0	...	23.3	1.0	...	0.4	38.2

Table A2 continued: Implementation of MDGI / Target 1 (halving the share of people whose income is less than one dollar a day)

Year:	Proportion of population below 1 \$ a day (%)			Proportion of population below 2 \$ a day (%)			Proportion of population below national poverty line (%)			Poverty gap ratio according to 1 \$-poverty line (%)			Gini index			Share of poorest 20 % in national income or consumption (%)			
	1990	1995	2001	1990	1995	2001	1987	1990	1995	2000	1990	1995	2001	1990	1995	2000	1990	1995	2001
MENA	2.1	...	2.2	21.0	...	23.3	1.0	...	0.4	38.2
EAP	30.5	...	15.6	69.7	...	50.1	6.8	...	4.0	40.0
EECA	1.4	...	5.1	6.8	...	20.3	0.1	...	0.9
LAC	11.0	...	11.1	27.6	...	26.0	5.2	...	4.0	50.2
SA	45.0	...	36.6	89.8	...	84.8	13.0	...	10.4	33.6
SSA	47.4	...	49.0	67.0	...	74.7	20.0	...	18.1	35.8
World	29.6	...	23.2	58.7	...	57.5	8.6	...	6.9

The abbreviations are explained below Table A3.

Source:
 Ali (2003b); Ali (2004); Kingdom of Bahrain / United Nations (2003); Loewe (2004e), Tables A1 and A3; UN (2002b); UN (2003a); UN (2004a); UNDP (2003a); UNICEF (2004); World Bank (2004e).

Annotations:

- Figure taken from World Bank (2004e). According to the Jordanian MDG progress report (Jordan MOPIC / UN 2004), the proportion of people living from less than 1 US\$-a-day stagnated at around 2 % between 1995 and 2001.
- Figure en from World Bank (2004e). According to the Egyptian MDG progress report (PARC 2002), the share of income poor people by national criteria was 12.7 % of the population. According to UNDP (2003a), however, it was 17.0 %. The Egypt Human Development Report 2004 says that the proportion of income poor people in Egypt was 25 % in 1990 and 22 % in 2001 (Leila 2004).
- Figure taken from the Algerian MDG progress report (UN 2004a). According to the World Bank (2004e), only 12.2 % of the population were income poor in 2000 by national criteria.
- The figures for Sudan refer to the Northern provinces only, which have at any point of time been controlled by the central government in Khartoum. These figures were taken from the draft version of the national MDG progress report for Northern Sudan...

Year:	Implementation of MDG1 / Target 2 (halving the share of people who suffer from hunger)														
	Share of children under weight for age (% under age 5)					Share of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (%)					Share of income or consumption of respective group on total national income or consumption (%)				
	1990	1995	2001	1990	1995	2001	1990	1995	2001	2000	Poorest 10 %	Poorest 20 %	Richest 20 %	Richest 10 %	2000
Algeria	10.4	12.8	6.0	5.0	...	6.0	2.8	7.0	42.6	26.8			
Bahrain	7.2	9.0	4.3	9.3	41.6	26.6			
Egypt	10.4	16.8	4.0	5.0	...	4.0	3.7	8.6	43.6	29.5			
Iran	15.8	15.7	...	4.0	...	5.0	2.0	5.1	49.9	33.7			
Iraq	11.9	...	15.9	7.0	...	27.0			
Jordan	6.6	6.4	...	4.0	...	6.0	3.3	7.6	44.4	29.8			
Kuwait	...	1.7	4.0			
Lebanon	...	3.0	...	2.5	2.5	3.0			
Libya	...	4.7	2.5			
Mauritania	47.6	23.0	32.0	14.0	...	12.0	2.5	6.4	44.1	28.4			
Morocco	9.0	...	8.9	6.5	...	7.0	2.6	6.5	46.6	30.9			
Oman	24.3	23.3	23.3			
Palest. Territ.	...	15.1			
Qatar	...	5.5			
Saudi-Arabia	...	14.0	...	4.0	3.0			
Sudan	...	33.9	11.0	31.0	...	21.0			
Syria	...	12.9	...	5.0			
Tunisia	10.3	9.0	4.0	2.5	...	1.0	2.3	5.7	47.9	31.8			
UAE	...	7.0	...	3.0			
Yemen	30.0	38.1	46.0	36.0	...	33.0	3.0	7.4	41.2	25.9			
MENA	...	14.5	...	6.8	...	8.5			

Table A3 continued: MDGI / Target 2 (halving the share of people who suffer from hunger)														
	Share of children under weight for age (% under age 5)					Share of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (%)			Share of income or consumption of respective group on total national income or consumption (%)					
	1990	1995	2001	1990	1995	2001	Poorest 10 %	Poorest 20 %	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000
Year:	1990	1995	2001	1990	1995	2001	Poorest 10 %	Poorest 20 %	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000
MENA	...	14.5	...	6.8	...	8.5
EAP	18.7	17.4	14.8	17.4	...	10.5
EECA
LAC	11.0	9.1	8.0	14.1	...	11.6
SA	64.1	53.0	...	16.6	...	25.4
SSA	31.6	...	32.8
World
Explanatory notes:														
EAP	East Asia and the Pacific													
EECA	Eastern Europe and Central Asia													
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean													
MENA	Middle East and North Africa													
SA	South Asia													
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa													
UAE	United Arab Emirates													
WB	World Bank													
...	no data													
Source:														
AH	(2003b); Ali (2004); Kingdom of Bahrain / United Nations (2003); Loewe (2004c); Tables A1 and A3; UN (2002b); UN (2003a); UN (2004a); UNDP (2003a); World Bank (2004e).													

Table A4: Implementation of MDG2 (achieving basic education for all)														
Year:	Net enrolment ratio (%)						Share of children reaching grade 5 (%)			Literacy rate				
	In primary education			In pre-primary education			In secondary education			Youth (% age 15-24)		Adults (% age 15 and above)		
	1990	2001	2000	1990	2000	2000	1990	2001	2002	1990	2002	1990	2002	
Source	WB/ UNDP	WB	UNDP	UNESCO	UNESCO	UNESCO	WB							
Algeria	92.9	98.3	98.0	97.2	...	2.8	53.7	58.5	94.3	97.2	77.3	89.9	52.9	68.9
Bahrain	99.0	91.0	96.0	94.0	27.1	36.9	84.9	81.6	89.2	99.6	95.6	98.6	82.1	88.5
Egypt	84.0	89.9	93.0	92.3	6.1	11.4	...	79.0	...	99.0	61.3	71.2	47.1	56.9
Iran	97.2	86.5	74.0	74.6	7.6	5.7	...	33.0	89.9	93.7	86.3	94.6	63.2	78.1
Iraq	78.6	93.1	93.0	93.1	12.5	14.4	41.0	45.4	35.7	40.1
Jordan	66.3	93.6	94.0	93.6	14.7	30.6	...	75.9	92.2	98.8	96.7	99.4	81.5	90.9
Kuwait	44.6	84.6	66.0	66.4	32.9	49.7	87.5	93.1	76.7	82.9
Lebanon	...	89.8	74.0	70.9	...	66.8	...	70.2	...	94.0	92.1	95.6	80.3	86.9
Libya	96.5	4.9	91.0	97.0	68.1	81.7
Mauritania	51.0	67.0	64.0	75.3	61.2	45.8	49.6	34.8	41.2
Morocco	58.2	88.4	78.0	74.5	65.8	58.0	...	29.9	75.1	83.7	55.3	69.5	38.7	50.7
Oman	70.3	74.5	65.0	65.1	3.0	4.8	...	58.5	95.9	96.2	85.6	98.5	54.7	74.4
Palest. Territ.	...	92.2	97.0	99.1	...	39.1	...	76.9
Qatar	86.6	94.5	95.0	...	27.3	28.6	67.1	78.0	64.1	...	90.3	95.3	77.0	82.1
Saudi-Arabia	59.2	58.9	58.0	57.9	7.1	5.2	31.2	...	82.9	93.7	85.4	93.5	66.2	77.9
Sudan	43.0	46.3	46.0	44.7	18.4	22.2	93.7	84.0	65.0	79.1	45.8	59.9
Syria	95.3	97.5	96.0	...	6.3	8.5	45.8	37.6	94.4	92.4	79.9	88.3	64.8	76.1
Tunisia	93.5	99.2	99.0	98.2	7.8	15.8	...	67.9	86.6	95.0	84.1	94.3	59.1	73.2
UAE	94.3	80.8	87.0	78.2	51.9	78.4	59.2	67.5	80.0	98.1	84.7	91.4	71.0	77.3
Yemen	52.7	67.1	67.0	...	0.8	0.9	...	37.0	65.3	86.0	50.0	67.9	32.7	49.0
MENA	...	83.3	94.2	70.9	81.2	52.9	65.4

Table A4 continued: MDG2 (achieving basic education for all)

Year:	Public spending on education												Public spending on education by level:									
	(% of GDP)						(% of total government spending)						Pre-primary and primary (%)		Secondary (%)		Pre-primary education		Primary education		Secondary education	
	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000
Source:	UNESCO												UNESCO									
Algeria	5.3	3.9	21.1	13.3	30.1	45.8	27	28	28	28	19	18			
Bahrain	4.2	3.0	14.6	11.4	30.4	30.4	30.1	34.5	34.5	...	45.8	34.5	...	26	21	19	18	13	14			
Egypt	3.7	4.1	25	24	24	23	...	17			
Iran	4.1	4.4	22.4	20.4	33.2	26.7	26.7	34.8	34.8	...	39.2	34.8	...	18	15	25	21	...	22			
Iraq	4.1	4.6	22.4	18.3	33.2	27.1	27.1	27	39	31	26	27	20			
Jordan	8.4	5.0	17.1	5.0	...	32.9	32.9	62.4	31.5	...	62.4	31.5	...	23	22	25			
Kuwait	4.8	...	3.4	...	53.4	13.6	13.6	16	16	18	14	12	11			
Lebanon	...	3.0	...	11.1	56.0	65.0	65.0	14	...	19	11	12			
Libya	8	14	8	8	7			
Mauritania	...	3.0	...	18.9	33.3	37.7	37.7	45	45	28	27			
Morocco	5.3	5.5	26.1	26.1	34.8	48.2	48.2	48.9	50.5	...	48.9	50.5	...	20	18	27	29	19	17			
Oman	3.1	3.9	11.1	...	54.1	39.1	39.1	37.0	50.7	...	37.0	50.7	...	20	19	28	25	19	18			
Palest. Territ.	22	...	31	31	32			
Qatar	3.5	3.6	18	29	11	13	13	10			
Saudi-Arabia	6.5	9.5	17.8	...	78.8	82.2	82.2	14	10	16	12	12	13			
Sudan	0.9	...	2.8	35	30	34	27	26	23			
Syria	4.1	4.1	17.3	11.1	38.5	28.2	28.2	27	24	25	23	34	15			
Tunisia	6.0	6.8	13.5	17.4	39.8	36.4	36.4	26	20	28	23	17	19			
UAE	1.9	1.9	14.6	53.3	53.3	...	45.1	45.1	...	21	19	18	17	14	13			
Yemen	5.0	7.0	...	32.8	46.0	44.0	44.0	42.0	40.0	...	42.0	40.0	...	15	17	...	30	12	14			

The abbreviations are explained below Table A3.

Source:

Republic of Yemen (2003); UN (2002a); UNDP (2003a); UNDP / AFESD (2002); UNDP / AFESD (2003); UNESCO (2002); UNESCO (2002); World Bank (2004e).

Table A5: Implementation of MDG3 (promoting gender equality and empowering women)														
Year:	Ratio of girls to boys (%)						Share of female teachers (%)				Ratio of literate females to males (%)		Female share of non-agricultural wage employment (%)	
	In primary and secondary education		In primary education only		In secondary education only		In primary education		In secondary education		Youth literacy (age 15-24)	Adult literacy (age 15 and above)	1990	2002
	1990	2001	1990	2001	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2002	1990	2002
Source:	World Bank		UNDP		UNESCO		UNESCO		UNESCO		UNDP		UNDP	
Algeria	80	99	81	88	80	107	39	46	43	50	79	91	8	14
Bahrain	97	103	95	96	103	106	54	75	54	58	99	101	7	13
Egypt	78	94	80	89	81	94	52	52	44	43	72	84	21	20
Iran	80	96	86	91	64	62	70	73	...	77	88	96	18	...
Iraq	75	77	80	79	73	92	53	54	43	46	44	50	13	...
Jordan	93	102	94	95	104	103	62	97	100	89	23
Kuwait	97	101	92	96	98	102	61	74	54	58	99	102	95	23
Lebanon	...	102	93	100	100	109	...	81	...	61	93	96	88	29
Libya	...	103	91	97	100	111	84	94	76	19
Mauritania	68	93	73	93	47	72	18	26	...	15	65	73	60	43
Morocco	68	92	66	84	73	80	37	37	32	35	62	79	59	37
Oman	86	98	89	93	78	98	47	54	40	48	79	98	78	19
Palest. Territ.	...	109	99	102	100	106	...	51	...	53	16
Qatar	94	102	91	95	110	136	72	...	56	...	105	105	104	15
Saudi-Arabia	82	94	84	92	81	90	48	53	38	50	86	96	82	18
Sudan	75	86	75	82	78	167	51	63	40	63	72	89	68	22
Syria	82	92	87	89	73	89	64	73	84	69	17
Tunisia	82	100	85	91	79	104	45	50	...	46	81	93	75	20
UAE	96	105	93	92	114	115	64	74	...	56	109	108	106	14
Yemen	...	56	45	64	...	37	34	60	39	9
MENA	79	95	75	87	...	21

Table A5 continued: *Implementation of MDG3 (promoting gender equality and empowering women)*

	Relation of economic activity rates of women and men (%)		Ratio of estimated female to male earned income (%)	Life expectancy of women as % of life expectancy of men	Labor force participation		Gender Development Index (GDI)		Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)	Share of women on ministerial level (%)		Year women received basic rights: Right to vote	Year first woman was elected/appointed to parliament		
	2000	2001			Rate (%)	Index (1990 = 100)	As % of male rate	GDI rank		HDI rank minus GDI rank	1990			2004	2000
Year:	2000	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	1990	2004	2000				
UNDP															
Source:															
Algeria	76	30	104	158	40	88	-1	2	3	0	0	1962	1962		
Bahrain	87	34	105	119	39	40	-4	...	0	1973	2002		
Egypt	79	39	106	117	45	99	-1	4	6	6	6	1956	1957		
Iran	78	28	104	137	38	86	0	2	3	3	9	1963	1963		
Iraq	11	8		
Jordan	77	31	104	160	35	75	-2	1	6	0	0	1974	1989		
Kuwait	76	34	105	96	48	45	-1	0	0	-	-		
Lebanon	77	30	104	123	39	70	0	...	2	2	2	1952	1991		
Libya	74	...	107	123	34	13	13	1964	1964		
Mauritania	86	56	106	98	74	125	1	0	4	4	14	1961	1975		
Morocco	80	40	106	107	52	102	0	...	11	5	5	1963	1993		
Oman	75	22	105	154	26	71	-4	-	-		
Palest. Terr.	72	73	105	148	13	6		
Qatar	90	...	107	126	46	0	0	-	-		
Saudi-Arabia	77	20	104	145	28	68	-6	...	0	0	...	-	-		
Sudan	86	33	105	114	41	116	-5	...	10	5	5	1964	1964		
Syria	78	28	104	122	37	93	-3	9	12	11	11	1949	1973		
Tunisia	78	36	106	113	48	76	-2	4	12	10	10	1957	1959		
UAE	86	21	106	109	37	49	-3	-	-		
Yemen	83	30	104	109	37	127	-6	4	1	1967	1990		

Table A.5 continued: Implementation of MDG3 (promoting gender equality and empowering women)

Year:	Ratio of girls to boys (%)						Share of female teachers (%)						Ratio of literate females to males (%)			Female share of non-agricultural wage employment (%)	
	In primary and secondary education		In primary education only		In secondary education only		In primary education		In secondary education		Youth literacy (age 15-24)		Adult literacy (age 15 and above)		1990	2001	
	1990	2001	1990	2001	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2000	1990	2002	2001	1990			2001
Source:	World Bank		UNDP		UNESCO		UNESCO		UNESCO		UNDP		UNDP				
MENA	79	95	75	87	...	21	...		
EAP	83	97	96	99	...	38	39		
ECCA	...	97	98	99	...	47	45		
LAC	...	102	100	101	...	38	43		
SA	68	79	71	79	...	13	17		
SSA	79	80	90	...	32	...		
World	84	87	35	37		

The abbreviations are explained below Table A.3.
Source: UN (2002a); UNDP (2003a); UNESCO (2002); World Bank (2004e).

Table A6: Legal position of women according to national civil status laws in selected MENA countries			
Criterion:	Applies to:	Applies partially (to some degree) to:	Does not apply to:
The guardian of the woman must consent her marriage.	All other covered countries ¹	Tunisia	Morocco
Only the guardian is entitled to conclude the marriage on a woman's behalf.	Yemen		All other covered countries
The marriage can be concluded without the woman's consent.	Yemen		All other covered countries
Even children can be married because there is no minimum age for marriage.	Yemen		All other covered countries
For women, the minimum age of marriage is below their age of majority and full criminal responsibility.	All covered countries ¹		All other covered countries
Polygamy is legal.	All other covered countries ¹	Egypt, ² Morocco ²	Tunisia
Women are obligated by law to obey their husbands.	All other covered countries ¹	Egypt	Tunisia, Morocco
Men have the right to forbid their wives to get economically active (get employed).	All other covered countries ¹	Yemen, Iran	Egypt, Morocco Tunisia
When a woman wants to get divorced from her husband, she must have a good reason for this (while men can outcast their wives at any point of time).	All other covered countries ¹	Egypt, Morocco Tunisia, Yemen	
Men have the exclusive authority to decide upon all concerns of their children.	All covered countries ¹		
When a father dies, he passes on his exclusive authority to decide upon his children to his relatives rather than to the mother of the children.	Yemen		All other covered countries
Women cannot bequeath their citizenship to their children.	All other covered countries ¹	Yemen, Egypt, Jordan ³	

Source: Abou-Habib (2003); Salehi-Isfahani (2000); Schürmacher (2004); World Bank (2004f); Würth (2004).

Annotations:

- 1 Countries covered by Würth (2004): Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.
- 2 Polygamy is legal. Nevertheless, every woman must declare that she accepts her husband to marry a second wife.
- 3 Only divorced and widowed women can pass on their citizenship to their children.

Year:	Implementation of MDG4 und MDG5 (reducing child and maternal mortality)											
	Under-five mortality rate (per 1000 live births)				Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)				Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births)			
	1990	1995	2001	2002	1990	1995	2001	2002	1990 ¹	1995 ¹	2001 ¹	2002 ¹
Algeria	69	55	50	49	42	40	39	38	170	160 ²	117	...
Bahrain	19	18	16	15	15	14	13	12	60 ²	38	22	...
Egypt	104	71	41	39	76	56	35	35	174	96	84	75
Iran	72	55	42	39	54	43	35	35	120 ²	130 ²	76	...
Iraq	50	117	133	125	40	98	107	102	310 ²	370 ²	250	...
Jordan	43	37	33	30	35	31	27	25	150 ²	...	41	...
Kuwait	16	14	10	12	14	11	9	10	29 ²	25 ²	5	...
Lebanon	37	34	32	32	32	30	28	26	300 ²	130 ²	150	100
Libya	42	29	19	16	34	25	16	17	220 ²	120 ²	97	...
Mauritania	183	183	183	179	120	120	120	108	930	870	747	550
Morocco	85	61	44	43	66	51	39	39	332	228	220	...
Oman	30	18	13	12	25	15	12	12	190 ²	120 ²	87	...
Palest. Territ.	53	38	25	24	42	32	21	20	...	75	42	...
Qatar	25	18	16	14	19	13	11	11	...	41 ²	7	...
Saudi-Arabia	44	34	28	26	34	27	23	21	130 ²	...	23	...
Sudan	123	115	107	94	75	70	65	66	660 ²	1500 ²	590	550
Syria	44	36	28	28	37	30	23	23	180 ²	200 ²	160	...
Tunisia	52	37	27	26	37	31	21	24	75	70	57	...
UAE	14	11	9	...	12	10	8	...	26 ²	30 ²	54	...
Yemen	142	126	107	114	98	89	79	78	1400 ²	850 ²	570	...
MENA	77	66	54	54	57	52	44	37	165	...
EAP	59	53	44	41	43	40	34	33	115	...
EECA	44	42	38	24	36	35	31	58	...
LAC	53	43	34	34	42	35	28	28	193	...
SA	129	111	99	...	86	78	71	71	566	...
SSA	178	175	171	164	110	108	105	105	917	...
World	403	...

Table A7 continued: *Implementation of MDG4 and MDG5 (reducing child and maternal mortality)*

Year:	Share of one-year-olds that are fully immunized against				Physicians attended by skilled health personnel (%)				Life expectancy at birth (years)			Disability-adjusted life expectancy (DALE) at birth (years)			Contributions to total national health care spending (%)		Health care spending per capita (PPP-US\$)					
	Measles (%)				TBC (%)				1990	1995	2001	1990	1995	2002	All	Only males	Only females	Public	Private	Total	1997	1997
	1990	1995	2002	2001	1990	1995	2001	1999														
Algeria	83	89	84	97	85	67	70	71	62	63	61	51	49	122	60							
Bahrain	87	95	100	...	92	98	99	169	71	72	73	64	65	59	42	539	204					
Egypt	86	89	98	98	37	46	69	218	63	65	69	59	59	58	27	73	118	86				
Iran	85	95	99	93	86	90	110	65	67	69	61	61	60	43	57	200	114					
Iraq	80	80	90	...	54	...	72	...	61	59	63	55	55	59	41	110	45					
Jordan	87	92	96	...	87	97	99	205	69	70	72	60	61	59	67	33	178	58				
Kuwait	66	98	99	98	...	160	75	76	77	63	63	87	13	605	76					
Lebanon	61	85	96	89	94	274	68	69	71	61	61	60	30	70	563	303				
Libya	89	92	93	99	...	94	...	120	69	70	72	59	60	59	54	46	221	102				
Mauritania	38	67	58	70	40	...	57	14	49	50	51	41	40	43	30	70	73	51				
Morocco	80	88	90	93	31	40	...	49	64	66	68	59	59	59	41	59	159	95				
Oman	98	98	99	98	...	91	95	137	69	72	74	63	62	64	55	46	334	120				
Palest. Territ.	93	97	...	69	71	73				
Qatar	79	87	92	99	...	98	...	220	72	74	75	64	64	63	58	43	1105	470				
Saudi-Arabia	88	94	96	94	...	91	...	153	69	71	73	65	65	64	80	20	332	35				
Sudan	57	51	67	86	52	55	58	43	43	44	21	79	43	34				
Syria	87	90	98	99	...	76	...	142	66	68	70	59	59	59	34	66	109	72				
Tunisia	93	91	90	97	69	81	90	70	70	71	73	61	62	61	42	58	239	127				
UAE	80	90	94	98	...	96	...	177	74	75	75	65	65	66	35	65	816	38				
Yemen	69	46	66	73	16	22	...	22	52	54	57	50	50	38	62	33	20					
MENA	84	87	93	85	64	66	69	50	50	284	101					

Table A7 continued: Implementation of MDG4 and MDG5 (reducing child and maternal mortality)

Year	Share of one-year-olds that are fully immunized against:			Births attended by skilled health personnel (%)		Physicians (per 100,000 inhabitants)	Life expectancy at birth (years)		Disability-adjusted life expectancy (DALE) at birth (years)		Contributions to total national health care spending (%)		Health care spending per capita (PPP-US\$)			
	Measles (%)	TBC (%)		1990	1995		2001	1990	1995	2002	All	Only males	Only females	Public	Private	Total
MENA	84	87	92	85	64	66	69	50	50	284	101
EAP	89	87	76	75	80	68	67	68	69	64	37	301	103
EECA	84	86	95	97	69	68	69	73	27	216	48
LAC	77	88	91	95	68	69	71	51	49	352	136
SA	56	69	58	77	39	42	59	61	63	42	58	130	55
SSA	57	54	58	73	50	49	46	53	47	78	34
World	59	41	443	120

The abbreviations are explained below Table A3.
 Source: UN (2002a); UNDP (2003a); UNICEF (2004); UNISD (2004); World Bank (2004e); WHO (2002).
 Annotations:
 1 The figures cited by different sources on maternal mortality diverge extraordinarily. Here, the figures of the World Bank (2004e) have been quoted.
 2 Data based on model calculations, cf. UNISD (2004).

Table A8: Implementation of MDG6 (combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases)													
	HIV prevalence among adults aged 15–49 years (%)	Contraceptive prevalence among 15–49 years (%)	Total number of officially registered HIV infections until respective year				Number of new malaria cases (per year and per 100,000 inhabitants)		Malaria-related mortality rate (per 100,000 inhabitants)		Number of new tuberculosis (per year and per 100,000 inhabitants)		TBC-related mortality rate (per 100,000 inhabitants)
			1990	1995	2001	2002	1990	2001	2000	2000	1990	2001	
			All ages		Children aged 0–4								
Year:	2002	2002	1990	1995	2001	2002	1990	2001	2000	2000	1990	2001	2001
Algeria	<0.1	57	1834	1	2	22	169	23
Bahrain	0.1	62	...	99	...	129	...	0	0	0	34
Egypt	<0.1	60	1501	...	0	0	0	0	23
Iran	0.2	74	27	0	0	53
Iraq	<0.1	44	14	15	71	89
Jordan	0.1	56	47	122	286	310	5	3	0	0	14	5	1
Kuwait	0	0	27
Lebanon	<0.1	63	0	0	0	22	11	3
Libya	0.1	45	2	0	0	11
Mauritania	0.5	25	11150	108	553	209
Morocco	0.1	63	7	1	8	49	47
Oman	0.2	10	27	0	0	5
Palest. Territ.	0.1	42	53	69	0	0	28
Qatar	0	0	13
Saudi-Arabia	...	21	...	240	414	32	0	0	27
Sudan	2.0	12	13934	70	408	142
Syria	0.1	48	702	0	5	0	47
Tunisia	0.1	66	1	0	0	18
UAE	0	0	13
Yemen	0.2	23	1	...	874	...	1263	1532	24	93	70

Source:

UNAIDS/WHO (2004); UNDP (2003a); UNDP (2004a); World Bank (2004e); WHO (2002). *In addition for Egypt:* PARC (2002); PARC (2004).
For Algeria: UN (2004a). *For Yemen:* Republic of Yemen (2003). *For Jordan:* Jordan MOPIC / UN (2004). *For the Palestinian Territories:* UN (2002a).
For Saudi-Arabia: UN (2002b). *For Syria:* Syrian Arab Republic (2003).

Table A9: Implementation of MDG7 / Target 9 (sustainable development)																		
Year	Forests (% of total land area)		Protected areas (% of surface area)			Energy efficiency (GDP in PPP-US\$ per kg of oil equivalent)		Carbon dioxide emissions (metric tons per capita)		Consumption of ozone-depleting chlorofluoro- carbons (ODP metric tons)		Electricity consumption kilowatt-hours per capita and year)		Ratification of conventions on environmental protection				
	1990	2001	1990	1995	2002	1990	2001	1990	2001	1990	2001	1980	2000	Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety	Convention on Climate Change	Framework Convention on Climate Change	Kyoto Protocol	Convention on Biological Diversity
Algeria	0.8	0.9	...	2.1	5.0	4.7	5.6	3.1	3.0	3570	1022	265	612	(+)	+	+	+	+
Bahrain	0.0	0.0	...	0.0	1.3	1.2	1.7	23.3	29.4	106	106	4970	8507	+	+	+	+	+
Egypt	0.1	0.1	...	0.8	1.0	4.0	4.8	1.4	2.0	2144	1335	380	976	(+)	+	(+)	+	+
Iran	4.5	4.5	...	5.1	7.1	3.0	3.3	3.9	4.8	1366	4205	495	1474	(+)	+	+	+	+
Iraq	1.8	1.8	...	0.0	0.0	2.7	3.3
Jordan	1.0	1.0	...	3.4	3.4	2.9	3.7	3.2	3.1	540	321	387	1236	(+)	+	+	+	+
Kuwait	0.2	0.3	...	1.7	1.5	1.1	1.6	19.9	24.9	1757	354	5793	13995	+	+	+	+	+
Lebanon	3.6	3.5	...	0.0	0.5	2.8	3.6	2.5	4.0	432	533	789	1814	+	+	+	+	+
Libya	0.2	0.2	...	0.1	0.1	8.6	8.3	67	985	1588	3921	+	+	+	+	+
Mauritania	0.4	0.3	...	1.7	1.7	1.3	1.2	17	13	+	+	+	+	+
Morocco	6.8	6.8	...	0.7	0.7	9.9	9.6	1.0	1.3	604	435	223	447	(+)	+	+	+	+
Oman	0.0	0.0	...	11.1	12.1	3.6	3.1	7.1	8.5	305	207	614	2952	+	+	+	+	+
Palest. Territ.	4.4	1.5	...	83.2	+	+	+	+	+
Qatar	0.0	0.1	...	0.0	0.2	28.2	91.5	85	85	9489	14954	+	+	+	+	+
Saudi-Arabia	0.7	0.7	...	2.3	38.4	2.5	2.3	11.3	11.7	3688	1594	1356	4912	+	+	+	+	+
Sudan	30.0	25.9	...	3.6	5.2	2.3	3.4	0.1	0.1	601	266	+	+	+	+	+
Syria	2.5	2.5	...	0.0	...	2.2	2.9	3.0	3.4	1272	1392	354	900	+	+	+	+	+
Tunisia	3.2	3.3	...	0.3	0.3	5.4	7.5	1.6	1.8	730	570	379	939	+	+	+	+	+
UAE	2.9	3.8	...	0.0	0.0	33.0	31.3	448	423	5320	10725	+	+	+	+	+
Yemen	1.0	0.9	...	0.0	0.0	2.4	3.9	0.7	1.1	...	1023	59	107	+	+	+	+	+
MENA	1.5	1.5	...	2.2	10.4	3.6	3.8	518	1406	+	+	+	+	+

Table A9 continued: Implementation of MDG7 / Target 9 (sustainable development)

Year:	Forests (% of total land area)		Protected areas (% of surface area)		Energy efficiency (GDP in PPP-US\$ per kg of oil equivalent)		Carbon dioxide emissions (metric tons per capita)		Consumption of ozone-depleting chlorofluoro- carbons (ODP metric tons)		Electricity consumption kilowatt-hours per capita and year)		Ratification of conventions on environmental protection					
	1990	2001	1990	1995	2002	1990	2001	1990	2001	1990	2001	1980	2000	Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety	Convention on Climate Change	Framework Convention on Climate Change	Kyoto Protocol	Convention on Biological Diversity
MENA	1.5	1.5	...	2.2	10.4	3.6	3.8	518	1406					
EAP	27.6	27.2	...	6.9	9.2	253	918					
EECA	39.4	39.7	...	3.2	7.1	1.7	2.3	2977					
LAC	49.3	47.1	...	7.3	11.5	4.1	6.1	845	1528					
SA	16.5	16.3	...	4.5	4.8	3.9	5.5	132	376					
SSA	29.5	27.3	...	6.2	9.9	2.5	2.9	463	457					
World					

The abbreviations are explained below Table A3.
 Source:
 UN (2002a); UNDP (2003a); World Bank (2004e).

Table A10: Implementation of MDG7 / Target 10 and Target 11 (improving access to water, sanitation and secure tenure)														
Year:	Proportion of households with access to an improved water source (%)						Proportion of households with access to improved sanitation (%)							
	Total			Urban			Rural			Total				
	1990	2001	2000	1990	2000	1990	1990	2000	2001	1990	2001	2001		
Source:	World Bank			UNDP			UNDP			World Bank			UNDP	
Algeria	...	89	94	82	92	
Bahrain	...	100	100	100	75	
Egypt	94	97	99	97	92	96	87	98	
Iran	...	92	98	83	83	
Iraq	...	85	96	48	79	
Jordan	97	96	100	99	92	84	98	99	...	72	76	
Kuwait	
Lebanon	...	100	100	...	100	99	
Libya	71	72	72	72	68	68	97	97	
Mauritania	37	37	34	34	40	40	30	33	
Morocco	75	80	98	94	58	56	58	68	...	88	...	
Oman	37	39	41	41	30	30	84	92	
Qatar	
Palest. Territ.	81	90	97	86	100	...	84	86	
Saudi-Arabia	...	95	100	64	100	
Sudan	67	75	86	86	60	69	58	62	
Syria	67	80	94	90	42	64	55	72	
Tunisia	75	80	92	91	54	58	76	84	
UAE	
Yemen	...	69 ¹	74 ¹	68 ¹	32	38	
MENA	...	88	94	76	85	

Table A10 continued: Implementation of MDG7 / Target 10 und Target 11 (improving access to water, sanitation and secure tenure)

Year:	Proportion of households with access to an improved water source (%)						Proportion of households with access to improved sanitation (%)			Proportion of households with access to secure tenure (%)			
	Total			Urban			Rural			Total			
	1990	2001	2000	1990	2000	1990	1990	2000	2001	1990	2001	1990	2001
MENA	...	88	94	...	76	85
EAP	71	76	93	...	67	46
ECCA	...	91	99	...	82
LAC	82	86	94	...	65	77
SA	72	84	95	90	81	66	34
SSA	53	58	83	86	44	39	53
World	95	...	71

The abbreviations are explained below Table A3.
Source: UN (2002a); UNDP (2003a); World Bank (2004e).
Annotation:
1 According to Khan / Chase (2003), only 40 % of the inhabitants of Yemen had access to an improved water source in 2001 (65 % of the urban and 25 % of the rural population).

Table A11: Implementation of MDG8 (global partnership for development) by selected indicators

Year:	Net official development assistance received (% of GNI)		Total external debt (% of GDP)		Gross domestic investment (% of GDP)		Foreign trade (% of GDP)		Youth unemployment rate (% of labor force aged 15-24)	Telephone mainlines and cellular subscribers (per 1000 inhabitants)		Personal computers in use (per 1000 inhabitants)	Internet users (per 1000 inhabitants)	People in R&D (per 1000 inhabitants)										
	1990	1995	2001	1990	1995	2001/2002 ^a	1990	1995		2001	1990				1995	2001	2001	2000						
Algeria	0.4	0.8	0.3	46.9	83.5	42.3	29	32	26	48	58	57	32	41	64	1	3	7	7	94				
Bahrain	3.9	0.8	0.2	16	15	13	210	153	140	6	13	202	290	672	...	50	142	203	...		
Egypt	12.9	3.3	1.3	78.6	55.3	29.4	29	17	17	53	50	42	26	34	30	47	147	...	4	16	9	93		
Iran	0.1	0.2	0.1	7.5	25.2	6.6	29	20	29	46	39	45	42	86	201	...	25	70	16	590		
Iraq	0.1
Jordan	23.1	8.1	4.1	219.0	117.2	84.6	32	33	27	155	123	117	58	61	295	...	6	33	45	1948		
Kuwait	0.0	0.0	0.0	17	15	9	103	97	92	262	296	685	7	56	132	88	63		
Lebanon	7.5	1.6	1.4	51.4	25.5	70.5	18	36	18	118	77	55	150	407	...	17	56	78	212			
Libya	19	12	13	71	52	51	74	118	4	...		
Mauritania	22.0	22.7	26.6	194.8	231.4	220.0	20	19	25	106	109	89	...	45	...	10	...	6	10	3		
Morocco	4.2	1.6	1.6	98.5	71.6	51.1	25	21	25	59	62	66	31	37 ⁴	16	43	204	...	3	14	14	77		
Oman	0.6	0.5	0.0	26.6	49.3	31.1	13	17	...	83	89	61	82	213	2	9	32	46	4		
Palest. Territ.	...	12.2	19.1	37	41	...	77	105	168	18	...		
Qatar	0.0	0.0	0.0	35	88	198	256	568	...	54	164	66	591		
Saudi-Arabia	0.0	0.0	0.0	20	21	19	82	74	66	78	95	258	24	36	63	13	45		
Sudan	6.6	3.9	1.5	119.2	280.3	137.5	...	22	18	...	27	29	4	18	...	0	14		
Syria	5.7	3.1	0.8	144.4	184.8	113.5	17	27	24	56	69	65	...	73 ⁴	...	115	...	7	16	4	68	...		
Tunisia	3.3	0.4	2.0	64.7	63.2	57.1	33	25	26	94	93	96	38	59	149	3	7	24	41	336		
UAE	0.0	0.0	0.0	20	29	...	106	142	224	343	956	29	49	136	315	...		
Yemen	8.4	4.6	5.0	132.6	170.2	57.6	15	22	19	34	65	54	12	13	30	...	1	2	1	...		
MENA	...	1.1	0.7	45.7	43.5	29.6	24	22	22	66	62	60	...	53 ⁴	...	59	152	...	13	32	16	317		

Table A11 continued: Implementation of MDG8 (global partnership for development) by selected indicators

	Net official development assistance received (% of GNI)		Total external debt (% of GDP)		Gross domestic investment (% of GDP)		Foreign trade (% of GDP)		Youth unemployment rate (% of labor force aged 15–24)	Telephone mainlines and cellular subscribers (per 1000 inhabitants)		Personal computers in use (per 1000 inhabitants)	Internet users (per 1000 inhabitants)	People in R&D (per 1000 inhabitants)						
	1990	1995	2001	1990	1995	2001	1990	1995		2001	1990				1995	2001	2001	2000		
Year:	1990	1995	2001	1990	1995	2001	1990	1995	2001	1990	1995	2001	2001	2000						
MENA	...	1.1	0.7	45.7	43.5	29.6	24	22	22	59	152	...	13	32	16	317		
EAP	1.2	0.8	0.5	35.5	38.2	31.1	34	38	32	8	35	207	1	4	19	41	619	
EECA	0.3	1.2	1.0	17.6	37.3	51.2	28	25	21	167	376	4	18	52	43	2554	
LAC	0.4	0.4	0.3	44.6	39.6	41.5	19	21	19	62	97	324	6	20	59	49	...	
SA	1.5	1.1	1.0	32.4	33.1	26.5	23	25	21	12	38	0	2	5	6	158	
SSA	6.4	6.2	4.6	63.1	77.5	67.7	15	18	18	14	41	...	8	10	8	...	
World	979

R&D: Scientists and engineers in research and development.
All other abbreviations are explained below Table A3.
Source: Gardner (2003); UN (2002a); UNDP (2003a); UNDP / AFESD (2003); World Bank (2004e).

	Quality of governance according to the World Bank Governance Indicator and the Freedom House Index													
	World Bank Governance Indicator										Freedom House Index			
	Voice and accountability		Political stability		Government effectiveness		Regulatory quality		Rule of law		Control of corruption		Freedom House Index	
	2004	1996	2004	1996	2004	1996	2004	1996	2004	1996	2004	1996	2004	1990
Algeria	-0.9	-1.2	-1.4	-2.8	-0.5	-0.8	-0.9	-0.7	-0.7	-0.6	-0.5	-0.3	6/5	4/4
Bahrain	-0.7	-0.9	+0.1	-0.6	+0.8	+0.5	+0.7	+0.6	+0.7	+0.6	+0.8	+0.1	5/5	6/5
Egypt	-1.0	-0.7	-0.7	-0.4	-0.2	-0.3	-0.6	-0.1	+0.0	+0.2	-0.2	+0.1	6/5	5/4
Iran	-1.4	-1.1	-0.9	-0.4	-0.7	-0.3	-1.3	-1.6	-0.8	-0.8	-0.6	-0.8	7/5	7/7
Iraq	-1.7	-1.7	-2.9	-3.0	-1.5	-1.4	-1.8	-2.3	-2.0	-1.6	-1.5	-1.4	6/6	6/5
Jordan	-0.7	-0.2	-0.1	+0.4	+0.2	+0.2	+0.1	+0.1	+0.3	+0.2	+0.4	-0.1	5/4	5/5
Kuwait	-0.5	-0.2	+0.3	+0.2	+0.5	+0.3	+0.1	+0.2	+0.6	+0.6	+0.7	+0.6	4/5	6/4
Lebanon	-0.8	-0.4	-0.8	-0.4	-0.3	-0.2	-0.5	+0.2	-0.3	-0.3	-0.5	-0.2	6/5	6/5
Libya	-1.8	-1.5	+0.0	-1.6	-0.7	-1.0	-1.5	-2.0	-0.6	-1.0	-0.9	-0.9	7/7	7/7
Mauritania	-0.6	-0.6	-0.2	-0.4	+0.0	-0.1	-0.3	+0.0	+0.0	+0.2	+0.0	+0.2	6/5	7/6
Morocco	-1.2	-0.8	+0.3	+0.7	+0.2	+0.3	+0.0	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	+0.0	+0.0	5/4	4/4
Oman	-0.9	-0.6	+0.8	+0.7	+0.9	+0.8	+0.4	+0.6	+1.0	+1.1	+0.8	+0.1	6/5	6/6
Palest. Territ.	-1.2	-1.6	-1.3	+0.0	-1.0	+0.0	-1.0	+0.0	-0.9	+0.0	-0.6	+0.0
Qatar	-0.8	-0.8	+0.9	+0.9	+0.9	+0.7	-0.2	+0.2	+0.8	+1.0	+0.6	-0.1	6/5	7/5
Saudi-Arabia	-1.6	-1.2	-0.6	-0.3	+0.1	-0.1	-0.3	+0.1	+0.2	+0.8	+0.2	-0.3	7/7	7/6
Sudan	-1.8	-1.7	-2.1	-2.7	-1.3	-1.5	-1.0	-1.7	-1.6	-1.5	-1.3	-1.1	7/7	7/7
Syria	-1.7	-1.4	-0.7	-0.6	-0.7	-0.4	-1.2	-1.0	-0.4	-0.5	-0.7	-0.7	7/7	7/7
Tunisia	-1.1	-0.5	+0.2	+0.2	+0.6	+0.5	-0.2	+0.1	+0.2	+0.1	+0.3	+0.0	6/5	5/4
UAE	-1.0	-0.7	+0.9	+0.9	+1.2	+0.7	+1.0	+1.0	+0.9	+0.8	+1.2	+0.2	6/6	6/5
Yemen	-1.0	-0.9	-1.5	-0.9	-0.8	-0.6	-1.0	-0.7	-1.1	-1.0	-0.8	-0.2	5/5	6/5
MENA	-1.2	-0.9	-0.5	-0.5	-0.1	-0.1	-0.5	-0.4	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	6.0/5.4	5.9/5.3

Table A12 continued: *Quality of governance according to the World Bank Governance Indicator and the Freedom House Index*

	World Bank Governance Indicator										Freedom House Index			
	Voice and accountability		Political stability		Government effectiveness		Regulatory quality		Rule of law		Control of corruption		2004	1990
	2004	1996	2004	1996	2004	1996	2004	1996	2004	1996	2004	1996	2004	1990
MENA	-1.1	-0.9	-0.5	-0.5	-0.1	-0.1	-0.5	-0.4	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.3	6.0/5.4	5.9/5.3
EAP	+0.0	+0.0	+0.2	+0.2	-0.2	+0.2	+0.0	+0.0	+0.1	+0.1	-0.2	+0.0	2.4/2.6	2.7/2.9
ECCA	-0.6	-0.7	-0.7	-0.2	-0.6	-0.7	-0.6	-0.8	-0.8	-0.7	-0.7	-0.8	3.5/3.3	4.1/4.1
LAC	+0.4	+0.3	+0.2	+0.0	+0.0	-0.2	+0.2	+0.2	+0.1	-0.2	+0.1	-0.2	3.9/3.5	4.7/4.2
OECD	-0.8	-0.6	-0.9	-0.8	-0.4	-0.2	-0.6	-0.1	-0.6	-0.5	-0.4	-0.5	4.6/4.4	4.8/4.8
SA	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.4	-0.7	-0.6	-0.6	-0.5	-0.7	-0.6	-0.6	-0.5	4.0/3.8	5.0/4.6
SSA	+1.2	+1.2	+0.9	+0.9	+1.3	+1.4	+1.3	+1.1	+1.3	+1.3	+1.3	+1.2	2.2/2.1	1.7/2.0

The abbreviations are explained below Table A3.

Source:

World Bank Governance Indicator: Kaufmann / Kraay / Zoido-Lobaton (1999); World Bank (2003); World Bank (2006).

Freedom House Index: Freedom House (2004).

Annotations:

The figures presented for the world regions are unweighted means of the single values for the countries in the respective world region.

The values of the six *World Bank Governance Indicators* range between -2.5 (very bad governance) and +2.5 (very good governance). Each of the indicators is a composite index, i.e. they are computed from a total of 81 existing single indicators from 13 different sources (research institutes, non-governmental institutions, international organizations and commercial rating agencies, among them UNDP, the World Competitiveness Yearbook, Gallup International, Freedom House, the *Heritage Foundation*, the *Economic Intelligence Unit* and *Standard and Poor's*). The World Bank stresses itself that each of these 81 single indicators is based on very personal, subjective judgments of experts.

The *Freedom House Index* ranges between 0 (very good) and 8 (very bad).

With regards to MDG No.		Capacity to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the MDGs																									
		Data gathering							Quality of survey information							Statistical tracking											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7							
					H ¹	M ¹	E ¹	W ¹						H ¹	M ¹	E ¹	W ¹						H ¹	M ¹	E ¹	W ¹	
Algeria	0	+	0	0	0	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	+	
Bahrain	...	+	0	0	0	0	0	+
Egypt (2002)	+	0	0	+	+	0	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	...
(2004)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	...
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	...
Jordan	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0
Lebanon	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mauritania	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0
Morocco	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0
Palest. Territ.	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0
Saudi-Arabia	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0
Sudan	...	+
Syria	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Tunisia
Yemen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table A13 continued: Capacity to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the MDGs

With regards to MDG No.	Statistical analysis							Incorporate statistical analysis into policies, plans and resource allocation mechanisms							Monitoring and evaluation												
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7						
					H ¹	M ¹	E ¹	W ¹						H ¹	M ¹	E ¹	W ¹						H ¹	M ¹	E ¹	W ¹	
Algeria	0	-	-	0	0	0	0	+	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Bahrain
Egypt (2002)	0	0	0	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Egypt (2004)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Iran	-	0	0	+	+	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	
Jordan	0	+	-	0	0	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Lebanon	0	0	+	0	+	0	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	
Mauritania	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Morocco	+	0	0	+	+	+	0	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Palest. Territ.	0	0	0	0	-	-	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Saudi-Arabia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	+	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	
Sudan	
Syria	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Tunisia	
Yemen	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Explanatory notes:
+ Strong
0 Intermediate
- Weak
... The national MDG progress report does not comment on this issue.
1 Some MDG progress reports differentiate with regards to MDG6 between the fight against HIV/AIDS on the one hand (H) and against malaria and other diseases on the other (M). Likewise, some reports differentiate under MDG7 between environmental protection (E) and people's access to improved water and sanitation (W).

Source: All indications are entirely based on the assessments made by the national MDG reports, cf. below Table A14.

Table A14: Quality of the 'supportive environment' / national support for the MDG implementation											
	MDG 1		MDG 2	MDG 3	MDG 4	MDG 5	MDG 6		MDG 7		
	Income poverty	Hunger	Education	Gender equality	Child mortality	Maternal mortality	HIV/AIDS	Malaria and tuberculosis	Environmental protection	Access to improved water	Access to improved sanitation
Algeria
Bahrain	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0
Egypt (2002)	0	0	+	0	+	+	-	+	0	0	0
Egypt (2004)	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	0	0	0
Iran	0	0	0	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0
Jordan	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	-	-	-
Lebanon	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mauritania	0	0	+	0	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
Morocco	+	+	0	0	0	0	+	+	+	+	+
Palest. Territ.	-	-	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-
Saudi-Arabia	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sudan
Syria	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0
Tunisia
Yemen	-	-	0	0	0	-	...	-	-	-	-

See the explanatory notes below Table A13.

Source:
For Algeria: UN (2004a). *Bahrain:* Kingdom of Bahrain / United Nations (2002). *Egypt:* PARC (2002); PARC (2004). *Iran:* Islamic Republic of Iran (2004).
Jordan: Jordan MOPIC / UN (2004). *Lebanon:* UN (2003a). *Mauritania:* UNDG (2002). *Morocco:* Royaume du Maroc (2003). *Palestinian Territories:* UN (2002a). *Saudi-Arabia:* UN (2002b). *Sudan:* UN (2004c). *Syria:* Syrian Arab Republic (2003). *Tunisia:* UN (2003b). *Yemen:* Republic of Yemen (2002a).

Table A15: Commitment of the governments in the MENA region for the MDGs			National MDG progress report has been produced by:
	Country was represented at the Millennium Summit by:	Other	
	Head of state or government		
Algeria	President <i>Bouteflika</i>		UN
Bahrain		Minister for Foreign Affairs <i>Al-Khalifa</i>	Government with UN
Egypt		Minister for Foreign Affairs <i>Amr Moussa</i>	Governmental research institute (2 reports from 2002 and 2004)
Iran	President <i>Khatami</i>		Government
Iraq		Dep. Minister for Foreign Affairs <i>Tarik Asis</i>	–
Jordan	King <i>Abdallah</i>		Government with UN
Kuwait		Minister for Foreign Affairs <i>Al-Sabah</i>	–
Lebanon		Ambassador to the UN <i>Tadnoui</i>	Government with UN
Libya		Minister for Foreign Affairs <i>Shtalgam</i>	–
Mauritania	Prime Minister <i>Mohamed Khotma</i>		UN
Morocco		Prince <i>Moulay Rachid</i>	Government
Oman		Minister of Culture <i>Faysal Al-Said</i>	–
Palest. Territ.	President <i>Arafat</i>		UNDP
Qatar	Amir <i>Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani</i>		–
Saudi-Arabia	Deputy Prime Minister and Crown Prince <i>Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz</i>		UN
Sudan	President <i>Ahmed Al-Bashir</i>		UN
Syria		Minister for Foreign Affairs <i>Farouk Al-Shara</i>	Government
Tunisia	President <i>Zine El Abidine Ben Ali</i>		Government with UN
UAE	Amir of Fujaira <i>Al-Sharqi</i>		–
Yemen	President <i>As-Saleh</i>		Government with UN
Islamic World Confer.	Secretary-General <i>Laraki</i>		
Arab League	Secretary-General <i>Meguid</i>		–

Source: Millennium Summit: UN (2000b). MDG progress reports: see below Table A14.

Table A16: Volume and priorities of German development cooperation with MENA countries													
	Volume of German development cooperation 2003						Priority areas of German development cooperation 2003						
	Official development assistance (ODA)			Other public disbursements	Private transfers		Total amount	Democracy, civil society, administration	Education	Health, family planning, HIV/AIDS	Water management, waste disposal	Environmental and resource protection,	Economic reform and market economy dev't
	Total	Only grants	Only credits		Investments	Export credits							
Algeria	-4.2	10.2	-14.4	-27.9	-38.0	5.8	-64.3	x ²			X		X
Bahrain	0.0	0.0	-	-	13.6	-42.1	-28.5					X	X
Egypt	65.7	52.6	13.1	-10.9	-101.9	0.0	-47.1			X			
Iran	33.7	33.7	-	-	460	204.6	698.3						
Iraq	19.5	19.5	-	-	-7.1	-0.1	12.2						
Jordan	59.9	59.9	-	11.4	1.8	-2.5	64.8			X			
Lebanon	7.7	7.6	0.1	-5.8	-13.8	-1.7	-13.7					X	
Mauritania	27.2	27.5	-0.3	-1.5	0.3	-0.3	25.7	X					
Morocco	17.9	46.0	-28.1	-10.1	-44.5	-1.2	-37.9	x ²		X		X	X
Oman	0.1	0.1	-	-	41.8	-0.1	41.7						
Palest. Territ.	40.2	40.2	-	-	0.2	-0.2	40.2	X		X			X
Saudi-Arabia	0.7	0.7	-	-	-99.8	-28.2	-127.3						
Sudan	15.4	15.4	-	-	-7.3	-	8.1						
Syria	-13.5	13.2	-26.7	-	4.0	-0.9	-10.4			X			X
Tunisia	-5.5	24.3	-29.8	13.3	6.3	4.6	18.7	x ²				X	X
Yemen	30.1	30.1	-	-	5.2	-	35.2		X		X		X
Total MENA ¹	305	391.1	-86.1	-31.5	220.3	137.7	752.5	3 ¹	1	1	7	5	6

Source: see below Table A17.

Annotations:

1 Includes regional (transnational) projects.

2 Regional project Maghreb.

Table A17: Reference to the MDGs in the planning and strategy papers of German development cooperation			
(a) Number of priority strategy papers (PSPs) that are in line with the criteria listed below (out of a total of 14 PSPs relevant for German development cooperation with the MENA region):			
Criteria:	Yes	Partially	No
Does the paper point out what the major problems of the partner country are?	12	0	2
Does it explain why these problems are more serious than others?	1	5	8
Do they explain why these problems exist?	11	2	1
Does it explain why the partner country is unable to solve its problems on its own?	3	5	6
Does it specify at least one of the MDGs as a goal of German development cooperation?	1	2	11
Do the goals of German development cooperation nevertheless conform with one of the MDGs?	10	2	2
Is it one of the critical MDGs (i.e. one of the goals that the partner country has severe difficulties to reach)?	9	1	4
Does the paper mention goals that have nothing to do with the MADG agenda?	11	2	1
Does it explain why it is nevertheless important to meet those goals?			
Does the paper specify in detail the measures that German development cooperation supports in the country?	11	0	3
Is it plausible that the measures that German development cooperation supports make a relevant and significant contribution to the achievement of the mentioned goals?	13	1	0
Does the paper convincingly outline the cause-and-effect-relation between the measure(s) and the goal(s) of German development cooperation?	9	2	3
Does it explain why precisely these measures are reasonable and appropriate and possibly more efficient than other measures for reaching the defined goals?	4	8	2
Does it explain why the respective partner country needs support for implementing such measures (why it is unable to take the measures on its own, i.e. without external support)?	3	7	4
Does it explain why the measures must be supported by specifically German development cooperation, i.e. what comparative advantages Germany has vis-à-vis other donors with respect to these measures?	5	3	6

Table A17 continued: Reference to the MDGs in the planning and strategy papers of German development cooperation

(b) Degree to which the planning and strategy papers of German development cooperation refer to the MDGs

	Country report / country brief	Country concept paper	Sector strategy paper 'Democracy, civil society, public administration'	Sector strategy paper 'Economic reform and market economy development'	Sector strategy paper 'Water management and supply, waste water and waste disposal'	Sector strategy paper 'Environmental and resource protection'	Sector strategy paper 'Education'	Sector strategy paper 'Health, family planning, HIV / AIDS'
Algeria	0		0	0	0			
Egypt	0	mentioned only occasionally	— ²	— ²	— ²	0		
Jordan	0			0	0			
Mauritania	0		0			0		
Morocco	0	0	— ²	referred to several times at right places		(0) ⁴		
Palest. Territ.	0	(0) ⁴	0	0				
Syria	0			— ²				
Tunisia	0		mentioned only once in the introduction			0		
Yemen	— ²	referred to several times at right places	— ²	— ²			German DC is well derived from PRSP	— ²

Table A17 continued: Reference to the MDGs in the planning and strategy papers of German development cooperation

<p>Explanatory note: PSP Priority strategy paper of German development cooperation</p> <p>Source: BMZ (1997); BMZ (2000a); BMZ (2002b); BMZ (2002c); BMZ (2002d); BMZ (2003a); BMZ (2003b); BMZ (2003c); BMZ (2004a); BMZ (2004b); BMZ (2004c); BMZ (2004d); BMZ (2004e); BMZ (2004f); BMZ (2004g); BMZ (2004h); BMZ (2004i); BMZ (2004j); BMZ (2004k); BMZ / Agypten (2003); BMZ / Algerien (2003a); BMZ / Algerien (2003b); BMZ / Marokko (2000); BMZ / PA (2004a); BMZ / PA (2004b); BMZ / Tunesien (2003).</p> <p>Annotations: 1 Strategy paper stresses at several occasions that the goals and strategies defined by the PRSP conform with those resulting from the MDG agenda. However, this statement is not at all explained in more detail. 2 Does not exist. 3 The strategy paper starts out from the assumption that improving the access to improved water and sanitation is crucial for reaching MDG 1–5 and 7. Nevertheless, it should elaborate in much more detail on the assumed impacts of the different measures supported by German DC. 4 The MDGs had not yet been formulated in 2000 when this specific priority strategy paper was finalised. 5 Refers to the priority strategy paper „Rural development / resource management“.</p>
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Table A18: Implementation of MDG8 by Germany and other OECD/DAC member countries

Year	Official development assistance (ODA)						Proportion of ODA provided to least-developed countries (LDCs)				Proportion of ODA to basic social services (% of total ODA)			Proportion of ODA that is not tied (% of total ODA)			Net grants by non-governmental organizations (% of GNI)		Refugees granted asylum (Thousands)		Conventional arms import (mUS\$ in 1990 prices)		Conventional arms export (mUS\$ in 1990 prices)	
	(m US\$)		(% of GNI)		(US\$ per capita)		(% of total ODA)		(% of GNI)		(% of total ODA)		(% of total ODA)		(% of total ODA)		1990		2001		1992		2002	
	2001	1990	2001	1990	1990	2001	1990	2001	1990	2001	1996	2001	1990	2001	1990	2001	1990	2001	1990	2001	1992	2002	1992	2002
Germany	4990	0.42	0.27	93	62	28	24	0.12	0.06	10	10	62	85	0.05	0.04	903	969
Australia	873	0.34	0.25	49	49	18	20	0.06	0.05	8	19	33	59	0.02	0.06	55	250	614	30	30
Austria	533	0.25	0.29	47	66	27	20	0.07	0.05	5	21	32	...	0.02	0.03	14	2	79	124
Belgium	867	0.46	0.37	83	85	41	34	0.19	0.12	11	15	0.03	0.06	12	64	29	14
Canada	1533	0.44	0.22	83	51	30	15	0.13	0.03	6	19	47	32	0.05	0.02	129	344	359	318
Denmark	1634	0.94	1.03	218	306	39	33	0.37	0.33	10	9	0	93	0.02	0.01	73	42	7	9
Finland	389	0.65	0.32	121	75	38	29	0.24	0.09	6	12	31	87	0.03	0.01	13	441	24	12
France	4198	0.60	0.32	113	72	32	26	0.19	0.08	64	67	0.02	0.00	132	387	22	1617
Greece	202	...	0.17	...	19	...	11	...	0.02	17	5	...	17	...	0.00	...	7	1994	567
Ireland	287	0.16	0.33	16	74	37	50	0.06	0.17	...	21	...	100	0.07	0.12	4	...	20
Italy	1627	0.31	0.15	50	28	41	30	0.13	0.04	7	6	22	8	0.00	...	9	42	308	490
Japan	9847	0.31	0.23	100	89	19	18	0.06	0.04	3	7	89	81	...	0.01	3	1523	154
Luxembourg	141	0.21	0.82	65	325	39	32	0.08	0.26	...	21	0.00	0.03	1
Netherlands	3172	0.92	0.82	160	195	33	31	0.30	0.25	12	22	56	91	0.09	0.06	152	143	236	260
New Zealand	112	0.23	0.25	25	30	19	26	0.04	0.07	8	100	...	0.03	0.03	5	61	17
Norway	1346	1.17	0.83	285	299	44	33	0.52	0.28	13	9	61	99	0.13	0.13	50	317	82	203
Portugal	268	0.24	0.25	16	26	70	45	0.17	0.11	6	3	...	58	6	103
Sweden	1666	0.91	0.81	189	207	39	27	0.35	0.22	11	14	87	86	0.06	0.01	146	47	45	120
Switzerland	908	0.32	0.34	108	123	43	28	0.14	0.10	9	11	78	96	0.05	0.07	58	170	36	11
Spain	1737	0.20	0.30	21	43	20	11	0.04	0.03	14	12	...	69	0.01	0.00	7	187	132	65
United Kingdom	4579	0.27	0.32	53	80	32	36	0.09	0.11	24	27	...	94	0.03	0.02	149	1166	575	719
United States	11429	0.21	0.11	57	39	19	15	0.04	0.02	23	22	0.05	0.04	516	198	346	3941
All DAC	52336	0.30	0.20	75	63	28	23	0.10	0.10	9	15	68	79	0.00	0.00	2465

Source: Alliance2015 (2005), Baulch (2004), European Commission (2005), Global Campaign for Education (2005), UNDP (2003a).

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