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Socio-political Impact of Development Cooperation Measures in Tanzania: Analysing Impacts on Local Tensions and Conflicts

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Preface

This study sets out to analyse the socio-political impact of German development cooperation at project level in Tanzania, presenting an approach to analysing impacts on local tensions and conflicts. It was conducted by a research team during the 1999/2000 training course run by the German Development Institute (GDI).

All the members of the team would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who helped them to prepare and carry out the study. In Germany we were encouraged by the considerable interest shown in our study and by the support provided and ideas put to us by experts at the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the German Foreign Office, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the German Bank for Reconstruction and Development (KfW) and the GDI. We were grateful for the comments and suggestions we received from experts and researchers in the areas of development cooperation, Tanzania, socio-political tensions, conflicts and impact analysis. It was particularly useful to share ideas and learn from our counterpart at the Institute of Development Studies (University of Dar es Salaam), Professor Ibrahim Shao, during his visit to Berlin in December 1999.

During our stay in Tanzania (February to April 2000) we were accorded a warm welcome, considerable interest in our study and great patience from village to ministerial level. We learned from our discussions with officials and experts at the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education and Culture, international donor agencies, political foundations and other institutions. We would like to thank all the participants in our workshops at the projects and in Dar es Salaam. We also attach great importance to our discussions with experts at the IDS, the GTZ and the German Embassy.

We were given a very friendly reception by the staff of our host projects, the Handeni Integrated Agroforestry Project (HIAP) and the Kagera Environmental Project (KEP). We wish to thank the project managers and staff for all the help they so willingly provided. We were able to carry out the study in a constructive atmosphere thanks to the kind cooperation of the villagers in the project areas, the regional and district administrations concerned, the committed and open-minded project management and staff and our competent translators.

Asante sana!

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List of Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific (countries associated with the EU under the Lomé Convention)
ADF	African Development Fund
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
BMZ	*Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung* (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
CCM	*Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (Party of the Revolution)
CIAS	Conflict Impact Assessment
CIM	*Centrum für Internationale Migration und Entwicklung* (Center for International Migration and Development)
CUF	Civic United Front
CUG	Catchment User Group, Community User Group
CWG	Country Working Group
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAS	District Administrative Secretary
DC	District Commissioner
DEA	Development-oriented Emergency Aid
DED	*Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst* (German Development Service), District Executive Director
DEG	*Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH* (German Finance Company for Investment in Developing Countries)
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DIAP	Diocesan Integrated Agroforestry Project, Kwediboma
DM	*Deutsche Mark* (German Mark)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRDP	District Rural Development Programme
DSE	*Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Entwicklung* (German Foundation for International Development)
ESAURP	Eastern and Southern African Universities Research Programme
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FES	*Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* (Friedrich Ebert Foundation)
FFD	Food for Development
FNS	*Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung* (Friedrich Naumann Foundation)
GDI	German Development Institute (*Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik,* DIE)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GPS	Global Positioning System
GTZ	*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (German Agency for Technical Cooperation)

HADEA	Handeni Development Association
HIAP	Handeni Integrated Agroforestry Project
IDA	International Development Association
IDS	Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KAEMP	Kagera Agricultural and Environmental Management Project
KAS	*Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung* (Konrad Adenauer Foundation)
KEP	Kagera Environmental Project
KfW	*Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau* (German Bank for Reconstruction and Development)
LUP	Land Use Planning
LUPC	Land Use Planning Committee
MAPP	Method for Impact Assessment of Poverty Alleviation Projects
m.	meter
mill.	million, millions
mm.	millimetre
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OED	Operations Evaluation Department
PCIA	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PD	Participating Districts
PPF	Para-professional
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
SHOs	Self-help Organisations
SMS	Subject Matter Specialist
SPRAA	Special Programme for Refugee Affected Areas
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
TCIA	Tension and Conflict Impact Analysis
TIRDEP	Tanga Integrated Rural Development Programme
TSh	Tanzanian Shilling
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme

UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US$	US Dollar
UVP	*Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfung* (Environmental Impact Analysis)
VLUPC	Village Land Use Planning Committee
WEO	Ward Extension Officer
WFP	World Food Programme
ZOPP	*Zielorientierte Projektplanung* (Objectives-oriented Project Planning)

Summary

I   Reason for the Study and its Objective

The role played by development cooperation in conflict situations has become an important topic in the international debate since the early 1990s. Development agencies are trying to gain a better understanding of their options and limits. This includes not only the role played by development cooperation in easing or resolving conflicts, but also its role in increasing or even generating tensions or conflicts.

The debate has so far concentrated on countries where violent conflicts are ongoing or have taken place, paying less attention to the prevention of conflicts at an early stage. It also focuses largely on the national level and international issues (e.g. international border conflicts) rather than on local aspects of a conflict situation.

Against this background, the present study (i) focuses on the project level and (ii) considers tensions or the potential for tensions rather than violent conflicts.

The study is based on the following assumptions: development cooperation projects can have positive or negative and intended or unintended impacts on tensions and conflicts. These impacts have yet to be systematically assessed. Consequently, a method of impact analysis could improve the quality of development cooperation.

The aim of the study is therefore to assess intended and unintended, positive and negative impacts of development cooperation projects on local socio-political tensions. This is achieved by designing and applying a research approach to assessing impacts. Two German development cooperation projects in Tanzania are used as empirical case studies for the application of the proposed research approach.

Tanzania was chosen for the case studies for several reasons. Even though it is located in an unstable region, Tanzania has experienced remarkable internal political stability. It has succeeded in developing peacefully since its independence and stresses that it has integrated more than 120 different tribes and other groups into a national union. Potential and actual tensions nevertheless exist at local level. In principle, efforts to prevent tension could play a role at a very early stage. Development cooperation is also making a significant contribution in the country.

II   State of the Art

In general, development cooperation is increasingly confronted with such political issues as "good governance" and human rights. This tendency includes development agencies' efforts to contribute to conflict prevention and peace-building. One idea being discussed in the current debate is that development cooperation should act sensitively so as to "do no harm".

Conflicts of interest are an integral and necessary component of all societies. However, societies and their institutions differ in their ability to cope with conflicts of interest peacefully:

— *cooperation* is the stage at which conflicts of interest can be resolved in a constructive and non-violent manner;

— *tension* is the stage at which it is not entirely possible to deal with conflicts of interest in a cooperative manner; sporadic violence occurs;

— *violent conflict* is the stage at which violence is frequently used; cooperative procedures are of minor relevance;

— *war* is the stage at which fighting and the use of armed force are dominant and widespread; cooperative procedures are absent.

Socio-political tensions and conflicts are due to a combination of several factors rather than one: the factors may cause, trigger or aggravate tensions and conflicts. The following classification of factors provides a conceptual framework:

— *socio-economic factors*, especially disparities and competition for natural resources;

— *socio-political and political constraints*, e.g. problems with managing transition and rapid change, a lack of legitimate government, a lack of good governance, insufficient formal and informal channels for conflict management and the exploitation of ethnic, cultural and other differences;

— *violence and insecurity*, e.g. a legacy of violence or uncontrolled military force and arbitrary police actions;

— *external sources*, such as the adverse effects of a given regional or international environment (e.g. instability in neighbouring countries).

Development cooperation can contribute – albeit on a limited scale – to conflict prevention and peace-building in various operational fields (certain projects and programmes) and in non-operational fields (such policy instruments and strategies as policy dialogue). As development agencies have a major interest in learning lessons from their experience in conflict situations, some of them (e.g. the World Bank, the Development Assistance Committee / DAC and the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) commissioned evaluations in the late 1990s. The evaluations stress the ambivalence of parallel positive and negative influences of development cooperation on tensions and conflicts.

III   Tension and Conflict Impact Analysis

Background: analysis of impacts

Impact analysis is an approach to measuring the effects of development cooperation projects in such areas as the natural environment and gender relations. These areas need not necessarily be identical with the explicit goal and main features of the project itself. As the scope of an impact analysis exceeds the analysis of the project's output or outcome, specific methodological difficulties, such as the problem of attributing impacts to a certain project, may arise.

Relevant categories for the analysis of tension and conflict impacts are: (i) impacts at macro (national) and micro (local) level, (ii) positive and negative impacts and (iii) intended and unintended impacts. Various experts and institutions have established a number of frameworks for the analysis of tension and conflict impacts. The frameworks indicate progress in conceptual terms, but a convincing approach in practical terms has yet to be developed.

Research approach

To enable the impact of development cooperation projects on tensions and conflicts to be analysed, a research framework needs to be designed. The proposed framework, *Tension and Conflict Impact Analysis* (TCIA), is an in-depth study approach. It is meant to be suitable for analysing different types of development cooperation projects and programmes.

TCIA consists of six main steps, representing not the chronological order in which data are to be collected, but a systematic way of using and presenting empirical research. The steps are:

1. *Description of the project region and the project*.

2. *Tension and conflict analysis*: the aim here is to identify tensions and conflicts in the project region, their structure and dynamics and the actors involved.

3. *Tension-related identification of project stakeholders*: the project stakeholders are identified, with the focus on the conflicts of interest uncovered by the tension analysis.

4. *Sensitivity of the project to tensions and conflicts*: the analysis of the relationship and interaction between the project and local tensions assesses the project's degree of sensitivity.

5. *Identification of impacts*: the results of the first four steps lay the foundations for interpreting the various impacts of project activities on conflicts of interest.

6. *Conclusions and recommendations*: the aim of the final step is (i) to identify the major impacts, (ii) to describe their influence on the conflicts of interest and (iii) to recommend to the project and the development agency ways of dealing with the situation.

The TCIA data collection process uses a number of empirical methods: (i) expert interviews, (ii) expert workshops (including workshops with project staff) and (iii) elements of the Participatory Rural Appraisal method (including group discussions, transect, mapping and diagramming). A specific matrix ("TCIA matrix") provides a systematic overview of all tension and conflict impacts identified during the research.

IV   Project Case Studies in Tanzania

Background

Tanzania is considered a unique case of political stability in the conflict-driven region of East Africa. Its stability is a feature not only of its internal affairs but also of its relations with its neighbours. Nevertheless, it today faces various pressures on its socio-political situation. Seven major areas of potential or actual tensions can be identified at macro level: (i) the recent developments in Zanzibar, threatening both its internal stability and its relationship with the mainland, (ii) the consequences of rapid economic change, (iii) the rise of social identification along religious or ethnic lines, (iv) corruption, (v) shortcomings in the state's acceptance of national responsibilities, (vi) the consequences of the restructuring of land tenure and land law and (vii) the instability of the East African region.

Tanzania's aid dependency is high. It receives an annual average of around US $ 900 million in development assistance. Almost one third of its national budget is financed by the international donor community.

Germany ranks sixth among Tanzania's bilateral donors. Tanzania is one of the most important sub-Saharan African recipients of German assis-

tance. The cooperation covers most of the Tanzanian regions, although there is a traditional focus on Tanga Region. In sectoral terms, the cooperation is concentrated on direct poverty alleviation, sustainable resource management, physical infrastructure, private sector management and policy advice.

Socio-political issues are relevant to Germany's development cooperation at macro and micro level. At macro level, for example, the German country policy paper on Tanzania recognises the existence of three potential areas of tension: (i) Zanzibar / mainland, (ii) Christians / Muslims and (iii) indigenous Africans / Tanzanians of Asian origin. In principle, German development cooperation may have impacts on macro-level issues in Tanzania (e.g. the Zanzibar issue because of the suspension of development assistance). At micro level, the case studies cover two German projects in some detail.

Handeni Integrated Agroforestry Project

The Handeni Integrated Agroforestry Project (HIAP) is the most important development project in its project area, which covers around 40 % of Handeni District (Tanga Region). Compared to the situation in other districts, the project area is characterised by low population density and low land pressure. Both are expected to increase because of high population growth. The main economic activities, subsistence farming and the keeping of livestock (pastoralism), are in most cases undertaken by different ethnic groups, the Wanguu and Wazigua (farming) and the Masai (pastoralism).

The aims of the project are to reduce the degradation of natural resources and to increase agricultural productivity. The target groups are villagers, both farmers and pastoralists. The HIAP's main activities are participatory situation analyses at village level, followed by land use planning. The HIAP supports this process by helping villagers to draw up and implement village land use plans and promotes self-help measures, such as the construction of small reservoirs.

There are three kinds of potential or actual tension in the project area: first, tensions between farmers and pastoralists over natural resource use; second, tensions between and within villages over local boundaries; a third potential source of tension – over access to natural resources, especially land – may occur between established villagers and newcomers to villages. The underlying cause of these tensions is competition for natural resources, mainly land and water. The tensions have led to sporadic cases of violent confrontation and threats of violence. They are likely to increase in the long run as competition for natural resources grows. In addition, potential sources of tension at macro level, such as the consequences of restructuring land tenure and the rise of social identification along religious and ethnic lines, are having an influence on Handeni.

The overall project goal of the HIAP is not explicitly related to tensions or conflicts. Over time, however, the project documents have placed considerable emphasis on tensions, and indicators of the resolution of land use disputes have been developed to assess the HIAP's progress. Adjustments have been made to time planning because of tensions between different land users in project villages.

The HIAP has positive, negative and ambivalent, intended and unintended impacts on tensions in the project area. Positive impacts are:

— *Land use planning increases the cooperative organisation of natural resource use*: land use planning brings people together to discuss the use and distribution of land in a participatory way.

— *Situation analyses assist in the recognition and discussion of problems* (e.g. boundary and land use disputes), as different points of view on socio-political issues in a village become apparent.

— *Improving productivity helps to reduce competition for natural resources (especially land)*: land use planning helps to increase productivity, easing competition for natural resources in the long run.

All of these positive socio-political impacts are intended, since they are related to the HIAP's project goal. Other project activities have minor positive effects on local tensions, since these impacts help to improve communication and negotiation structures.

The HIAP has had the following negative impacts:

— *Project activities without previous situation analysis and land use planning favoured one stakeholder*: a reservoir was built without regard for the dispute between a village and its neighbours, which fuelled tensions. In this case, HIAP activities focused heavily on a Masai community which is seeking to develop its newly registered village.

— Land use planning brought conflicts of interest to light and created tensions in the short run.

— *Situation analysis brought border disputes to light and created tensions in the short run*: as part of the process of land use planning, boundaries are mapped and recorded. Disputes thus occur for the first time, as differing opinions about boundaries become apparent.

While the first negative socio-political impact was unintended, the two impacts creating tensions are intended: they were discounted by the HIAP because of the assumption that in a long-term perspective it is better for land use disputes or boundary disputes to be identified at an early stage.

The HIAP's ambivalent impact:

Land use planning helps to preserve group identities by supporting the spatial dissociation of land users. This impact is ambivalent, since it may be positive or negative. On the one hand, tensions may be reduced if different socio-political groups can live according to their respective ways of life. On the other hand, the spatial dissociation of land users may impose identities of different socio-political groups along ethnic lines. In this regard, the HIAP may have either a positive or an unin-

tended negative impact on the integration of different groups and on inter-group tensions.

The HIAP's positive impacts outstrip its negative impacts. It is helping to reduce socio-economic and socio-political causes of tension. It is reducing socio-economic causes by weakening competition for natural resources. In socio-political terms the HIAP is strengthening channels of communication and increasing the participation of the village population.

Kagera Environmental Project

The Kagera Environmental Project (KEP) is situated in the remote north-western part of the country, on the borders with Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. The area is part of the Great Lakes Region and has been characterised by constant immigration from the neighbouring countries since the beginning of the 20th century. Since 1993 Kagera Region has witnessed a massive influx of more than half a million refugees escaping the ethno-politically motivated violence in Burundi and Rwanda. At the peak of the influx, the population of some areas more than doubled. A large number of relief organisations then began to assist the refugees. In 1996/97 most of the Rwandan refugees were repatriated. Over 110,000 Burundian refugees still live in camps in Ngara District. Their number is now rising again (1999/2000) owing to the continuing violence across the border.

On the basis of an agreement between the Tanzanian government and donor organisations the KEP was launched in 1995 with the overall goal of providing assistance for the hitherto neglected host communities in the affected area, with the long-term perspective of fostering their willingness to accept refugees. The project thus has an explicit tension-related focus. The KEP is designed as a resource rehabilitation project that helps to reduce the destruction of natural resources in three districts affected by refugees. The main activities are support for tree nurseries, the construction of firewood-saving stoves and the training of stove technicians, pilot schemes in the

areas of joint forest management and the rehabilitation of water-catchment areas, and environmental education. Despite its wide range of measures, the KEP is one of the smaller projects in the region.

The TCIA of the KEP was carried out in two districts of the project area and focused on a tension and conflict analysis of the project region. It was based on the following preliminary hypothesis:

> The KEP is unlikely to achieve its overall goal of having a positive impact on relations between refugees and local people, because the link between the project activities and any possible reduction of tension is too indirect. The target group is unlikely to perceive environmental rehabilitation measures as compensation for losses caused by refugees.

Although it was generally possible to confirm the hypothesis concerning the difficulty of establishing a link between environmental measures and compensation, it was not a true reflection of the local and regional situation.

The TCIA led to the following conclusions:

There are no significant tensions between the local and refugee populations. The tensions between the local and refugee populations perceived by the German development community could not be confirmed. The project can therefore have no significant impact on the relationship between the two groups. Consequently, there is no need to give specific assistance to the local population with a view to reducing tensions and so maintaining hospitality.

The project sends out a positive signal at policy level. Concern about the influx of refugees is more pronounced at district, regional and national level than among the local population. The project therefore sends out the positive signal that the international community cares not only for the refugees but also for the local population and the host country.

*There is potential for tensions or conflicts be-
tween Hutus and Tutsis in Kagera Region.* There
is considerable potential for tensions between
Hutus and Tutsis owing to the history of inter-
group violence in the neighbouring countries. The
tension is not expressed openly, but exists below
the surface in the local communities. Although no
direct link to project activities can be established,
these findings need to be accepted as an important
key to understanding the socio-political environ-
ment of the whole region and may be relevant to
other projects and donor strategies in general.

*There is potential for tensions between two ethno-
political areas of Ngara District* (Bugufi and
Bushubi). The potential for tensions between the
Bugufi and Bushubi areas, i.e. between the Han-
gaza and Shubi peoples, in Ngara District, is dis-
cussed more openly than the Hutu and Tutsi di-
mension. It stems from local traditional political
and economic power structures and from one
group's traditional feelings of superiority over the
other. In some instances the identification of local
tensions was related to the distinction between
Hutus and Tutsis. It is not clear at this stage, how-
ever, whether there is a broader perception of a
correlation or if in future local identities may be
related to the Hutu and Tutsi conflict potential.

*The assessment of hypothetical tension-related
impacts suggests that the KEP does not have a
significant impact on the two potential sources of
tension identified.* KEP activities were not found
to have any tension-related impacts at village
level. The only impacts identified were hypotheti-
cal and suggested that the KEP's impacts on ten-
sions and conflicts are not significant. Potential
sources of tension may be aggravated by the con-
centration of project activities on one stakeholder
group. This may develop into an unintended nega-
tive impact in the future if the activities concerned
are perceived as intentionally biased. There is also
potential for positive impacts if communication
and cooperation among different stakeholders can
be enhanced through workshops and training.
However, as the potential for tensions and the
parties involved have never been actively identi-
fied, the project has not systematically developed
this positive potential or defined a position as

regards its intended role in its socio-political envi-
ronment.

V   Findings and Recommendations

Findings on the socio-political impact of development cooperation projects

The research team's findings on the impact of
development projects on socio-political tensions
are as follows:

*Tension and conflict patterns are complex and
may change quickly.* Many factors may cause,
trigger or aggravate tensions and conflicts. The
channels through which development cooperation
may have impacts on the socio-political environ-
ment are as numerous as these factors.

*Tensions and conflicts are relevant at project
level.* Development cooperation as an actor in
society influences conflicts of interest and is in-
fluenced by them. There are no purely technical
projects that operate without interrelating with
their socio-political environment.

*Development projects can generate unintended
socio-political side-effects.* The side-effects do not
necessarily have to be negative: they may also be
positive.

*The stakeholders' perception of the project mat-
ters.* The way social groups perceive a develop-
ment project is crucial for the actual socio-
political impact of the project.

*Project staff must be qualified and sensitive to
tension situations.* Given the complexity of possi-
ble impacts, project staff must show that they are
sensitive to actual and potential socio-political
tensions and conflicts.

*A tension-sensitive approach may be inconsistent
with project goals*: A tension- and conflict-
sensitive approach may not necessarily accord
with other project goals. Where the two objectives
are inconsistent, a trade-off occurs.

Balanced participation by different project stakeholder groups may be socio-politically advisable, but may be inconsistent with other principles of development cooperation. A demand-driven approach or other incentive systems may restrict a project's ability to balance the support it gives to different social groups.

In Tanzania, identification on the basis of ethnic criteria may influence the socio-political impact of development cooperation. In both project regions examined, local tension factors were linked to the identification of stakeholder groups along ethnic lines. As an actor in so sensitive a socio-political environment, development cooperation should avoid adverse side-effects.

Findings on Tension and Conflict Impact Analysis (TCIA)

The research team's findings on the TCIA methodological approach are as follows:

TCIA is useful for analysing tension situations and the impacts that a project has on tensions. The TCIA methodological approach has been used to analyse both local tension situations and impacts of development projects on local tensions. It is possible to analyse the two aspects separately. Different elements of TCIA can be applied to individual tension situations in project areas and to different types of projects.

TCIA includes relevant features of impact analyses. The approach looks beyond intended project goals and the intended project beneficiaries and stakeholders and analyses unintended effects of the project.

TCIA focuses on tension stakeholders' perceptions and tackles the problems of attributing impacts and assessing their significance. As perceptions play an important role in the area of tensions and conflicts, the TCIA approach is especially advantageous. It enables project impacts to be attributed to socio-political situations and helps to gauge the importance of project activities in terms of their socio-political impact. Should project activities or the project as a whole not be known to the tension actors, problems of attributing impacts and assessing their significance remain.

Methodological shortcomings have to be taken into account. The sensitivity of the topic is such that it may not be possible for all relevant information to be obtained. Some of the shortcomings of PRA methods are also to be found in TCIA.

Elements of TCIA can be applied to projects at different stages of implementation. TCIA can be useful for ongoing and completed projects. Individual elements of the approach can be used at the planning stage of projects or at the initial stage of project implementation.

General recommendations

On the basis of the field study findings the team's general recommendations regarding the TCIA approach are as follows:

Socio-political impacts should be considered more systematically in development cooperation. Development agencies should seek to be sensitive to tensions and conflicts at all stages of the project cycle. Analysing socio-political impacts can help to enhance the quality of development cooperation and to promote the overall goal of conflict prevention and peace-building.

Tension and conflict analyses should be carried out at different stages of tension-related projects. When a project has a direct bearing on a tension or conflict situation, a tension and conflict analysis should be carried out on site during planning and again during implementation. Such follow-up seems essential because socio-political situations may change very quickly, making it necessary for tension-related projects to be redesigned.

The tension and conflict sensitivity of development projects should be promoted by development agency headquarters. Projects should be encouraged to analyse their socio-political impacts and to draw conclusions for further action accordingly. Projects characterised by similar or interre-

lated tensions and conflicts in neighbouring countries, e.g. projects in border regions, should be helped to share experience and ideas.

Development agencies should provide support for projects in tension and conflict situations. This may mean providing specific help for projects encountering tensions and conflicts and offering tension and conflict training and workshops for projects at all stages of project cycle management.

Priority projects for TCIA should be identified. Consideration should first be given to tension- and conflict-relevant projects, such as projects in areas characterised by tensions and conflicts, projects with a tension- and conflict-sensitive focus, e.g. projects concerning the use of natural resources, and projects with a high financial input. Lists of criteria, checklists or other devices may prove helpful in identifying "high-risk projects" and "potential projects" in terms of socio-political tensions and conflicts.

I   Introduction

Since the beginning of the 1990s the international donor community has been giving careful consideration to the impacts of development cooperation on peaceful and stable development. Globally, the number of violent conflicts within and between states is high, with the proportion of internal conflicts rising. As the current international debate shows, resolving internal violent conflicts is usually considered to be a sovereign matter for the states or parties involved, except when excessive violation of basic human rights occurs.

Development cooperation may also play a part in resolving, exacerbating or even generating tensions or violent conflicts. Hence the need for profound research into the options open to and limits of development cooperation as regards conflict prevention and peace-building. Despite this, the international debate focuses largely on countries where violent conflicts are ongoing or have taken place. As a rule, it is also confined to the macro level, focusing on national and international issues and failing to consider the importance of tensions at a country's micro level over regional or local issues.

This study seeks to fill the gap by analysing the impacts of development cooperation at project level before violent conflicts occur. To this end, it assesses the socio-political impact of two development projects, both of which are being implemented by the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ/German Agency for Technical Cooperation). The two projects have two main features in common: they focus on the use of scarce natural resources, and they are being implemented at "grassroots level" through close cooperation with the target group.[1]

The study was carried out by a country working group (CWG) of the German Development Institute (GDI). CWGs are the core element of the GDI's training programme, which prepares postgraduates for work in the field of development cooperation. Each group draws up a study on a development issue of current interest, consists of up to six members and is headed by a member of the GDI's professional staff.

Working assumption

This study is based on the following assumption:

In general, the impacts of development cooperation can be positive or negative and intended or unintended. Although some methods of impact analysis exist,[2] the impacts of development cooperation on socio-political tensions are not systematically assessed. A method or instrument for analysing impacts would improve the quality of development cooperation.

Objective of the study

Following on from this assumption, the study has the following objective:

By designing and adopting a research approach, the study seeks to assess intended and unintended, positive and negative impacts of two German development cooperation projects on regional and local socio-political tensions in Tanzania.

Conduct of the study

The study was conducted from November 1999 until May 2000 and was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of desk study in Germany. During the second phase an in-depth empirical study was conducted in Tanzania. For the third phase the CWG returned to Germany, where the report was finalised and its findings were presented to the GDI, the *Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung*

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1   The two projects are the Handeni Integrated Agroforestry Project (HIAP) and the Kagera Environmental Project (KEP).

2   Environmental Impact Analysis, for example; see section III.1.

(BMZ, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development), the GTZ and the *Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau* (KfW, German Bank for Reconstruction and Development).

During the first phase, the design of the research in Tanzania was developed. The research team carefully reviewed and discussed literature on a) tensions, conflicts and their prevention, b) impacts of development cooperation and their analysis and c) Tanzania. A considerable amount of information was obtained from Professor Ibrahim Shao during his visit to Berlin in December 1999. As the director of the Institute of Development Studies of the University of Dar es Salaam, he represents the counterpart institution of the study and contributed to the discussion with a detailed briefing. The research team also interviewed experts of the major German development cooperation institutions, including the BMZ, GTZ and KfW. The first phase ended with the presentation and discussion of a preliminary report at the GDI in Berlin on 7 February 2000.

During the second phase, the research team carried out an in-depth empirical study in Tanzania from 12 February until 29 April 2000. At the end of this phase, the findings were presented and discussed in Dar es Salaam. The research team chose Tanzania because of its remarkable internal political stability. It is located in an unstable region where public interest focuses on the genocide in Rwanda, the "ethnically motivated" clashes in neighbouring Burundi and the civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Somalia. Tanzania has nevertheless managed to develop peacefully since its independence in 1961 and to integrate more than 120 tribes into a national union.[3] At local level, however, there are potential sources of tension, which may have been influenced by development cooperation.

During the third and final phase in May 2000, the research team completed the report and presented it to the GDI, BMZ, GTZ and KfW.

Clarification of terms

Conflicts of interest

The term *conflicts of interest* describes an inherent and necessary component of all societies. They may have positive or negative consequences, depending on whether a society deals with them in a cooperative or violent manner.

Tension and violent conflict[4]

The terms *tension* and *violent conflict* reveal how a society deals with conflicts of interest. *Tension* means a society's partial inability to cope with conflicts of interest in a cooperative and non-violent manner. Sporadic violence may occur as a means of dealing with conflicts of interest. In contrast, *violent conflict* means the frequent use of violence to deal with conflicts of interest. In this study conflict always stands for violent conflict.

Socio-political

The term *socio-political* in the context of this study is used to describe the social and political interaction between different groups, especially the decision-making process, the interests of different social groups and their power. Thus the term *socio-political tension*, for example, focuses on conflicts of interest between social groups, not between individuals.

Impact of development cooperation projects[5]

The *impact of a development project* refers to all influences and effects of a project related to a specified area, such as its impact on the natural environment or on the social situation of people. This specific area does not necessarily need to be identical with the nature and goal of the project itself: a resource project, for example, may have social or gender impacts. Impact differs from the output or outcome of a project in that it goes be-

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3   See Hofmeier (1997), p. 151.

4   For more details see section II.2, "Conflicts of Interest: A Four-Stage Model".

5   For more details see section III.1.

yond the original aim of the project. As a rule, impact is linked to a project more indirectly than output or outcome.

Impacts at macro and micro level[6]

Impacts at macro level are the impacts that development cooperation has on tensions and conflicts throughout a country. In contrast, impacts at micro level are the impacts that projects or programmes have on tensions and conflicts within specific regions, districts, communities and the like.

Positive and negative impacts[7]

Positive impacts help to promote cooperation or to ease tensions and conflicts. *Negative impacts, on the other hand, help* to impede cooperation or to aggravate tensions and conflicts.

Intended and unintended impacts[8]

Intended impacts are impacts related to a project's goal (intended positive impact) or critical impacts which have been expected and discounted (intended negative impact). *Unintended impacts* are impacts which have been neither considered nor expected or impacts which may have been considered negligible. These unintended impacts can be positive or negative.

II State of the Art: Development Cooperation in Tension and Conflict Situations

This chapter reviews the current debate on development cooperation in tension and conflict situations. Although this debate has gained in importance in recent years because development coop-

eration has become more political, academic analysis is still in its infancy. However, any new research project in this field would be well advised to begin by considering existing approaches and determining what can be derived from them. For the purpose of this study, particular importance is attached to the analysis of possible causes of socio-political tensions and conflicts, the examination of experience in situations of tensions and conflicts and the analysis of existing tension- and conflict-oriented concepts.

The first section discusses reasons for addressing the study topic. It is recalled that development cooperation has become more political since the beginning of the 1990s, thus making appropriate impact assessment necessary (section II.1). The second section (II.2) presents a four-stage model, revealing the options open to society for coping with conflicts of interest. Factors that may cause or aggravate tensions and conflicts are then reviewed (section II.3) to provide the structure for the impact matrix developed in Chapter III. This is followed by a description of areas of development cooperation activity related to tensions and conflicts (section II.4). The last section (section II.5) comprises evaluations of donor agencies' experiences in tension and conflict situations.

1 Conflict Prevention and Peace-building in Development Cooperation

This section discusses the relationship between conflict prevention and peace-building on the one hand and development cooperation on the other.

Violent conflicts and development[9]

Throughout the world there are many violent conflicts between and especially within nation states.

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6   For more details see section III.1.2.

7   For more details see section III.1.2.

8   For more details see section III.1.2.

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9   For an overview see Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997); Rabehl (ed.) (1999); Matthies (1994); Annan (1999).

Violent conflicts cause injury and the loss of human life and also take a financial toll through the destruction of buildings, infrastructure, etc. Violent conflicts are therefore a major obstacle to development. They not only impede further development, but also destroy results that have already been achieved in development. The prevention of violent conflicts is therefore of great importance for a country's development.

Development cooperation has become more political

In general, development cooperation has become more political in recent years.[10] It now places more emphasis on such political aspects of development as good governance, democratisation and human rights. In German development cooperation conflict prevention and peace-building have been among the main objectives pursued since the late 1990s.

Development projects and socio-political tensions and conflicts

Development projects located in areas of tension and conflict affect and are affected by the surrounding situation. Projects in areas of violent conflict are often adversely affected, and many have to be terminated prematurely.

Development projects in situations of socio-political tension or conflict can never be completely impartial. They may either cause further tensions or help to resolve conflicts of interest. In the former case, projects may contribute to further tensions, for example, by concentrating their benefits on certain stakeholders. The current debate reflects the idea that projects in these situations should act sensitively so as to *"do no harm"*.[11] In the latter case, development cooperation may play a constructive role in the prevention of violent conflicts and in peace-building.

The current debate focuses on how development projects can help to prevent conflicts and contribute to the process of peace-building.[12] It concentrates, however, on the role of development cooperation in situations of violent conflict. Insufficient attention has been given to the role of development cooperation in socio-political tensions, where violent conflicts have not yet occurred. This level is of specific importance, because further escalation of conflicts can still be prevented. Development cooperation may be able to influence situations at this level of tension rather than in situations of violent conflict.

2   Conflicts of Interest: a Four-Stage Model

Every society consists of different groups, each pursuing its own interests. Conflicts of interest are thus an inherent and necessary component of all societies.[13] However, a society has many options for coping with conflicts of interest. They may range from democratic procedures to the continuous use of violence by armed groups. This section defines a rough model that identifies four different stages in coping with conflicts of interest. The model can be used to describe the socio-political environment at the macro and micro levels of a development cooperation project. The four stages are:

—   cooperation,

—   tension,

—   violent conflict,

—   war.

Before the four stages are discussed individually, the distinction between the macro and micro levels of the socio-political environment will be considered. While the macro level describes the envi-

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10   See Diaby-Pentzlin (1999).

11   A refererence to the title of a book by Anderson (1999).

12   See, for example, Fahrenhorst (ed.) (2000); Wissing (1995); Klingebiel (1999).

13   See, for example, Levy (1999).

ronment from a national perspective, the micro level encompasses the local and project environment. Distinguishing between the macro and micro levels is necessary to enable a distinction to be made between the project's broader environment and its immediate environment, which are not necessarily identical. At a given point in time, a country may be peaceful from a macro point of view while violence is being used at micro level.

The first stage, *cooperation*, represents the ability of a society and its institutions to resolve conflicts of interest in a non-violent manner. At this stage they use constructive devices to cope with conflicts of interest. Such devices are debates in national or local parliaments, the rule of law, free media, round tables, discussion groups, ad hoc task forces, village meetings, etc.

The second stage, *tension*, describes a society's partial inability to cope with conflicts of interest

The third stage, *violent conflict*, features the frequent use of violence to deal with conflicts of interest while cooperative procedures appear to be of minor relevance within the society. The violence continues to be limited either to a region or to particular groups in society (ethnic, religious or ideological). The violence at this stage extends to the killing of individuals on a larger scale.[14]

The fourth stage, *war*, is characterised by the widespread mobilisation and use of armed forces as the only means of coping with conflicts of interest. The fighting between the different groups of armed forces is continuous and centrally organised, and the warring factions pursue a strategy. There are likely to be many battle-related deaths.[15]

The different stages outlined above describe the socio-political environments in which a development cooperation project is or will be conducted. They are interconnected, indicating an implicit

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Figure 1:   Conflicts of interest: a four-stage model

Fundamental component of a society	Stage	Characteristic	Dynamic
Conflicts of interest within a society	Cooperation	Cooperation, absence of violence	Positive
	Tensions	Occasional disturbance of cooperation, sporadic violence	
	Violent conflict	Limited cooperation, frequent violence	
	War	No cooperation, widespread violence	Negative

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in a cooperative manner. This may be due to a lack of or inappropriate procedures – depending on the scale of the conflicts of interest. Such shortcomings may trigger sporadic violence as a means of dealing with conflicts of interest, e.g. through the deliberate and/or malicious destruction of valuable, relevant or characteristic goods of opponents. Violence may even be directed against individuals or groups of people and include the killing of opponents.

dynamic. This dynamic implies entails a positive or negative valuation, depending on the rise or fall in violence, as shown in Figure 1.

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14   See Rabehl (1999), pp. 51 - 54; Annan (1999).

15   See Annan (1999).

3   Factors Causing and Aggravating Socio-political Tensions and Conflicts

Socio-political tensions or conflicts are caused by a combination of several factors rather than a single factor. This section sets out to structure and describe factors that may cause or aggravate tensions and conflicts. In so doing, it serves as a framework for the research approach adopted in Chapter III. The categories identified need to be completed and specified according to circumstances in the country concerned and at its local level.

The following list of factors that may cause or aggravate tensions and conflicts is neither complete nor universally applicable. The literature[16] describes other ways of dealing with this issue and distinguishing between different factors.[17] Factors can be regarded as (i) causing and/or (ii) triggering and/or (iii) aggravating tensions or conflicts.

For the purpose of this study, factors are classified as follows: (i) socio-economic imbalances, followed by (ii) socio-political constraints, (iii) violence and insecurity and (iv) external factors. The list includes both possible disparities within society and society's ability to cope with them. The interaction of the two categories mainly determines *if* and *to what extent* tensions and conflicts may arise. Besides these two categories, the perception of individuals is assumed in the following to be an important influencing factor: tensions and conflicts may increase because disparities are perceived, no matter whether they are real or imagined.

16   See Jeong (1999); Matthies (1994); Leonhardt (1999), pp. 20 - 23; DAC (1997), pp. 12 - 15; Mehler (1999); Engel / Mehler (1999); Bush (1998).

17   Factors that *cause* tension or a conflict situation are its root or structural causes (e.g. land distribution in some Central American countries in the 1960s and 1970s). Factors that *trigger* tension or a conflict situation are the specific events or circumstances leading to the beginning of tension or a conflict situation (e.g. arbitrary action taken by security forces). Factors that *aggravate* tension or a conflict situation facilitate its escalation (e.g. the proliferation of weapons).

Socio-economic factors

Socio-economic disparities can cause or aggravate tensions since they are often a crucial, sensitive issue in a society. Widening socio-economic disparities seem to be the most relevant. Widening disparities are due to two major factors: first, unbalanced economic growth accompanied by unequal distribution of its benefits (e.g. Central America in the 1970s and 1980s). In this case, the established pattern of income and wealth may be disturbed or strengthened. This is particularly important if one group controls the apparatus of state and knows how to channel benefits to its own members. The second major factor occurs where economic shocks lead to sudden economic decline and certain groups lose far more than others. This can worsen the marginalisation of vulnerable groups and so aggravate tensions. Even decreasing socio-economic disparities or their mere existence may cause or aggravate tension if, for example, they are accompanied by growing awareness of the disparities.

Competition for natural resources (e.g. land, water, firewood, game and livestock) can cause, trigger or aggravate tensions and conflicts. Tensions and conflicts can arise over the management, distribution or allocation of scarce resources (e.g. water in the Middle East). Tensions caused by competition can increase where changes exacerbate the scarcity of resources within a region. Such changes may affect land tenure and water management systems and migration, leading to shifts in population density, environmental degradation and regional disasters. As the presence of large numbers of refugees and displaced people increases the pressure on local resources and facilities, it may lead to greater inter-group tensions. The risk of rising tensions due to competition for resources increases if the resources are common goods or if no clear property rights are defined.

Inadequate satisfaction of basic needs can aggravate tensions or conflicts where a large proportion of a society lives below the national absolute pov-

erty line.[18] The ability of the sector of society concerned to cooperate with its immediate environment may be limited.

Socio-political and political constraints

Problems with managing transition and rapid change can also cause tensions and conflicts. Rapid and fundamental changes, such as colonisation and decolonisation or current modernisation, can weaken traditional structures and systems without replacing them adequately (e.g. the ongoing transformation process in former socialistic countries). The loss of cultural identity or the marginalisation of certain groups may follow, especially if power structures shift in favour of certain groups.

The absence of legitimate government and good governance (e.g. Kenya in the early 1990s) may prevent a society from coping with tensions and conflicts constructively. As illegitimate or corrupt governments are neither credible nor accepted by the majority in society, its conflict management capacity is limited. In addition, active discrimination is easier in such systems. Examples are the failure to respect minority rights and the repression of political dissent.

Limited participation may hinder a society in its efforts to manage increasing tensions and conflicts. When the proper integration of diverse groups into political activities is hampered, the participatory approach to coping with inter-group conflicts of interest is blocked. Futhermore, a lack of participation can cause tensions and conflicts where citizens are not allowed to manage their own affairs and safeguard their interests legally.

Inadequate formal and informal channels of tension and conflict management have an adverse effect on society's ability to deal with conflicts. Where traditional mechanisms and mediation structures are destroyed or no longer accepted,

and others have yet to be installed (e.g. institutions of civil society or the media), society's capacity for cooperation is limited. The existence and operation of legal or judicial systems and access to them are especially important in this context: if people cannot rely on independent mechanisms, they are more likely to defend their rights by violent means.

Limited institutional capacities can hamper society's ability to deal with tensions and conflicts constructively. Institutional capacities are deemed to be limited in this context both where institutions do not exist and where institutions are unable to perform their tasks. The term *institution* includes social institutions and village or government institutions.

The exploitation of ethnic, cultural and other differences, and discrimination may generate tensions and conflicts. Such exploitation or simple discrimination against groups in society is often politically motivated and seeks to divide groups along ethnic, cultural or other lines. Some authors[19] take the view that differences as such can cause tensions or conflicts. This is not assumed here. Tensions and conflicts are not caused by differences as such, but may be caused by the political manipulation of certain differences for political ends. In addition, a number of factors may help to polarise groups, examples being increased economic, political and social dislocation within the development process and the legacy of colonial boundaries that still encourages a yearning for independent statehood.

Social disintegration or exclusion may cause or aggravate tensions and conflicts where knowledge of another group's way of life or other behavioural patterns is limited. Forms or indicators of social disintegration or separation are limited inter-group communication, limited joint decision-making, patterns of separate settlements (within villages or

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[18] "National absolute poverty line" means a supply of basic needs just sufficient for survival.

[19] For a detailed discussion see Henderson (1999). See also Leach / Brown (1999); Kreile (1997); Aseka (1999); Otterbein (1999).

in separate villages) and the absence of intermarriage.

Violence and insecurity

Uncontrolled military forces and arbitrary police action may cause, aggravate or trigger tensions and conflicts. Tensions and conflicts may arise if military or police forces act independently in their own right and neglect other parts of the population. If they represent a strong pressure group, they can cause tensions mainly in two ways: first, by weakening the legitimate authorities, the threat of uncontrolled police and military action being particularly important; second, by stepping up state repression (e.g. Chile under General Pinochet's military regime). Arms proliferation and the existence of paramilitary groups increase willingness to resort to violence within a society. As paramilitary fighters have their own economic and political interests, they may ignore accepted rules and become a serious destabilising factor.

Inadequate security may aggravate tensions or conflicts if high levels of crime and violence increase the vulnerability of society (e.g. the formation in South Africa's Cape Province of People against Gangsterism and Drugs as a result of the increased insecurity in the region).

A legacy of violence, i.e. a history of inter-group violence, may be seen as aggravating tensions and conflicts (as in Burundi or Rwanda). There are mainly two reasons for this: first, new tensions may be created if conflicts are not resolved and inter-group disagreements are routinely settled by violent means; here new tensions may arise from simple conflicts of interest; second, in cases where war economies are well established and beneficiaries are powerful enough to assert their interests.

External sources

Negative consequences of international involvement may cause tensions and conflicts mainly for three reasons: first, external forces may create a potential for internal tensions. The external actors may compete for scarce resources, ignore existing stabilising rules and government authorities, enhance war economies and support certain groups within society, with the result that polarisation increases. Second, international involvement through such channels as foreign policy, foreign investments, development cooperation and the arms trade may aggravate tensions by stabilising corrupt or repressive systems and existing power structures. Third, a country's border regions may be adversely affected by tensions or conflicts in neighbouring countries (e.g. increased insecurity, refugee migrations, effects on border trade and the danger of a spill-over).

Negative consequences of the regional / international environment may cause or aggravate tensions or conflicts if they are relevant to the country concerned. A change of government or a shift in the political line followed, for example, may influence the balance of power within a neighbouring country, unleashing a political power struggle.

4   Areas of Activity for Development Cooperation

Even though limited in scope, development cooperation can contribute to conflict prevention and peace-building.[20] With the focus on tensions and conflicts, this section defines four areas of activity for development cooperation and gives examples of activities in each area. The first three areas comprise operational activities (specific cooperation projects and programmes), whereas the fourth field is non-operational (policy instruments and strategies).

The first area of activity is not explicitly related to tensions and conflicts, but the activities have impacts on tensions and conflicts. The second area is partly related to tensions and conflicts, and the

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20 For the following see Wissing (1995), especially Chapter 5.

third is explicitly so related. In this instance, activities are specifically designed to have impacts on tensions and conflicts. The fourth, non-operational area for development cooperation is policy dialogue between donor and recipient countries, because this instrument can address conflicts and tensions.

Development cooperation not explicitly related to tensions and conflicts

The first area of activity for development cooperation is not explicitly related to tensions and conflicts, but has impacts on them. It comprises the bulk of "conventional" cooperation facilitated by development agencies. Its activities focus on key development aims, such as poverty alleviation, environmental protection, the promotion of education and the strengthening of the position occupied by women. The following examples may illustrate how "conventional" cooperation can have positive impacts on tensions and conflicts:

— Environmental protection projects can help to ensure the sustainable use of such vital resources as water, thus reducing the risk of conflicts over resources.

— Resource management projects can help to facilitate discussions among user groups.

— Food security programmes can help to create structures for dialogue among different groups in areas of tension and conflict.

— Poverty alleviation programmes can help to reduce economic and social disparities.

— Urban development programmes can help to reduce the use of violence.

"Conventional" cooperation has specific advantages. Development agencies have gained knowhow in this area of activity, accumulated regional expertise and built up mutual confidence during long periods of cooperation with partner countries. Long-term approaches predominate, but "conventional" development cooperation may also have positive short-term impacts, as by venturing into such areas of tension or conflict as areas with a high influx of refugees or areas recently affected by civil war hostilities.

Development cooperation partly related to tensions and conflicts

The second area of activity for development cooperation is partly related to tensions and conflicts, because the activities may address tensions and conflicts. It comprises "political" cooperation, mostly facilitated by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), political foundations and Christian development agencies. "Political" cooperation is also of increasing importance for governmental development agencies. Its activities, such as training, conferences and seminars, can address issues and groups relevant to tensions and conflicts. The following examples show how "political" cooperation can have positive impacts:

— Promotion of NGOs and self-help organisations through capacity-building and networking can help to strengthen participation and pluralism in a country.

— Civic education can help to promote human rights awareness.

— Facilitation of dialogue among social or religious groups can help to improve mutual understanding.

— Promotion of independent and competent media can help to reduce prejudices between social groups.

"Political" cooperation has specific advantages. NGOs, political foundations and Christian development agencies often establish long-term relationships with their respective counterparts in developing countries. These relationships can be sustained even in cases where governmental cooperation is difficult or withdrawn. Non-governmental cooperation can also have positive short-term impacts, by reacting flexibly when political issues arise, for example.

Table 1: Tensions and conflicts: areas of activity for development cooperation				
Relation to tensions / conflicts	**Features of cooperation**	**Main actors**	**Activities** (Examples)	**Positive impacts** (Examples)
- operational -				
Not explicit	"Conventional", focus on key development aims	Development agencies	- Poverty alleviation - Resource management - Urban development - Environmental protection	- Decreasing economic and social disparities - Enhancing dialogue structures among social groups
Partial	"Political", addresses issues and groups relevant to tensions and conflicts	NGOs, political foundations, Christian development agencies; also, increasingly, governmental development agencies	- Promotion of NGOs and other groups - Civic education	- Facilitating dialogue - Strengthening of participation - Advocating democracy and human rights
Explicit	Oriented towards conflict prevention and peace-building	Development agencies' specialized units: Development-oriented Emergency Aid, Civic Service for Peace	- Demobilisation of soldiers - Rehabilitation of war victims - Provision of psychological counselling	- Stabilizing post-conflict countries - Strengthening potential for peace - Promoting reconciliation
- non-operational -				
Explicit	Policy dialogue addressing conflicts and tensions in a recipient country	Donor countries, consultative donor groups	Conditionality through: - increase in cooperation, debt relief - reduction of cooperation, shift from financial to technical assistance	- Encouraging negotiations and confidence-building measures between conflict groups - Pressure for democratisation - Encouraging disarmament

Development cooperation related explicitly to tensions and conflicts

The third area of activity for development cooperation is specifically designed to have impacts on tensions and conflicts. Projects and programmes are often implemented by specialised units of development agencies, often focus on post-conflict countries and seek to[21]

— demobilise and reintegrate former combatants;

— contribute to a country's social, political and economic stability, through a post-war reconstruction programme, for example;

— clear mines from residential and agricultural areas and promote mine awareness;

— rehabilitate and reintegrate war victims, through an orthopaedic project, for example;

— promote respect for democracy and human rights by the military and police;

— strengthen the judiciary, with a view to pending genocide trials, for example.

One example of a specialised unit is Germany's Civic Service for Peace, introduced in 1999 to focus on new forms of cooperation related explicitly to tensions and conflicts. "Peace professionals" are trained to strengthen the potential for peace by education and confidence-building measures, promoting programmes for dialogue among the warring factions and working for reconciliation and reconstruction.[22]

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21 For country examples see Klingebiel (1999), p. 15; GTZ (1998); KfW (1999).

22 See BMZ (1999).

Policy dialogue explicitly related to tensions and conflicts

The policy dialogue between donor and recipient countries can be considered a special area of activity since it is not an instrument in operational terms. Positive impacts on tensions and conflicts can be achieved by means of conditionality aimed at ensuring good governance and the promotion of democracy, human rights and peace. While the incentives include an increase in development assistance or debt relief for a recipient country, conditionality may be enforced through the reduction or even freezing of development assistance or a shift from financial to technical assistance. Policy dialogue and donor conditionality may encourage negotiations between conflict groups, exert pressure for democratisation and encourage disarmament.

5   Evaluations of Donor Agencies' Experience in Tension and Conflict Situations

Besides formulating areas of activity, donor agencies are increasingly anxious to learn lessons from their past experience in tension and conflict situations. A number of case study evaluations have been carried out, the findings of three being presented below. They cover the experience of the World Bank, the German BMZ and DAC member countries. The aim of these evaluations was to determine whether the activities assessed had been able to contribute to a stable and peaceful development process or whether they had promoted destabilising forces and so provoked tensions or conflicts.

The findings and recommendations of all three evaluations reflect similar experience: all the studies highlight the ambivalence of parallel positive and negative influences and draw attention to the usually unintended nature of negative impacts, which will need to be better recorded and monitored in the future. To this end, all the evaluations stress the need for sensitive staff and the flexible organisation of aid.

The World Bank's experience of post-conflict reconstruction[23]

In 1998 the World Bank's Operations Evaluations Department (OED) published a review of the performance of the Bank's portfolio in post-conflict reconstruction. It considered nine country studies, conducted interviews and reviewed the literature, covering altogether 157 post-conflict operations.

The study found that the Bank's assistance during peace negotiations and its post-conflict aid coordination had had a considerable peace-building impact. It had been successful in rebuilding physical infrastructure and in stabilising the economy at macro level, thus reducing structural causes of conflict.

In many cases these positive findings were overshadowed by negative effects. These mostly arose from the failure to take account of the specific characteristics of post-conflict situations. In Cambodia, for example, the Bank, following its usual practice, pressed for a reduction in the size of the civil service. The political coalition arrangement under the peace accords was, however, partly based on an increase in the size of the civil service to absorb large numbers of new parties' functionaries. Thus, by calling for a reduction, the Bank had helped to destabilise the post-conflict situation.

Consequently, the OED formulates several conditions for successful post-conflict operations, which reflect the shortcomings identified in the Bank's work. They include the following:

— Funds need to be disbursed more quickly and more flexibly than usual to meet the short-term needs of post-conflict countries.

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23   See Kreimer et al. / OED (1998).

— Strong field presence and monitoring are advisable where there is no competent government.

— Programmes in which importance is attached to participation can contribute to consensus-building and the sustainability of the peace process.

— Capable and sensitive staff are needed for operations in post-conflict situations.

— Addressing existing or emerging distribution imbalances promotes the peace process and contributes to the prevention of renewed hostility.

Cross-section Report on Evaluations of German Development Cooperation in Six Countries: Impact of Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations[24]

In 1998/1999 the German BMZ carried out a review of the impact that development cooperation in six countries had had on conflict situations, the findings being set out in a cross-section report. The country studies also covered technical and financial assistance and other operational and non-operational activities. A distinction was made between explicitly conflict-oriented measures and conventional development aid.

The report reveals largely positive impacts on conflict situations where measures are explicitly conflict-oriented, e.g. rehabilitation and stabilisation packages, direct action or mediation to help improve understanding between warring factions and the demobilisation of former combatants.

Findings on conventional development measures are ambivalent: positive impacts are primarily due to a long-term reduction of root causes of conflict. However, the report highlights the effect of unintended negative impacts, such as support for a (repressive) government which is itself involved in the conflict, an increase in regional imbalance in favour of the ruling elites and even the trigger-

ing of violent conflict over such resources as irrigated areas.

Recommendations for development cooperation therefore emphasise the need for tension-sensitive institutions and staff capable of appreciating the political implications of their activities beyond the immediate project goal. They include:

— strengthening the quality and flow of information to facilitate early and appropriate action,

— building capacities in development agencies for conflict awareness and peace-building as a prerequisite for explicit action,

— increasing the degree of flexibility, risk-taking and acceptance of responsibility shown by development actors under conditions of escalating conflict,

— coordinating donors' activities appropriately.

DAC Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation: The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict[25]

A DAC-initiated research project analysed the use of aid as an incentive or disincentive in conflict and conflict-prone situations. It was based on four case studies, which were published in a summary report in 1999. This report seeks to learn lessons for the design of strategies for the promotion of peace through development activities, with particular emphasis on influencing the actors in conflicts.

Positive impacts – here: incentives for peace – are seen primarily in the strengthening of individual and institutional capacities for peace initiatives. Impartiality is regarded as the most important characteristic of all activities, since it creates neutral space for communication between social groups.

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24 See Klingebiel (1999).

25 See Uvin (1999).

Table 2: Tension- and conflict-oriented concepts of German and other donor agencies

Agency	Concept	Purpose and contents	Operational features
BMZ	*Development cooperation and crisis prevention*, June 1997[a]	• Outlines two areas of activity for development cooperation in crisis prevention: • combating root causes of crisis (poverty reduction, economic recovery, and social recovery, use and maintenance of natural resources, • promoting peaceful settlement of conflicts (political participation, social institutions, legal systems, civil integration of military and police).	Conceptual framework for operational activities.
	Development cooperation for the prevention and management of disasters and conflicts. Conceptual aspects and their implications for development policy, Position paper of the BMZ Advisory Board, June 1997[b]	Provides a framework for conflict and disaster analysis and shows three levels of action by development cooperation having to contend with conflicts and disasters: • the event itself (risk assessment, emergency preparedness); • management of conflicts and disasters (self-help institutions, development-oriented relief and humanitarian assistance); • conflict and disaster prevention (structural social, economic and political conditions: short- and long-term activities).	Analytical framework for German development cooperation.
4	*Instruments for assessing conflict and crisis potentials in partner countries of development policy*, BMZ research paper, 1999[c]	It opts for the systematic integration of the conflict dimension into development cooperation, including all state and non-state actors, for international coordination and for an improvement of statistics on the probability and mechanisms of disasters. Develops indicators for measuring the risk of conflict that countries face (conflict-proneness). The aim is to make it easier: • to distinguish different levels of escalation; • to group countries according to the likelihood of violence; • to give guidance on when to incorporate active peace-building activities into the BMZ's development cooperation in a specific country.	Most elaborate indicator concept; will be incorporated into BMZ country strategies.
GTZ	*Development-oriented Emergency Aid (DEA)*, GTZ's working principles, Technical cooperation in the context of crisis, conflict and disaster, June 1998[d]	With these principles the GTZ incorporates explicit conflict prevention and peace-building measures into a new development-oriented concept of relief and humanitarian assistance (DEA). It is to give guidance on how technical assistance may reduce the risk of conflict and disasters and how it can ease distress. Specific areas of action envisaged are: • support for institutions conducive to peace-building; • training for peace-building and reconciliation; • strengthening of "peace constituencies"; • support for media in "peace-lobbying"; • support for peace education; • work on reconciliation and traumatic situations.	Recently introduced, no experience yet gained.
	Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management (Draft), Technical cooperation in the context of crisis, conflict and disaster, January 1999[e]	Outlines a strategy for conflict management which should be incorporated in DEA. Main idea is to strengthen local capacities and resources to enable conflicts of interest to be dealt with constructively in the interests of a sustainable peace-building process. Two elements are highlighted: • support for "peace lobbies/constituencies" (groups interested in promoting peaceful ways of resolving conflicts and having the power to do so); • support for *structural stability* (social and economic stability). Suggested activities specify areas of action mentioned in DEA.	Elaborate strategies for explicit conflict prevention and peace-building, draft status; will be incorporated in DEA.
KfW	*Contributions of financial assistance to crisis prevention and post-crisis management in developing countries*, Working Paper, October 1999[f]	Paper identifies entry points and activities for financial cooperation in conflict prevention and in post-conflict situations. They cover the following areas: • social investment funds and work programmes; • communal development plans; • transnational protection of natural resources; • support for and implementation of peace agendas; • reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes; • resettlement of refugees; • reintegration of former combatants and soldiers; • other activities, such as support for media and arms conversion.	Policy paper. Most activities identified belong to the conventional range of financial assistance projects/programmes. However, there is no systematic approach or analysis yet to guide further activi-

Table 2: Tension- and conflict-oriented concepts of German and other donor agencies

			ties.
DFID	*Strategic Conflict Analysis and Conflict Impact Assessment,* Discussion Paper, August 1999[g]	The study opts for the incorporation of conflict prevention as a cross-section goal into all financial cooperation programmes. Paper presents key steps and analytical outline guidance for applying the following tools: • strategic conflict analysis; • preliminary conflict impact assessment; • detailed conflict impact assessment. It seeks to ensure both that development projects are not adversely affected by conflict situations and that they themselves avoid exacerbating conflicts. Ways of helping to reduce violent conflict and to build peace are sought. Finally, the paper makes suggestions on how to combine strategic conflict analysis and detailed conflict impact assessment with project cycle management procedures.	Work in progress, not yet incorporated into project cycle management.
OECD	*DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation,* 1997[h]	Paper addresses donor agencies and gives guidelines for incorporating conflict prevention in their work. It covers: • a framework for analysing conflicts; • key guidelines for donors on international aid coordination; • guidelines for peace-building activities; • guidelines for post-conflict rehabilitation; • possible regional approaches to conflict prevention and peace-building.	Rather elaborated framework concept. Operationalisation varies from one member country to another.
	Participatory Development and Good Governance, Development Cooperation guidelines series, 1995[i]	Paper gives an overview of principles and approaches and of areas for action relating to • participatory development; • democratisation; • good governance; • human rights; • coherence and coordination. It expresses the view that the promotion of society's institutional skills fosters conflict prevention. The paper also calls for the development of further knowledge of mediation and conflict resolution.	Operational status varies from one member country to another.
World Bank	*Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction,* May 1997[j]	Framework covers fields of action for Bank's involvement in post-conflict situations, e.g. • integrating displaced persons into society; • providing technical advice for peace negotiations; • providing practical advice at the macro level of economic and political reconstruction. It stresses the need for methods of integrating conflict analysis into development activities.	Represents the Bank's policy on post-conflict re-construction. No clear operational guidance yet. The Bank is working on eligibility criteria for post-conflict assistance.

a See BMZ (1997)   c See Spelten (1999)   e See GTZ (1999)   g See Warner/Walker/Scharf (1999)   i See DAC (1995)

b See BMZ (1997a)   d See GTZ (1998)   f See KfW (1999)   h See DAC (1997)   j See World Bank (1995)

As regards negative impacts, the report particularly emphasises the political nature of all aid. The perceptions that the actors in conflicts have are too often neglected, as are the relations between groups, in terms of income or status, for instance, which may be more important than the absolute situation of one group alone.

The lessons learned and recommendations made include the following:

— cooperation among ODA and non-ODA actors should be promoted with a view to achieving a coherent policy, including diplomacy or trade;

— innovative and flexible approaches should be developed to enhance aid capacities, including better timing, new kinds of knowledge and human resources and decentralised decision-making;

— peace incentives should be targeted at all parties alike;

— donor involvement in local initiatives that encourage pro-peace behaviour or discourage the opposite.

III   Tension and Conflict Impact Analysis

Following the overview in Chapter II of current trends in development cooperation in tension and conflict situations, Chapter III considers the specific issue of observing and analysing the impacts that development measures have on tensions and conflicts. It consists of three main parts: the first part covers the theoretical background to the development of tension and conflict impact analysis, supported by empirical findings in development cooperation (section III.1), the second part (section III.2) is a concrete research approach to *Tension and Conflict Impact Analysis* (TCIA), which will set out the conceptual basis for the Tanzanian case study, and the third part (section III.3) presents methods and tools for TCIA data collection.

1 General Background to Impact Analysis

Before a research approach to tension and conflict impact analysis is designed, a closer look should be taken at the area of impact analysis in general[26] and of tension and conflict impact analysis in particular.

In the past, evaluations in German development cooperation focused on the output of development projects. In recent years there has been a growth of interest in analysing the impacts of projects where certain aspects of development are concerned. German development agencies are now concentrating on developing methods of analysing the *impact* and *outcome* of projects, rather than their *output*. A prominent example is Environmental Impact Assessment[27], which is integrated into German development agencies' project cycle management. Another recently developed approach is MAPP (Method for Impact Assessment of Poverty Alleviation Projects)[28], which focuses on the social dimension and presents instruments for analysing impacts of development projects in the area of poverty reduction.

The following sections discuss methodological characteristics of impact analysis (section III.1), present different categories of tension and conflict impacts (section III.2) and give an overview of existing frameworks of tension and conflict impact analysis (section III.3).

1.1   Definition and Characteristics of Impact Analysis

Impact analysis is part of the system of monitoring and evaluating development cooperation. An impact analysis is intended to gauge the effects of

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26 Brüne (ed.) (1998) provides a general overview on this subject. See also Dawson (1996); Roche (1999) and Teklüve (1998).

27 This concept is known as *Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfung (UVP)* in Germany.

28 See Neubert (1998, 1999) and Neubert (no date). For a description see Box 1.

project and programme activities in specified areas, such as the natural or social environment and gender relations. These areas need not be identical with the nature and goal of the project itself. A resource project may, for example, have social or gender impacts.

The impact[29] of a project differs from its *output* or *outcome* in that it may exceed the original scope and goal of the project. According to Conway/ Maxwell, *impact* can be defined as positive and negative, intended and unintended changes and effects due to the project, seen in relation to both target groups and others who are affected. While the intended effects are usually related to the project's explicit goals, unintended or unforeseen impacts are positive or negative side-effects which

This kind of impact analysis is an assessment of the development effectiveness of the measures[30] and represents only one part of an overall impact analysis.

An overall impact analysis

— looks beyond the intended project goal,

— looks beyond the intended project beneficiaries/stakeholders,

— looks at unintended effects of the project.

As projects do not, of course, always achieve the intended results or achieve results which are unintended or even unknown to the project itself, further knowledge of these effects is a precondition

Table 3: Hypothetical example of the output, outcome and impact of an education project			
Objective: *Improve income opportunities through better access to and quality of primary education*			
Target group: *Rural children and adolescents*			
Outputs (=goods and services resulting from project inputs)	**Outcomes** (= results emerging from outputs)	**Impacts** (= results emerging from outputs and outcomes)	
New curricula are developed for primary schools	Teachers use new curricula in primary schools	Increase in proportion of adolescents finding employment	**Positive intended impact**
New school buildings are built in the vicinity of the target group	Increased enrolment	Increase in proportion of girls completing primary education	**Positive unintended gender impact**
		Decrease in average family income	**Negative unintended socio-economic impact**
Source: Adapted from OED (1997) and Neubert (1999), with authors' additions. Shaded boxes indicate the scope of an assessment of the "development effectiveness" of measures.			

are not necessarily related to the explicit project goals and can be reasonably attributed to project activities. Impacts are linked to a project more indirectly than outputs or outcomes. Table 3 shows an example of the distinction between these three levels of effects:

The use of the various terms in the evaluations is not clear. The term "impact analysis" very often means an assessment of only positive intended impacts of a project (shaded boxes in Table 3).

for the improvement of development cooperation. This is especially true of such sensitive areas as impacts on socio-political tensions and conflicts. An impact analysis seeks to observe and assess these effects and so to lay the foundations for improved action by development actors.

When an impact analysis is undertaken, some methodological characteristics need to be considered:

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29 For a discussion of the German term *Wirkungen* (impacts) see Wasel / Heidemann (1999).

30 Known in German as *Wirksamkeitsprüfung*.

Box 1:   MAPP – Method for Impact Assessment of Poverty Alleviation Projects

Unlike other approaches to impact analysis, MAPP considers the context of development projects. Based on PRA methodology and including structured discussions with local population groups, it evaluates the local population's perception of the development process and of measures and activities undertaken by a project. It enables positive and negative, intended and unintended impacts of projects to be identified.

Overview: MAPP steps:

I)   Preparations in the area of research:

    1.   Adjustment of MAPP and its instruments to sector, region and characteristics of the target group.

    2.   Definition of social sub-criteria with project staff, review of criteria (correction and additions with the target group).

II)   Implementation (in project villages) and first evaluation with target groups:

    1.   Use of PRA instruments (Lifeline, Trend analysis, Activity list, Influence matrix, Transect).

    2.   Direct observation.

    3.   Analysis of situation.

The five participatory tools of MAPP:

(1)   Lifeline => identification of minimum social factors

The target groups draw a curve showing how their community has developed over the past 20-30 years. The amplitude of the curve indicates the change in their quality of life on a five-level scale. The criterion that determines the evaluation awarded determines the minimum factor, which is fixed at the beginning, but may be questioned and changed every year. The lifeline provides a first clue to the determining factors of life in the region and also an indication of whether or not they are within the range of project activities.

(2)   Trend analysis => establishment of a matrix on social development in the village

In the first two or three MAPP sessions the trend analysis begins with a discussion about the most important criteria, which determine social development in the given region. With the help of a trend analysis a profile of the community is drawn, showing how the community has changed in recent years before and during the project cycle on a five-level scale. The trend analysis reveals the "gross impact" for all social criteria.

(3)   Activity list => identification of the significance and beneficiaries of the project activities and of the time and expenses involved

With the aid of a simple chart, again based on a five-level scale, all project activities and sponsors are identified. The significance of each activity for the everyday lives of the target groups is then evaluated, and the groups benefiting from the activities are identified. Points are then awarded for the work and financial input required for the implementation and maintenance of the operations.

With the help of this activity list the importance of the project examined can be compared to that of other projects, and conclusions on the significance of the operations, i.e. their spread throughout the community, can be drawn. Internal efficiency can also be calculated, i.e. the importance of an operation compared to the work or financial implications it has entailed.

(4)   Influence matrix => attribution of impacts of project activities

Impacts are now attributed systematically with the aid of a matrix in which the strength of the influence of each project activity on each criterion is again evaluated on a scale of one to five. it, The actual intensity of influence identified for each project activity on each social criterion is always discussed during the meetings with the target groups. The matrix shows direct and indirect, positive and negative influences. Finally, active and passive sums are formed, reflecting respectively the most influenced social criterion and the most influential project activity. It is thus possible to identify successful and unsuccessful activities.

(5)   Transect => systematic inspection of visible measures

All visible project activities in the village are inspected by the evaluation team for effectiveness, e.g. magnitude and soundness.

Source: Description taken from Neubert (1998, 1999) and Neubert (no date).

— Depending on the phase of the project cycle, an impact analysis may be hypothetical: the earlier in the project cycle the assessment is begun, the more hypothetical are the findings, because impacts have not yet occurred and the assessment therefore represents no more than a forecast. In the case of impact and con-

flict impact analysis, the earlier the assessment can be made, the more opportunity the donor will have to respond early and to take appropriate conflict prevention measures.

— Depending on the kind of impact that needs to be analysed, quantitative or qualitative data can be gathered. While an environmental im-

pact analysis may rely on a wide range of quantitative data, a tension and conflict impact analysis, which largely considers the social environment of groups and their perceptions, will have to rely more on qualitative data.

— The analysis of impacts takes account of the context (social, political, etc.) in which the project is being implemented. This context should be regarded as a constant process; the analysis should therefore reflect the dynamics of and changes in the project environment, rather than being restricted to a certain point in time.

— As impacts are often attributable to a project no more than indirectly, it is very difficult to isolate the project's impact on a tension and conflict situation from other external and internal effects.[31] Given the ever-changing nature of socio-political situations, no typical "with-and-without comparison" can be conducted to produce valid impact assessment data. And even if such "filtering out" of project impacts is possible, it will still be difficult to assess how much weight or importance should be attached to the influence of project activities, the implementation of the project being only one variable among many others.

— An inherent problem lies in the observation of unintended impacts of projects. As these effects cannot – by definition – be foreseen, it will be especially difficult to identify them. An open research design therefore seems particularly important.

1.2 Different Categories of Tension and Conflict Impact

This section divides tension and conflict impacts into three categories: impacts at macro and micro level; positive and negative impacts; intended or unintended impacts. The three categories are explained and illustrated below.

Impacts at macro and micro level

Impacts at macro level are impacts which development cooperation has on the tensions and conflicts of a whole country. In contrast, impacts at micro level are impacts which individual projects or programmes have on tensions and conflicts in regions, districts, communities and the like.

Donor conditionality, for example, may have an impact at macro level by contributing to a government's political openness and by providing incentives for conflict resolution. In contrast, unconditional cooperation may help to stabilise a repressive government which is itself involved in a conflict. On the other hand, projects or programmes have an impact at micro level when they help to ease or aggravate tensions in regions, districts, communities and the like. Thus a project may have an impact at micro level if it integrates an underprivileged group or discriminates against it.

Positive and negative impacts

Positive impacts help to promote cooperation or to ease tensions and conflicts. In contrast, negative impacts help to impede cooperation or to aggravate tensions and conflicts.

According to the four-stage conflict model introduced in section II.2, this means, for example, that, where conflicts of interest have reached the tension stage, positive impacts of development cooperation help to return them to the cooperation stage. On the other hand, negative impacts may help to lead conflicts of interest to the violent conflict stage. With this division into positive and negative impacts, the following table arranges the findings of a cross-section report on impacts of German cooperation on tensions and conflicts,[32]

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31 For the problem of attributing impact to specific project measures see, for example, OED (1997); Neubert (1999); Tekülve (1998).

32 Summarised in Klingebiel (1999), p. 25.

Table: 4 Possible positive and negative impacts of development cooperation			
Positive impacts		**Negative impacts**	
Promoting cooperation/easing tensions and conflicts by		**Impeding cooperation/aggravating tensions and conflicts by**	
reducing structural disparities	**strengthening the ability to cooperate**	**increasing structural disparities**	**weakening the ability to cooperate**
- political and social stabilisation: eventual removal of regional disparities, generating employment opportunities, defusing conflicts over resources - removal of opportunities for self-enrichment and clientele systems by means of economic reform / structural adjustment	- political openness, participation, democratisation and increase in awareness of tensions and conflicts - improved security and human rights conditions due to the presence of cooperation personnel	- increased regional imbalances through the promotion of certain regions to the ruling elite's liking - encouragement given to clientele systems and opportunities for corruption	- direct support for and stabilisation of the government which is itself involved in the conflict - wrong signals sent to the government and opposition forces by "omission" and "approval", for example, through failure to seize opportunities during the policy dialogue - violent countermeasures taken by the regime as a result of pressure for political reform (which may be achieved in the long run)
Source: Adapted from Klingebiel (1999), p. 25.			

using Bush's[33] distinction between structural disparities and the ability to cooperate.

As regards structural disparities and the ability to cooperate, an urban development project, for example, may have a positive impact on socio-economic disparities by providing opportunities for unemployed young people. A resource management project may have a positive impact on the ability to cooperate by helping to open a dialogue among different user groups, through the promotion of new discussion forums, for instance.

tended positive impacts) or critical impacts which have been expected and discounted (intended negative impacts). In contrast, unintended impacts are impacts which have been neither considered nor expected. They may be positive or negative.

An education project, for example, may fall short of its goal of enabling students to pass examinations, but the project may – even unintentionally – reduce tensions between social groups by increasing communication. On the other hand, it may achieve its goal of enabling students to pass ex-

Table 5: Intended and unintended impacts			
Intended impacts		**Unintended impacts**	
Positive	**Negative**	**Positive**	**Negative**
Related to the project goal	Critical, but expected and discounted	Related to the project, but not considered or expected	Critical, but not considered or expected

Intended and unintended impacts

Development cooperation can have both intended and unintended impacts. Intended impacts are impacts which are related to the project goal even though they were not explicitly formulated (in-

aminations, but increase tensions between social groups by underscoring one group's perception that it is being discriminated against.[34]

Development cooperation activities may simultaneously have various tension and conflict impacts

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33 See Bush (1998).

34 See Bush (1998), p. 2.

with opposite tendencies. This underlines both the complexity and the necessity of tension and conflict impact analysis.

1.3   Existing Frameworks of Tension and Conflict Impact Analysis

A tension and conflict impact analysis permits the assessment of the actual effects of development cooperation activities, both intended and unintended, on the lives of its beneficiaries and other stakeholders, beyond the immediate project outputs. While output corresponds to the project objectives, impact is associated with the broader socio-political environment. The purpose of this section is to give an overview of existing frameworks and like-minded approaches.

The different frameworks examined[35] indicate that (i) progress has been made towards the goal of analysing the impact of development cooperation on socio-political tensions and conflicts. Despite this, (ii) the differences among the frameworks show that no approach has yet emerged as a convincing practical method. In a review of the literature on and practice in "conflict impact assessment" by Leonhardt[36] only three (see Box 2) of the ten frameworks studied refer explicitly to "conflict impact assessment". Common to all the frameworks are (iii) an underlying vagueness and lack of practicality.

(i) Progress is evident from the attempt in all the frameworks to analyse the impact of development cooperation activities more systematically and to make policy-shapers and policy-makers more aware of the issue. Achieving a high level of sensitivity to tensions and conflicts can be seen as a major step forward in the process of promoting development cooperation activities designed to advance peace by mitigating the risks of tension and conflict.

(ii) Disparity can be seen in the aims of the various frameworks. Some frameworks mention peace as a development goal in itself and so stress the integration of peace objectives into development programming from an early stage (Reychler[37], Warner/DFID[38]). Others focus on unplanned and potentially negative side-effects of development cooperation activities, including the danger of increasing socio-political tensions or conflicts (Anderson[39], Bush[40]). The two aims may nonetheless be complementary.

Another dimension in this respect is that the focus is either on the impact of development cooperation activities on tensions and conflicts or on the impact of tensions and conflicts on the development cooperation activities themselves.

In addition, a number of suggestions concerning the timing of the use of impact tools are put forward. Some propose an ex-ante approach (Esman, Spelten, FEWER[41]), others an ex-post approach (Laprise, Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee[42]), yet others a process-monitoring approach (Anderson[43]), while others recommend various combinations of the three (Brusset, Reychler, Warner/DFID[44]).

The criteria for conducting a tension and conflict analysis in a specific area also vary. An area with a history of violent conflict or the location of development projects in disputed territories are the

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35   Important frameworks are presented by Anderson (1996 and 1999); Brusset (1999); Bush (1998); Canadian Peacebuilding Coordination Committee (1999); Warner / DFID (1999); Esman (1997); FEWER (1999); Laprise (1998); Reychler (1998); Spelten (1999).

36   See Leonhardt (1999a).

37   See Reychler (1998).

38   See Warner / DFID (1999).

39   Anderson (1999).

40   Bush (1998).

41   See Esman (1997); Spelten (1999); FEWER (1999).

42   See Laprise (1998); Canadian Peacebuilding Coordination Committee (1999).

43   See Anderson (1999).

44   See Brusset (1999); Reychler (1998); Warner / DFID (1999); Leonhardt (1999a), pp. 34 - 40.

Box 2:	Three tension and conflict analysis frameworks compared

Luc Reychler[a]: Conflict Impact Assessment (CIAS)

Aims or main statements

–   Assess positive / negative impacts of operations on dynamics of conflicts

–   Contribute to a coherent conflict prevention and peace-building policy

–   Tool for increasing policy-makers' awareness (identifying weaknesses in the approach)

–   Further development and peace-building efforts

Where and when to apply a CIAS

–   Determined by the nature of the environment, not by the type of project

–   In an environment characterised by incipient, latent, and manifest violence

–   Ex-ante and ex-post

Experience

–   No practical experience

–   Suggested: country study, interviews, discussions, questionnaires, workshops, diary

Kenneth Bush[b]: A Measure of Peace

Aims or main statements

–   Operations in conflict-prone regions inevitably have an impact on the environment

–   Development and peace-building criteria are not identical: success or failure of a project can therefore be only a relative judgement

Where and when to apply

–   Determined by nature of the environment (history of violence, disputed territory)

–   Ex-ante and ex-post

Experience

–   No practical experience

Warner/DFID[c]: Conflict Impact Assessment

Aims or main statements

–   Mitigating the risks which development cooperation activities exacerbate or provoke in conflict situations

–   Mitigating the risks to which development cooperation activities are exposed in conflict situations

–   Seizing opportunities to facilitate peace-building initiatives

Where and when to apply

–   In conflict situations

–   Ex-ante, monitoring and ex-post

Experience

–   No practical experience

Source: a   Reychler (1998);
                  b   Bush (1998);
                  c   Warner / DFID (1999)

criteria proposed by Bush. Reychler argues that whether or not a tension and conflict analysis is undertaken should be determined by the nature of the environment in which the activity is planned, not by the type of project. However, he presents much broader categories, referring to environments characterised by incipient, latent and manifest violence.

(iii) Vagueness and a possible lack of practicality can be seen in the various tools described – if practical tools are provided. They include both checklists (Spelten[45]) and workshop approaches (FEWER[46]). Checklists have the advantage of being unobtrusive and easy to compile. On the other hand, they may not be flexible enough, given the wide range of conflict situations and the little space allowed for differing views. Though far more participatory, the workshop approach requires extensive resources in terms of time and personnel and may put personnel at risk in certain situations.

Although the European Commission suggests three different stages for the integration of tension and conflict analysis into the project management cycle: 1. programming (macro level, ex-ante), 2. project planning (micro level, ex-ante) and 3. monitoring and evaluation (macro and micro levels, ex-post),[47] a realistic approach to integrating tension and conflict analysis into the project management cycle has yet to be devised.

In summary, it is clear that, if a convincing practical framework is to established for tension and conflict analysis, further research and practical guidance will be needed.

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45   Spelten (1999).

46   FEWER (1999).

47   See Leonhardt (1999a), p. 43.

2   The Research Approach: Tension and Conflict Impact Analysis (TCIA)

This section describes the study approach, including the tools and procedures used to analyse the tension and conflict impacts of development projects. This approach was applied to two projects in Tanzania supported by German development co-operation, the results of which will be presented in Chapter IV.

Tension and Conflict Impact Analysis (TCIA) is to be conducted at project level and is based on the collection of mainly qualitative data (see section III.3). The approach features:

— a systematic and theoretically based framework for analysis in six stages;

— a practical instrument for grouping and arranging the principal findings in the form of a matrix.

Like other frameworks for tension and conflict impact analysis, TCIA seeks to increase the sensitivity of project planners and implementing project staff. As the prerequisite for any action to be taken, TCIA is a semi-standardised method of analysing possible tension and conflict impacts at project level. It focuses on possible negative side-effects of project operations and on intended and unintended positive side-effects that are usually overlooked when direct project outputs are evaluated. Where the timing of TCIA is concerned, the approach should ideally be able to cover the implementing and the post-project phases, but it should also be adjustable for the planning phase.

The six analytical stages of TCIA are as follows:

1. *Description of the project region and the project*: The regional environment in which the project is located and the project itself are described. There is no focus on tensions and conflicts yet, but this stage should set the scene needed for a comprehensive understanding of the project, its objectives and the dynamics of its environment.

2. *Tension and conflict analysis*: This stage consists of the identification of actual and poten-

tial tensions and conflicts in the project region, their structure and dynamics and the actors involved. It is not explicitly related to the project. The aim of the tension analysis is to provide a clear picture of conflicts of interest, not from the project's viewpoint but from a neutral angle. The impact of the project will subsequently need to be considered in relation to this tension and conflict environment.

3. *Tension-related identification of the project stakeholders*: It should be determined whether the actors in conflicts of interest are identical with the project stakeholders. The latter need to be identified with the focus on the conflicts of interest described in the tension analysis. Their characteristics, interests and ability to influence the situation are described.

4. *Analysis of the sensitivity of the project to tensions and conflicts*: The relationship between the project and local tensions reveals how sensitive the project is to actual or potential tensions. It should be determined whether the project has recognised or anticipated tensions and whether it has acted accordingly. This relationship also shows whether the project has the ability to anticipate possible impacts of its own activities.

5. *Impact identification*: The fifth stage identifies the project's impact on socio-political tensions. It is carried out from the perspective of the different stakeholders. A distinction is made between positive and negative, intended and unintended impacts.

6. *Conclusions and recommendations*: To ensure that the findings of the analysis are incorporated into the project's future activities, this stage comprises the listing of the most important results through (i) the extraction of the major impacts identified, (ii) a description of their bearing on conflicts of interest and (iii) the submission of recommendations to the project and the donor on how to cope with conflicts of interest.

These six stages are described in detail in sections III.2.1 to III.2.6. They form the analytical frame-

work which should be adopted in the final analysis and in the presentation of results. However, the empirical data needed for all stages can be collected by any practicable method without the sequence of the six stages necessarily being respected.

For reasons of transparency, one or more impact *hypotheses* should be developed between the desk phase and the beginning of the empirical research. The hypotheses should be reviewed later. However, enough room should be left for open research to supplement these main hypotheses.

As an analytical tool for the approach, a *TCIA matrix* is provided in section III.3.2 for the systematic collection and grouping of all information. It can be used at any empirical stage and for the final interpretation of results. It summarises and depicts all information gathered in the form of a matrix and reduces a presumably complex situation to an overview. It thus makes it easier for the user to interpret the various impacts of the project activities on conflicts of interest.

2.1   Description of the Project Region and the Project

The analytical framework for the description of the project region and the project is as follows:

Profile of the region

The impact of development cooperation projects depends on the profile of the region in which it is located. The following aspects should therefore be considered before the project itself:

(i)   Natural resources, environmental degradation, physical infrastructure.

(ii) Social structure, including population density, the ethnic and religious composition of the population, the role of men and women, migration patterns.

(iii) Economic structure, including income disparities, main income-generating activities, subsistence activities, markets.

(iv) Political structure, including regional and local government structures, administrative structures and the process of political decision-making and participation.

(v)   Other features of the region.

Profile of development cooperation activities in the region

Other development cooperation activities also need to be considered if certain impacts are to be related to specific projects. It is therefore useful to outline the objectives and characteristics of international development cooperation in the region and to compare the project activities in terms of coherence and complementarity. The main linkages should be analysed to determine whether the activities are cumulative or counteractive.

Profile of the project

This section describes the project and its development basically from the donor's point of view. A reference to tensions and conflicts may be included only where the explicit objective of the project is to reduce existing tensions or conflicts. The following features should be outlined:

(i)   Background (includes project idea, problems identified and project initiators; major stakeholders can already be identified at this stage).

(ii) Objective and target groups.

(iii) Description (including operational and non-operational activities, timing of the different phases of the project cycle, counterpart, implementing organisations, core documents).

(iv) Overall output and outcome.

(v)   Outlook (including the potentials and problems the project may face during the next phases of the cycle).

2.2   Tension and Conflict Analysis

The aim of tension and conflict analysis is to explain the nature and dynamics of the socio-political situation in which the project is located. It seeks to describe and analyse the determinant causes of a tension or conflict situation and to identify the relevant actors.[48] The tension and conflict analysis is meant to be conducted without reference to the project. However, the project may, of course, be covered by the analysis if it is obviously an important actor in the situation itself.

The tension and conflict analysis consists of five elements:

(i)   description of tensions and conflicts in the project region (micro-level tensions),

(ii)   analysis of the factors that cause, trigger and aggravate tensions and conflicts,

(iii)   analysis of actors in the tension and conflict situation,

(iv)   relationship between micro- and macro-level tensions,

(v)   assessment of the tension and conflict level and trend analysis.

(i) Description of tensions and conflicts in the project region (micro-level tensions)

This element is a description of the socio-political situation as a whole and of the possible tensions or conflicts that may be found. It should include the viewpoint of outsiders as well as insiders. The description should also include tensions reported both formally and informally, i.e. it should draw on media or court information as well as on private discussions and rumours.

(ii) Analysis of the factors that cause, trigger and aggravate tensions and conflicts and of their dynamics

This element breaks down the situation into different factors that may cause, trigger or aggravate tension dynamics at local level. It is assumed that every tension or conflict situation has its roots in several factors. The analysis should include potential tensions and conflicts as well as existing ones, so as to cover all possible relevant factors. The results of this analysis are helpful during the observation of the impact of project operations.

The analysis of the local dimension of factors that cause, trigger or aggravate tensions and conflicts is based on the general categories and sub-categories set out in section II.3:

Socio-economic factors:

—   socio-economic disparities,

—   competition for natural resources,

—   inadequate satisfaction of basic needs.

Socio-political and political constraints:

—   problems with managing transition and rapid change,

—   lack of legitimate government and good governance,

—   limited participation,

—   insufficient formal and informal channels for tension and conflict management,

—   limited institutional capacities,

—   social disintegration and separation,

—   exploitation of ethnic, cultural and other differences, and discrimination.

Violence and insecurity:

—   uncontrolled military forces and arbitrary police actions,

—   inadequate security,

—   legacy of violence.

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48   The term *actors* is used here to designate direct and third parties to tensions or conflicts, and should not be confused with the term *stakeholders*, which is used in the context of a given project (see section III.2.3).

External sources:

— negative consequences of international commitments,

— negative consequences of regional/international environment.

The tension and conflict analysis adapts these general factors to the local situation so that potential or actual tensions or conflicts in the project region may be identified. The categories should be used as a guideline and can be extended if necessary, or left blank. The different local dimensions identified can be of a long-term or short-term nature, or may be described as an underlying cause or a factor that triggers or aggravates tensions or conflicts. This distinction facilitates the general assessment of the tension or conflict situation. The significance of each factor should be pointed out, since not all factors found locally will be of the same relevance to the main tension or conflict situation. A reference should also be made to the dynamics or trend in each category (decreasing or increasing).

(iii) Analysis of actors in the tension and conflict situation

The third step is to show the interests and leverage of the various actors in the conflict. Actors may include social groups, ethnic communities, political parties, neighbourhoods, governments, military forces, etc. After the actors identified have been grouped, their interests and capacities in the conflict and the power that each has to influence the situation can be analysed. This is often referred to as an analysis of dividers and connectors.[49]

(iv) Relationship between micro- and macro-level tensions

The fourth element relates the tensions analysed at micro level to macro-level tensions. It may be

important to know whether conflicts of interest found locally form part of a country-wide or regional trend or whether they are due to specifically local factors. Existing macro-level analyses of tensions and conflicts, in country strategy papers, for example, may be used for this purpose.

(v) Assessment of the tension and conflict level and trend analysis

The last element of the tension and conflict analysis defines the intensity of the given tension or conflict situation. It assesses the extent to which the conflicts of interest observed are dealt with peacefully or by violent means. It also analyses the dynamics of violence in the tension or conflict situation, stating whether the intensity is rising or falling in a short-, medium- and long-term perspective. The trend analysis helps to assess the direction of a project's impact on the situation and to indicate whether or not the impact of the project supports the trend.

2.3 Tension-related Identification of Project Stakeholders

The tension-related identification of project stakeholders assesses conflicting interests of the groups or institutions affected by a project and reveals whether stakeholders are able to solve problems by cooperative means.[50]

The study is based on the GTZ's stakeholder analysis approach, but concentrates on a rather small segment of it and tries to go into greater detail:[51] it seeks to assess the extent to which the project stakeholders are identical with the actors in the tension situation with a view to analysing

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49 See Anderson (1999).

50 The term *stakeholders* is used here to designate groups or institutions affected by a given project and should not be confused with the term *actors*, which means direct and third parties to tensions and conflicts (see section III.2.2).

51 The GTZ "participant analysis" approach is described in Annex B.2.

the project's impact on the tension situation through the stakeholders. The GTZ uses the term *participant analysis*, which can be regarded as synonymous with *stakeholder analysis* since it also covers people indirectly affected by the project.[52]

The tension-related identification of project stakeholders should include the identification of project stakeholders involved in the tension situation, along with their status, power and ability to influence the project and other stakeholders. These include target groups, project staff, counterpart institutions, other official institutions, etc. Stakeholder groups can often be divided into subgroups with differing interests.

2.4   Sensitivity of the Project to Tensions and Conflict

This section links the results of the second and third stages. It relates the project to conflicts of interest in the region and also analyses the project's sensitivity to situations of tension. The following sources should be used for the detailed examination:

— project concept,

— project approach,

— project documentation,

— experience of the project staff.

The following aspects should be considered:

The project's recognition of potential and actual tensions and conflicts

This section describes the sensitivity of the project to tensions and conflicts. An analysis is made of the extent to which the project and its staff have recognised potential or actual tensions. This does not mean that the socio-political environment of any project necessarily has to be tense. Sensitivity

to tension is also high when reference is made to tension-relevant issues during the project cycle before tensions become obvious.

Project adjustments and initiatives prompted by local tensions and conflicts

Where a project is highly sensitive to tension, there is a chance that reactive adjustments will be made provided that the project staff recognise potential or actual tensions. Elements of projects may be altered at any stage of the project cycle. This should be done if the project staff realise that individual activities are having a negative impact on a tense situation. The study therefore considers, for example, whether the goal had to be redefined, the approach was changed, the target group was enlarged or reduced in size, individual activities were altered or even abandoned, etc.

Going one step further, the project may even take proactive initiatives that were not included in its initial phase. Proactive in this context means anticipating tensions or conflicts and taking additional measures so as not to increase the tension. The difference from reactive adjustments is that altering elements of the project is more of a passive approach after problems become visible. Proactive initiatives, on the other hand, seek to prevent negative impacts or support positive results and so demonstrate a high degree of tension sensitivity.

Project policies

Such project policies as employment policy and support structures may have an impact on tensions and conflicts in the project region. Where employment policy is concerned, it should be considered whether certain social groups are overrepresented among the long- and short-term staff, since this may be perceived as unfair treatment of various stakeholder groups. The same holds for the support structures, including financial sources and the supply of materials, which may favour certain stakeholder groups rather than others.

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52   See GTZ (1989); GTZ (1997), pp. 281 - 283.

2.5 Impact Identification

The impacts of a project on tensions and conflicts need to be grouped according to the perception of all stakeholders (including the project staff). Positive, negative, intended and unintended impacts should be distinguished. Impacts should be specified by reference to the identified local dimension of *factors causing, triggering and aggravating tensions and conflicts*. Depending on the features of the project, the impacts identified should be attributed either to the project as a whole or to individual activities.

2.6 Conclusions and Recommendations

The final step is the general impact interpretation of all findings, which is facilitated by the use of the TCIA matrix explained below. It produces tension-related recommendations for the project's future concept and activities. The impact interpretation should

— aggregate the interpretation of the project impact in each category of factors causing, triggering and aggravating tensions to enable the dominant areas of project impact, both positive and negative, to be identified,

— identify the aggregate significance of the project impact, i.e. answer the question whether the project impact was one of the major or rather minor reasons for the development of tensions or conflicts observed,

— come to a conclusion on the aggregate tension and conflict impact of the project, thereby assessing how far the impact hypothesis can be verified,

— relate the aggregate tension and conflict impact of the project to the macro level, and tentatively draw conclusions on whether there may be cumulative or inconsistent effects of development cooperation measures as a whole in the country concerned.

3 The Research Approach: Methodological Instruments

This section describes the methodological instruments used in the TCIA approach, beginning with those used for the collection of data and then presenting the TCIA matrix as a tool for analysing the data.

3.1 Data Collection

As the study is explorative in nature, it adopts a qualitative methodological approach. To enable as many different views as possible to be assessed, a wide range of empirical methods combined with a large number of interviewees and resource persons is used. This is sometimes referred to as *triangulation*. The empirical methods are listed in the following:

— *Expert interviews*: Semi-structured interviews are conducted with experts on issues relevant to tensions and conflicts and to the development cooperation projects concerned. The experts are both people involved in the project (e.g. representatives of target groups, project staff, etc.) and people not involved in the project (e.g. academics, staff at the implementing organisation's headquarters). The aim of this differentiation is to gain as broad a picture as possible.

— *Expert workshops*: This method has comparative advantages in two ways. First, experts from different backgrounds should give rise to a dynamic discussion. This may reveal new aspects of the topic which the researchers have not previously considered. Second, it is a time-efficient method. The large quantity of information obtained makes it essential for the workshop to have good documentation. Who the experts are will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. A workshop attended by the project staff is highly recommended for every TCIA.

— *Secondary data*: statistics, literature, project documents.

— Elements of the *Participatory Rural Appraisal* (PRA) method:[53]

Transect walk: The research team observes aspects of the stakeholders' everyday life as a means of both gathering new information and verifying the quality of the interviews. By taking a walk through the village or fields, the team can also check whether the statements made during the interviews accord with its observations.

Group discussions: At village level in particular, group discussions are conducted with stakeholders with the focus on tensions which the stakeholders see as existing in the project region. It has to be decided on a case-by-case basis whether groups with opposing interests can be interviewed at the same time. The sample can be chosen either randomly or by systematically forming interview groups by reference to certain criteria, such as socio-economic background, gender and education. During the group discussions at village level trend lines should be drawn and impact tables compiled.[54]

Mapping and diagramming: Whether or not the researchers use graphic instruments as another participatory method depends on their creativity. Two visualising instruments which have proved helpful during group discussions are presented in the following.

Visualising tools at village level: trend lines and impact tables

Trend line: The trend line[55] shows the relative change in the perceived quality of peaceful relations over time (see Figure 2 below). It should cover a period of not more than 15 years or a few

years before the project was launched or before certain tensions arose. It should begin with an important event which can be easily remembered by all participants and may mark a change in their lives. The ranking of each year should be conducted in accordance with PRA rules, with one to five points being awarded to describe the initial situation in year X, followed by "better" or "worse", "much better" or "much worse", a comparison thus being made with the situation in the preceding year(s). While the line is being drawn and afterwards, a discussion on the determinants of "turning points" should be encouraged. This discussion should be as intense as possible, and different perceptions can be visualised with a second trend line (e.g. a different line for the perception of pastoralists as a subgroup). New indicators emerging from this discussion are included in the list of criteria. If possible, a forecast for the next few years should be added to give an impression of the villagers' perception of the future.

Methodologically, by drawing on the cumulative memories of the village people, the trend analysis compares the situation before the project with the situation during the project. It thus addresses the typical difficulties encountered in impact analysis, as shown in section III.1.1. The trend line seems particularly suitable for tension- and conflict-related topics, because – though considering peoples' *perceptions*, which are subjective views and cannot therefore be cross-checked – it genuinely reflects the subjectivity that characterises situations of potential tension or conflict.

Impact table: The impact table[56] links the project and its impacts to the socio-political situation of the village as perceived by the participants in the group discussion. The village people are asked to name all the activities they know form part of the project and then to gauge the relevance of these activities to their personal lives and to village life. Should the village not mention certain activities which seem important to the research team, they may be added, but marked separately. Each activ-

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53   For detailed information, see Neubert (1998); Pretty (1995); UNDP (1997a); Schönhuth/Kievelitz (1993).

54   See below.

55   The trend line has been adapted from Neubert's *Lebenslauflinie* (Neubert 1999). See also PRA tools like "time-lines", "historical profiles" and "time trends"; see, for example, Schönhuth/Kievelitz (1993), p. 62.

56   The impact table has been adapted from Neubert's *Aktivitätenliste* (Neubert 1999).

Figure 2:   Example of trend line: peaceful relations in village X

ity should now be related to the previously established indicators of peaceful village relations. The group should consider whether the project is having or has had an impact on social or political relations and, if so, what form this impact takes and whether they perceive it as being positive or negative (see Table 6).

3.2   Data Analysis: the TCIA Matrix

The TCIA matrix is the main analytical instrument used in this approach. It gives an overview of all tension and conflict impacts that can be identified during the research. It is designed as a chart structured along two lines:

Table 4: Impact table of project activities (example)		
Activity	**Relevance to village life (ranking)**	**Impacts on village life (comments)**
Activity 1	3	
Activity 2	1	
Activity 3	4	
Activity 4 (added by researchers)	2	

As the trend line is likely to connect project activities to socio-political events or processes more easily in the minds of the village people, it is recommended that the trend line be used first and the impact table compiled later.

— First, it systematically groups all impacts in the *categories of factors causing, triggering, and aggravating tensions and conflicts* (see Table 7, vertical axis, columns 1-5). The categories are derived during the Tension and Conflict Analysis.

— Second, it shows all impacts according to the different perceptions of the relevant *stakeholders,*

Table 5: TCIA Matrix – Basic Sheet

General categories; factors causing, triggering, and aggravating tensions	More specific level of factors causing, triggering, and aggravating tensions	Local dimension	Perception of stakeholder 1: project staff				Stakeholder 2	Research team's observations	Interpretation
			Positive impact +		Negative impact –				
			Intended	Unintended	Intended	Unintended			
Socio-economic factors	Socio-economic disparities								
	Competition for natural resources								
	Inadequate satisfaction of basic needs								
	Other factors								
Socio-political and political constraints	Problems with managing transition and rapid change								
	Lack of legitimate government and good governance								
	Limited participation								
	Insufficient formal and informal channels of tension and conflict management								
	Limited institutional capacities								
	Social disintegration and separation								
	Exploitation of ethnic, cultural and other differences, and discrimination								
	Other factors								
Violence and insecurity	Uncontrolled military forces and arbitrary police action								
	Insufficient security								
	Legacy of violence								
	Other factors								
External sources	Negative consequences of international involvement								
	Negative consequences of the regional / international environment								
	Other factors								

including the research team's observations (horizontal axis). The data originate from the tension-related identification of project stakeholders and from the impact identification.

If necessary, impacts can be attributed to different project activities with the aid of other matrix sheets.

How to use the matrix

At the beginning of the research period the matrix is no more than a skeleton chart whose axes and sheets need to be further specified:

— The local dimension and dynamics of factors causing, triggering and aggravating tension that are found in the tension analysis (see section III.2.2) are entered vertically in column 4, specified according to the given categories (see section II.3).

— The relevant stakeholders identified in the stakeholder analysis (see section III.2.3) are listed horizontally.

The axes and the impact fields should be filled in step by step during the research process.

Explanations

The stakeholders' and research team's perceptions: As the various stakeholders may have different perceptions of the impact of the project, they are displayed separately. This also helps to reveal the possibly different impact on different stakeholders and to explain their role and importance in the final interpretation (see section III.2.6). The research team's observations should be included as a separate column to reflect the views of the knowledgeable outsider. Impacts that are not directly mentioned by stakeholders but are obvious to the researchers can be referred to here. It is necessary to separate stakeholders' perceptions and researchers' observations to ensure transparency.

Systematic grouping of impacts: Entering each impact under one specific determinant of the tension or conflict situation makes it easier to assess the nature of this impact: is it a short-term or long-term impact? Does it contribute to an already vulnerable socio-political situation? Equally, any possible proactive measure that the project may want to take can then be better planned and managed.

Interpretation: The last column is used for a summary and assessment of the aggregate impact in each category of causes. It considers the different impact perceptions of all stakeholders and should then answer three questions: is the aggregate impact positive or negative? Is it significant or not? Does it support the general trend or not?

General remarks

The matrix is not an instrument for the quantitative assessment of data. It provides a detailed overview that facilitates the complex qualitative analysis of a project's impact. To this end, it is advisable to give a short explanation for each matrix field to enable third parties to follow and evaluate the final impact assessment. Many matrix fields and even local dimensions of factors that cause, trigger and aggravate tensions are likely to remain blank. This is part of the systematic approach and should not be taken to mean that information is missing.

IV   Analysis of the Socio-political Impact of German Development Cooperation: Case Study of Tanzania

This chapter presents a case study of Tanzania and two projects assisted by German development cooperation in the country. A broad analysis of the socio-political tensions and the profile of ongoing German development cooperation activities in Tanzania at macro level (section IV.1) is followed by a discussion of the Tension and Conflict Impact Analysis of two development cooperation

Map 1:   Tanzania: Regional boundaries

Source: Huwe (1997). Modified by CWG Tanzania.

projects: the Handeni Integrated Agroforestry Project (section IV.2) and the Kagera Environmental Project (section IV.3).

These projects were selected because they satisfied the criteria that the projects examined should (i) be examples of a priority area of German development activities and (ii) present different situations of socio-political tension.

(i)   The two projects have a common background in that both concern resource management and rehabilitation, which is a priority area of

German development cooperation in Tanzania and other developing countries.

(ii)   While the socio-political dimension of tensions in the HIAP emerged gradually during the implementation of the project, potential tensions had already existed before the KEP was launched. In the case of the HIAP the type of project (land use) is the criterion for conducting the TCIA; for the KEP it is the nature of the political environment (area affected by refugees).

1 National Background

The aim of this section is to present background information on Tanzania by identifying socio-political tensions (section IV.1.1), describing the German development cooperation profile (section IV.1.2) and providing an overview of the impact of German development cooperation on macro-level tensions (section IV.1.3).

1.1 Potential for Socio-political Tensions in Tanzania

Since Tanganyika and Zanzibar joined in 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania, the country has been considered a unique case of political stability in the conflict-driven region of East Africa.[57] In Rwanda genocide has been committed, in Burundi there is "ethnically motivated" confrontation and persecution. Similarly, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda have suffered from civil and/or international wars. In this context, the stability not only of Tanzania internally but also of its relations with its neighbours is extraordinary. During the last four decades Tanzania has developed into a nation unifying more than 120 different tribes[58] without facing open conflict. In the 1990s the transition from a one-party to a multi-party system and from socialism to a market-oriented economic system was initiated. Although these transitions have formally been completed, the former ruling party, the CCM (*Chama cha Mapinduzi*, Party of the Revolution), still plays a dominant role in politics without being seriously challenged by an opposition, especially in rural areas of the mainland.

Today Tanzania's socio-political situation is under strain in several respects. Seven major areas of tension can be identified:[59] (i) recent developments in Zanzibar, challenging both its internal stability and its relationship with the mainland, (ii) the consequences of rapid economic change, (iii) the rise of social identification along religious and ethnic lines, (iv) corruption, (v) shortcomings in the state's discharge of national responsibilities, (vi) the consequences of the restructuring of land tenure under the 1998 land law and (vii) the instability of the East African region, resulting in a substantial flow of refugees into Tanzania.

(i) Zanzibar

Tensions exist both within Zanzibar and between Zanzibar and mainland Tanganyika.

Within Zanzibar, tensions increased in the late 1990s. Zanzibar mainly consists of two islands: Pemba in the North and Unguja in the South, the latter often being called Zanzibar and having the capital city, also known as Zanzibar. Tension in Zanzibar exists largely in the relationship between the two main islands. The inhabitants of Pemba feel neglected by the Zanzibari government on the island of Unguja; this attitude is consistent with a long tradition of ethnic conflict patterns. According to international observers, the polls in 1995 were badly rigged, which further damaged Zanzibar's integrity. The Civic United Front (CUF), which is mainly represented on Pemba, refused to takes its seats in the parliament. Fraud has prompted most donor countries – including the European Union and its Member States – to suspend development cooperation or confine it to the completion of current projects in Zanzibar.

Human rights violations in Zanzibar have increased since the 1995 elections. Journalists are intimidated, and government security forces allegedly use violence against political opponents. Eighteen CUF members of parliament have been imprisoned without trial on charges of high treason. The suppression of the opposition's participation in politics through the violation of basic human rights has increased to such an extent that in

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57 For an overview see Rabehl (ed.) (1999), pp. 17-30.

58 For further details see Ofcansky/Yeager (1997), pp. 145-148.

59 For detailed information on Tanzania's socio-political development see Fengler (1997); Halfani & Nzomo (1995); Hofmeier (1993) and (1997); Costello (1999);

Mair (1999), pp. 8-18, 23-24, 50-51;.Ofcansky/Yeager (1997).

1998 such donor countries as Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden were prompted to make the continuation of development cooperation subject to certain conditions.

The internal instability of the situation in Zanzibar is also a threat to the union with the mainland. Options ranging from dissolving Zanzibar's government to granting it greater autonomy or even complete sovereignty have long been under discussion. Since the 1995 elections even a divided Zanzibar has seemed a possible scenario.

(ii) Consequences of rapid economic change

The introduction of a market-oriented economy has exacerbated the economic differentiation of the Tanzanian people. During the period of Nyerere's *Ujamaa* socialism the income disparities were relatively insignificant. These disparities have now increased, and the population is becoming increasingly divided into 'haves' and 'have-nots'. This is true not only of individuals within a region but also of the various regions. While Kilimanjaro and Tanga Regions, for example, are performing relatively well, Kagera, Kigoma and Lindi Regions face serious economic problems. This tendency has been aggravated by a high population growth rate of 3.1 % p.a. (1980-1997), which has increased the pressure on scarce economic resources.

(iii) The rise of social identification along religious and ethnic lines[60]

Tanzania managed to unify more than 120 tribes in one nation without facing open conflict. In this Julius Nyerere's broader vision of an East African Union played a decisive role. Today, however, there appears to be a growing tendency among the

Tanzanian people to divide along religious and ethnic lines. This has been due to the introduction of a market-oriented economy, increasing regional disparities, the adoption of a multi-party system and the strong influence of the Arab world not only in Zanzibar but also on the mainland.

The unification of the various tribes in Tanzania's early history was partly state-imposed. The villigisation that formed part of the concept of *Ujamaa* socialism gathered Tanzanians from different ethnic backgrounds in new villages, forcing many of them had to leave the land they had previously lived on. The reasoning behind villigisation was that it would make it easier for central government to provide such social services as education and health care. What was disregarded was that some of the people might have had other preferences, such as good access to farmland. The fact that many Tanzanians left the new villages after the *Ujamaa s*ystem was abandoned shows that the villigisation concept was not sustainable.

Besides economic differentiation, the multi-party system has enabled the Tanzanian people to articulate their interests by forming political parties. Although this has increased political participation considerably, it has also made the fragmentation of the population more obvious. The smaller parties in particular may tend to gear their political aims to religious and ethnic criteria. In many cases they are also heavily dependent on the funding of a few individuals, who usually occupy crucial positions in the party.

Arab influence is gaining momentum both in Zanzibar and on the mainland. There are tensions between Christians and Muslims and between different groups within the Muslim section of the population. By investing foreign capital in Tanzania, such Islamic countries as Oman are also gaining socio-political influence. This may have encouraged a trend towards religious fundamentalism among both Muslims and Christians. Further tensions exist within the Muslim section of the population. Moderate Muslims who support Tanzania as a secular state are opposed to Islamic radicals, who favour a religious state.

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60 The information for this section was derived mainly from the symposium "Tanzania Revisited – Political Stability, Aid Dependency and Development Constraints" held at the *Institut für Afrikakunde*, Hamburg, 22-23 October 1999.

(iv) Corruption[61]

Corruption has increased since the government dropped its socialist economic approach and became market-oriented. In 1999 Transparency International ranked Tanzania 93rd, six from the bottom. At the Consultative Group Meeting held in Paris in May 1999 under the auspices of the World Bank the Tanzanian government presented a holistic approach to fighting corruption. Tanzania's main aims are to increase transparency and to establish or strengthen such institutions as the Prevention of Corruption Bureau. However, the fight against corruption has so far had little success because of ineffectiveness and resistance at all levels of the judicial system. Confidence in the Tanzanian judiciary and law enforcement agencies has fallen sharply. Along with a rising crime rate, growing reports of mob justice show that Tanzanians are taking the law into their own hands. Thus, owing to the lack of confidence in the country's social, economic and political institutions, corruption is rapidly leading to the disintegration of Tanzanian society.

(v) Shortcomings in the state's discharge of national responsibilities[62]

The Tanzanian state is today hampered in the discharge of its responsibilities by weak structures and severe budget constraints. This has led to social tensions, particularly in the areas of education and health. Fees have been introduced both for health services and for school attendance, driving a further wedge between the poorest sections of the population and the rest. Development aid plays an important role in this context. Many international donors are trying to improve school attendance and health services. In addition, some foreign donors are supplying security forces to the areas bordering Burundi and Rwanda among other regions. The Tanzanian state is incapable of en-

suring security because of the major influence of the political situation in neighbouring countries. Development agencies are thus assuming some of the state's responsibilities. Some major tasks are being externalised.

(vi) Consequences of the restructuring of land tenure[63]

As land is one of the main productive factors in Tanzania, the enforcement of the 1998 land law, which extensively restructures land tenure in Tanzania, has caused disputes among various stakeholders. Customary law does not regard land as property. Unlike the new law, it grants no more than the right to use land. As many farmers are not well informed about their new rights, they are sometimes not even aware that they will need a title deed to be able to farm land in the future. Even where farmers do know about the new situation, high transaction costs due to cumbersome administration and corruption impede them in their efforts to obtain land titles.

Disputes over land between different stakeholders – pastoralists and farmers, smallholders and large-scale farmers, villages and the national administration, individuals and local government, etc. – do occur. Since the Tanzanian economy was restructured in accordance with the principles of a market-oriented economy, large-scale investors both from within the country and from abroad have obtained title deeds to considerable amounts of land, and demand is still high. In combination with the constantly low productivity of small-scale farming and the high population growth rate this is resulting in the continuous expansion of farmland. This trend is having a significant effect on pastoralists, who are changing their traditional way of life. Their grazing land is shrinking as farmland expands and game reserves and national

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61   See United Republic of Tanzania (1995); United Republic of Tanzania (1999); World Bank (1998) and (1999b).

62   See Rugumamu (1997); Klemp (1997); Mair (1999), pp. 23-24; Helleiner (1999).

63   See Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (1994); Ndagala (1996); Sundet (1996); Oppen (1996); Coldham (1995).

parks are established or enlarged.[64] Furthermore, as population growth among pastoralists is high, the grazing land available per capita is dwindling at an even faster pace. While pastoralists used to do no more than keep livestock, many now grow crops as well, either for sale or for their own consumption.

Given the importance of land and the increasing pressure on it, the new law provides new opportunities for its more efficient use; at the same time, it is a major source of tension and a challenge for the judicial system.

(vii) Instability of the East African region

The political instability of the East African region, which reached its peak in the genocide in Rwanda, has had a serious impact on Tanzania.[65] The unrest in such neighbouring countries as Burundi has caused hundreds of thousands of refugees to cross the border into Tanzania and seek shelter in the camps supported by the UNHCR and other international organisations. External conflicts are having a major influence on Tanzania's internal situation through the refugees that result.

Tanzania has made some serious efforts to stabilise the region, its mediating role in the Burundi conflict being an outstanding example. By imposing economic sanctions, Burundi's neighbours forced the warring factions to join in peace negotiations. The negotiations were initiated by Tanzania's former President Nyerere, who also acted as a mediator during the talks.[66] Although the success of the negotiations was limited, they were an important step in stabilising the East African region.

1.2   Profile of German Development Cooperation with Tanzania

Volume and relative importance of German development cooperation with Tanzania[67]

Tanzania is one of the most important Sub-Saharan African recipients of German development aid. At annual disbursements of approximately US $ 50 million, Germany ranks sixth among Tanzania's bilateral donors (after Japan, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands).

The bulk of Germany's public disbursements are transferred by the GTZ and KfW.[68] Christian church-based organisations and most other German development institutions (e.g. the DED, the CIM and such political foundations as the FES, KAS, FNS, DEG and DSE) are working in Tanzania.

Tanzania's most important multilateral donors are the World Bank and the European Union, with a combined average annual contribution of approximately US $ 250 million from 1995 to 1999.

Tanzania has received an average annual total of some US $ 900 million in multi- and bilateral development aid in recent years. Almost one third

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64 Unlike farmers, pastoralists use grazing land only temporarily. How far they migrate depends on the intensity of the dry season. The less water there is, the further they have to take their livestock. This means that they may visit certain areas only once in several years. Farmers seeing this land unused most of the time may claim it for cultivation. Even if pastoralists obtain title deeds, the core problem is not solved, since the pastoralists need far too much land for their traditional way of keeping livestock. One solution might be to intensify the use of grazing land, by establishing cattle ranches, for example. Besides the ecological problems that might arise, this would lead to a significant change in the pastoralists' way of life.

65 See, for example, Nsengiyaremye/Gakusi (1998) and Sellström/Wohlgemuth (1996), pp. 59-66.

66 See Nyerere (1999), p. 15; see also Mair (1999), pp. 50-51.

67 See German Embassy Dar es Salaam (1999), pp. 17 - 19 and pp. 31 - 32.

68 German public bilateral disbursements consist of technical and financial cooperation. On average, technical cooperation accounts for 38 % and financial cooperation for 62 % of total disbursements.

Figure 3: **Bilateral and multilateral donors, disbursements in 1996 as percentages of the total**

Source: German Embassy Dar es Salaam (1999), p. 32

of the Tanzanian national budget is financed by donors. Figure 3 shows the relative importance of Tanzania's bi- and multilateral donors in 1996.

Main areas of activity[69]

Regional orientation

German development cooperation covers most of the administrative regions, though not to the same extent in all cases. Traditionally, German-Tanzanian cooperation has been particularly active in Tanga Region.[70]

Cooperation with Zanzibar is currently suspended; ongoing projects will be phased out. This is in line with EU development cooperation directives following human rights violations in Zanzibar. Further cooperation depends on progress being made

in this respect and on fair elections being held in 2000.

Sectoral orientation

In line with general conditions in Tanzania, German development cooperation is focused on poverty alleviation as its major objective. Besides direct poverty alleviation, special attention is paid to sustainable resource management, physical infrastructure, private-sector management and policy advice.

Current projects in the context of direct *poverty alleviation* are basic needs projects in the nutrition, health and education sectors. Examples are an integrated food security programme in one of Tanzania's poorest regions (Rukwa), an AIDS control project in Mbeya Region and a family health project in Tanga Region. Another important project in the promotion of social services is a cooperation project between Tanzanian Christian churches and government on the one hand and German Christian churches and public development funds on the other.

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69 See German Embassy Dar es Salaam (1999), pp. 19 - 21; BMZ (1998), pp. 7 - 9; KfW (1998).

70 See GTZ (1999a), pp. 12 - 30.

Resource management activities focus on renewable natural resources and account for the bulk of Germany's current technical cooperation activities. Examples are soil erosion and agroforestry projects in Tanga Region, for example, and an integrated pest management project in Shinyanga Region. Other important projects concern national parks and include conservation, game protection and buffer zone development measures.

The two projects discussed in section IV.2/3, the Handeni Integrated Agroforesty Project and the Kagera Environmental Project, are intended as resource management projects.

The contribution to *physical infrastructure* includes the establishment of an efficient road maintenance system, as in Kilimanjaro Region, water supply management and railway and energy projects.

Private-sector promotion measures include income-generating projects for small farmers and small-scale producers, examples being a small-scale enterprise and crafts promotion project and a vocational training project in Dar es Salaam. Assistance to private enterprises focuses on artisanal industries, crafts and trades, in Kilimanjaro Region, for instance.

Policy advice and policy dialogue are mainly focused on support for development-friendly conditions at macro level and for institution-building. East African Cooperation and the Tanzanian Revenue Authority are currently being promoted.

Future trends in German-Tanzanian development cooperation[71]

As Germany is currently facing serious budget restrictions, further concentration of development funds on a few selected sectors and main activities is planned. Sectoral dialogue and sector programmes are therefore gaining in significance. However, poverty alleviation remains the overrid-

ing objective. Some shifts in others sectors are listed below:

— *Activities likely to become less significant*: road sector, railway sector (apart from reconstruction and privatisation).

— *Activities likely to become more significant*: social services, water management, natural resource management, private-sector promotion (especially support for the financial sector), policy advice.

1.3   Overview: Possible Impact of German Development Cooperation on Macro-level Tensions

The aim of this section is to relate possible impacts of German development cooperation to potential areas of tension in Tanzania at macro level. The different areas of tension are examined one by one, possible positive and negative impacts being compared. Before the various tensions are considered, the German country policy paper on Tanzania will be briefly examined for the tensions to which it refers.

The German country policy paper on Tanzania[72] recognises the existence of three potential areas of tension: first, the overall situation in Zanzibar and its relationship with the mainland; second, the relationship between Christians and Muslims; third, the relationship between indigenous Africans and Tanzanians of Asian origin. Although the country policy paper acknowledges these tensions, it does not draw any conclusions on how to proceed at operational level in the circumstances. However, it would appear to be necessary under these conditions to take account of possible implications for the strategy of development cooperation with Tanzania.

The tensions acknowledged in the German country policy paper are either directly or indirectly included among the seven potential areas of tension in Tanzania identified in section IV 1.1. The

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71   See BMZ (1998), pp. 9 - 11.

72   BMZ (1998).

aim now is to relate them to possible impacts of development cooperation activities.

The recent developments in Zanzibar, threatening both internal stability and Zanzibar's relationship with the mainland: Most donor countries – including the European Union and its Member States – have suspended development cooperation with Zanzibar because the 1995 elections were rigged and human rights violations have been on the increase ever since. This may exert pressure on the government of Zanzibar to encourage a change of conduct. At least the government is not being strengthened. However, the current situation may also deteriorate because of the withdrawal of development cooperation personnel, since this may reduce opportunities for influencing government policies and political transparency in general.

Rapid economic change through the introduction of a market-oriented economy: Growing income disparities in Tanzanian society are apparent not only among individuals but also among regions. A balanced approach in development cooperation activities may help to mitigate short-term difficulties in society and promote long-term opportunities. Unbalanced operations, on the other hand, may intensify disparities.

Rise of social identification along religious and ethnic lines: In recent years identification along religious and ethnic lines has increased among the Tanzanian people. Such social identification is due to various factors, one being the growth of regional disparities. This being the case, the concentration of Germany's development cooperation activities in Tanga Region may either improve the situation if it uses its comparative advantages to reduce disparities or worsen the situation if it increases disparities. Furthermore, development cooperation which, by design or by accident, focuses on one ethnic or religious group may have a significant influence on the relationship between the group supported and other groups. In one way differences may be reduced and tensions between certain groups therefore limited. In another way tensions may be caused by a greater awareness of

an underprivileged status or the exacerbation of actual differences.

Clientelism and corruption: Clientelism and corruption in Tanzania have increased significantly in recent years. In this respect development cooperation – if appropriately designed – may have the positive effect of contributing to transparency and political openness. By the same token, clientele systems and corruption at all levels may be unwittingly encouraged if the inflow of resources is inadequate.

Shortcomings in the state's discharge of national responsibilities: The pressure on the Tanzanian state to take responsibility for the provision of basic social services with a view to preventing social unrest may be eased by the "internationalisation" of these tasks. Development cooperation in this area may act as an incentive to the government by paving the way. However, it may also help to delay necessary changes and so increase underlying social tensions.

Restructuring of land tenure: Given the importance of land as a productive resource in Tanzania, the restructuring of land tenure (through the enforcement of the 1998 land law) provides new opportunities on the one hand, while creating a major source of tension on the other. While enabling certain groups or whole communities through development activities to benefit from the new opportunities may make a major contribution to the reduction of poverty, an unbalanced approach in respect of the groups and/or communities supported may aggravate or create tensions.

The instability of the East African region, which has resulted in a substantial number of refugees fleeing to Tanzania: The many refugees fleeing to Tanzania, especially during the genocide in Rwanda, has at times led to a doubling of the population in some districts. A vast number of international, governmental and non-governmental humanitarian relief organisations are endeavouring to help the refugees. There is a strong possibility of negative impacts through "overaiding", i.e. initiating or encouraging the development of corrupt structures or unbalanced

approaches. On the positive side, if development cooperation is particularly sensitive to an environment characterised by tension, it may, as a long-term follow-up strategy, encourage the local population to maintain their acceptance of refugees. Conversely, an unbalanced approach may have an adverse effect.

2 Handeni Integrated Agroforestry Project (HIAP)

This section sets out to analyse the impact of the Handeni Integrated Agroforestry Project (HIAP) on tensions and conflicts. To this end, it follows the steps of the in-depth study described in section III.2.

At the end of the desk study in Berlin the following hypotheses were formulated:

1.   The HIAP is having a positive impact on the local tension situation by helping to improve communication and negotiation structures in the villages.

2.   Some project activities, e.g. the construction of reservoirs, are having adverse effects on the tension situation.

2.1 Description of the Project Region and the Project

This part of the chapter describes the region in which the HIAP is located and the main features of the project itself.

Profile of the district/project region

(i) Natural resources, environmental degradation and physical infrastructure

Handeni District is located in Tanga Region north of Dar es Salaam and covers an area of approximately 14,000 km². The project region is located in the west of the district and covers an area of

5,800 km², equivalent to 41 % of the area of the district. It can be divided into four ecological zones:

—   the semi-arid zones, west of the Nguru mountains, bordering Masai land; they are 1,200 m above sea level and receive less than 600 mm of annual rainfall,

—   the slopes of the Nguru mountains, up to 1,400 m, with annual rainfall between 800 and 1,000 mm,

—   the hilly plateau in the east of the mountains, with annual rainfall of up to 800 mm,

—   the southernmost parts of the Masai Steppe, which cover the north of the project region.

The condition of some of the roads in the project area is very poor, especially during the rainy season. Villages located in hilly areas, such as Kilindi, may then be virtually cut off from the rest of the region.

(ii) Social structure

According to the latest population census, conducted in 1988, Handeni District then had a population of 251,855, a population density of 18 inhabitants/km² and an annual growth rate of 3.1 %.[73] Immigration into the district accounts for a large proportion of the growth. At a growth rate of 3.1 %, the population of the district will have risen to some 363,000 in 2000, resulting in a population density of 26 inhabitants/km². Compared to other regions, such as Kilimanjaro, the population density is still low. The population is unevenly distributed, being concentrated in the areas best suited to agriculture.[74] The project region has a population of 180,000 people[75], the main ethnic groups settled there being the Wazigua and Wanguu (predominantly farmers) and

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73   Huwe reports population growth of 3.5 %. Huwe (1997), p. 2.

74   See Ndagala (1999).

75   See GTZ (1999).

Map 2:   Handeni District and the HIAP project area

Source: HIAP Documentation (2000). Modified by CWG Tanzania

the Masai (Ilparakuyo and Kisongo, predominantly pastoralists).[76]

(iii) Economic structure

The main income-generating activities of the people in the project region largely depend on the traditions of the various groups and on how and how far the land can be used. The rural population grow crops and keep livestock primarily for subsistence. Land used to generate incomes in the project region can be divided into three categories, agricultural land, grazing land and forest.

— Agriculture in the district is undertaken mostly by sedentary small-scale farmers, the Wanguu and Wazigua.[77] Their main agricultural products are maize, beans, yams, sweet potatoes, sugar cane, tobacco, fruit, and vegetables.[78] For the most part, they practise shifting cultivation, clearing unused land to cultivate it for four or five years and then moving on. Land previously cultivated needs enough time to regenerate before it is cleared again.

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76   See Ndagala (1999).

77   Some farmers also keep livestock on a small scale, usually as a source of income to complement farming. The livestock is always kept close to the permanent settlement; the Wanguu and Wazigua do not migrate to find grazing land.

78   See Mitzlaff (1988), p. 34.

Any reduction in the land available for agriculture will threaten the sustainability of this system. Maps show that the 1980s and 1990s in particular saw a massive expansion in land under cultivation, which indicates that the pressure on land as a natural resource will increase even further in the future, given the high population growth rate.[79] The expansion of cultivated land has already had an effect on the pastoralists. While they were fairly evenly distributed in the area in the 1960s, they now tend to concentrate on the dwindling amount of land still unused by agriculture.

— Grazing land is predominant in the northern and western parts of the project area. The villages in these areas and their surroundings, where there is little or no permanent water, have rainy-season pastures. The slopes of the adjoining highlands are used for dry-season pasture, but are also popular with farmers because of their permanent water sources. The distribution of grazing herds in the area depends on the total amount and distribution of annual rainfall.

In the context of this study, it is important to note that the seasonal movements of grazing herds between the rainy and dry seasons *"cross systematically and everywhere village boundaries of nearly all villages within the project area."*[80] The Masai, the main group of pastoralists in the project region, are semi-nomadic. They move to distant areas only when the dry season is extremely long and their herds cannot survive near their settlements. Otherwise, their livestock, which largely consists of cattle, goats and sheep, graze close enough to the settlements for the Masai to return to their villages every night.[81] The Masai are increasingly cultivating parts of their land in reaction to the shrinking amount of land available per capita.

— Outside the forest reserves there is forest to which the people have access and which they use for different purposes. Firewood and mushrooms are collected and used for domestic and commercial purposes. Timber is cut for construction. High population growth, deforestation and increased commercial harvesting exceed the forest's regeneration capacity.

(iv) Political and administrative structure

The district administration represents the regional administration, which in turn represents the national administration. The district administration is headed by the District Commissioner (DC), who is appointed by the President of the Republic. Each district is split into several divisions, which are overseen by division administrations. The political structure does not have any institutions at division level. Below the administrative division level there are wards, which consist of several villages, with each village comprising a number of hamlets.

Profile of development cooperation activities in the region

The HIAP is the most important development cooperation project in terms of financial commitment in the project region. Other development activities include the following:

— *World Vision International*: This Christian NGO operates throughout the district, although it is far more active in the eastern part, where it is the most important donor, than in the western part. With poverty alleviation as its objective, it builds social and physical infrastructure (schools, clinics, dispensaries, reservoirs) and distributes seed to farmers.

— *World Food Programme (WFP)*: The programme finances Food for Development (FFD) activities in the district during periods of food shortages. It is run from Dar es Salaam and implemented at field level by the HIAP in the western part of the district and by World Vision International in the eastern part. Cooperation with other donors was pre-

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79   See Huwe (1997), p. 8.

80   Huwe (1997), p. 18.

81   See Mitzlaff (1988), p. 29.

ferred to the use of governmental structures for the implementation of FFD projects.

— *DIAP (Diocesan Integrated Agroforestry Project Kwediboma)*: This NGO, which is associated with the Anglican Church, finances credits for investment in dairy cattle.

— *Handeni Development Association (HADEA)*: This NGO organises self-help activities, e.g. road construction.

— *Pentecoste Church*: This church is active in the health sector and supplies food at times of shortages.

Profile of the project

(i) Background

The project was initiated by the Tanga regional authorities and the Handeni District Council as another development project assisted by the GTZ (TIRDEP – Tanga Integrated Rural Development Programme) was phased out. The initiators were prompted to ask the German government for support mainly by the degradation of natural resources in the project region (soil, forest and water), which is threatening the income-generating activities of the rapidly growing population. The District Executive Director (DED) acts as the main executive partner and institutional counterpart of the GTZ, which is implementing the project on behalf of the German government.

(ii) Objective and target groups

The overall goal of the project is to increase agricultural productivity and to reduce the degradation of natural resources in the south-western part of Handeni District. The long-term objective is to make it easier for the villagers to manage and plan the use of their natural resources.

The target groups of the project are the sedentary farmers and semi-nomadic pastoralists and include the villagers, men and women, who are increasingly organised in community-based organisations and committees.

(iii) Description

The project began in January 1992 with an orientation phase that lasted until June 1994. The objective in this phase was to develop an integrated agroforestry concept and a participatory approach of consultation and implementation in chosen villages in two ecological zones and to test them for implementation. In the second phase (implementation phase: July 1994 – August 1997) the aim was to improve the project activities and to extend them to other villages. Furthermore, the concept of participatory land use planning was developed and implemented in 13 villages. During the following phase (consolidation phase: September 1997 – December 2000) the concept of participatory land use planning is to be further improved and introduced in 52 villages in the project area as the basis for further resource management activities. The final phase, during which no German staff will be permanently on site, will last another two years and is primarily intended to ease the withdrawal of German development cooperation from the project. The project is thus designed to run for 11 years at a total cost of DM 13.3 million. The German share of this sum is DM 13 million.

The HIAP's main activities and their chronological order are described in the following:

1. The HIAP begins its operational activities at village level by conducting a *participatory, gender-specific situation analysis*. This analysis covers all topics raised by the villagers, whether or not resource-related, and is the basis for cooperation between the implementing organisations and the villagers. The aim is to analyse existing and potential problems in the village and to develop specific approaches to resolving the problems identified. A situation analysis always ends with the drawing up of a resolution on the future plans of the village, which has to be ratified by the village government. Where an important issue concerning natural resources is identified, the village begins the process of land use planning.

2. *Land use planning process:* A Village Land Use Planning Committee (VLUPC) is formed. It is usually attached to the village government. During this phase of the land use planning process the HIAP provides a considerable amount of expertise and hardware for the *collection of technical data on available resources*. For this, local subject matter specialists (SMS) use high technology equipment, such as global positioning systems and geographical information systems. The technical data are processed, together with the interests of the village as identified in the situation analysis, at an *issue-based workshop*. This process is completed with the development of a land use plan, on which the villagers have to agree. As a rule, *by-laws* are needed to ensure the implementation of the plan. The HIAP offers to help with the formulation of by-laws.

3. *Support during the implementation of the plans:* The HIAP supports the villages during the implementation of the land use plans both by supplying materials and by providing training on issues related to the use of natural resources. The supply of materials can range from the financing of signs to indicate different land uses to the financing of up to 60 % of the cost of the construction of reservoirs. The HIAP also implements food security measures, such as training in the construction of storage facilities, and promotes leadership through its main training activities, which are the *training of the Village Land Use Planning Committees* in matters relating to natural resources (e.g. watershed management, crop diversification) and the *training of "para-professionals"*, whose task it is to disseminate their knowledge of land uses in their hamlets.

Besides this approach at village level, the HIAP promotes *intersectoral planning and coordination at district level*, the district authorities concerned being briefed on land use planning methods.[82]

The HIAP has decentralised its activities by creating four zones and delegating major responsibilities to zonal staff in order to increase efficiency. Each zone consists of several wards. Zone No 3, which includes the villages of Mkindi and Lengusero, has been exempted from operational project activities because of budget cuts.

(iv) The HIAP's output

Table 6: The HIAP's output (February 2000)	
Indicator	**Achieved**
Number of villages where participatory situation analyses have been conducted and ratified by village assembly.	33
Number of villages where Land Use Planning Committees (LUPCs) have been set up and their members trained in LUP, soil and water conservation measures and their specific duties as LUPC members	31
Number of land use plans which have been developed by participatory means, accord with principles of watershed management, include approaches to resolving land use conflicts and have been ratified by the village assembly	23
Number of para-professionals trained in land use issues	> 500
Source: GTZ (2000).	

(v) Outlook

When the project was planned in the early 1990s, its completion was scheduled for the end of 2000, with an ensuing two-year phasing-out period. Despite this, the latest GTZ Project Progress Review recommends the continuation of major HIAP activities beyond 2000 because *"a considerable amount of conceptual and strategic activities are still necessary to sustain achievements of the HIAP project. Additionally, further activities to increase capacity of staff on district level are still needed."*[83]

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82 For a general overview of land use planning issues and methods see FAO/UNEP (1999) and GTZ (1998f).

83 GTZ (2000).

Empirical research

The research team spent five weeks in the project region. During the first week it conducted interviews, mainly with project staff, and visited two villages in the project region both to obtain information to supplement that contained in the project documentation and to become familiar with local conditions. The team also participated in an exposure trip organised by the HIAP to Arusha Region, where it had an opportunity to meet pastoralists with land use problems similar to those facing the pastoralists in the project region. Because of the time constraint and as the qualitative approach favours in-depth research rather than a large sample, four villages were chosen for the application of the TCIA approach in accordance with the following criteria with a view to obtaining as broad a picture as possible:

— the proportion of socio-political stakeholders should vary significantly in the villages,

— different agro-ecological zones of the project region should be represented,

— the land use planning process in the villages should have reached different stages,

— the issue of title deeds and boundary demarcation should be reflected in the sample,

— the intensity of project activities (number of activities, financial or material contribution) should vary significantly.

The following villages were therefore included in the sample:

— Kibirashi: located in the west of the project region, with a population composed of farmers and pastoralists. The land use planning process had been completed, and the HIAP was very active with implementation supporting measures.

— Kilindi: located in the south-west of the project region and inhabited only by farmers. The land use planning process had been completed, and the pressure on land from outside the village was said to be extremely high.

— Lengusero: located in the north of the project region, its population consisting solely of pastoralists. Without initiating the land use planning process, the HIAP had supported the construction of a reservoir.

— Mkindi: bordering Lengusero Village to the south, its population consisting largely of farmers. The HIAP had so far conducted only a situation analysis.

The socio-political situations in Mkindi and Lengusero are so closely linked that they will be considered as one case in the Tension and Conflict Impact Assessment.

2.2   Tension and Conflict Analysis

The tension and conflict analysis for the HIAP project region will follow the six steps outlined in section III.2.2. It is based on the field research findings and on such project documents as consultancy studies and review missions.[84]

(i) Description of tensions and conflicts in the project region (micro-level tensions)

This section describes three kinds of tension identified in the project region, all of which are mainly due to competition for natural resources: first, tensions between farmers and pastoralists over natural resource use; second, tensions between and within villages over local boundaries; third, potential for tension between villagers and newcomers over access to resources, especially land.

Tensions between farmers and pastoralists: natural resource use

The first kind of tension in the project region concerns the use of natural resources. Farming and pastoralism (herding) are the main rivals for natu-

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84 For the following, see Oppen et al. (1992); Ndagala (1999); Moono (1999).

ral resources. Both professional groups, farmers and pastoralists, depend on land and water.

While farmers often complain about losses of seed, crops and harvests caused by cattle damaging their fields, pastoralists accuse farmers of taking land which they have traditionally used. The search for water in the dry season often heightens tensions between the two groups. Pastoralists in search of water and grazing land use tracks to gain access to water points (traditional water holes, reservoirs, etc.) and to traditional dry-season grazing land. This often entails moving cattle across several village boundaries. Cattle tracks and water points are trouble spots, since cattle crossing the boundaries in search of food, for example, may destroy fields under cultivation.

On the other hand, pastoralists claim that during the dry season farmers venture on to grazing land left by pastoralists when they moved their cattle to dry-season grazing land. On returning to the rainy-season grazing areas, pastoralists may find that they have been partly cleared by fire and that cultivation has begun. In one case it was reported was that a farmer had tried to fake crops on a cattle track so that he might demand compensation from pastoralists for the damage done.

An example of violence erupting because of this tension is to be found in the village of Kibirashi. In 1999 pastoralists and farmers confronted each other after cattle had entered a field. The result was several people injured and the intervention of the police and the district authorities.

Tensions between and within villages: local boundaries

The second kind of tension in the project region concerns local boundaries. Tension of this kind has arisen both between and within villages. The main cause is competition for natural resources in areas where boundaries are disputed, since they are often poorly marked and maps and documents do not exist or, conversely, because there have been several demarcation processes in the past four decades, supervised from different administrative levels. In one case, inconsistent boundaries

between two villages even affected relations between Handeni District and the adjoining district (Kiteto).[85]

Tensions between villages often occur when the use of natural resources, e.g. a river or a reservoir, is in question. In some cases, lucrative resources include timber and game. There is also the question of the village government to which a hamlet near village boundaries should pay its taxes. Since the introduction of land title deeds for villages, village governments are beginning rather hesitantly to survey and define boundaries which have often been unclear, mainly because of the absence of precise markings, maps and documents.[86] Interpretations may differ from one village to another, causing tensions among their inhabitants, especially if there are natural resources in the disputed area. This is especially true of the Mbugoi valley (north-west Handeni District), where pastoralists have built a reservoir in cooperation with the HIAP.[87]

Tensions within villages may concern internal boundaries and can affect relations among villagers and between villagers and their village leaders. Boundaries within a village may be disputed, and even the allocation of land for different uses may cause tension.[88] Tensions within a village may also occur between different communities where one community announces its intention of registering a separate, new village. Tensions between villagers and their village leaders occur when there are allegations of corruption, e.g. when a village chairman is accused of being bribed by a neighbouring village to recognise its claim.

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85 Source: interview with Kimoleta, R. K., DED Handeni, 22 March 2000.

86 Currently, only 22 villages in Handeni District have a village title deed. Source: interview with Kimoleta, R. K., DED Handeni, 22 March 2000.

87 See Moono (1999).

88 Source: Interview with Heile, H.-J., Team Leader, and Lüneburg, B., Technical Advisor, GTZ Handeni, 24 February 2000, Handeni.

Potential for tensions between villagers and newcomers: access to natural resources, especially land

A third potential source of tension in the project region is access to natural resources, especially land. Compared to other districts in Tanzania, land pressure in Handeni is still low, but expected to rise with population growth due to high fertility and immigration from other districts. Newcomers consist mainly of families immigrating from other districts where land pressure is higher, individual big investors and large agricultural companies. The potential for tensions between villagers and newcomers is still of minor importance in the project region.

(ii) Analysis of factors causing, triggering and aggravating tensions and conflicts

In this step the factors that cause, trigger and aggravate the three kinds of tension in the HIAP region are analysed. Using the factors outlined in section II.3, it is decided which of these factors are causing, which are triggering and which are aggravating tensions. To determine the nature of the tension situation, conclusions are drawn from the local dimension of the abstract factors mentioned in the TCIA matrix. Detailed *findings of the empirical research can to be found in Annex C 2.*

A socio-economic factor, competition for natural resources*,* is the major cause of all three kinds of tension. The most important natural resources, land and water, are interrelated: land that receives abundant supplies of water or has natural or man-made water sources is particularly valuable. Both land and water are becoming scarcer because of population pressure. In addition, a deterioration in water quality may be caused by increasing use of and damage to the environment.

Other natural resources are timber and game, especially in forest reserves, game reserves and areas where game is controlled. Compared to land and water, these natural resources are of minor importance as regards tensions between villages

over local boundaries and potential tensions between villagers and newcomers over access to natural resources.

(iii) Analysis of actors in the tension and conflict situation

Tensions between farmers and pastoralists: natural resource use

The main actors in situations of tension over natural resource use are farmers and pastoralists. Other actors include village governments, Handeni District and the HIAP.

Main actor 1: Farmers: Subsistence farmers are in the majority in most of the project area. Their main interest in the tension situation is to secure existing fields and to extend cultivation, primarily by clearing new areas and planting crops. Farmers see themselves above all as members of the ethnic Wanguu and Wazigua groups, who are considered to be closely linked and "friends".[89] Ethnic groups of newcomers include Wasambara, who are also regarded as being closely linked, with the result that intermarriage is common and more newcomers from this ethnic group are being invited to settle in Handeni. Most farmers are Muslims, but traditional beliefs are still important. Some villages in the project area, such as Kilindi and Negero, are almost entirely composed of Wanguu or Wazigua farmers. In other villages, there is a pastoralist minority.

Main actor 2: Pastoralists: Most pastoralists belong to the Parakuyo and Kisongo sub-groups of the Masai people. Their main interest in the tension situation is to secure their dry- and rainy-season grazing areas, access to these areas along cattle tracks and access to water sources, formerly traditional wells, but also, increasingly, pumped water and small reservoirs. After the establishment of a new Masai village (Lengusero) in the 1990s, the Masai have shown a hesitant, but noticeable tendency to want to form their own vil-

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89   Group discussion in Kilindi village, 14 March 2000.

lage entities with a view to securing their areas.[90] As Masai feel that farmer-biased village governments discriminate against them in disputes over natural resource use, they also hope to increase their political participation by registering new villages.

Most Masai live on the western and north-western fringes of Handeni District, where there are villages, e.g. Saunyi or Lengusero, that consist exclusively of Masai. In most other villages, Kibirashi, for example, the Masai form a minority group, usually living in a number of adjacent Masai hamlets, close to the grazing land for their cattle. Pastoralists in Handeni, compared to other districts in Tanzania, are still heavily dependent on livestock. A mix of farming and livestock activities is still in its infancy, but becoming more prevalent among pastoralists. Some are, for example, beginning to cultivate small fields on their grazing land. M*ost Parakuyo are Christians, but such traditional aspects of the Masai lifestyle as the initiation of various age groups and polygamy still prevail.*

Table 9 provides an overview of the main actors in tensions over natural resource use:

Table 7: Main actors in the HIAP project area: land use groups, ethnic and religious composition		
Pastoralists	Mixed land use	**Farmers**
Masai (Parakuyo and Kisongo)	Wanguu / Wazigua	
Mainly Christians	Mainly Muslims	

The relatively small group of mixed land users includes both Masai and Wanguu or Wazigua. This group has been mentioned as a possible "connector" in the tension situation, meaning that it is especially interested in resolving conflicts of interest cooperatively.[91]

Other actors: village governments, district authorities and the HIAP: Village governments are also important actors in tension situations, since it is their task to resolve any conflicts of interest brought to their notice and to agree on procedures for settling them, e.g. by-laws. District authorities have to intervene in some cases of tensions, mediating or deciding on conflicts of interest. The HIAP actively helps with the formulation of by-laws and the identification and demarcation of different land use areas. It also tries to support pastoralists in finding new ways of organizing livestock management.

Tensions between and within villages: local boundaries

Main actors: villages, and especially village governments and other leaders: Tensions between and within villages are primarily tensions between village and community leaders interested in finding the best possible solutions for their villages. In the special case of Mkindi, this tension is summed up in the phrase "*there are two governments in this village*", the explanation being that Lengusero's chairman still lives in Mkindi.[92] Village boundaries can be defined by legal means – e.g. by surveying a village and obtaining a title deed from the Ministry of Lands – or by political means – e.g. by persuading district authorities to decide in favour of one village rather than another. Securing the largest possible amount of land for a village is especially important, given the growing number of potential outside investors.

Other actors: district authorities and the HIAP, national authorities: District authorities intervene when boundary issues cannot be solved by villages themselves. The HIAP supports the mediation and other activities of the district authorities, sometimes by providing mediators from its staff. On the other hand, district authorities can draw new boundaries by dividing one village into several villages for political or other reasons. Such

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90   Interview with Mwarabu, A. O.: Staff member of Masai NGO *Imusot e Purka*, 12 March 2000.

91   See Oppen et al. (1992).

92   Source: group discussion in Mkindi village, 1 March 2000.

national authorities as the Ministry of Lands also have a say in boundary issues.

Potential for tensions between villagers and newcomers: access to natural resources, especially land

Main actors 1: Villagers: As actors in a potential tension situation, villagers may have an interest in preventing newcomers from using village resources. This may take the form of protests, boycotts or even threats against newcomers. Different villagers may also have other, different interests and leverage in this potential tension situation, depending on the advantages or disadvantages resulting from the presence of newcomers in the village and on the villagers' social position and influence.

Main actors 2: Newcomers: Village newcomers have an interest in gaining access to resources so that they may engage in small- or large-scale farming. While small farmers may be more easily accepted in villages because their fields are of a more acceptable size, their leverage is limited. On the other hand, big investors may cause problems by encroaching on large amounts of fertile land. They may therefore disrupt the organization of access to natural resources and also have greater leverage through the employment and other opportunities they provide for villagers. In Kilindi it was said that big investors can "buy support".

Other actors: village governments, district authorities, national authorities and the HIAP (partly): Village governments are important actors because it is their duty to decide on the allocation of land to newcomers. Their interest should be the common interest of the village, but there are many cases of members of village governments "selling" land as if they personally owned it, without consulting their fellow members.

Apart from mediating in such possible tensions, district and also national authorities endeavour to direct newcomers to selected villages, an example being Masai evicted from other areas of Tanzania, who are to be settled in Handeni at the Prime Minister's request.

To some extent, the HIAP can be considered as an actor in such conflicts of interest, since its personnel are conscious of problems resulting from land grabbing and so try to raise awareness of these problems at an early stage.

(iv) Relationship between micro- and macro-level tensions

Tensions over natural resource use and local boundaries are being influenced by the introduction of the new Tanzanian land law and by the tendency for villages to survey boundaries and obtain title deeds. Tensions over local boundaries in particular may rise, possibly in combination with disputes between the two professional groups, farmers and pastoralists, over the boundaries of newly emerging villages.

The potential for tensions between villagers and newcomers over access to natural resources, especially land, may be influenced by the rise of social identification along religious, ethnic and regional lines.

(v) Assessment of the tension and conflict level and trend analysis

Tensions in Handeni District are still low, causing only sporadic cases of violence. As a rule, cooperative procedures for dealing with conflicts of interest prevail. Apart from violent confrontations between farmers and pastoralists in the village of Kibirashi, Mkindi and Lengusero, where there have been threats of violence, may be regarded as harbouring a combination of all three kinds of tensions, if Lengusero's Masai are counted as "newcomers" in the Mkindi villagers' perception.

Tensions between farmers and pastoralists: natural resource use

Although tensions between the two competing land use activities are not a permanent problem, sporadic eruptions of violence are reported and remembered by people in Handeni District. The destruction of fields by cattle seems to be kept

under control by the imposition of fines. While the payment of fines by pastoralists may be a sign of cooperation between the different land users, it may also aggravate tensions. Pastoralists may gain the impression that they are being overcharged by farmers. In Lengusero, Masai stressed that in their own pastoralist village the payment of such fines could not be expected by farmers, who are advised to fence in their fields.

Apart from actual cases of violence, the ultimatum the Masai received from the Mkindi villagers to leave the village within six months was the most serious sign of aggression. Both sides confirmed that guns had been prepared for use.

Tensions between and within different villages: local boundaries

Tensions over local boundaries exist, but are still at an early stage: violence has not yet been reported, and the tensions between Mkindi and Lengusero were eased through mediation by district administration and HIAP staff. On the other hand, the fact that the mediation meeting was held in a forest indicated that the conflict of interests between the two villages had reached the stage where outside intervention was needed.

Potential for tensions between villagers and newcomers: access to natural resources, especially land

So far there have been no reported cases of tensions between villagers and newcomers leading to violence. On the other hand, it appears that witch doctors have been employed to cast spells. There were some hints of this during interviews in Kilindi and during a group discussion with Masai from Lengusero, witchcraft being mentioned as a possible way of scaring newcomers away from Lengusero. This threat was even meant to be directed against Masai from Same District, who are expected to be resettled in northern Handeni District.

Trend analysis

Competition for environmental resources as the main cause of all three kinds of tension is likely to increase as both land and water become scarcer owing to population pressure. Tensions between competing land use activities can be expected to rise, especially during the dry season and generally during periods of drought. Pastoralists are under pressure from increasing farming activities around them, which will further hamper the movement of cattle during the dry season. As the movement of cattle is still unavoidable in Handeni District's pastoralist economy, disputes over fields destroyed by cattle, one of the main causes of tension, are likely to continue.

2.3   Tension-related Identification of Project Stakeholders

Table 10 seeks to show that there may be cases when not all the major actors in tension situations are direct HIAP stakeholders, because they may not all be included in HIAP activities.

As regards tensions over natural resource use, all major and other actors in the tension situation are HIAP stakeholders. Farmers and pastoralists are target groups of the HIAP and are brought together in the LUP process.

As for tensions over boundaries, there may often be cases when the HIAP concentrates on just one village, as its approach is village-based, and an integrated approach for several adjoining villages is not adopted. Thus there may be actors in situations of tension over village boundaries who, though not direct stakeholders of the HIAP, are affected by its activities. Villages involved in HIAP activities may be at an advantage over other villages in boundary disputes in that they have more information, for example.

Table 8: Tension-related stakeholders of the HIAP			
Conflicts of interest	**Main actor 1**	**Main actor 2**	**Other actors (reactions, initiatives, decisions)**
Natural resource use	Farmers HIAP stakeholders (target group)	Pastoralists HIAP stakeholders (target group)	- Village governments (HIAP stakeholders) - District (HIAP stakeholder) - HIAP
Local boundaries	Villages participating in HIAP activities (especially village government and other leaders) HIAP stakeholder	Villages *not* participating in HIAP activities (especially village government and other leaders) No direct HIAP stakeholder	- District (HIAP stakeholder) - HIAP - National administration
Access to natural resources, especially land	Villagers HIAP stakeholders, if cooperation between HIAP and village	Newcomers HIAP stakeholders, if *integrated* into activities No direct HIAP stakeholders, if *excluded* from activities	- Village governments (HIAP stakeholders) - District (HIAP stakeholder) - National administration - HIAP

Where tensions over access to natural resources (especially land) are concerned, it is not clear whether village newcomers, e.g. people from other districts, are stakeholders of HIAP activities. Because of the HIAP's village-based approach, there is a focus on village governments and on villagers nominated by village governments for Land Use Planning Committees, training activities and the like. This may exclude newcomers from HIAP activities. On the other hand, the training of para-professionals and the setting up of Land Use Planning Committees may lead to the integration of newcomers, especially as they are often more open to new agricultural concepts and techniques. As regards the potential for tensions between villagers and newcomers, it cannot be said for sure whether village newcomers are HIAP stakeholders. HIAP activities may either integrate village newcomers or exclude them.

Box 3: Results of a field visit to Mkindi and Lengusero (March 2000)
Lengusero split from Mkindi, an *Ujamaa* village, in the early 1990s to form a purely Masai village. A Parakuyo Masai community largely originating from the village of Kibirashi and living in Mkindi and other villages since 1987 registered Lengusero as a new village in 1992. After the area had been surveyed, Lengusero obtained its title deed from the Ministry of Lands in 1995. Currently, only about 200 of the 2700 Lengusero villagers actually live in Lengusero, most of them in the hamlet of Mbugoi, which used to be part of Mkindi. The other Lengusero villagers continue to live in other villages, including Mkindi. In 1996 Lengusero villagers began to construct a reservoir in Mbugoi Valley in cooperation with the HIAP. It is the biggest and most expensive reservoir built by the HIAP. By providing labour and cash, Lengusero villagers contributed 40 % of the cost of the reservoir construction, compared to the HIAP's 60 %. According to the official survey and title deed, the site of the reservoir is part of Lengusero, but after the reservoir was completed and filled with water, the neighbouring villages of Mkindi and Saunyi claimed parts of the area as their own. As early as 1996 the Mkindi people had given the Masai living in their village an ultimatum to leave within six months, threatening to evict them by force if necessary. The district authorities, with the assistance of HIAP personnel, tried to negotiate a compromise. In 1999 it was decided that the Lengusero people should be allowed to stay in Mkindi until village infrastructure was fully installed in Lengusero. At the same time, the Mkindi people should be allowed to use the reservoir. The research group visited each village for 2 days. The results of the group discussions showed that the HIAP had been operating in Lengusero since 1994, whereas only one activity had been undertaken in Mkindi, a joint situation analysis of Mkindi villagers and of Lengusero villagers living in Mkindi, which revealed that there was disagreement over the boundaries. During interviews with members of the village government and villagers in Mkindi, it was found that the relationship between the Masai community and Mkindi was severely strained. It was stressed by Mkindi villagers that the co-existence of the two communities was impossible, and even teachers emphasised the need for the 60 to 70 Masai children to attend classes in their own school as soon as possible.

Box 3 continued:	Results of a field visit to Mkindi and Lengusero (March 2000)

During a group discussion with Lengusero villagers living in Mkindi, it was stressed that the Mbugoi reservoir had been Lengusero's and the HIAP's main activity and had triggered tensions as it filled with water. Other activities, such as land use planning and a ranch project, were referred to as work in progress, and in the opinion of Lengusero's village chairman, the HIAP's focus had been shifting from agriculture and agroforestry to pastoralism. However, all activities had been halted because of the tensions between Lengusero and Mkindi. Other HIAP activities, such as the provision of the global positioning system and experts and the drawing of small maps, were said by Lengusero Masai to have been helpful in the boundary dispute with Mkindi.

In interviews with individual Lengusero villagers at the hamlet of Mbugoi it became clear that the settlement of Masai in Lengusero will be very slow because there is no village infrastructure. In addition, Lengusero pastoralists expect to continue moving their cattle during the dry season, as Lengusero is a rainy-season grazing area. The study group thus concluded that Lengusero villagers will be dependent on their settlement in such other villages as Mkindi for markets and social services, for example, and that cattle will continue to be moved through these villages to traditional dry-season grazing areas.

The following trend lines relating to good neighbourliness resulted from separate group discussions with Mkindi and Lengusero villagers. Situations were ranked on a five-point scale. Five points mean very good relations, one point rather bad relations. A selection of important events and developments mentioned by the villagers is given below.

Group discussion with Mkindi villagers, 1 March 2000 (participants: around 30 people, women and men)

1987	Masai from Kibirashi arrived and stayed in Mkindi.
1987-1996	Problems between farmers and pastoralists. Pastoralists occupy fertile areas, preventing farmers from cultivating them. Tensions increase in dry season, decrease in rainy season. Fields were destroyed by cattle, Masai refused to pay compensation (*"endless discussions with Masai"*).
Since 1996	Situation improved: end of discussions (*"we know now how to handle these things"*).
1997	Situation analysis; it is pointed out there are only HIAP activities in Mkindi.
1999	Lengusero reservoir may be used by the people of Mkindi.
2000	Boundary dispute worsens relations with Masai. The dispute is regarded as a turning point in relations with Lengusero: they will either improve or worsen.
Future	District authorities should intervene to solve the dispute, otherwise relations will worsen (*"there are two village governments here, Mkindi and Lengusero government"*).

Group discussion with Lengusero villagers, 6 March 2000 (participants: around 30 people, elders, warriors, women)

1988	Motion calling for establishment of village; collection of contributions for own village (fund).
1989	Survey of Lengusero village (financed by fund).
1991	Bull shot by farmer; farmer had to give two calves in compensation; Mkindi villagers no longer allow pastoralists to graze cattle on fields.
1992	Village registration, big celebration; Kisongo Masai from Saunyi are not happy about the establishment of Lengusero village.
1993	Msomera (Kisongo Masai) and Lengusero (Parakuyo Masai) collect TSh 800,000 for reservoir at Mbugoi.
1994	HIAP: survey of grass species, etc; Msomera and Lengusero divide fund for reservoir.
1995	Collection of money from all elders; road from Msente to Mbugoi (reservoir site); reservoir project criticised by people from Mkindi (threat to use witchcraft).
1996	Reservoir construction starts.
1997	Drought in dry season, move to Kilindi area; October to June 1998: heavy rains fill reservoir (El Niño).
1998	Saunyi people claim Lengusero to be theirs: Mkindi, Lengusero and Kikwembe united, help from former Handeni MP; Mkindi also wants to change boundary with Lengusero; HIAP survey for land use planning and ranch project stopped because of boundary dispute.
1999	Elders meet to resolve conflict; resources should be used jointly: grazing area in Mkindi, water from reservoir.
2000	Rumours that boundaries have been changed by Mkindi (rumour started by Saunyi people).
Future	Need for reconciliation, meeting of elders needed.

Figure 4: Trend line Mkindi / Lengusero Villages

Source: Drawn jointly during group discussion in the villages of Mkindi (1 March 2000) and Lengusero (6 March 2000)

2.4 The HIAP's Sensitivity to Tensions

This section analyses the sensitivity of the HIAP to local tensions in the project region, as identified in section IV.2.3. To this end, it considers how far local tensions have been integrated into the objective of the project, whether the project has made adjustments and taken initiatives to allow for tensions and whether the project policies reflect a tension-sensitive approach.

Objective of the project

The HIAP's overall goal is not explicitly related to tensions or conflicts. It focuses on the improvement of natural resource use. However, tensions play an important part in the description of the project and the problems in the project area identi-fied in the project documentation.[93] One of the land use planning objectives mentioned in the project documents is, for example, the discussion and settlement of land use disputes.[94]

Over time, more emphasis has been placed on tensions in the project approach. This is reflected in the indicators used to assess the progress of the project: first, the development of land use plans should take account of the settlement of land use disputes; second, at least 80 % of land use dis-putes should be settled with the help of land use plans within 12 months of cooperation with the HIAP.[95]

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93 See GTZ (1997); GTZ (1998a); GTZ (1999c); GTZ (2000).

94 See GTZ (1998a); GTZ (1999c); GTZ (2000).

95 Source: HIAP Documentation.

Target groups

The target groups of the project include the main actors in the local tension situation: farmers and pastoralists in the project villages. Particular emphasis is placed on the participation of all relevant socio-political groups in the project area in situation analyses and the land use planning process.[96] This reflects the project's awareness of the local tension situation, in that it has recognised the main stakeholders and their ethnic background (Wanguu, Wazigua and Masai) and so included them in the project approach.

Project adjustments and initiatives due to local tensions

Rising tensions over questions of land use have led to adjustments to the timing of the project. Fewer villages than envisaged in the project planning have successfully undertaken land use planning. This has been due to the time taken by some of activities involved in the process and to increasing tensions between different land users in project villages. Consequently, greater emphasis has been placed on the process of land use planning than on other project activities with a view to facilitating the easing of tension over land use.[97]

A further objective of the project is to help villagers to combat possible attempts by politicians from district to national level to take over land in their areas, by supporting the process of land use planning. This is also intended to increase transparency of decision-making on land allocation to enable minorities to negotiate the most appropriate use of resources.

The aggravation of tensions between Lengusero and Mkindi in connection with the construction of the reservoir in Lengusero was recognised by the project, but only after serious problems had arisen. As a result of the tensions, further activities in the villages had to be stopped. The HIAP

supported mediation between farmers and pastoralists.[98]

Project policies

Employment policy

The HIAP has no specific employment policy aimed at coping with local tensions. Its staff originates from ethnic groups of both sets of actors involved in the tensions. The same is true of para-professionals trained by the HIAP. Only a few of the permanent staff originate from the project region. Some of them are delegated to the HIAP by the district administration, there being rotation among the various regions.

The HIAP staff consider the question of employment policy to be of only minor relevance to local tensions.

Support structures

In general, all villages in the project area are eligible for support from the project. From a number of examples, however, it is evident that financial resources and project activities are unfairly distributed in favour of certain actors in the tension situation. Thus large sums of money were allocated to Lengusero for the construction of the reservoir, benefiting the Masai community. The HIAP also undertakes activities on behalf of a special programme (*Tropenökologisches Begleitprogramm)* for GTZ, which provides the project with additional financial resources. These activities are explicitly devoted to the Masai community, in Lengusero, for example.[99] Project activities in the neighbouring village of Mkindi, on the other hand, have been stopped owing to financial cuts in the project budget. In this case, there was little reaction from the project regarding possible tensions due to the unequal distribution of re-

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96   See GTZ (1997); HIAP Documentation.

97   See GTZ (1999c).

98   See Box 3.

99   See GTZ (2000). The project stresses that the Mkindi community was not ready to contribute to a reservoir supported by the HIAP at that time.

sources among the various stakeholders in the tension situation. No additional project activities have been undertaken in favour of Mkindi.

2.5   Identification of Impacts

This section gives an overview of the main findings on the HIAP's socio-political impact. As research was conducted in only four villages in the project area, the results of the study are not necessarily valid for all villages in the project area. However, expert interviews with HIAP staff and district officials, for example, provide some evidence that the findings in the villages visited reflect the situation in many of the project villages.

The results of interviews and group discussions on the impacts of the project are grouped in the TCIA matrix according to sources of information. The matrix gives an overview of different stakeholders' perceptions of project impacts, reflecting the results of group discussions and interviews in the project area.

The HIAP has positive, negative and ambivalent impacts on local tension situations. The following summarises the overall findings on short- and long-term effects of the HIAP on local tension situations.

Positive impacts

The following positive effects on local tension situations were observed:

1) Land use planning improves the cooperative organisation of natural resource use.

Land use planning induces people to cooperate by discussing the use of village land and its distribution among different land users in a participatory way. Village Land Use Planning Committees have been set up in all project villages to create institutions and procedures for the communication and discussion of differing interests in the area of land use. Rules (by-laws) are laid down to organise the use of land by different users and fine those who do not obey the rules.

In the long term land use planning is therefore regarded by the villagers in all villages visited as having a positive impact on cooperation between different socio-political groups.[100] Where land use is organised in a cooperative way, tensions may be prevented in the long run. The promotion of institutions and channels for communication and negotiation helps to ease conflicts of interest and so to prevent tensions and violent conflicts.

2) Situation analyses help people to recognise and discuss problems.

The situation analysis helps people to recognise and discuss problems in a village. Boundary disputes with neighbouring villages, for example, were often recognised during the situation analysis, as different views became apparent.[101]

In the long term this therefore helps to ensure that conflicts of interest are resolved in a cooperative manner before violent conflicts arise. It was thus regarded by villagers in Kibirashi, Mkindi and Lengusero as a having a positive impact on the tension situation in the long run.

3) Improving productivity helps to reduce competition for natural resources.

Land use planning helps to increase productivity and – in the long term – to ease competition for land use, which is a structural cause of tensions and conflicts. Other activities include training in tree planting, cultivation, animal husbandry and the making of stoves that save firewood. In group discussions these activities were regarded as having a positive impact on tension situations, since they increase productivity and eventually reduce competition for natural resources as a structural cause of tensions and conflicts.

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100 Source: group discussions in Mkindi, Lengusero and Kilindi.

101 Source: group discussions in Mkindi, Lengusero and Kilindi.

Positive impacts of minor significance

Some project activities have positive effects on the local tension situation by improving structures for communication and negotiation between different groups and so helping to prevent tensions and violent conflicts. These activities include the *training of para-professionals* and *Catchment User Groups* and *mediation initiatives* taken by the project in tension and conflict situations. However, little evidence was found of these activities having a positive effect on tension situations, since their significance at village level is rather limited. They were hardly mentioned by the local people in group discussions.

The *training of para-professionals and Catchment User Groups* is having a positive effect on Kilindi's cooperation and neighbourliness with neighbouring villages. Joint training of farmers from different villages enabled ideas to be exchanged and friendships to be formed between different villages.[102] This project activity had an unintentional positive socio-political impact. However, the significance of the activity and, therefore, its positive effect were rather limited (only a few people knowing about it).

Mediation initiatives were assisted by the HIAP in some cases of land use disputes, as in Lengusero/Mkindi and Kibirashi. However, the positive impact of these activities was attributed not to the HIAP, but to the district authorities.[103]

Situation analysis brought different socio-political groups together.

The participatory approach adopted in the situation analysis carried out in the villages with the joint discussion of problems brought men and women together. In Lengusero and Kibirashi, for example, joint discussions and meetings between men and women used not to be held within the Masai community. As a result of this project activity, men and women now participate together in discussions, even if women play a far smaller part than the men.[104]

The example shows that situation analysis can bring together different socio-political groups within a village and improve communication structures. It can thus help to prevent tensions and violent conflicts.

Negative impacts

The following negative effects on the local tension situation were observed:

1) Project activities without a previous situation analysis or land use planning favoured one stakeholder. The Lengusero reservoir caused tensions.

In Lengusero's case the project did not initiate a situation analysis before launching other project activities. The reservoir in Lengusero was built without a prior analysis of the situation and problems in the village.

The boundary disputes between Lengusero and Mkindi were not therefore recognised before the reservoir was built. Depending on the course of the boundary between the two villages, either one village or both would have access to the reservoir and the scarce water it held. The construction of the reservoir in Lengusero therefore aggravated the tensions between the two villages over two natural resources, land and water (see Box 3). In short, the project had an unintended negative impact on the tension situation.[105]

2) Land use planning revealed conflicts of interest and led to growing tensions in the short term.

As explained above, land use planning has a positive impact on local tension situations in the long term and may help to prevent violent conflicts.

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[102]   Source: group discussion in Kilindi.

[103]   Source: group discussion in Kibirashi.

[104]   Source: group discussions with Masai in Lengusero and Kibirashi.

[105]   Source: group discussion in Lengusero.

Table 9:   The HIAP's TCIA matrix

In the short term, on the other hand, land use planning sometimes helps to create tensions, as differing interests become apparent. During the land use planning process boundaries were mapped and recorded. Consequently, disputes over boundaries occurred for the first time, as differing opinions on boundaries became apparent.[106] The process therefore had an intended *negative* influence on the tension situation. The project staff took this negative effect into account with a view to achieving a positive impact in the long run.

3) The situation analysis brought boundary disputes to light and led to growing tensions in the short run.

As shown above, the situation analysis has a positive socio-political impact in the long run.

In at least one case, however, it had a negative effect, in that the local tension situation worsened. In this case, the boundary between the villages Mkindi and Lengusero was unclear. The situation analysis brought the boundary dispute to light for the first time, and tensions between the two villages followed.[107]

The process therefore had an intended negative impact on the tension situation. The project staff took this negative effect into account with a view to achieving a positive impact in the long run.

Ambivalent impacts

Land use planning contributes to the preservation of group identities by encouraging the spatial dissociation of land users.

Land use planning contributes to the consolidation of village structures where different socio-political groups live in separate parts of the village as a function of the way in which they use the land. This is because land use planning arranges

the distribution of land use according to different types of land, e.g. cultivated land and grazing land. As the different forms of land use in the project area mostly correspond to different ethnic backgrounds, the spatial dissociation of ethnic groups may be encouraged.

In principle, two outcomes are possible:

— On the one hand, such dissociation may help to reduce tensions and violent conflicts, since it enables different socio-political groups to live their own lives and to pursue their own economic activities. Disputes over different forms of land use may be prevented, tensions reduced and good neighbourliness encouraged.

— On the other hand, it may result in tensions and violent conflicts in the long run. It may lead to the assertion of the identities of different socio-political groups along ethnic lines, which may slow down integration between different socio-political groups or even increase their disintegration. Communication and negotiation structures between these groups may shrink over time, with a consequent increase in tensions if conflicts of interest occur. In this case, channels and procedures for coping with conflicting interests may not be operating well enough.

The HIAP may thus have either a positive or an unintended negative impact on the integration of different groups and, therefore, on the local tension situation.

2.6   Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

The HIAP is having both positive and negative impacts on the socio-political situation in the project region, but the positive easily exceed the negative.

On the positive side the HIAP is helping to reduce both socio-economic and socio-political causes of tension and conflict. It is increasing productivity

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[106]   As reported by HIAP staff.

[107]   Source: group discussions in Mkindi and Lengusero.

and so reducing a socio-economic source of tension by weakening competition for natural resources. Socio-politically, the HIAP is creating new channels of communication and conflict management, both formal and informal, and using existing ones. It is also increasing the participation of the village population by using participatory methods in the land use planning process, which enables socio-politically marginalised groups to express political ideas.

On the negative side, the HIAP has in one case favoured a project stakeholder without being aware that, as a result, competition for land and water has increased sharply. The HIAP has also brought underlying tensions to light in a situation analysis. This is inevitable if more serious tensions or conflicts are to be avoided in the long term. The underlying argument is that it is generally better to resolve conflicts of interest at an early stage than to let tensions develop that subsequently may even erupt as violent conflicts. Nevertheless, this short-term impact must be recognised by the project and taken into account in its activities.

In addition, the HIAP is drawing lines between different land uses. In the HIAP region land uses are closely linked to ethnic background. The project may therefore be encouraging the ambitions of certain groups to form their own village.

The overall socio-political impact of the HIAP in the project region is significant. The HIAP is the largest development project in the region and addresses what the people perceive as being the most important issue: use of natural resources. The HIAP's activities have significantly changed the way villagers cope with this issue and the opposing interests that are inherent in the use of the land. This also reduces tensions introduced from the macro level. The restructuring of land tenure under the 1998 land law poses a major challenge for the various stakeholders. The HIAP supports a cooperative approach to facing this challenge. Nevertheless, if the productivity of the land remains low and population growth remains high, tensions due to competition for natural resources

are likely to rise despite the HIAP's positive impact.

Recommendations

With due regard for the focus of the study, the recommendations are set out below. They may clash with such other limiting factors as time or budget constraints. Weighing the trade-off between opposing limitations does not lie within the scope of this study.

Recommendations are made for action by the project at village and hamlet level and above village level and for its general policies.

Village level

Catchment User Groups (CUGs): The HIAP has made a considerable effort to train more than 500 para-professionals to act as multipliers. The idea is that the knowledge they gain should spread at hamlet level, which will have the side-effect of improving the socio-political situation by creating new and strengthening old channels of communication. In the villages visited the research team found evidence of the channels not functioning properly because the CUGs are still weak as recipients of knowledge. Promoting CUGs would therefore improve the cooperative use of natural resources.

Training in land use planning (LUP)*, by-laws and administrative procedures*: Besides carrying out land use planning itself, the HIAP should train villagers in the abstract concept of LUP and the steps involved in its implementation in villages, e.g. the establishment of by-laws and administrative procedures, where this seems necessary. During the study it became obvious that villages do not always recognise the relevance and advantages of a formal land use plan. Nor, because of poor education and a lack of knowledge, are they always capable of completing administrative procedures related to land use. Enhanced training in these respects would further increase the sustainability of the cooperative form of land use promoted by the HIAP.

Above village level

Integrated approach for neighbouring villages:
As far as possible, the HIAP should be active in neighbouring villages so that they do not feel badly neglected, as has been the case with Mkindi. If activities cannot be conducted in a neighbouring village for any reason (the project's budget constraints, the village's unwillingness to contribute funds, materials or labour of its own, etc.), the reason should be made known to the village concerned through an increase in communication with the project. In this context, the activities with the village of Mkindi should be resumed. Although it is located in the project zone where all operational activities have been suspended because of budget cuts, the HIAP has a responsibility in this exceptional case, since the construction of the Lengusero reservoir in the current socio-political situation has created tensions between the two villages.

Land use planning at ward and district level: Several unresolved boundary issues in the project region are closely related to the use of natural resources. The HIAP should consider how far land use planning can also be undertaken at ward level and facilitated at district level. Land use planning should then be complementary and also assisted at higher levels (ward, district, region). Knowledge of land use planning processes in Germany may prove helpful in this respect.

Para-professional training as a means of improving communication: The HIAP places considerable emphasis on its training activities for para-professionals. Although the transfer of knowledge should remain the main objective of the training, the participants should be selected with the focus on communal learning and communication. As some farmers raise livestock and pastoralists are increasingly tending to cultivate land, they might be encouraged to learn together. The training might then not only improve communication between the para-professionals of different villages, but also bring together different stakeholders at village level.

General policies

With the focus on socio-political tensions, the HIAP should adopt a clear position on the formation of new villages. The research team was unable in the end to determine whether the formation of villages devoted entirely to livestock or to cultivation would reduce or increase tensions. On the one hand, it might weaken competition for natural resources by putting space between rival land users. On the other hand, it might increase tensions by reducing communication and joint political decision-making. The research team recommends the HIAP to clarify the situation. It should assess the likely socio-political impact of the formation of new villages and decide whether or not to support such aspirations through its activities.

3 The Kagera Environmental Project (KEP)

The aim of the TCIA in Kagera Region was to analyse the impact of the Kagera Environmental Project (KEP) on socio-political tensions or conflicts.

A preliminary hypothesis for the KEP was developed during the desk study in Germany, with due regard for the fact that Kagera Region has experienced a sudden influx of large numbers of refugees and the arrival of numerous international relief agencies. This has led to substantial social and economic changes in the project region, confronting its population with new and unexpected challenges. The KEP has been funded by the BMZ to help the local population in these circumstances and so to reduce tensions between the local people and the refugees.

Accordingly, the preliminary hypothesis of the present study for the KEP was:

> The KEP is unlikely to achieve its overall goal of having a positive impact on the relationship between refugees and local people, because the link between the project's activities and any possible re-

duction of tension is too indirect. The target group is unlikely to perceive environmental rehabilitation measures as compensation for losses caused by refugees.

This hypothesis was based mainly on project documents and related material examined during the desk study phase.

Empirical research

Five weeks were spent in Kagera Region for the empirical research. Table 12 shows the schedule of the visit.

second, the length of time the KEP had been active in them, and third, a geographical criterion (in Ngara District the two traditional areas of Bugufi and Bushubi were to be included). The criteria for the villages are listed in Table 13.

3.1 Description of the Project Region and the Project[108]

This section describes the KEP's project region, the main development cooperation activities within the region and the main features of the project itself.

Table 10: Schedule of the field visit to Kagera Region		
Weeks	**Activities**	**Interviews / discussion partners[a]**
First week	Expert interviews in Ngara	KEP staff, district officials, representatives of international organisations and local institutions, local resource persons
Second week	Village discussions and trend lines, transects and semi-structured interviews in villages covered by the KEP in Ngara District (Ruganzo, Kazulo and Goya Goya/ Rulenge)	Villagers, village/ward officials
Third week	Expert interviews in Bukoba (regional capital) and Karagwe District	KEP staff, district officials, representatives of international organisations and local institutions, local resource persons
Fourth week	Village discussions and trend lines, transects and semi-structured interviews in a ward and village covered by the KEP in Karagwe (Kibondo Ward, Kakuraijo Village) Visit to Lukole refugee camp in Ngara	Villagers, village/ward officials, camp personnel, representatives of international organisations
Fifth week	Preparation of findings and presentation	KEP staff
a A complete list of interview partners is listed in Annex D.		

As the project area is comparatively large (three districts) and the research period was limited to five weeks, the research activities were focused on Ngara District (three villages) and took another village in Karagwe into consideration for purposes of comparison. The third district of the project region, Biharamulo, was omitted because it had been left comparatively unaffected by the influx of refugees.

Three criteria were identified for the selection of villages to be visited: first, the degree to which they had been affected by the influx of refugees;

The Great Lakes Region has been unstable for many years, causing migrations of refugees from Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo to neighbouring countries. The political instability found its climax in the Rwandan genocide, unleashing an enormous influx of refugees (approximately 650,000) into Tanzania in 1994/95. Shelter was provided for the majority of

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108 See GTZ (1995); GTZ (1997a); GTZ (1999b); Klingshirn (1999); Seibel (1995); GTZ (1998b); GTZ (1996).

Table 11:	Criteria for the selection of villages in Kagera Region
Village	**Criterion**
Ruganzo Village	Ngara District (Bugufi),
	close to the present refugee camps,
	KEP activities: training of stove technicians, demonstration stove, tree nurseries.
Kazulo Village	Ngara District (Bugufi),
	close to the town of Ngara, where the main market is,
	close to the former (Benaco camp) and present refugee camps,
	KEP activities: tree nurseries.
Goya Goya Village	Ngara District (Bushubi),
	near Rulenge, which is the main market in Bushubi,
	close to a former transit camp,
	KEP activities: firewood-saving stoves, tree nurseries and Joint Forest Management (pilot village).
Kibondo Ward/ Kakuraijo Village	Karagwe District,
	close to a former refugee camp but no longer affected (clear distinction between times with and without refugees),
	KEP activities: firewood-saving stoves.

refugees in the two border regions of Tanzania, Kagera and Kigoma. In places the population in these regions more than doubled during the 1990s.

Map 3 shows Kagera Region of Tanzania as part of the Great Lakes Region and the neighbouring countries of Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda.

Profile of Kagera Region, with particular reference to Ngara and Karagwe Districts

Kagera Region is situated in the north-west of Tanzania on the borders with Uganda in the north and Rwanda and Burundi in the west. In Tanzania Kagera is considered to be an area affected by refugees. It comprises 28,531 km² of land and 10,752 km² of water (mainly Lake Victoria). It consists of six districts, of which the two border districts, Ngara and Karagwe, and Biharamulo District form the project area.

Kagera Region is remote in many respects: it is 1,500 km from Dar es Salaam, its average GNP per capita is 72 % below the Tanzanian average, and 37 % of its population live below the poverty line.

(i) Natural resources, environmental degradation and physical infrastructure

Natural resources and climate: The landscape of Kagera Region is hilly, and Ngara District is 1,800 m above sea level. The annual average rainfall in the region varies between 800 and 2,100 mm, and the average temperature is 25°C. The natural vegetation consists of subclimax woodlands and grassland, its density depending on the intensity of seasonal fires and grazing. Ngara and Karagwe Districts are mainly covered by woodland savannah, which is the region's main natural resource and is used for charcoal and firewood production.

Environmental degradation: Kagera is facing severe environmental damage in three areas – forestry, wildlife and soil – principally because of the following:

— Uncontrolled burning of open lands is a general problem because it is reducing Kagera's woodlands significantly. The high population density as a result of the influx of refugees has increased the exploitation of the region's forests (firewood consumption).

Map 3:   The Great Lakes Region and the KEP project area

UGANDA

ZAIRE

N. KIVU

Goma

Gisenyi

Lake Kivu

Kabale

Byumba

Karagwe

KAGERA

Kigali

RWANDA

Bukavu

Cyangugu

Butare

Kirundo

Ngara

TANZANIA

S. KIVU

BURUNDI

Uvira

Bujumbura

Kibondo

Kasulu

Lake
Tanganyika

0	miles	50
0	km	80

The Great Lakes Region

Source: Vassall–Adams, 1994.

Source: Strizek (1998). Modified by CWG Tanzania

— The sudden rise in population density in the region, together with poaching in the game reserves, has reduced wildlife numbers significantly.

— In Karagwe District in particular the influx of refugees has led to a very sharp rise in the amount of land under cultivation and to inappropriate land use, causing serious degradation.

Physical infrastructure: To meet logistical requirements during the influx of refugees, the main road in Ngara was renewed by donors and is in good condition (unlike most other rural roads). However, access to communication systems is limited and services are still unreliable.

(ii) Social structure

Population: The project area has a population of approximately 750,000, with an average of 41 per km². Some 330,000 people live in Karagwe, 240,000 in Biharamulo and 180,000 in Ngara.

Migration: Tanzania, and Kagera Region in particular, has been an immigration area for people from neighbouring countries for many years now.

Many of them have settled permanently in Kagera Region. Many Rwandan immigrants who arrived in the 1950s and 1960s were offered Tanzanian citizenship. Many of the later immigrants are still living in Kagera Region as refugees.

Figure 5 shows the total number of refugees in Kagera region in the last seven years.

Kagera's border districts were not affected equally in 1994/95: about 437,000 refugees moved into Ngara and 162,000 into Karagwe. Although the majority of refugees left Kagera in 1996/97, there has continued to be a steady movement into the whole region. Two refugee camps remain in Ngara. In early 2000 the number of persons seeking refuge in Kagera again rosn sharply and stood at 113,201 by 29 February 2000. A new camp for refugees from Burundi is already planned.

Ethnic and religious composition: The population of Ngara and Karagwe Districts is composed of various ethnic groups, most belonging to the interlacustrine Bantu. The dominant ethnic groups in Karagwe are the Nyambo and the Haya. In Ngara, Hangaza mostly live in the western highlands around the town of Ngara, while Shubi have settled in the lowlands around Rulenge. Owing to a

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Figure 5: Total number of refugees in Kagera Region (1993 - January 2000)

Source: SPRAA (1999); UNHCR (2000)

long missionary tradition in Ngara, the majority of the people are Christians, Muslims forming the minority.

Gender-related issues: All ethnic groups are patrilinear. Men usually control the assets (land, livestock, crops) and head the household. They are responsible for the construction of houses, the herding of livestock and for some of the field work. Cleaning, sowing, weeding, cooking, child care and the collection of firewood and water are considered to be women's tasks.

(iii) Economic structure

Most of the population (90 %) live in rural areas. They are small farmers, mostly living at subsistence level, growing bananas, maize, cassava, beans and coffee. The agricultural economy is most advanced in Karagwe, largely because of the more regular rainfall, larger farms and better soil there. Nonetheless, agricultural production is limited by very basic production tools, especially in Ngara. There are a few food-processing units.

Besides arable farming, there is livestock farming, which is more intense in the border areas of Karagwe and regularly crosses the international borders.

The introduction of a cash economy on a broader basis is a recent development. It was a side-effect of the influx of refugees and the presence of international organisations.

All production activities are hampered by limited local demand coupled with a poor system of roads between villages and a lack of access to markets.

(iv) Political and administrative structure

Kagera Region is divided into six administrative districts, which are further split into divisions, wards and villages. Ngara, for example, has four divisions, 14 wards and 70 villages. Bukoba is the capital of the region and the only urban district. Although Tanzania succeeded in making the transition from a one-party to a multi-party system in the 1990s, there is still no real opposition to the

CCM in Kagera. The former CCM organisational structures at village level are still in place: villages are subdivided into cells of ten households controlled by a "ten-cell leader", who is a very important authority for the people.

Profile of development cooperation activities in the region

The influx of refugees in 1994/95 was followed by the arrival in Ngara of numerous international organisations, covering all fields of emergency aid. Given the requirements at the time and the remit of emergency aid institutions, all early activities were concentrated on the refugees and refugee camps.[109]

Besides emergency aid, development cooperation activities in general (with the focus on poverty alleviation) and resource-related activities in particular have increased since the influx of refugees in 1994, with the aim of helping the local population (as distinct from the refugees). However, as the Kagera Environmental Project is designed as a resource rehabilitation project, this section focuses on resource-related development cooperation to give an impression of the relative importance and possible significance of individual projects in the region.

Three programmes in particular include resource rehabilitation measures in Kagera Region: the District Rural Development Programme (DRDP: Dutch government), the Kagera Agricultural and Environmental Management Project (KAEMP: International Fund for Agricultural Development) and the Kagera Environmental Project (KEP: German government/GTZ and EU). The UNHCR is also funding comparable activities.

The DRDP is the main actor in the region in terms of volume and influence. The Dutch government is giving the district development offices remarkable budgetary support. The DRDP is an integrated rural development programme, covering

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109 For details see Mullan (1999), pp. 37 - 40.

Table 12:	Donor agencies and their resource-related activities in Kagera Region (from 1994)			
Activity \ Institution or project	UNHCR	DRDP	KAEMP	KEP/EU
Reforestation	x	x	x	x
Firewood distribution	(x)			
Food security	x		x	
Firewood-saving activities	(x)	x		x
Sustainable land use		x	x	
Institution-building		x	x	x
Water management			x	x

UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees, since 1994 (in brackets: only1994/95; implementation through CARE)

DRDP: District Rural Development Programme (The Netherlands), since 1997

KAEMP: Kagera Agricultural and Environmental Management Project (International Fund for Agricultural Development, IFAD), since 1997

KEP (GTZ/EU):   Kagera Environmental Project (described in the following section), since 1996

Source: Derived from GTZ (1999b), pp. 7-8.

various areas of activity: primary health care, education, income generation, agricultural training and inputs, capacity-building at the district development offices and the environment. Given the wide range of its activities and its overall presence, it is well known in the region.

The KAEMP focuses on capacity-building at district level, especially in the agricultural and environmental sectors. Concrete measures are improved agricultural production and seed production, pest management and forestry measures (the KAEMP distributes seedlings free). Support is also given to social sectors.

The KEP is the smallest project in terms of overall funding and focuses solely on resource rehabilitation measures.

Table 14 shows the interaction of the major international resource management activities currently being undertaken in Kagera Region.

Profile of the project

(i) Background

The KEP has its origins in an earlier emergency relief project, supplying firewood to the camps for refugees from Rwanda and Burundi for a few months in 1994. It was then turned into a conventional development project. The idea behind the design of a long-term development cooperation project was also to give assistance to the local population in the affected area so that they might continue to accept the presence of refugees. However, this original socio-political intention is not reflected in the Implementation Agreement between the Tanzanian government, the GTZ, the European Development Fund's National Authorising Officer and the European Commission. Implementation focuses on resource-related activities.

(ii) Objective and target groups (approach and funding)

Objective: The KEP's project objective, as defined in the project documents, is to ensure that "local communities practise sustainable use of natural

resources"[110] and that "the livelihood of the people in Kagera Region is secured".[111]

Target groups: The target groups are defined as women, men and pupils in rural areas (mostly living at subsistence level or engaged in small-scale farming) and local institutions (such as local NGOs, local groups, districts and schools).

Approach: The KEP's approach is demand-driven. Interested groups have to apply for assistance and make their own contributions. Implementing partners are local NGOs and district councils (as counterparts).

Duration and funding: The KEP began in 1996 and will be phased out in 2001. One year might be added for consolidation purposes. The project is jointly funded by the Tanzanian government (DM 0.48 million), the European Community (DM 1.5 million) and the German government (DM 4.7 million). The total budget of the project amounts to DM 6.8 million.

(iii) Description

The KEP has six major activities:

— construction of firewood-saving stoves (training of stove technicians, advice),

— tree planting (distribution of seedlings, tree nurseries, advice),

— afforestation and conservation of water catchment areas (distribution of seedlings, advice),

— community-based land use planning and forest management (integrated forest management),

— strengthening district capacities for environmental management,

— environmental education in secondary schools.

(iv) Overall output and outcome

The outputs and outcomes are as follows:

— More than 3,000 improved stoves have been built (the dissemination rate has been ten times higher than planned).

— More than 50 groups have planted over 500,000 trees.

— More than 1,000 people have participated in workshops on the sustainable use of natural resources.

— The districts have put forward an Environmental Rehabilitation Plan as a guideline for further coordination in the environmental sector.

In the view of the project staff at the field office, the KEP's activities have not all been equally successful. The making of firewood-saving stoves is the most successful activity. Tree-planting is unlikely to be sustainable owing to widespread bushfires and should be phased out. Activities in water catchment areas are felt to have future potential. Joint forest management, on the other hand, has come to a halt because of limited governmental cooperation. Environmental education has just begun and could be stepped up.

3.2   Tension and Conflict Analysis[112]

(i) Description of tensions and conflicts in Ngara and Karagwe

Kagera Region is not known for open violent conflicts or for tensions between socio-political groups.

A feature of the region, however, is its high level of insecurity. Together with Dar es Salaam, Kagera Region is reported to have the most cases of armed robbery in the country.[113] The presence of

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110 GTZ (1998b), p. 1.

111 GTZ (1998e).

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[112]   For detailed research data see the KEP TCIA matrix (Table 15) and village findings in Annex C 3.2.

113 See The Guardian, Dar es Salaam, 3 April 2000.

so many refugees is said to have caused this security problem, since they have brought military weapons into the region. Armed escorts are provided on the roads from Ngara to Karagwe and from Ngara to Biharamulo because they pass through scarcely populated stretches of land. There have been several cases of hijacking and armed robbery along these routes.[114]

Apart from this general insecurity, three potential sources of tension or conflict can be identified in the border districts of Kagera (Ngara and Karagwe), which differ in significance:

— relations between refugees and the local population: competition for natural resources and infrastructure,

— relations between Hutus and Tutsis: spill-over of ethno-political conflict facilitated by a history of inter-group violence,

— relations between two areas and groups within Ngara District (Bugufi/Hangaza and Bushubi/Shubi): struggle for economic and political power.

The three potential sources of tension will be described and analysed separately in the following sections.

Potential source of tension between refugees and the local population: competition for natural resources and infrastructure

This potential source of tension was referred to at the time when the project was initiated, but has turned out to be of limited significance in the opinion of the local population. In none of the group discussions at village level was a troublesome or competitive relationship with the refugee population mentioned as being of serious concern. It attracted more interest at policy level from district, regional and national officials, which does not, however, correspond to the local dynamics.

When the various impacts refugees have had on the local situation are considered, it is possible to identify serious negative effects which could have led to tensions with the village population: in general, significant damage has been done to the physical infrastructure and natural environment. Such natural resources as forests (charcoal production and firewood), game, water and land have suffered overuse and serious degradation. The local communities faced food shortages when they provided assistance for the refugees as they first entered the country in 1993 and 1994. Border trade with the neighbouring countries also ceased on the outbreak of violence. Where health was concerned, such diseases as cholera and dysentery spread. Very important in the perception of the local population is the general insecurity that has so far prevailed in the region. Thefts and armed robbery are relatively common and carried out by refugees and locals alike.[115] In general, the number of crimes in the region has increased significantly.

At the political and higher administrative level, the protracted presence of enormous numbers of refugees is often referred to as a major burden on the host society and also on the district administration, whose capacities have been seriously overstretched. A potential source of tension seems obvious, especially to the donor community, which had agreed on a *"social compensation approach"*[116] to damage caused by the presence of the refugees.

However, the local population's current view is that there is no significant potential for tension between themselves and the refugees. This is due to a variety of factors, which were referred to during individual and group discussions at village level (see Annex C 3.2):

— The local population was and continues to be very willing to welcome and host the incoming refugees, because people in the border ar-

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114 Source: interviews with the DC of Karagwe; UNHCR sub-office, Ngara.

115 Source: interviews with the UNHCR sub-office; Kibondo Ward village officials; Karagwe District officials.

116 See Mullan (1999), p. 27.

eas of Kagera and in Rwanda and Burundi feel they belong to one and the same group of people, speaking the same language and sharing a common history (see paragraph below on the potential for tension between Hutus and Tutsis). Social interaction and family ties are very strong between the old and new inhabitants of Kagera, facilitating exchanges and mutual help.

— As the local people as a whole have gained significantly in economic terms from the presence of the refugees, the repatriation of Rwandan refugees in 1996 was even seen as causing a decline in the quality of life. Better

access to markets and increased demand for food products produced in the region were regarded by the local people as particularly important improvements in their lives. The presence of refugees introduced a lively cash economy into the districts, enabling people to buy consumer goods and production inputs. The number of bicycles and cars rose sharply, facilitating transport on the newly built roads. Refugees were employed as cheap labour on the farms, and the international organisations operating in the region created new employment opportunities for the locals.

Box 4:	Trend line in the village of Ruganzo
The trend line is an example of a visualised group discussion carried out in the village of Ruganzo in Ngara District. It concentrates mainly on changes in the life of the village community due to the influx of refugees and illustrates some of the aspects discussed above. The population of Ruganzo believe that the first, unorganised influx of refugees in 1993 had an adverse effect on their daily lives in some ways (security, environment). Subsequently, their perception was dominated by positive changes stemming from an improved market situation due to the refugees' purchasing power and better employment opportunities for themselves. Although the improved market situation declined after the repatriation of the Rwandan refugees, life today has settled at an average level, because the former adverse side-effects, such as increased insecurity and environmental damage, are slowly disappearing.[a]	
a Further details are listed in Annex C 3.2.	

Figure 6:   Trend line in the village of Ruganzo

Source: Drawn jointly during a group discussion in the village of Ruganzo, 29 February 2000

— By the time the initial phase of emergency relief in the region had ended, the international donor community had, as the UNHCR sub-office in Ngara emphasised, learned that the concentration on assistance for the refugees had left the local population to cope with damaged social and other infrastructure, which had already been very poor. Local infrastructure was rehabilitated (schools, roads, health facilities, water points, etc.), and some social services for the refugees, such as hospitals in the camps, were opened to local communities. The improvements were appreciated by the local population.[117]

— The peak in refugee numbers was reached some years ago. The vast majority of refugees were repatriated in 1996 (see Figure 6). Damage to the environment, which remains, of course, has affected only common property, and women in the villages visited said that they were used to devoting a considerable amount of time to collecting firewood and water and no longer related this solely to the presence of the refugees.

— The local people themselves realise that they are equally responsible for the continuing destruction of natural resources due, for instance, to their habit of starting bushfires. Nor is the security situation blamed entirely on the refugees, villagers and village officials repeatedly reporting that locals had been "willing pupils" of the criminals who had entered the region.

Potential source of tension between Hutus and Tutsis: spill-over of ethno-political conflict facilitated by a history of inter-group violence[118]

The societies in the border regions of Kagera, as in the neighbouring countries, share a history of feudal systems, identification with which is related to Hutu and Tutsi social identification. These identities are seldom openly expressed and largely remain below the surface. A further politicisation of these identities may arise from the specific political dynamics and instability of the Great Lakes Region as a whole, which may affect relations between Hutus and Tutsis in Tanzania.

In Tanzania, social or ethnic identification with Hutus or Tutsis has never played a political role. According to official documents, there are no such groups in the country. The main local ethnic groups are the Hangaza and Shubi in Ngara and the Nyambo and Haya in Karagwe. However, most people in the region stress that they and the people across the borders in the neighbouring countries have a common background. They speak a language (of Bantu origin) very similar to the Burundian or Rwandan people and have close family and other ties with each other. This common identity ignores borders and nationalities.

Ngara and Karagwe have a long history mainly of immigration from, but also of some migration to the neighbouring countries, Burundi, Rwanda, the DRC and Uganda. Since the late 1950s Tanzania has taken in a considerable number of refugees and unregistered immigrants, who have settled in the border regions of Kagera. Many of them were Tutsi refugees from Rwanda, who were granted permanent resident status and subsequently applied for citizenship, moving to other regions of Tanzania. The border areas continue to have a

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117 See Annex C 3.2.

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118 For details on the ethno-political conflict between Hutus and Tutsis in the Great Lakes Region see: Strizek (1996) und (1998); Harding (1998); African Rights (1995); Sellström/Wohlgemuth (1996); Asche (1995); Mair (1999).

Table 13:   The KEP's TCIA matrix

mixed and moving population, people who usually lack official documents that would prove their nationality.[119]

The mid-1990s were characterised by an unprecedented influx of refugees, mostly Hutus from Burundi at first, in 1993 and again in 1995, and, later, in May 1994, mostly Tutsis fleeing the genocide in Rwanda. Although refugee camps provided these people with shelter and food, many of them mixed with the local population and settled in local communities. This was reported at both village and district level. This also occurred after the repatriation of Tutsi refugees in 1996. All newly arriving refugees are highly politicised and have witnessed extreme ethno-politically motivated violence. Their integration into Kagera society has taken place at least partly along ethnic lines, as can be seen in Kibondo Ward and as local experts report. This very probably increases awareness of ethnic Hutu or Tutsi orientation within the region.

The situation is also the cause of some concern at national and macro-policy level. Tanzania government is accused by the Burundian government of acting as a base for Hutu rebels operating in Burundi. With assistance from the UNHCR, Tanzania has taken steps to improve security and control in the camps. With a view to regulating migratory movements in the border regions more closely, new, stricter legislation on refugees has been introduced, requiring every newly arrived individual to prove that he or she has a valid residence permit. Rwandan nationals have to make an official application for asylum, while prima facie refugees from Burundi are restricted to the camps. In some local communities this has led to a general feeling of legal insecurity and to a cautious attitude towards the authorities and outsiders. As a considerable proportion of the people are themselves first- or second-generation refugees, the atmosphere is tense.

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[119] Source: district officials in Ngara and Karagwe; a regional official in Bukoba.

Potential source of tension between Bugufi/Hangaza and Bushubi/Shubi: struggle for economic and political power

In Ngara District a distinction is made between the "uphill" area of Bugufi, populated mainly by Hangaza, and the "downhill" Bushubi area, inhabited mainly by Shubi. The people see the River Ruvuvu as forming the main boundary between the two areas. The two sections of the population differ in power and economic potential. The struggle for resources is a potential source of tension which is openly discussed at village and district level and can be interpreted as a mixture of competition between two traditional political areas and a struggle between the two groups. A distinction can be made between two kinds of dynamic:

Local dynamic: The political distinction between the Bugufi and Bushubi areas can be traced back to the two neighbouring kingdoms of Buhangaza – later Bugufi – and Bushubi, which existed until the middle of the 20th century. Their old political power structure, with Buhangaza more powerful than Bushubi, is still reflected in the present relationship between the two parts of Ngara District. Ethnically, as villagers and local Ngara District experts emphasised, the two groups do not differ in language or background. Nevertheless, typically ethnic stereotyping and the Hangaza's feeling of superiority over the Shubi form part of their relationship and are expressed openly at all levels.

Today, Bugufi is both the administrative and the economic centre of the district, which has received a further boost from the presence of refugees since 1994. Bugufi, with its main town, Ngara, benefits from improved infrastructure built to enable provisions to be taken to the refugee camps and from better access to markets. Bushubi is a mainly rural area inhabited by subsistence farmers. The standard of living in Bushubi is very low, the people lacking access to basic social and other infrastructure.

The struggle for influence and resources becomes apparent in the district council, where representatives of the more densely populated Bugufi area

are in the majority. Both groups try to gain influence to safeguard the interests of their own group, and there is keen awareness of the need to have appropriate shares of district resources and power.[120]

Regional dynamic: Another important feature of these potential sources of tension is the relationship between a Hangaza or Shubi identity and a Tutsi or Hutu identity. In some quarters it is clear

(ii) Analysis of factors causing, triggering and aggravating tensions and conflicts

In the analysis the TCIA matrix was used to provide a systematic description of all tension and conflict features found in the two districts.[121]

Data were gathered from individual interviews and group discussions at village level (trend lines), expert interviews and observations. Infor-

Table 14: Factors of potential sources of tension between refugees and the local population		
General categories: factors causing, triggering and aggravating tensions	**More specific level of factors causing, triggering and aggravating tensions**	**Local dimension**
Socio-economic factors	Socio-economic disparities	Refugees have better access to social infrastructure than the local population.
		Many refugees have more cash than most of the local people: a number of them were economically better off in Rwanda and Burundi than people in Kagera, they are provided with shelter, food and social services in the camps, and they are often able to work on farms and trade surpluses on the market.
Socio-political and political constraints	Limited institutional capacities	District administrative and government capacities were overstretched by the influx of refugees (e.g. district officials, police capacities).
	Exploitation of ethnic, cultural and other differences, and discrimination	Refugees are made scapegoats for violence and other negative incidents.
Violence and insecurity	Inadequate security	The sudden influx of refugees led to an increase in crimes committed by both refugees and locals. The number and kind of weapons and the nature of the crimes (rape and banditry) have changed. There has been widespread mobilisation of militia and paramilitary forces in response.
		There are rumours that rebels from neighbouring countries are using Tanzania as their base.
External sources	International involvement and environment	Unbalanced donor support in favour of refugees.

that the Hangaza people are predominantly associated with the Tutsis and the Shubi people predominantly with the Hutus, which corresponds to the ethnic stereotypes of Hutus and Tutsis and correlates with the history of other peoples throughout the Great Lakes Region, according to district and regional officials and local experts. This being the case, the disparities between Bugufi and Bushubi and Bugufi's traditional feelings of superiority over Bushubi are likely to become a ready arena for the politicisation of ethnic identities.

mation was aggregated according to the categories outlined in the TCIA matrix, giving the local dimension of factors causing, triggering and aggravating tensions and conflicts.[122]

Not all of the tension factors subsequently proved to be of significance, either because they were mentioned by only a few individuals or because they are aggravating factors that do not correspond directly to other factors forming the three

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[120]   Source: interviews with local experts.

[121]   See Table 15.

[122]   The matrix contains tension and conflict data as well as impact data. The impact data provide the analytical base for section (iv), *Identification of impacts*.

potential sources of tension referred to above. While the KEP matrix still shows all the tension factors examined, the following analysis lists only those which are directly related to the potential sources of tension identified. For the source of information see the entries in the complete TCIA matrix above.

Potential sources of tension between refugees and the local population

The principal sources of tension between refugees and the local population are to be found, if at all, in the areas of socio-economic disparities and the initially unbalanced international involvement of the donor community. There have been no recent signs of this playing a major role in the minds of the local population.

Factors causing tensions

Differences in access to social infrastructure and in economic success (socio-economic disparities): It is widely emphasised that the provision of such social services as health, sanitation and education is far better in the camps than in the local communities owing to the general level of poverty in Ngara District. The rehabilitation of local facilities and the villagers' access to some of the camp facilities have done little to change this situation. Refugees typically have cash when they arrive in their host districts, and they are allowed to do a limited amount of farmwork, which enables them to trade surpluses from farming or food rations on the local markets. Active markets have developed in the camps. These disparities are not, however, perceived as a threat to the mostly peaceful relations between refugees and locals, since the latter have gained significantly from the situation and are better off than they were before.

Donor support overly focused on refugees (international involvement): At the beginning of the refugee crisis in particular, relief organisations rushed into Kagera Region, focusing solely on assistance for the incoming refugees, even though the situation of the host communities had deteriorated dramatically and local people's property and

assets were destroyed. In interviews villagers said they saw this first phase of the presence of the refugees as the most critical time in their relationship with them. In the meantime, however, the situation has greatly improved, primarily because the economic situation has become very favourable for the host society, but also because donor agencies learned from their initial experience and launched rehabilitation measures for local communities. Only a few people complained about donors supporting the refugee communities. International organisations also provided employment opportunities in the districts for many trained or educated people.

Refugees as scapegoats (exploitation of differences): In some instances refugees were blamed, for example, for theft or murder in the district concerned, without there being any real evidence. There is, however, no common pattern or conscious agitation against the refugees as a group, which would contribute to a further escalation of the socio-political situation. Instead, the local population appear to be pursuing their own individual interests.

Aggravating factors

Overstretched district capacities (limited institutional capacities): District administrations were unable to cope with the task of hosting an extremely large refugee population on their own. Particularly when the refugees first arrived, the district did not work efficiently and could not provide the necessary services for the local communities, because it was preoccupied with refugee matters. To some extent at least, support from donor agencies has helped in this situation and increased capacities.

High crime level and rumours about rebels operating from Tanzanian soil (inadequate security): Many people in Kagera have a feeling of insecurity, which may contribute as an aggravating factor to any increase in the level of tension. Criminal offences are common and range from murder to simple theft. People are reluctant to go out at night, and some sleep by their fields to protect their harvest against thieves. Rumours about re-

bels operating in the Tanzanian bush support this feeling of insecurity, which is not only reported by local communities, but also constitutes a threat to the camp population. The refugees are constantly afraid, for instance, that their women will be raped and robbed on their way to collect firewood outside the protected camps.

Potential sources of tension between Hutus and Tutsis

The Hutu/Tutsi dimension consists of various factors connected, above all, with ethnic stereo-

Factors causing tensions

Ethnic stereotyping (exploitation of ethnic differences): The pattern of Hutu and Tutsi people living in one society is also reported in the border regions of Kagera in Tanzania and is reflected in stereotyping: the Hutus are described as being predominantly farmers and generally less well educated, while the Tutsis are said to occupy higher positions and to employ others for farmwork. Phenotypical descriptions of the two groups refer to height and the size and shape of the nose as distinguishing features. This stereotyping almost led to a violent encounter in one reported

Table 15: Factors of potential sources of tension between Hutus and Tutsis		
General categories: factors causing, triggering and aggravating tension	**More specific level of factors causing, triggering and aggravating tension**	**Local dimension**
Socio-political and political constraints	Lack of legitimate government and good governance	The fact that the majority of people living in Kagera Region do not have legal documents leads to arbitrary decisions on citizenship and residence permits by administration and legal representatives.
	Exploitation of ethnic, cultural and other differences, and discrimination	Stereotyping of Hutus and Tutsis by the refugee and local communities.
		There are rumours that the Rwandan government (Tutsi-dominated) may seize Kagera Region to form part of a greater "Tutsi/Hima Empire".
	Social disintegration and separation	Limited communication between Hutus and Tutsis.
		There is no intermarriage, and Hutus and Tutsis sometimes live in separate settlements.
		Rwandan Tutsi immigrants identify themselves as Tutsis rather than Tanzanian citizens.
Violence and insecurity	Legacy of violence	Direct and indirect experience of ethnic violence in neighbouring countries.
		Local people identify with the people of the neighbouring countries and their experience of ethnic violence.
	Inadequate security	The sudden influx of refugees led to an increase in crimes committed by both refugees and locals. The number and kind of weapons and the nature of the crimes (rape and banditry) have changed. There has been widespread mobilisation of militia and paramilitary forces in response.
		There are rumours that rebels from neighbouring countries are using Tanzania as their base.
External sources	Negative consequences of international environment	Political developments in neighbouring countries (Rwanda, Burundi, DRC) have a direct effect on the political and social situation in Kagera Region.

typing and the experience of Hutu and Tutsi violence in Tanzania's neighbours Rwanda and Burundi. No outbreak of violence between these two groups in Kagera has been reported. The contribution the factors make to this potential conflict varies.

instance, when a sub-village of Hutus threatened an unknown visitor who resembled the Tutsi stereotype.[123]

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123 Source: interview with a local expert in Ngara.

Separation and no intermarriage (social disintegration and separation): There is a history of ethnic separation of Hutus and Tutsis. In a number of cases reported and observed, as in the village of Kakuraijo in Karagwe, Hutus and Tutsis have settled in separate villages or sub-villages. When asked about intermarriage, all interviewees vehemently denied it ever occurred.

Identification of Rwandan Tutsis (social disintegration and separation): Many Tutsis who had fled from Rwanda to Tanzania in the past four or five decades and become permanent residents in Tanzania, some even having Tanzanian passports and occupying posts in the Tanzanian government, instantly returned to Rwanda when Tutsis took power there in 1996. This move was perceived by many Tanzanians as deceitful. The fact that these people had obviously seen themselves primarily as Tutsis rather than Tanzanians ran counter to the Tanzanians' belief that they had overcome the importance of ethnic differences. The people of Ngara and Karagwe are very much aware of this historic event.

Ethno-political civil war in Rwanda and Burundi (legacy of violence and political environment in neighbouring countries): The experience of violence suffered by the people in the neighbouring countries was shared across the border in Tanzania. In many cases, family relationships with the other country meant there was a direct impact on relatives in Tanzania. Refugees arriving in Kagera were also able to recount their own experiences of violence to the people. Those who mixed with the local population now form part of Kagera society. Generally, the close interrelationship between the Kagera people and the Burundian and Rwandan people and physical proximity mean that political developments in these countries has a strong influence on the perception of the Kagera people and may pose a threat to stability in the Tanzanian border regions by promoting identification and perpetuating the history of violence.

Aggravating factors

Arbitrary decisions on citizenship and residence permits (lack of good governance): A stricter law

on the status of refugees and immigrants in the border areas was recently passed. Villages and wards are required to report any refugee or migrant without a residence permit to the authorities. As most of the people in Ngara and Karagwe do not have legal documents to prove their citizenship, this opens the way for arbitrary decisions on anyone not born or without proof of being born in Tanzania. This situation can therefore be abused by communities to ethno-political ends.

High crime level and rumours about rebels operating from Tanzanian soil (inadequate security): The general feeling of insecurity that many people in Kagera have may act as a contributory factor to the possible growth of the potential for conflict. This problem is faced by all groups equally and is increasingly leading to the formation of local militia groups and to readiness to use violence.

Rumours of a possible seizure of Kagera by Rwandan Tutsis (exploitation of ethnicity): These expansionist rumours are particularly prominent in Karagwe, which borders Rwanda. They have the potential to aggravate a feeling of insecurity, especially among the local Hutus, and generally to foster identification on both sides, since they draw on the history of the former Hima/Tutsi Empire in the Great Lakes Region.

Potential sources of tension between Bugufi/Hangaza and Bushubi/Shubi

Factors that might contribute to the potential for tension between Bugufi/Hangaza and Bushubi/Shubi fall into two main categories: socio-economic differences and the exploitation of differences.

Factors causing tension

Bugufi's better economic potential (socio-economic disparity): Compared to Bushubi, Bugufi is the more active and more densely populated centre of the district. Ngara, the district capital, is the main town in Bugufi. The area surrounding the town of Ngara has benefited far more than Bushubi from the economic boom caused by the

Table 16: Factors of potential sources of tension between Bugufi/Hangaza and Bushubi/Shubi		
General categories: factors causing, triggering and aggravating tension	**More specific level of factors causing, triggering and aggravating tension**	**Local dimension**
Socio-economic factors	Socio-economic disparities	Bugufi is developing faster than Bushubi and is more likely to benefit from the changes initiated while the refugees were present.
	Competition for natural resources	Land is slowly becoming an important natural resource. People are moving from Bugufi to Bushubi, where there is still plenty of land. There is also immigration from neighbouring countries to Kagera Region. More private land titles are being issued.
Socio-political and political constraints	Exploitation of ethnic, cultural and other differences, and discrimination	Negative stereotyping of Shubi by Hangaza.
Violence and insecurity	Inadequate security	The sudden influx of refugees led to an increase in crimes committed by both refugees and locals. The number and kind of weapons and the nature of the crimes (rape and banditry) have changed. There has been widespread mobilisation of militia and paramilitary forces in response.
		There are rumours that rebels from neighbouring countries are using Tanzania as their base.

presence of the refugees: infrastructure has been rehabilitated or, like the airstrip and the new tarmac road on the Mwanza-Rusumo route linking the refugee camps with the town of Ngara, newly built. The new road in particular has lowered Bushubi's status even further: before it was constructed, the main traffic route passed through Rulenge, the main town in Bushubi, and made it a busy transit stop. The new road has isolated Rulenge from the main transport route and markets. The disparity is further exacerbated by the fact that almost all of the international organisations have their offices in Bugufi, near the big refugee camps. Hangaza also occupy more senior positions in the district administration and the local government.

Growing shortage of land (competition for natural resources): The shortage of land is of increasing importance in the district, although it has not yet become a major concern, since there is still enough land for farming in Ngara District as a whole. However, there is a movement from the more densely populated Bugufi to Bushubi, and people are trying to obtain private land titles under Tanzania's new law on land tenure. There is also a constant influx of settlers from neighbouring countries. This factor may become highly relevant

to the relationship between Hangaza and Shubi in the medium term rather than the near future.

Negative stereotyping of Shubi (exploitation of differences): Negative stereotypes of the occupations or intelligence of Hangaza and Shubi are common. They reflect the traditional feeling of superiority that Hangaza have over Shubi and are regarded as common sense by the people.

Aggravating factors

Inadequate security (violence and insecurity): See the remarks on factors affecting the relationship between refugees and locals and on Hutus and Tutsis.

(iii) Analysis of actors involved in the tension or conflict situation

The main actors involved in the tensions referred to above have already been described in as much detail as is possible at present. The following table gives an overview of their circumstances. A more precise analysis of their interactions, sub-groups and internal dynamics is desirable, but will require further research.

Table 17:	Actors involved in potential tensions in Ngara and Karagwe		
Tensions	**Main actor 1**	**Main actor 2**	**Other actors**
Refugees/ locals	Refugee camp population	Local people who are not recipients of donations from international donors	International donors Tanzanian government and administration
Hutus/ Tutsis	Hutus: recently arrived refugees living a) in camps b) in villages	Tutsis: recently arrived refugees living a) in camps b) in villages	Tanzanian government Neighbouring governments Other local identity groups Rebel groups
	Hutus: long-term immigrants	Tutsis: long-term immigrants	Hangaza, Shubi, other local identity groups
Hangaza/ Shubi	Hangaza	Shubi	Tanzanian government (especially local government)

(iv) Relationship between micro- and macro-level tensions

The refugee situation in Kagera Region is relevant at local, national and even international level. The same is true of the potential sources of tension between Hutus and Tutsis, which must be seen in a wider regional context: to focus solely on the micro level would be to misinterpret the regional dynamics. The power struggle between Bugufi and Bushubi is primarily of local importance, but it also derives some relevance from its association with the broader dynamics of tension in the region. The macro level of tension is therefore very important in the case of the border region of Kagera.

(v) Assessment of the level of tension and conflict and trend analysis

Potential sources of tension between refugees and the local population: competition for natural resources and infrastructure

There are no significant potential sources of tension between refugees and the local population, and the situation suggests that this will remain so even if further refugees arrive. The presence of refugees has created both favourable and unfavourable opportunities for villagers, although the effects of this have dwindled with the decline in the number of people in the camps since the repatriation of Rwandan refugees in 1996. After development agencies and even relief organisations realised that they should also take an interest in

the local people, having initially neglected them, much of the damaged infrastructure, such as roads, schools, health facilities and water points, was repaired or even improved. In the opinions of the local people, the increase in markets and improvement in access to them were and, to some extent, remain a major positive aspect of the presence of the refugees. Such negative aspects as difficulties collecting firewood do not seem to be of primary concern to the people. In general, the close social links between the communities on both sides of the borders mean that people in Kagera are willing to provide support for refugees coming into the area.

On the other hand, the official policy of the local government representatives towards refugees is a minor potential source of tension. The local officials do not identify with the people in Kagera Region. Most of them have been transferred to Kagera from other parts of the country under a general policy. As "aliens", refugees can easily be seen as scapegoats for institutional weaknesses, but they are also used to attract foreign money.

Potential sources of tensions between Hutus and Tutsis: spill-over of ethno-political conflict facilitated by a history of inter-group violence

Identification with the Hutus and Tutsis, the warring factions in one of the most serious ethno-political confrontations in the Great Lakes Region, is a potential source of tension in both Ngara

and Karagwe. The Tanzanian government is also aware of potential sources of tension in its border regions and seems to fear any kind of major factor that would result in the situation getting out of control. Among other things, a new law on refugees has been introduced to help control movements in Tanzania's border regions of. By hosting the Arusha peace talks, Tanzania shows that it is at pains to remain neutral in the region.

So far there has not been an outbreak of violence or any open politicisation. However, in a situation of reduced security, local militarisation and legal insecurity, a spill-over of the main conflict in the Great Lakes Region seems possible. If such an outbreak occurred, the potential for escalation could be very high, given the legacy of violence experienced by many inhabitants of the region. It is this probably serious dimension of the possible tensions that characterises the situation, rather than any likelihood of an outbreak of violence, which is very difficult to assess.

Potential sources of tension between Bugufi/Hangaza and Bushubi/Shubi: struggle for economic and political power

Although there is no open tension between Bugufi and Bushubi at present, the delegation of more powers to the local level as part of the decentralisation process may give rise to serious tension between these two areas. Should the DED be chosen by the district council itself in the future, conflicts of interest may increase. The opposition of Bushubi's representatives and a council dominated by Bugufi's may also become relevant during the forthcoming elections. However, the potential for tension between Bugufi and Bushubi, or between Hangaza and Shubi, seems to be of limited significance at this stage if it stems only from differences between the two ethno-political areas of Ngara in terms of economic and political power.

However, if combined with the exploitation of ethnic identities, which would reflect visions of superiority or oppression, the Hangaza-Shubi dimension should be seen as a more relevant potential source of tension in the future, since it is

closely related to possible developments among Hutus and Tutsis in Kagera's border regions.

3.3 Tension-related Identification of Project Stakeholders

Table 20 gives an overview of the tension-related stakeholders of the KEP.

The KEP is working with all the actors identified: Hutus and Tutsis, Hangaza and Shubi.

As there is neither an obvious criterion for distinguishing Hutus from Tutsis nor any clear local separation of the two groups, it is difficult to determine how far each benefits from the project. No Hutu or Tutsi pressure groups have yet emerged.

It seems easier to identify project stakeholders in the Hangaza/Shubi situation, since each group can be at least roughly ascribed to a geographical area. Furthermore, the Hangaza and Shubi identities are expressed openly. As the above table shows, the KEP is operating in both areas and therefore with both groups. However, some KEP activities, such as the training of stove technicians and environmental education, are concentrated on Bugufi.

Further knowledge of the composition, interests and leverage of KEP stakeholders would be useful.[124]

3.4 Sensitivity of the KEP to Tensions

This section assesses the KEP's sensitivity to the potential sources of tension identified in Ngara and Karagwe Districts, mainly on the basis of interviews with the project staff responsible and of the project documentation. The aim is to determine whether the project is really aware of the current potential sources of tension in its area and whether it has ever considered the impact it may

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[124] See section IV.2.6.

Table 18:	Tension-related stakeholders of the KEP				
Tensions	**Main actor 1**	**Project stakeholder**	**Main actor 2**	**Project stake-holder**	**Other stake-holders**
Refugees/ Locals	Refugees in camps[125]		People living in villages	- Stove technicians - Seedling groups - Pilot villages	Tanzanian government, district, regional and national officials, international donor agencies
Hutu/ Tutsi	Hutus: recently arrived refugees living in camps		Tutsis: recently arrived refugees living in camps		
	Hutus: recently arrived refugees living in villages		Tutsis: recently arrived refugees living in villages		Tanzanian government
	Hutus: long-term immigrants	- Stove technicians - Seedling-groups - Pilot villages	Tutsis: long-term immigrants	- Stove technicians - Seedling-groups - Pilot villages	Other local identity groups
Hangaza/ Shubi	Hangaza	- Stove technicians from Bugufi - Seedling-groups in Bugufi - Pilot villages in Bugufi - Pupils in two secondary schools	Shubi	- Seedling-groups in Bushubi - Pilot village in Bushubi	Local government as a joint stakeholder of tensions and the project

be having on the socio-political situation and eventually adjusted certain activities accordingly.

Recognition of potential and actual tensions

Recognition by the project staff (field office)

Potential sources of tension between refugees and local population: It should be stressed that the KEP staff in Kagera had soon realised that a simple line could not be drawn between refugees and locals and had abandoned the political goal of the initial phase. However, as this change was never

made explicit, it led to different perceptions within the organisation of the project's overall goal.

Potential sources of tension between Hutus and Tutsis: The KEP field staff recognise that Ngara's population identify with the two major ethnic groups. It has been reported, for instance, that, even in Kagera, people can and do easily identify with one or other group. However, the issue is not considered to be of further relevance.

Potential sources of tension between Bugufi and Bushubi: In terms of personal capacities a great deal is known about the identified potential sources of tension between the people of Bugufi and the people of Bushubi. The project staff responsible at field level are well aware of the growing economic disparities between the two parts of Ngara District and of the feeling of superiority that Bugufi/Hangaza traditionally have over Bushubi/Shubi. However, it has not yet been

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[125] As a rule, when references are made to possible tensions between refugees and the local population, only the camp population is meant. Given that there are no tensions between refugees and the locals, the creation of a group of *refugees in villages* and another of *non-refugee villagers* serves no useful purpose.

considered necessary for these findings to be related to KEP activities.

Recognition in the project documents

The official planning and implementation documents mention neither the Bugufi/Bushubi situation nor any identification of the majority of the people living in Kagera Region with either Hutus or Tutsis. The documents do not touch on these potential sources of tension at all.

Recognition in connection with the selection of target groups/beneficiaries

Potential sources of tension between Bugufi/ Bushubi and Hutus/Tutsis: As the two main operational project activities, stove-making and tree nurseries, are demand-driven, no specific attention is paid to either group. In practice, however, there is no guarantee that a demand-driven approach, which may be necessary if the operational project goals are to be achieved, will automatically lead to balanced distribution among beneficiaries. If one group is more prepared to apply and work with the project, the target group may shift towards this group and unwittingly exclude others. Where KEP beneficiaries are concerned, this is precisely what the responsible field staff of the project realised after discussing the findings of the tension analysis: while most of the stove technicians from Bugufi maintain contact with the KEP and attend regular workshops, none of the trained technicians from Bushubi has remained in the current pool of active stove technicians with a view to obtaining further training. The drop-out rate among trained stove technicians from Bushubi is therefore one hundred per cent. No information on the participation rates of either Hutus or Tutsis is available.

Project adjustments and initiatives caused by local tensions

No reactive adjustments have been made or proactive initiatives taken because no need has yet been identified. The project staff in Ngara could imagine reacting, for example, by adopting a different

employment policy (see the next paragraph) if potential sources of tension identified emerged in the future and provoked incidents.

Project policies (tension-sensitive employment policy)

The project field staff do not originate from the project area. They cannot therefore be attributed to one or other group in the region. Moreover, very few local people are working with the KEP. Only one of them (the extension officer) maintains close contact with the villagers. No problems were reported by the project staff.

3.5 Identification of Impacts[126]

The KEP's impact with regard to its overall, tension-related goal of maintaining the local population's acceptance of the refugees

As the tension and conflict analysis has shown, there is, for the time being at least, no need for the hospitality of the local people to be improved. For several reasons they already welcome refugees coming into the area. The KEP cannot therefore have a significant positive impact on the relationship between refugees and locals at village level.

Nevertheless, the KEP does at least provide the hosting of refugees with some additional support by assisting the local communities. This can be

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[126] During the research it was found that the visibility of KEP activities in the villages visited is limited. Although the research was not directly concerned with assessing the project's general significance, the fact that the majority of the interviewees at village and ward level had no detailed knowledge of KEP activities made impact identification very difficult. The limited recognition of KEP measures may be due to the fact that a) the KEP works indirectly with the people through the district administration and b) only individual recipients and some groups know about the measures because of the KEP's demand-driven approach. For detailed information see the impact data in the TCIA matrix (Table 15) and the village findings in Annex C 3.2.

seen as a positive intended impact directed against the unbalanced donor support to the benefit of the refugees that prevailed when assistance first began. This is particularly relevant at policy level as a signal to the Tanzanian government, which had agreed with some donor agencies on the need for social compensation for the damage caused by refugees on their arrival.

At district level, where administrative capacities were far from being a match for the wide range of tasks awaiting them, the KEP's involvement is similarly a positive signal.

However, the KEP's involvement has not had the same impact at grassroots level, if only because it does not accord with the priorities which the trend lines have shown the people to have (Annex C 3.2). Nor, unlike some other donors, does the KEP provide assistance free: it relies on the beneficiaries' active and material involvement. This is sometimes perceived as unfair treatment when compared to the free assistance that refugees receive from relief organisations.

In summary, the KEP's impact on the relationship between refugees and locals is somehow mixed, but on the whole insignificant in terms of its original intention, given the absence of any major tensions.

Identification of hypothetical areas of KEP impacts

As the other potential sources of tension were not found empirically to have any direct impacts, broader areas and directions of possible future impacts should be mentioned:

The project staff at the field office realised that, where the stove-making in Ngara is concerned, the project unwittingly works only with stove technicians from the Bugufi area. Although Bushubi apprentices had initially been involved in the project, they had subsequently dropped out as time passed. It cannot be said today whether one group may have seen this as a negative impact,

but it proves that biased support is at least possible.

On the positive side, the project has the – albeit very limited – potential to improve communication and cooperation among the different actors involved in tension situations by arranging joint workshops and providing training. Such an impact would be a positive unintended side-effect of project work, but cannot be expected to have significant overall effects.

3.6   Conclusions and Recommendations

The TCIA of KEP activities took place in a very complex socio-political environment. It revealed that project monitoring fell short of achieving the transformation of the socio-political environment of the refugee situation. In these specific circumstances the tension and conflict analysis was more important than impact identification, because what the outsider sees as possible tensions differs enormously from the actual potential sources of tension in the project area, which remain largely below the surface of society.

The following were the conclusions drawn and recommendations made:

Conclusions

(i) There are no significant tensions between the local people and the refugees.

It was not possible to confirm the German development community's perception of tensions between the local people and the refugees. The project does not therefore have a significant impact on the relationship between the two groups. There seems to be no further need for specific assistance to be given to the local population with the aim of reducing such tensions and so maintaining their acceptance of the refugees.[127]

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127 This does not mean that there are no other important reasons for development cooperation in Kagera Region.

(ii) The project sends out a positive signal at policy level as regards assistance to areas affected by refugees.

Greater concern about the influx of refugees is felt at district, regional and national level than among the local population. The project has therefore shown, and continues to show, that the international community cares not only for the refugees but also for the local population.

(iii) There are potential sources of tension or conflict between Hutus and Tutsis in Kagera Region.

The potential sources of tension between Hutus and Tutsis in Kagera are of a very sensitive nature, because they have to do with the history of inter-group violence in the neighbouring countries. They are not expressed openly, but rather exist below the surface of the local communities. Although no direct link to project activities can be identified, these findings should be seen as an important key to understanding the socio-political environment of the whole region and may become relevant in another context.

(iv) There is a potential source of tension between two ethno-political areas of Ngara District.

The potential sources of tension between Bugufi and Bushubi area, or between the Hangaza and Shubi, in Ngara District are discussed more openly than identification with the Hutus and Tutsis, since the tension stems from traditional local political and economic power structures and from one group's traditional feelings of superiority over the other. In some instances, local identification was related to the distinction between Hutus and Tutsis. It is not clear at this stage, however, whether there is a broader perception of a correlation or if local identities will be related to the Hutu and Tutsi conflict potentials in the future. The KEP's activities are targeted at both areas of Ngara District.

(v) The assessment of hypothetical tension-related impacts suggests that the KEP does not have a significant impact on the three potential sources of tension identified.

Because of the difficult research setting, no tension-related impacts of KEP activities were identified empirically. The mainly hypothetical impacts identified suggest that the KEP's tension and conflict impacts are not significant. Potential sources of tension may be aggravated by the concentration of project activities on one stakeholder group. This may become an unintended negative impact if the KEP is perceived as intentionally taking sides. There are also potential sources of positive impacts if communication and cooperation among different stakeholders can be improved through workshops and training. However, as a conscious effort to identify potential sources of tension and their actors has never been made, the project has not been able to develop this positive potential systematically or to define a position on its intended role in its socio-political environment.

Recommendations

(i) Investigate the relationship between Hutus and Tutsis in Tanzania's border regions and its dynamics

If more insights into the relationship between Hutus and Tutsis in Kagera's long-term resident and short-term refugee/migrant population are to be gained, far more time and local knowledge will be required. This knowledge is needed for any sensitive project work in this region. It is of primary importance that the local project staff should be aware, sensitive and familiar with the local environment.

(ii) Launching cross-border initiatives and exchanges of information

The KEP is purposely situated in the regions bordering Rwanda and Burundi, which form part of the Great Lakes Region. The people of Kagera have very close ties and a common history with these neighbouring countries. Sharing experiences

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It was not, however, an aspect on which the present study focused.

and learning from development projects across the borders could become routine. German development cooperation projects should begin a regular exchange based not only on sectoral similarities but also on the exchange of socio-political knowledge. Cross-border initiatives between different development projects, in Rwanda and Tanzania, for example, might be launched to help stabilise the border regions. This would, of course, far exceed the scope of a small project like the KEP, but it might be achieved in a wider context of coordinating projects that are being implemented by different donor agencies. Such initiatives could become a starting point for a regional conflict prevention strategy.

(iii) Trying not to be perceived as taking sides in identified conflicts of interest

As the KEP may be concentrating more on one stakeholder than on the other, some thought might be given in the future to not being perceived as deliberately taking sides. If the differences between the stakeholders became a political issue, the KEP might be more involved than it is now, regardless of the impartial incentive system on which its activities are based. The KEP's education component, for instance, might include the preparation of lectures for out-of-school lessons to enable groups that may not yet be represented in the participating schools to be involved.

(iv) Holding a one-day workshop to carry out a tension-related stakeholder analysis for the KEP as follow-up to the tension analysis

As a follow-up to the present tension analysis, an in-depth tension-related stakeholder analysis for the project is strongly recommended. It should take the form of a one-day workshop attended by project staff, extension workers and other partners, and one or two neutral moderators. It should take account of the present findings of the tension and conflict analysis. The actors involved in the potential tension situations (Hutus and Tutsis, Hangaza and Shubi) and project stakeholders (stove technicians, user groups, pupils, etc.) need to be involved, and any impacts should be identified. A project position should be agreed on this

basis. The project staff's knowledge at this stage of implementation is an important prerequisite for a sound analysis. Any further action or reaction needed can be identified by the workshop participants. This joint analysis may be a better means of ensuring that the findings stem from project reality and that plans for further action are supported by the project staff.

First checklist for a tension-related KEP workshop:

— Is the project aware of the ethnic structure of the villages in which it is operating?

— Who are the project's main beneficiaries and multipliers? To which area or ethnic group do they belong?

— How are development activities shared between Bugufi and Bushubi? (Such factors as geographical distance, better or worse working relationships and political pressure may play a part as causes of an unbalanced relationship.)

— Has any ethnic or other identity of project staff ever posed a problem in day-to-day project work?

— Is there a possibility that the project is perceived in the district as taking sides (in the council, for example)?

— Has it ever been necessary to adjust project activities because of the tensions referred to above?

V   Findings and Recommendations

This chapter extracts from the case studies findings and recommendations that can be generalised for development cooperation. It begins by describing the main findings on the socio-political impact of development projects. The findings on the methodological approach of the Tension and Conflict Impact Analysis are then outlined. Finally, recommendations are made for development co-

operation as an actor in socio-political environments.

1 Findings: Socio-political Impact of Development Cooperation Projects

This section describes the main findings of the study on the impact of development projects on socio-political tensions and conflicts.

(i) Tension and conflict patterns are complex and change quickly.

Factors that lead to tensions and conflicts are many and varied. The extent to which they influence the socio-political situation differs from one case to another and over time. Furthermore, a factor that causes tensions in one case may trigger or aggravate a conflict in another. Consequently, the channels through which development cooperation can have impacts on the socio-political environment are as numerous as the factors.

(ii) Tensions and conflicts are relevant at project level.

As conflicts of interest are an inherent aspect of society, development cooperation as an actor in society both influences these conflicts and is influenced by them. There are no purely technical projects that act without interrelating with the socio-political environment.

(iii) Development projects may have unintended socio-political side-effects.

As tension and conflict patterns are complex, development projects may have unintended socio-political side-effects, which need not be negative: they may also be positive.

(iv) The stakeholders' perception of the project matters.

Socio-political tensions and conflicts are not caused solely by "objective reality". The actors' perception is at least as important as the facts. How social groups perceive a development project and its role within the social environment is therefore crucial to its actual socio-political impact.

(v) It is essential for project staff to be well-qualified and sensitive to situations of tension.

Because of the complexity of possible impacts, project staff wanting to provide expertise on the technical aspects of a project must show that they are qualified and sensitive to actual and potential socio-political tensions and conflicts.

(vi) A tension-sensitive approach may be inconsistent with other project goals.

As the issue of *tensions and conflicts* is a cross-section dimension of development cooperation, a tension- and conflict-sensitive approach may not necessarily be consistent with other project goals. They may even oppose each other. In this case, there is a trade-off between the two opposing objectives.

(vii) The balanced participation of different project stakeholder groups may be socio-politically advisable, but counteract other principles of development cooperation.

The recommendations derived from both case studies call for the balanced participation of the various project stakeholders. However, balanced participation may not accord with such principles as the demand-driven approach. Other incentive systems may also restrict the options open to the project for balancing the support it gives to various social groups.

(viii) In Tanzania ethnicity has an impact on development cooperation.

Although ethnicity reportedly does not play a crucial role in Tanzania, the study found evidence that local factors examined in both project regions for tensions were connected to the identification of stakeholder groups along ethnic lines. As an actor in so sensitive a socio-political context, development cooperation faces some major challenges if adverse side-effects are to be avoided.

2   Findings: Tension and Conflict Impact Analysis (TCIA)

On the basis of the research on the two projects, this chapter presents the general findings regarding the TCIA methodology:

(i) TCIA is a useful approach to the analysis of situations of tension and the impacts of projects on tensions.

The methodology of Tension and Impact Analysis (TCIA) is used to analyse both local situations of tension and the impacts of development projects on local tensions. The step-by-step TCIA approach has proved helpful in the systematic analysis of environments. It enables flexible use to be made of the various elements of TCIA, which can be applied to individual tension situations in project regions and to different types of project.

(ii) TCIA has decisive features of an impact analysis.

TCIA has the most important features of impact analyses, since it looks beyond the intended project goal and the intended project beneficiaries/stakeholders and considers unintended effects of the project.

(iii) TCIA focuses on the tension stakeholders' perceptions and addresses the problems of impact attribution and assessment of impact significance.

An important advantage of TCIA is its focus on the tension stakeholders' perceptions, since perceptions play a major role in tensions and conflicts. On the basis of the tension stakeholders' perception, TCIA permits the *attribution of impacts* to project activities, just as the local population attributes socio-political effects to project activities (during group discussions, for example). *Impact significance* is assessed by local tension stakeholders when they weigh the importance of project activities in terms of socio-political impact.

The problems of attributing impacts and assessing their significance may persist if some of the project activities or the entire project are unknown to the tension actors.

(iv) Methodological shortcomings must be taken into account.

Some methodological shortcomings were observed during the collection of data. They must therefore be taken into account in the interpretation of the data to minimise a possible bias of the results:

—   The sensitivity of the topic is such that it may not be possible to obtain all relevant information. People may be reluctant to speak frankly about tensions or be under pressure from others and so frightened to impart certain information. However, these are problems that generally arise in empirical research. Based on the principle of triangulation, the TCIA approach enables some important information to be obtained. Different approaches to data collection allow information to be cross-checked for reliability.

—   The TCIA approach covers complex and sensitive situations and environments. It should therefore be remembered that more time may

be needed for the research than for short-term consultancy activities in other areas.

Some general shortcomings of empirical research methods are also to be found in TCIA:

— In group discussions a few people may dominate the discussion and influence the opinions and statements of others.

— As those conducting TCIA and the project staff need to cooperate closely, there may be built-in bias. During field work for this study, project cars were used to travel to the project villages and, in some cases, the groups were accompanied by project staff (as translators, for example). This may have influenced the statements made by the interviewees in the project villages.

(v) Elements of TCIA can be applied to projects at different stages of implementation.

TCIA is useful both for current projects and for projects which have been completed. Individual elements of the approach may also be applied to projects at the planning stage or the first stage of implementation, because TCIA enables the various elements of the approach to be used flexibly. In these cases, emphasis should be placed on tension and conflict analysis.

Entry points for the incorporation of the tension and conflict dimension in the project cycle are shown in Table 21. The table gives an overview of possible tension- and conflict-related elements arranged according to their use in the project cycle. The objective of each element at that specific stage is listed, along with a reference to the operational guidelines that can be provided to facilitate its application. This list naturally represents only one possible set of tension- and conflict-related elements. It would also need to be adapted to different institutional environments.

Apart from the first element (strategic conflict analysis), none of the suggested tension and conflict elements has yet been systematically inte-

grated by any institution, but they represent work in progress at different stages and in different organisations. It should be noted that the table does not include a filter element, which would restrict a detailed impact analysis to a small number of cases. Given the tight financial situation and lack of staff in donor agencies, the development of such a filter element is important.

3 General Recommendations

Based on the findings and recommendations for the two projects analysed during the case study and on the findings and recommendations regarding the TCIA approach, the recommendations are as follows:

(i) Socio-political impacts should be considered more systematically in development cooperation.

Development agencies should seek to be sensitive to tensions and conflicts at all stages of the project cycle, because every development project has socio-political implications and may even cause, trigger or aggravate tensions. Analysing socio-political impacts can help to enhance the quality of development cooperation and to promote the overall goal of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

To make the socio-political impacts of cooperation transparent, development agencies should analyse positive and negative, intended and unintended impacts at micro level more systematically. Positive impacts should be made more visible, and awareness of possible negative impacts increased. Unintended impacts in particular should be made transparent. Considering socio-political impacts more systematically promotes a better understanding of tensions and conflicts in societies, helps to gear projects to influencing tensions and conflicts positively and may help in the design of new activities.

Table 21: Possible entry points for the incorporation of the tension and conflict dimension in the project cycle in German development cooperation

Project cycle stage	Tension and conflict element	Objective	Operational guidelines for project cycle management instruments needed	Main responsibilities
Country strategy	Strategic conflict analysis ("Spelten indicators")	To incorporate assessment of conflict risk in Country Strategy Papers	Indicators for measuring the conflict risk	BMZ
Project planning/ appraisal	Preliminary Risk Appraisal (Checklist 1)[b]	To assess the hypothetical importance of tensions and conflicts for a project and decide – whether to go ahead with planning or not (knock-in / knock-out), – whether there is a need for special attention to be paid to tensions and conflicts in further planning.	Checklist: – categories to identify "risk projects", – indicators to identify "risk areas".	GTZ, KfW, other implementing agencies: Desk officers and/ or advisors, consultants
Tension and Conflict Impact Analysis (TCIA) → Tension and conflict analysis[a]		– To identify severity of conflicts of interest – To analyse causes, dynamics and actors of a possible tension or conflict situation	– Stage or escalation model – Categories of factors causing, aggravating and triggering tensions – Guidelines to analyse tension and conflict actors' capacities and interests	
Tension and conflict-specific stakeholder analysis[a]		– To identify possible peace and conflict constituencies – To identify vulnerable groups	– Extended guidelines to analyse stakeholders' capacities and interests with regard to tensions and conflicts	
Impact Matrix		Hypothetical assessment of positive and negative, intended and unintended impacts of the project on identified socio-political tensions and conflicts	Framework matrix to integrate categories of causes of tensions and conflicts and stakeholders' perceptions of project impact	
Tension and Conflict Management Plan[b]		Possibly to redesign project or include conflict prevention and management instruments		

Table 21 (continued): Possible entry points for the incorporation of the tension and conflict dimension in the project cycle in German development cooperation

Phase	Element	Purpose	Method	Responsible
Implementation	Detailed and field-based TCIA[a]	To assess the extent to which the project contributes to either conflict or cooperation dynamics	(See project planning/appraisal)	Project staff and advisors/consultants
	Tension and Conflict management plan[b]	To formulate reactive or pro-active measures for the project: – to develop strategies and choose instruments for conflict prevention and management, – to adapt project design or project goal.	Flexible	
Monitoring and Evaluation	Sensitivity Check (Checklist II)[a]	To gain an impression of the extent to which project management and staff were/are able to – recognise tensions and conflict in project environment, – react appropriately to possible socio-political tensions and conflicts.	Indicators of tension and conflict sensitivity of project	Advisors / consultants
	Detailed and field-based TCIA[a]	To assess realistically the extent to which the project contributes to either conflict or cooperation dynamics – To lay out some foundations for political decision on project's future	Stakeholder analysis workshops	
	Tension and Conflict management plan[b]	(See implementation phase)	Flexible	

a   Elements are outlined in present study.
b   No operational element yet available.
Source: Adapted from Warner (1999)

(ii) Tension and conflict analyses should be carried out at different stages of tension-related projects.

When a project that has a direct bearing on a tension or conflict situation is launched, a tension and conflict analysis should be carried out on site during planning and again during implementation. Such follow-up seems essential because socio-political situations may change very quickly, making it necessary to redesign tension-related projects.

(iii) The tension and conflict sensitivity of development projects should be promoted by development agency headquarters.

Projects should be encouraged to analyse their socio-political impacts and to draw conclusions for further action accordingly. This may be achieved by:

— creating incentive systems to promote tension and conflict sensitivity. Development agency headquarters should encourage projects to analyse their socio-political impacts, e.g. by stressing advantages for projects conducting such analyses; sharing results of such analyses must not be a disincentive;

— crossing country borders in communication, mutual learning and action; projects characterised by similar or interrelated tensions and conflicts in neighbouring countries, e.g. projects in border regions, should be helped to share experience and ideas.

(iv) Development agencies should provide support for projects in tension and conflict situations.

Development agencies should provide support for projects which are influenced by tensions and conflicts and projects which are influencing tensions and conflicts. This may mean:

— providing projects with tension and conflict specialists or task forces, should the need arise;

— offering tension and conflict training and workshops to projects at all stages of project cycle management; project staff should be enabled to act competently in situations of tensions and conflicts.

(v) Priority projects for TCIA should be identified.

In principle, all development cooperation projects could analyse their socio-political impacts by using elements of TCIA. Given the budgetary and other constraints, consideration should first be given to tension- and conflict-relevant projects, such as:

— projects in regions, countries or areas characterised by tensions and conflicts; TCIA elements may increase understanding of their socio-political environment and create awareness of tension and conflict impacts of these projects;

— projects with a tension- and conflict-sensitive focus, e.g. projects relating to the use of natural resources and projects with political goals; TCIA elements may help such projects to have their intended positive socio-political impacts;

— projects with a high financial input; TCIA elements may help such projects to assess their influence on the distribution of resources.

To determine which projects should be considered for TCIA first, lists of criteria may prove helpful in identifying "high-risk projects" and "potential projects" in terms of socio-political tensions and conflicts.

Annex

Annex A   Data Sheet Tanzania[128]

Area and Population

Area   45,087 sq. km

Population
       Total   31.3 mill. (1997)
          Growth rate   3.1 % p.a. (1980-1997)
          Rural share   74 %
          Urban share   26 %
              Growth rate urban population   6.6 % (1980-1997)
              Growth rate urban workforce   3.1 % (1980-1997)
          Density   35 per sq. km
          Refugee population total   415,000 (1999)
              Burundi   285,000
              Democratic Republic of Congo   118,000
              Rwanda   8,000
              Somalia   4,000

Economic Indicators

GDP   Total   US $ 6,920 mill. (1999)
          Per capita   US $ 210
          Growth rate   2.7 %
          Share agriculture   47 %
          Share industry   21 %
          Share service   31 %

Further indicators (1997)
          Gross domestic investments   20 % of GDP
          Gross domestic savings   3.4 % of GDP
          Public expenses   13 % of GDP
          Private expenses   83 % of GDP
          Foreign exchange debts   72 % of GDP
          Debt servicing   12.9 % of Export
          ODA   15.6 % of GDP (1996)
          Balance of payment   US $- 544 mill.

Currency   1 Tanzania Shilling (TSh)= 100 Cents

Exchange rate   US $ 1 = TSh 670 (01.2000)

Rate of inflation   22.6 % (1991-1997)

Social Indicators

Human development index rank   156 (1999)

Population characteristics
          Life expectancy   48 years (1997)
          Infant mortality   10 % (1997)
          Adult illiteracy rate   32 % (1995)
              Male   21 % (1997)
              Female   43 % (1997)

Access to save water   49 % (1996)

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128 Sources: UNDP (1997); UNDP (1999); UNHCR (2000); World Bank (1995); World Bank (1999).

Annex B   Information on the Research Approach

B 1   Dimensions and Possible Indicators of Cooperation and Tension

The aim of adopting different dimensions and indicators for the *cooperation* and *tension* stages is to enable stock to be taken of a socio-political trend (see section II.2). Within the framework of this study it is not possible to give clearly measurable and generally valid indicators and corresponding magnitudes.

Table A 1: Dimensions and possible indicators for cooperation and tension	
Dimensions for *cooperation*	**Possible indicators for *cooperation* (indicating trends)**
Functioning of communication structures (village meetings, council of elders)	Frequency of meetings, structure of participants
Consensus on norms, values and procedures (acceptance of traditional and/or modern jurisdiction)	Number of court cases
Reliable and active inter-group relations (trade, mutual help, exchange of information, history of inter-group relations)	
Practice of social openness (participating in festivities of other groups, respecting social differences)	Number of inter-group links: economic partnerships, marriages, etc.
Maintenance of law and order (trusting and respecting public authorities)	Number of infringements
Dimensions for *tensions*	**Possible indicators for *tensions* (indicating trends)**
Limited communication (reliance on conjecture instead of solid information)	Frequency of meetings, structure of participants
Dissent on norms, values and social procedures (rejection of traditional and/or modern jurisdiction)	Number of court cases
Strains on inter-group relations (unreliable information, lack of trust, history of inter-group differences)	
Social barriers (stereotyping, suspicion of other groups)	Number of inter-group links: economic partnerships, marriages, etc.
Occasional public unrest (protests, boycotts)	Number of infringements

B 2   GTZ Participant Analysis

GTZ Participant analysis

Objective

The GTZ systematically conducts participants analyses at various stages of the project cycle. They form part of the broad framework of the GTZ's major project planning method *Zielorientierte Projektplanung* (ZOPP, Objective-Oriented Project Planning). While ZOPP forms the basic framework of participatory planning processes, participant analysis is used to analyse "*the major project actors, their interests and goals and their interrelationships. It aims to shed light on the social reality and power relationships prevailing on site in the project. Major actors include not just potential winners but also potential losers.*"[a] The overall objective is to increase the probability of the project succeeding.

Characteristics

The conduct of a participant analysis is far from standardised. There is no manual or step-by-step guide, which leaves the project staff considerable scope for creativity and calls for a high degree of flexibility in adapting to conditions on site.

The participant analysis is itself a participatory approach. Participants in a project are given the opportunity to express their interests, hopes and fears during workshops chaired by GTZ staff or consultants. As a rule, the actual participants in workshops constitute no more than a small fraction of the participants in the project and have to be carefully selected to ensure that the analysis is representative of the participants in the project.

The GTZ begins by splitting the participants in projects into three groups[b]:

(i)   active participants working on the project,

(ii)   passive participants affected by the impact of the project,

(iii)   third parties working in the field of development cooperation in the same region.

The next step is a more detailed examination of the participants with the aim of grouping them in accordance with specific criteria, such as occupation, sources of income, ethnic and religious or cultural background. Subgroups with different interests in the project can often be identified among these groups. The analysing staff must therefore be sensitive to the degree of detail needed in grouping the participants.

To analyse the various groups of participants, the GTZ has developed the following analytical framework[c]:

1. Characteristics of the group:
– social characteristics (members, social background, religion, cultural aspects),
– status of the group (formal or informal, etc.),
– structure of the group (organisation, leaders, etc.),
– situation and problems - the group's perception.

2. Interests, motives, attitude:
-     needs, wishes,
-     interests (open, hidden),
-     motives (hopes, expectations, fears),
-     attitude (towards the implementing institutions and organisations).

3. Potentials:

- strengths (resources, rights, monopolies, etc.),

- weaknesses,

- what can the group contribute to the project's success.

4. Implications for the project:

- how should the group be incorporated,

- what kind of measures have to be taken with regard to the group,

- how does the project treat the group?

Participant analysis and the project cycle

The GTZ usually conducts the participant analysis within the ZOPP framework between the various phases of a project. The analysis differs widely from one phase of the project cycle to another.

During the first two phases of a project (appraisal proposal and project appraisal) direct participation of the project's participants in the planning process is hardly possible, because these phases are conducted in Germany and participants still have to be identified. The analysis is therefore very hypothetical in nature. The information obtained is often rather limited. It is nevertheless indispensable because the GTZ staff are forced to take the point of view of potential participants into account.

During the project's other phases representatives of the participant groups take part in the analysis. At the beginning the presiding staff have to play a passive role. Any opinion expressed by participants must be respected, and the chairpersons' role is limited to obtaining as much information as possible by asking neutral questions. Depending on the situation, the chairpersons may subsequently play a far more active role, as they try to create a cooperative atmosphere among the participant groups.

Despite this mediating function of the analysis, no explicit guidelines are given on how to deal with opposing interests or tensions between groups. It its left to the staff's sensitivity to decide whether opposing groups should participate in the same workshop and how they should be treated.

Source: a See GTZ (1997a).
       b See GTZ (1989).
       c See GTZ (1987).

Annex C   Information on Empirical Research

C 1   Design and Schedule of Field Research in Tanzania

The aim of the case study in Tanzania was to analyse the socio-political impact of German development cooperation at micro level. The study focused on the TCIA of two German development projects, the HIAP and the KEP. The research team concentrated on the following topics during its stay in Tanzania:

— Development cooperation officials and experts and socio-political issues in Tanzania (mainly in Dar es Salaam): potential and actual socio-political tensions, especially at macro level, role of international development cooperation in Tanzania and possible influences on socio-political tensions at macro and micro level.

— Development cooperation officials and experts and socio-political issues in the two project areas: socio-political tensions in the project area, possible influences of development cooperation on socio-political tensions, especially influences of the HIAP and the KEP, influence of macro-level tensions at micro level.

— Target groups and other stakeholders of the two development projects, the HIAP and KEP (mainly villagers): features and trend of socio-political tensions, possible influences of the HIAP and KEP on socio-political tensions.

The research visit consisted of four phases:

— During the first phase the team organised two initial workshops to present the preliminary report and discuss it with IDS experts and representatives of development cooperation agencies. The research team conducted interviews with (i) representatives of the German Embassy and German development agencies, (ii) representatives of other bi- and multilateral donors, (iii) representatives of Tanzanian institutions responsible for bi- and multilateral development cooperation, (iv) experts on socio-political issues in Tanzania and (v) representatives of NGOs.

— During the second phase the group divided into two for visits to two German projects, the HIAP and the KEP. The two teams conducted interviews and used a set of methods (outlined in this study) during visits to villages in the project area.

— During the third phase, the whole group discussed the findings of the two sub-groups, HIAP and KEP, and drafted the final report.

— During the fourth phase, the team discussed its findings with representatives of its Tanzanian counterpart, the IDS, representatives of German and other development agencies and representatives of the German Embassy.

Table A 2: Overview of the schedule of field research in Tanzania					
First phase	**Second phase**			**Third phase**	**Fourth phase**
Whole group: Dar es Salaam	Two sub-groups: German development projects HIAP and KEP			Whole group: various places	Whole group: Dar es Salaam
Workshops discussing preliminary report, expert interviews	Expert interviews in project area	Each sub-group conducts research in 4 villages	Presentation and discussion of sub-groups' preliminary findings	Additional interviews, discussion of results by working group, preparation of report	Presentation and discussion of report
First week	Second to sixth week			Seventh to tenth week	Eleventh week

C 2   Handeni Integrated Agroforestry Project

C 2.1   Findings on Factors Causing, Triggering and Aggravating Local Tensions

The following findings are presented in detail to describe the local dimension of factors causing, triggering and aggravating the three kinds of tension in the HIAP area.

Tensions between farmers and pastoralists: natural resource use

Factors causing tensions

Competition for natural resources is the main factor causing tensions between farmers and pastoralists. Access to land and water is continuously disputed because pastoralists want to move their cattle in search of grazing land and water and because farmers are looking for new land they can clear and cultivate. Damage to fields leads to mutual accusations and disputes over compensation; the scarcity of water sources (pumps, wells, reservoirs) causes disputes over the rights of access to these sources.

According to pastoralists in Kibirashi, *the lack of legitimate government and good governance* also causes tensions. They pointed out that the history of forced *Ujamaa* villagisation is still seen as a cause of tensions between farmers and pastoralists. Before *Ujamaa* villagisation Nguu farmers in the Kibirashi area lived near the mountains, cultivating fields there, while the plains were used by Masai pastoralists. The *Ujamaa* village brought farmers closer to the plains and was composed of both farmers and pastoralists. This enforced proximity of the two professional groups was regarded as a cause of tensions.

Pastoralists in Kibirashi also mentioned that limited participation is causing tensions between farmers and pastoralists. They claim that their underrepresentation leads to unfair decisions on farmers who encroach on grazing land. Many of them seem to regard fines and compensation to be paid for destruction of fields as chicanery, imposed on pastoralists arbitrarily by village governments mainly composed of farmers. These village governments adopt by-laws regulating fines and compensations. On the other hand, farmers in Kibirashi felt that the pastoralists' aspiration to have a Masai elected village chairman was having an adverse effect on village life.

Factors triggering tensions

Tensions are triggered by a combination of competition for natural resources, meaning, in the HIAP region, above all else access to land and water, and a legacy of violence, mainly the practice of people taking the law into their own hands. Sporadic violence may occur after cattle enter and destroy fields and when pastoralists "chase farmers away" from what pastoralists regard as their grazing land. It is common practice in the project area for people to take the law into their own hands, i.e. to punish thieves and other intruders in community life, and it may easily escalate into violence and counter-violence, as happened in Kibirashi in 1999.

Factors aggravating tensions

A combination of *socio-economic disparities* and *inadequate satisfaction of basic needs* may aggravate tensions. Most farmers in the project area are cultivating fields for their families' subsistence. If their fields are destroyed by pastoralists' cattle, which farmers cannot usually afford and which may number up to several hundred head, envy and frustration may aggravate tensions, especially as the farmers' ability to satisfy their basic needs may be endangered.

Another combination of factors aggravating tensions is a perceived *lack of legitimate government and good governance* and *limited participation.* Pastoralists often see themselves as a suppressed minority. Village governments may be regarded by pastoralists as being biased towards farmer and fines as imposing arbitrary compensation. Pastoralists in Kibirashi attributed this to what they per-

ceived as unequal representation of the two professional groups.

Inadequate formal and informal channels of tension and conflict management were mentioned as an aggravating factor by farmers in Kibirashi. The absence of a permanent committee until 1999 aggravated the tensions between farmers and pastoralists.

Limited institutional capacities may aggravate tensions if by-laws are unclear, contradictory or unknown. This is especially true of pastoralist communities, in which illiteracy is still rife and whose members often cross several villages that may have different by-laws.

The *exploitation of ethnic, cultural and other differences, and discrimination* may aggravate tensions, there being a coincidence of a professional group and an ethnic group. Pastoralists are mainly Parakuyo or Kisongo Masai, whereas farmers are mainly Wanguu or Wazigua. This facilitates the e*xploitation of ethnicity and of such other differences as religion, since most Ilparakuyo consider themselves to be Christians, whereas the majority of Wazigua and Wanguu are Muslims. Pastoralists referred to such* slogans such "*Go to Saunyi*" (a village inhabited by Kisongo Masai) and the advice from farmer to farmer: "*Cultivate, but don't tell*", i.e. encroach on grazing land secretly. In general, this polarisation between the Wanguu/Wazigua farmers and the Parakuyo/Kisongo pastoralists may aggravate tensions. Even the ancient belief that "*all cattle belong to Masai*", which served as a justification for stealing cows from farmers, is still remembered, even by the farmers.

*Closely associated with this factor, s*ocial disintegration and separation* may also aggravate tensions. The two professional groups communicate on certain occasions, at market and joint festivities, for example, but they seem to be separated most of the time. There is no intermarrying, for instance. Where there have been continuous quarrels, mutual frustration can be found, e.g. in Mkindi village. The farmers' frustration was underlined by such statements as "*You can't mix

crops and livestock" and even "*The only solution is for the Masai to leave*". Poor communication may encourage rumours and misunderstandings that aggravate tensions, an example being rumours among the Masai living in Mkindi that fresh steps are being taken to change the boundaries with Lengusero.

A combination of the *legacy of violence* and *inadequate security* aggravates tensions further. People not only take the law into their own hands but may even threaten to use witchcraft. Weapons are widespread and a part of traditional life. While farmers usually have guns, Masai in the Ilmoran ("warrior") age group carry knives and spears. Masai in Kibirashi stressed that farmers sometimes felt insecure or ill at ease because Masai warriors commonly carry weapons in public. There is also a history of inter-group conflicts, which is illustrated by tales. *Inadequate security* in Handeni District largely means that the police are hardly in evidence. Villages have security committees in command of militiamen, who may sometimes aggravate tensions by taking the law into their own hands.

Tensions between and within villages: local boundaries

Factors causing tensions

Competition for natural resources is the main cause of tensions over local boundaries. Villages want to secure access to land and water. The rights to use reservoirs or water sources can be linked to boundaries, where, for example, a river or a valley with a reservoir forms a boundary. The interpretation of such boundaries varies, especially if natural resources are found in boundary areas, as was the case with the boundaries between Kilindi and Misufini and between Mkindi and Lengusero. Kilindi considered its boundary with Misufini to be in a river, whereas Misufini regarded the whole river and the adjacent area as its own. Mkindi claimed that its border with Lengusero should be in the middle of a valley, i.e. the middle of a reservoir constructed by Lengusero.

Problems with managing transition and rapid change are mainly due to the pastoralists' lifestyle being under pressure. Grazing areas are under pressure because of cultivation, and herds are dwindling because of diseases. Consequently, many pastoralists are turning to agricultural activities. Pastoralists increasingly want to set up their own village structures, especially to secure "their" land, by obtaining title deeds, for example. Masai NGOs or NGOs promoting minority empowerment often support such processes, and some donors (including Christian organisations) are also promoting Masai aspirations. The forming of new villages can cause tensions between the communities which once formed one village. A hamlet that once formed part of Mkindi was registered as the centre of a new village, Lengusero. After the Lengusero Masai had obtained a title deed for their village, the Mkindi villagers realised that a significant part of Mkindi now belonged to the new pastoralist village.

A combination of the *lack of legitimate government and good governance* and *limited participation* can cause tensions within one village if one community accuses the village government of ignoring its rights. Masai hamlet leaders in Kibirashi saw unequal representation as their main problem, because they claimed the village government would always be biased against pastoralists in land use disputes, thus encouraging farmers to encroach further on Masai grazing land.

Social disintegration and separation is another factor that causes tensions between or within villages. There is now a tendency for Masai communities to seek to establish their own villages, especially where there is mutual frustration between pastoralists and farmers.

Factors triggering tensions

Again, *competition for natural resources* is the main factor triggering tensions between and within villages. Disputes over rights of access to land and water easily trigger tensions, as was the case with the reservoir in Lengusero village. After the reservoir had been completed and filled with

water, the neighbouring villages of Mkindi and Saunyi claimed the surrounding area as their own.

Factors aggravating tensions

Socio-economic disparities can aggravate tensions over local boundaries. As surveying a village and then obtaining a title deed is a very costly and time-consuming business, wealthier communities have less trouble obtaining what are decisive documents in boundary disputes. A poor community adjoining a village of this kind may suddenly find that its neighbour has obtained extensive occupancy rights, as the village of Lengusero has done.

The perception of there being a *lack of legitimate government and good governance* can aggravate tensions, especially if corruption is alleged. One community may accuse another of having obtained its occupancy rights unlawfully or its own leaders of having been bribed by the neighbouring community to tolerate "land grabbing".

Limited participation can aggravate tensions over local boundaries, given the dominance of higher administrative levels, and especially of the district and national administrations. The people of Mkindi, who had rejected the idea of a Masai village splitting from Mkindi, suddenly found, for example, that the people of Lengusero had secured their claims by consulting the Ministry of Lands and other authorities directly.

Limited institutional capacities are linked to this aspect. Clearly, the official survey team from the Ministry of Lands recorded boundaries in Lengusero which far exceeded what the people of Mkindi believed was land that had traditionally been used by Masai. On the other hand, Mkindi had failed to have the survey team accompanied by delegates of its own. In short, a badly organised village may fail to secure its claims, because it cannot produce any evidence when a dispute breaks out.

A combination of *exploitation of ethnic, cultural and other differences*, *and discrimination* and *social disintegration and separation* may aggra-

vate tensions in cases where a community consisting of a different social or ethnic group applies to set up its own village. Along with the anti-Masai slogans in Kibirashi, some of the arguments advanced in Mkindi can serve as examples: the people of Mkindi stressed that they could no longer co-exist with the Masai. Mutual frustration after "*endless discussions*" (as perceived by the Mkindi people) led to a growing belief that the two communities had to separate, which led to the Masai being given an ultimatum in 1996 to leave the village of Mkindi within six months.

Potential sources of tension between villagers and newcomers: access to natural resources, especially land

Factors causing tensions

The main factor causing potential sources of tension between villagers and newcomers is *competition for natural resources* in the project area. More newcomers from other districts, or from abroad, want access to land, which is still available in Handeni District. Villagers may perceive newcomers as unwanted competitors.

Socio-economic disparities may be a potential source of tension if, for example, newcomers are richer, more successful at farming and marketing their products than the villagers and more influential.

Limited participation may be a potential source of tension, since there are then only a few decision-makers with the authority to permit newcomers to buy land even though villagers may reject the idea. There have been cases of village chairmen selling land to outside investors without consulting the village government. In one such case a village leader sold land to an outside investor without giving the villagers prior notice. The district administration looked into the case because of the huge amount of land sold, which included more than two thirds of the village land.

The prevailing dominance of higher administrative levels, and especially of the district and na-

tional administrations, can cause tensions. For example, a Masai community evicted from a game reserve in Same District is to be resettled in Handeni District, which can be expected to cause tensions. The decision was taken by the district council after it was asked by the Prime Minister to allow the Masai community to settle in Handeni. The villages expected to integrate the Masai from Same District had not yet been asked when the resettlement decision was considered close to being implemented.

Factors triggering tensions

Tensions between villagers and newcomers may be triggered by a *lack of legitimate government and good governance,* e.g. if there are allegations of corruption in the allocation of land by village governments.

Limited participation, and especially the dominance of higher administrative levels described above, can also trigger tensions. This may happen, for example, where newcomers suddenly arrive in a village, as in the case of the resettlement of the Masai from Same District in Handeni District.

Factors aggravating tensions

Socio-economic disparities may aggravate potential tensions between villagers and newcomers. Large-scale farming and big investors are relatively new phenomena for Handeni District, which is characterised by subsistence farming. As it is often hoped that investors will bring capital, employment opportunities and know-how, it is easy to buy support at all levels of a village, which may aggravate tensions in the long run if expectations are not fulfilled.

A combination of a *lack of legitimate government and good governance* and *limited participation* can aggravate potential sources of tension. There are frequent allegations of corruption when land is allocated to newcomers.

Limited institutional capacities can also aggravate tensions between villagers and newcomers. Lack of resources, education and know-how may pre-

vent villages from taking effective measures to protect their land against being grabbed. They may, for example, have no land use planning documentation or have failed to keeping documents concerning land allocation. The issue of village title deeds is subject to many regulations and to tedious and unclear procedures, making it difficult for village governments to protect their land against encroachment from outside. Though difficult to assess for outsiders, the *exploitation of ethnic, cultural and other differences, and discrimination* and a *legacy of violence* could aggravate potential sources of tension between villagers and newcomers. There were some hints from villagers that newcomers from other ethnic groups, such as the Wachagga, are considered both influential and successful, but are apparently not wanted for all that. There were also slight hints of the threat of witchcraft to frighten newcomers away from a village. This factor may go together with *inadequate security* for newcomers, since there is little evidence of a police presence in the project area, whereas villages protect themselves by having security committees and militiamen. These security forces may be biased against newcomers.

C 2.2   Village Findings

Description of Kilindi

The village of Kilindi, located in the south-west of Handeni District on the eastern slopes of the Nguu mountains, was founded in 1974 in the nationwide process of *Ujamaa* villagisation. It was registered in 1975. The soil of the village area is comparatively fertile, and rainfall is fairly high. The main income-generating activity of the village is farming. The population consists almost completely of Wanguu, who are farmers. Some of them also raise livestock on a small scale. There are no pastoralist settlements within the village area, and it is only in very dry years that pastoralists may come to Kilindi to graze their livestock. In the 1990s Kilindi suffered two droughts and one flood, which resulted in food shortages, despite the fertile soil and high rainfall. Tensions seem to occur in the village especially at times

when food is scarce and basic needs for survival remain unsatisfied.

The major development constraint in the village, according to its inhabitants, is its physical infrastructure. The village settlement is located on an isolated road to Msanja in the North. As the road is in a very poor condition, the village is virtually cut off from the rest of the district during periods of heavy rainfall. Inter-village trade in agricultural products becomes almost impossible at such times.

With the assistance of the HIAP, land use planning has been conducted and implemented in Kilindi. The land use planning process and the prior situation analysis uncovered the boundary problems with the village of Misufini. The Kilindi village government claims that the river forms the boundary between the two villages, while the Misufini government takes the view that the river and a considerable amount of land beyond it are on the Misufini side of the boundary.

The concept of para-professionals (PPFs) (18 in Kilindi) trained by the HIAP enjoys wide support not only as a source of technical assistance, especially in watershed management, but also as a means of communication. Nevertheless, opinions differ on how effective they in fact are, partly because of problems establishing catchment user groups, who are supposed to cooperate with the PPF.

The HIAP is also implementing the Food-for-Development activities funded by the World Food Programme in Kilindi, which, like all other villages, is required to submit a project proposal in order to receive WFP assistance. The villages already included in the HIAP activities have an advantage over the other villages for two reasons: first, they benefit from the situation analysis conducted as the first HIAP activity and consisting of a systematic assessment of the villages' problems and potentials; second, they are often helped by HIAP staff to formulate the proposal professionally.

The research team spent two days in Kilindi collecting empirical data.

Group discussion

Trend line

(5 points are awarded for good neighbourliness, 1 point for rather "poor neighbourliness")

Figure A 1:	Trend line for the village of Kilindi

Remarks:

1991   Outbreak of measles, minor thefts, minor famine due to delay of rain, shortage of water, stock finished, shortage of human medicine, people from Taota and Misufini (area without health services) coming to Klinidi➔very good relationship with other villages.

1992-1994   Shortage of food, "*you cannot ask anyone for food because these is none*", "*no need to break into other people's houses*"➔ relations still extremely good.

Floods: some deaths, one village completely under water➔cultivation in higher areas: crops failed because it is too hot; VLUP starts (cultivators ask for fields, no more roaming/shifting).

In 1997 and 1998: little cooperation because people absent (not even burial ceremonies).

1999   Thefts among themselves (chickens, goats) because of hunger; the HIAP provides maize (food for development) ➔"bad feelings" (realisation that "even your uncle has stolen your goat").

2000   Rain; harvesting and planting moderate (as in 1982); disadvantage: many rain seasons, little time before rain season starts➔not possible to cultivate big fields; no money.

Future: (+)   Only Nguu here, friendship with Zigua (Tamota, Wameru).
         (-)   Problems: high population growth and lack of social services, bad roads➔transport problem.
         (-)   Without help from outside situation will become worse.

Source: Drawn jointly during group discussion in the village of Kilindi, 14 March 2000.

Table A 3:   Impact table – village of Kilindi

Activity	Relevance to village life (ranking)	Comments
1) HIAP as teacher (brought new ideas, e.g. mlonge tree)	3	
2) Land use planning	1	Right way to use crops, money
3) Donations (seeds, spades)	4	
4) Food donations during hunger (government did not help, but HIAP did)	7	Food for development (roads, communication)
5) Signboards	6	Help newcomers, show areas; reduce conflicts over areas in village; no problem, HIAP and villagers sat together
6) Training for farmers in Kwediboma (crop husbandry, LUP, water/soil conservation, watershed management)	2	Meeting with farmers from other villages, exchange of ideas, new ideas
7) Support for forest nursery establishment	5	Fruit trees, trade mango and jackfruit

Description of Kibirashi

Kibirashi was one of the HIAP's first project villages. Many project activities have been carried out, and the land use planning process was completed in 1997. Main sources of income in the village are farming (mainly by Wanguu) and animal husbandry (mainly by Masai). The village has a mixed population of Wanguu (majority) and Masai (minority).

Two group discussions were held in Kibirashi, since some evidence of tensions between farmers and pastoralists was found during the preparation of the visit to the village. Consequently, two separate groups (farmers and pastoralists) were formed to enable interviewees to express their opinions and concerns about the tension situation as openly as possible. A total of 2½ days was spent in the village.

Figure A 2:   Trend line in the village of Kibirashi

Source: Drawn jointly during group discussion in the village of Kibirashi, 8-9 March 2000

Both groups, farmers and pastoralists, reported periodical tensions between them over land use and boundaries, especially in the dry season. The most serious tensions were observed in 1999, when nine people were injured in connection with land use disputes, and intervention by mediators from outside was necessary. The event led to the establishment of a permanent committee of elders from both groups to discuss and solve problems and prevent future tensions.

Boundary disputes with neighbouring villages have also been an important issue for Kibirashi. In addition, there has been a report of at least one case of a member of the village government being involved in the selling of land to outside investors, which also caused some "misunderstandings".

Political representation in the village government is another important issue for both groups: the Masai community feels underrepresented in the village government, although it holds 7 of the 25 seats. It believes that most of the decisions taken by the village government favour the farmers and neglect its interests and rights. The Masai leaders interviewed therefore plan eventually to establish their own village, with its own political representation and social services. Farmers also saw this as

the region). Threats of violence, through the use of witchcraft, for example, were also reported by villagers. Despite this, there is economic interaction and friendship between the two groups, and festivities are celebrated jointly.

Both groups regarded the HIAP as an important actor in the tension situation. Land use planning in particular was seen as an important activity for good neighbourliness and cooperation in the village. Such other activities as training in soil and water conservation were also seen as having a positive impact on the tension situation, since they reduce competition for natural resources in the long run.

The following trend lines relating to good neighbourliness and cooperation were developed during the discussions with the two groups. Situations were ranked on a five-point scale, with five points being awarded for very good neighbourliness and one point for rather "poor neighbourliness".

Influence of project activities

The following project activities were mentioned in the group discussions and ranked according to

Table A 4: Impact table – village of Kibirashi (pastoralists)		
Project activity	**Ranking by relevance to village life**	**Relevance to good neighbourliness**
Land use planning	1	Resolved conflicts between farmers and pastoralists Empowered pastoralists, but some do not comply with LUP
Good way of planting maize, other crops	2	Good for relationships
Planting trees and grass	3	Good for relationships
Cattle watering trough	4	"*No conflicts*"; (someone trying to cut tree near water point was chased away)

an important issue, since they felt has insecure when a Masai first tried to become village chairman in 1995.

Misunderstandings and tensions between pastoralists and farmers are also part of daily life in the village: the Masai feel discriminated against by such slogans as *"Go to Saunyi"* (a Masai village in

their importance for village life (second column). Their relevance for good neighbourliness and cooperation in the village is noted in the third column.

Table A 5: Impact table – village of Kibirashi (farmers)		
Project activity	**Ranking by relevance to village life**	**Relevance to good neighbourhood**
1. Soil and water conservation	1	
2. Training: permanent cultivation		
3. Livestock husbandry	3	
4. Para-professional training		
5. Training LUP	4	1
6. Tree planting in settlement area and fields	2	2
7. Construction of simple stoves		3 (future: not enough trees)
8. Storage facilities		
9. Excavation of gulleys		
10. Construction of modern houses by firing bricks	5	

C 3 Kagera Environmental Project

C 3.1 Data Sheet Kagera Region

General indicators

Location

Kagera Region is located in the north-west of Tanzania bordering Uganda in the north, Rwanda and Burundi in the west and Kigoma Region of Tanzania in the south.

Structure

Kagera consists of six districts: Biharamulo, Bukoba rural, Bukoba urban, Karagwe, Muleba and Ngara

Biharamulo, Karagwe and Ngara are the districts of Kagera which have hosted refugees and are participating districts (PDs) in the Kagera Environmental Project

Area of PDs in total		19673 sq. km
	Biharamulo	9199 sq. km
	Karagwe	6734 sq. km
	Ngara	3740 sq. km

Population of PDs total		797, 540
	Density	41 per sq. km
	Growth rate	2.7%
	Rural share	90 %
	Urban share	10%

Altitude		1000 m above sea level
		near Lake Victoria up to 2000 m

Economic indicators (Kagera)

GDP	Total	20.841 mill. TSh (1992)
		=2 % of national GDP
	Per capita	26.590 TSh (50 % lower than national average)
Other indicators	Share agriculture	65 % of employment
	Share industry	3000 persons
	Unemployment rate	30 % of work force

C 3.2   Village Findings

The following data were collected by means of group discussions in various villages of Ngara and Karagwe Districts. The information presented was visualised jointly by the village participants and the research team, resulting in a trend line for each village. The trend line represents the majority view of the participants. Individual views that deviate from the norm are expressed in only a few cases. In one village the women's and men's perceptions differed and are therefore visualised separately.

The trend line was modified for the TCIA in KEP villages: during the pre-test and in the first village it became obvious that the villagers had difficulty with the term *good neighbourliness* and its meaning. It was therefore suggested that the question *How was life for your community?* should be used. On the vertical axis, the Swahili words for *bad, fair, average*, *good* and *very good* were introduced.

In all the villages people preferred to discuss different aspects of their life separately, as reflected in the trend lines below.

In all the villages the people generally had no perception of KEP activities owing to the following factors:

— It is district policy to have a rotating system of development projects in Ngara District. The KEP has therefore been active in the villages for only a year or two.

— The KEP gives all its assistance through the district administration and is not therefore directly visible within the villages.

— Because of the KEP's demand-driven approach, the project works only with individuals and small user-groups, not with whole villages.

Results of the field visit to the village of Ruganzo

Ruganzo was the first village to be visited during the research phase in Kagera Region. It is located in the Bugufi area of Ngara District (about 45 minutes by car from the town of Ngara) and is populated mainly by Hangaza. It has a population of 3000, the majority being subsistence farmers who grow maize, bananas, groundnuts, cassava and beans.

The transect walk showed the village extended for 5.6 km. A further observation was that many young people from the village are receiving militia training.

Two KEP activities, the training of stove technicians and support for tree nurseries, have been undertaken in Ruganzo since 1999. However, the KEP was known only by a few individuals working with the project. An impact perceived by the community as such could not be identified.

The explanations for the shape of the trend line as derived from the group discussion (see Figure 7) are listed below.

1990: Life was bad (1):

The economic situation was considered to be very poor in the early 1990s. A former civil servant reported that government salaries were so low that he could not even buy a mattress. People could not sell their products, and as their children had no clothes, they could not go to school. Women complained about the poor health situation, especially for children, since there was a small dispensary, but no drugs.

1991/1992: Life was average (3):

It was reported that good rains had improved the overall situation for the farmers slightly, an exception being their coffee business. The villagers were very disappointed in the coffee association, which was supposed to be running the coffee business, but had failed to pay

for the coffee beans they had produced. Women reported that the health situation had improved thanks to the vaccinations that had begun.

1993: Life was fair (2):

The villagers complained about thefts, which they attributed to the sudden and unorganised arrival of Burundian refugees. Many farmers had to sleep near their fields to protect their harvest against thieves. There were even reports of houses being occupied.

1994/1995: Life was average (3):

The villagers reported that the economy had improved appreciably owing to better markets for their farm products, which they could sell particularly to refugees, but also to international organisations (in the town of Ngara). The construction of a road had made transport (by minibus or bicycle) to Ngara easier and created employment opportunities. Older people reported that their children had found work with international organisations in the town of Ngara, and some even said that they were employing refugees on their farms.

The villagers reported that the security situation in the village was still unsatisfactory. The theft of livestock and food had become commonplace, and there were even reports of people being killed for the food they were carrying. Women complained that their husbands had to protect their fields at night and could not, of course, protect their houses at the same time. The rapid destruction of the environment, and particularly the felling of trees, was mentioned by many villagers. The women referred to a declining health situation owing to the advent of new diseases (AIDS) in the village.

1996/1997: Life was average (3):

People complained that demand for farm products had fallen after the refugees had left, causing a decline in their market and employment opportunities. An improvement in the security situation had been noted when the refugees were forced into camps by the gov-

ernment or repatriated. The villagers felt that international donor activities had improved the environmental situation around the village.

1998/1999/2000: Life was/is average (3):

People realised that their economic situation had stabilised at a lower level, but was still much higher than in the early 1990s. It was also felt that the environmental situation around the village had improved.

The village of Kazulo

Before the influx of refugees, Kazulo (Ngara District) had been a small village without access to markets of any size. Life was dominated by subsistence farming.

With the influx of refugees the economic situation and infrastructure in Kazulo changed tremendously. Kazulo was surrounded by the huge refugee camps of Benaco and Lukole. The logistics involved in bringing assistance to the refugee camps meant that tarmac roads had to be built on both sides of Kazulo. Two markets were set up in Kazulo, one near Lukole camp, the other near Benaco. Both still exist today.

Kazulo changed from a small village into a lively market place. Many farmers from Kazulo migrated to less populated areas to continue farming, while outsiders, refugees and businessmen from other parts of the country, moved to Kazulo.

These special features of Kazulo would appear to explain the shape of the trend line below: in the "economy" and therefore the "general life" categories there is no continuous line, since very little information was provided on the period 1994-1997, when the number of refugees in Ngara reached its peak. This indicates that most of the people attending the meeting with the research team did not have a common perception, because they were newcomers who had just arrived in Kazulo at that time.

Figure A 3:   Trend line for the village of Kazulo

Source: Drawn jointly during group discussion in the village of Kazulo, 2 March 2000

Observations in the village showed that the inhabitants of Kazulo are economically better off than those of other villages visited. They are more used to the presence of international organisations and had benefited from their assistance with housing and infrastructure, for example. These observations contrast starkly with the views shown in the trend line below.

Separate trend lines for men and women were drawn to show that women generally perceived the situation before the influx of refugees as having been better than the men did. This is mainly due to the importance women attach to the environment (firewood, water).

Goya Goya Village

Goya Goya is a wide, thinly populated village situated in the Bushubi area of Ngara District. In general, Bushubi is less developed than Bugufi in

terms of both economic status and social infrastructure. The village itself has no centre, but is composed of a large number of small farms.

Subsistence farming is the dominant form of economic activity throughout the area. Local products are sold in the nearby market of the village of Rulenge, the centre of Bushubi.

When the refugees arrived in 1993/94, they passed through Goya Goya on their way to the newly established refugee camps of Benaco and Lukole. The main transit camp of Ngara District for newly arrived refugees is within close range of the village.

The direct influence of the influx of refugees is reflected in the trend line below:

— Employment situation: in the early 1990s employment by the government, the most common source of work after subsistence

Figure A 4:   Trend Line for the village of Goya Goya

Source: Drawn jointly during group discussion in the village of Goya Goya, 4 March 2000

farming, was reduced sharply. In 1993 international organisations offered new employment opportunities for the local community, which declined appreciably with the repatriation of the Rwandan refugees in 1996. Today there are very few employment opportunities outside the farming sector.

— Economic situation: the presence of the refugees improved the market situation, introducing a cash economy. Since the bulk of refugees were repatriated in 1996, the market situation has deteriorated.

— Environmental situation: very serious damage was done to the environment from 1993 to 1995 owing to the movement of refugees. The environmental situation is improving again thanks to the process of natural rehabilitation and outside assistance.

Kibondo Ward

Kibondo Ward is part of Karagwe District and comprises three villages (Kakuraijo, Kibondo and Nyakaiga), which are all cooperating with the KEP.

The group discussion took place between village and ward officials and other authorities in the village of Kibondo. Besides small-scale farming (bananas, coffee, maize, beans, cassava, etc.), animal husbandry is an important economic activity in the area.

Further interviews, group discussions and a transect were carried out in the village of Kakuraijo. One major observation was that the Hutus and Tutsis had settled separately in the village, indicating ethnic group identification.

The results of the discussion are shown in the lifeline below:

— Economic situation: the economy improved during the influx of the refugees as markets expanded and refugee labour was employed. The subsequent decline since 1996 has been due to the repatriation of refugees, damage caused by El Niño and the collapse of the coffee union.

— Relationship with Rwanda: the formerly close interaction between villages on the two sides

— of the border (between Rwanda and Tanzania) suddenly stopped as a result of the genocide and the ensuing political turmoil. It has so far proved impossible to restore normal relations. The falling line does not therefore reveal the adverse effect on the relationship as such.

Figure A 5:   Trend line for Kibondo Ward

Source: Drawn jointly during group discussion in Kibondo Ward, 13 March 2000

Annex D List of Interviewees and Resource Persons

The following list does not include the many experts, officials and interviewees at village level we talked to during our research. We thank them all for their assistance. Nor does the list include interviewees and participants in workshops held after April 2000.

The structure is as follows:

Name, post, institution and place, date of interview, place of interview

Interviews relating to the **Handeni Integrated Agroforestry Project**

Almasy, M.: HIAP Coordinator Zone II, GTZ Handeni, 14.3.2000, Kwediboma,

Ayoub, S.: DALDO Officer, District Handeni, 3.3.2000, Handeni

Chadoa, J.: Farmer, 15.3.2000, Kilindi

Dominick, S.: Headteacher Primary School, 15.3.2000, Kilindi

Doo, P.S.: Ward Extension Officer, District, 15.3.2000, Kilindi

Heile, H.-J.: Team Leader, GTZ Handeni, 24.2./22.3.2000, Handeni

Jayson, M.K.: Coordinator Participatory Land Use Management, National land use planning Commission Dar es Salaam, 25.4.2000, Dar es Salaam

Kimoleta, R.K.: District Executive Director Handeni, District, 22.3.2000, Handeni

Legazo, A.: Member of Village Committee on Planning and Finance Kilindi, 15.3.2000, Kilindi

Lüneburg, B.: Technical Advisor, GTZ Handeni, 24.2./ 3.3./ 22.3.2000, Handeni

Mango, G.K.: Director of Physical Planning and Research, National land use planning Commission Dar es Salaam, 25.4.2000, Dar es Salaam

Makobe, O.: Former Village Chairman Negero, 23.2.2000, Negero

Mbwana, M.: Village Chairman Kilindi, 15.03.2000, Kilindi

Mdoe, M.: Subject Matter Specialist LUP and Range Manager HIAP Zone II, GTZ Handeni, 21.2.2000, Handeni

Mhina Kilandiro, F.K.: Farmer, 15.3.2000, Kilindi

Mtalo, A.L.: District Administration Secretary, District, 22.3.2000, Handeni

Mwarabu, A. O.: Staff member of Masai NGO Imusot e Purka, 12.3.2000

Mzimba, O.: Member of Village Committee on Planning and Finance Kilindi and HIAP-PPF, 15.3.2000, Kilindi

Sangali, B.: Village Chairman Negero, 23.2.2000, Negero

Schröder-Breitschuh: GTZ Eschborn, 2.12.1999, Eschborn

Selemani Mhadu, A.: Member of Village Committee on Peace and Security Kilindi, 15.3.2000, Kilindi

Selemani, H.: Member of Village Committee on Peace and Security Kilindi, 15.3.2000, Kilindi

Sirikwa, A.: Administrative Financial Manager Ilamaratak Lorkonerei (NGO), 28.2.2000, Terrat

Sufiani, M.: Secretary Village Committee on Social Services Kilindi, 15.3.2000, Kilindi

Wessolowski, J.: Desk Officer, East Africa, GTZ Eschborn, 1.12.1999, Eschborn

Willekens, E.: Technical Engineer, German Development Service Handeni, 10.3.2000, Handeni

Zimmermann, W.: GTZ Eschborn, 1.12.1999, Eschborn

Interviews relating to the **Kagera Environmental Project**

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