Development Policy - a Core Element of European Security Policy

The Security Strategy adopted by the European Council in late 2003 underlines the importance of conflict prevention and civil, but also – wherever necessary – military intervention in weak or failing states. The new Security Strategy recommends that foreign and security policy be more closely dovetailed with development policy.

In view of the fact that development cooperation (DC) is in possession of specific operational experiences in cooperation with weak states, development policy would be called upon to assume a proactive stance toward the European Security Strategy.

Development policy's aim of providing significant contributions to Europe's new security policy calls implicitly for huge efforts in personnel, conceptual, and financial terms. This in turn must be predicated on new forms of the division of labor between bilateral, European, and multilateral development policy. At the same time, additional financial investments are needed to come effectively to grips with the new challenges.

1   Introduction

In December 2003 the European Union formulated a security policy based on a draft presented by the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana. The fact that the EU strategy has identified the security threats facing Europe, and derived a set of strategic goals from them, is an important contribution to a more coherent European foreign, security, and development policy. The "Solana strategy" defines three interlinked threats to European security.

First, an extremely violence-prone, transnational organized terrorism that is for the most part associated with religious fundamentalism.

Second, an increasing potential for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WND) that favors arms races and could well give rise to an inflammable mixture of proliferation and terrorism.

Third, the failure of state systems, which gives rise to spaces without legal and governmental structures, a situation conducive to the organization of terrorist activities and the trafficking in humans, drugs, and arms.

The strategy concludes that these security threats facing Europe are, as a result of processes dissolving the boundaries of the nation-state, of an increasingly global nature. The EU is therefore obliged to define the field of its own security interests in global terms:

- In view of the process of globalization and the ongoing enlargement of the EU, the Union needs to expand its security belt around Europe.

- In view of new transnational security threats, the EU will have to step up its efforts to help forge an effective multilateral world order, one keyed to the norms of the UN Charter.

- However, as the security risks of the 21st century cannot be addressed by purely military means, the EU must have at its disposal a mix of instruments consisting of both civil and military measures.

Placing the key arguments of the EU Security Strategy in the overall context of Europe's external relations highlights its *primary focus on security policy*. Instead of being a blueprint for the formulation of the EU's highly diverse external relations, the strategy is restricted to the field of security. Even so, the security strategy is geared to the *concept of "extended security."* Viewed from this perspective, insecurity and escalating violence may be seen as rooted in complex economic, power-related, sociocultural, and/or environmental factors. Accordingly, sustainable security policy is not only a matter of military capabilities. With this in mind, the European security strategy calls for a closer dovetailing of various instruments from the different fields involved in the EU's external relations.

Compared with the US *National Security Strategy*, the EU Security Strategy is marked by a *European "bias."* While it is true that the EU Security Strategy concurs in important areas with the US' risk analysis of September 2002, the two strategy concepts come (in part) to different conclusions. The *specifically European profile of the security strategy* is evident in

- the emphasis with which the European security strategy calls for efforts to strengthen a multilateral world order and international law;

- its focus on long-term conflict prevention and civil cooperation;

- efforts to embed political pressure and the use of robust military intervention in the framework of the existing international legal order.

As far as the Transatlantic relationship is concerned, this European profile could facilitate a *division of labor with the US on security policy*. On the one hand, the EU, in view of its relatively modest military potentials, would seek to focus its efforts in the fields of prevention, conflict resolution, and stabilization of fragile states. In matters bound up with the military dimensions of security policy the EU would remain the US' "junior partner." On the other hand, the US, the only military power with a global intervention radius, would be practically predestined in the medium term to take on the task of conducting robust military missions. In view of the mounting problems the US is facing in Iraq in its efforts to "win the peace," the US could in the future develop a more marked willingness to accord more serious consideration to the EU's soft-power capabilities and experiences.

This, however, would imply that the EU undertakes *massive efforts to further develop the multilateral legal framework* for "humanitarian interventions" and the deployment of military means to protect international security. These efforts should be accompanied by targeted efforts to sustain core UN principles such as the ban on the threat or use of force (UN Charter, Article 2.4) and the UN Security Council's monopoly on power (UN Charter, Chapter VII). Furthermore, an "*eye-level*" *Transatlantic partnership with the US* would have prospects of success only if the EU were in fact to comprehensively expand its responsibility in the fields of conflict prevention and resolution as well as in efforts to strengthen weak states. In this context Development policy would have an important role to play.

2 Dovetailing Security and Development Policy: Interdependencies, Risks, and Opportunities

Neither for European foreign policy nor for development policy are conflict prevention and efforts to strengthen weak states entirely new issues. However, two aspects of the Solana strategy may be seen as innovative: first, since the 9/11 attacks in the US, the world's 20 to 30 fragile, failing, or failed states have been perceived not as marginal phenomena of world politics but as an acute security threat to Europe; second, the Solana paper explicitly calls for a close dovetailing between foreign, security, and development policy - and thus for a new quality in the combined use of civil and military intervention.

No development without security: Socioeconomic blockades to development cannot be overcome without peaceful coexistence in a given society. The EU strategy therefore seeks to forge close links between the agendas of development policy and security policy. Investments in development programs are practically doomed to ineffectiveness as long as civil war, organized crime, and terror are undermining a society's political stability. In other words, development policy can achieve its aims in fragile states only if its efforts are flanked by measures designed to improve these countries' security environment. If we take the EU strategy seriously, efforts would have to be undertaken to reverse the inclination of the development policy of the 1990s simply to withdraw from this troublesome group of countries.

No security without development: The relationship between development and security may just as well be viewed the other way around. In the long run both national and international security are not to be had without development. In a globalizing world, fragile states are bound to pose security threats. Impoverishment processes, ecological degradation, moribund education and training systems, weak governmental institutions, corruption, and political exclusion generate the well-known, explosive mixture consisting of organized crime and religious and/or ethnically embellished extremism. In the extreme case this may result in state failure and civil war. Such zones of disorder serve as seedbeds of transnational terrorism, international crime, and proliferation of WMD.

Strategic consequences for a sustainable security policy: These interdependencies between security and development unquestionably call for a new strategic alliance between development policy and security policy. If Europe's aim is in fact a secure world order firmly rooted in international law, it will, first, need a security policy that fosters, in partner countries, the acceptance of liberal norms in the international system. Second, if we are in fact serious about this close interrelationship between security and development, the consequence – even for security policy – will inevitably have to be that promotion of good governance, socioeconomic development, and democratic regimes be raised to the level of guiding principles. This logic has yet to reach the mainstream of foreign policy, as is clearly illustrated by calls of many security experts for a classic stability policy that acquiesces in authoritarian rule in view of the turbulences currently being experienced in Iraq.

The fears of development policy: Yet many actors engaged in DC point to possible risks entailed by a close dovetailing between foreign, security, and development policy.

- In the first place, there is a concern that DC portfolio resources could be reallocated in favor of investments of particular relevance to security policy.

- Second, there are fears that the security imperative anchored in Europe's foreign relations might alter the goal system of development policy to the detriment of other central issue areas of DC.

- Third, it is argued that development policy could gradually lose its autonomy and be instrumentalized by foreign and security policy, without gaining in return any possibilities to provide strategic inputs bearing on the formulation of foreign policy.

These fears are not unfounded. However, attempts to sidestep the discussion on the interdependencies between foreign, security, and development policy and instead to fall passively back "traditional" fields of DC are doomed to failure. Development policy would be likely to lose a good measure of its significance if it declined to become involved in these strategy debates. We would therefore urge development policy to adopt a proactive strategy that self-assuredly reflects the comparative strengths of DC in the debate on European security policy.

Blind spots in the European security strategy: Development policy derives its legitimacy from the fact of its being the one policy field in possession of the greatest trove of experience in conflict prevention, stabilization of weak societies, and civil activities in post-conflict situations. In view of its operational experience, development policy can thus be said to be the policy field potentially best equipped to make up for the blind spots in Europe's security policy:

A first blind spot of the EU Security Strategy must be seen in the fact that, beyond problem definitions and broad strategic thrusts ("prevention"), it is lacking in background knowledge on the chances and limits involved in its efforts to gain influence from outside on social processes in "difficult countries." The process character typically subscribed to by development policy in its efforts to promote poverty reduction, the provision of basic social services, and "good" governance is for the most part given insufficient attention by other policy fields. This may mean a loss of the long-term perspective needed to eliminate the breeding grounds of terrorist structures and to prevent the proliferation of WMD.

Second, another blind spot of the EU's security strategy consists in its failure to reflect adequately on the security and world-political interests of developing countries, which are now becoming the target group of the new security strategy. Attempts to narrow down perceptions of global risk to factors which immediately affect the security of the OECD world, as well as a certain measure of indifference shown toward the problems facing the poorer regions of the world, are problematic in conceptual terms and contradictory in nature.

Comparative strengths and obligations of development policy: In view of these blind spots of the EU Security Strategy, DC is faced with the challenge of marshaling its conceptual and operational know-how in this field and of explaining to outside actors the viability and effectiveness of its own set of instruments. The concern here is not to invent new instruments but to develop, for the world's 25 to 30 fragile states, a strategic perspective that takes the Solana strategy seriously: What societies in these country groups should be given the highest priority for Europe's development policy? How can various experiences, both positive and negative, be translated, in cooperation with weak states, into manageable, country-specific, long-term, and realistic strategies? Are the established monitoring procedures sufficient to track developments in crisis countries? How might the crisis-prevention strategies of the EU member countries

best be brought together to form an effective approach? What would be the price tag on a strategy designed to stabilize weak states? How can competences in development, foreign, and security policy be effectively interlinked?

Here development policy can build on some comparative strengths of its own. No other policy field has looked so intensively into the potentials and the limitations involved in efforts to promote good governance and nation-building based on liberal principles. Development-policy actors are also in possession of a good measure of country expertise, the sine qua non for harnessing together humanitarian aid, subsistence strategies, efforts to (re)build government structures, poverty reduction, and economic development strategies. If development policy succeeds in formulating, from this rich trove of know-how, a properly defined set of best practices designed to deal effectively with relevant security-related issues, it will be able to position itself as a strategically relevant actor in the context of the EU Security Strategy. If it fails, development policy may well find itself up against a set of instruments and modes of resource allocation dictated by actors from other policy fields.

Challenges facing a coherent European development policy: If European development policy is to position itself in this way, it will be forced to tackle a number of political-institutional challenges. In view of a situation marked by resource-scarcity, European development policy is going to have to deal head on with growing *allocation conflicts* and to defend itself in disputes concerning the terrain for which it is concretely responsible. European DC will continue to be faced with the challenge of overcoming its multiple coherence problems. Today, at least three commissioners (development cooperation, trade, foreign relations) are responsible for development-related tasks. Furthermore, the situation is made even more complicated by the appearance of two new major actors in charge of shaping the course of the EU's foreign relations: the High Representative for the CFSP as well as a future EU foreign minister, whose competences have yet to be clearly defined. Apart from coherence problems at the EU level, there is also an urgent need for enhanced coordination processes between national ministries and implementing agencies. Taken together, the continuing existence of these structural deficits would make it largely impossible for European development policy to adequately address its own security agenda.

3 The Significance of the Security Strategy for European Development policy

Development policy will be unable to position itself successfully and proactively in the field of security policy as long as it is regarded as just another point on the to-do list of European development policy. Owing to the growing interdependencies between foreign, security, and development policy, considerable creative and political power will thus be needed to reshape European development policy in such a way as to safeguard its autonomy, without losing sight of the interdependencies involved in European external relations.

Since the 1990s development policy has continuously enlarged its agenda. The linkage between development policy and security policy is giving rise to another resource-intensive and highly complex field of activity. The attempt to aggregate this thematic diversity is best reflected in three megaprojects of international development policy, viz. 1) the *MDG poverty-reduction agenda*, 2) *the security agenda*, and 3) *the Rio agenda*, with its focus on global challenges. While there are substantial interrelationships between these projects, in a world marked by scarce resources tensions will inevitably emerge among them.

The MDG agenda: This is the classic playing field of DC. In essence, the concern here is to halve absolute poverty, to eradicate poverty-linked diseases, and to ensure access to basic education for all by the year 2015. Viewed from this perspective, development policy should under no circumstances be concentrated on countries that

pose security threats. It should instead focus its efforts on the 60 poorest developing countries that are unable to achieve the MDG goals on their own. If the MDG goals are in fact to be reached, ODA would have to be doubled, according the calculations presented in the Zedillo Report on "Financing for Development."

The security agenda: Conflict prevention, conflict management, and the political stabilization of weak countries are the development-related building blocks of the European Security Strategy. If we are serious about using the European Security Strategy as a script for European development policy, we will have to concentrate the limited funds available mainly on the 20-30 states and societies that have already "failed" or are threatened with failure. The primary target group would in this case consist of the societies that are currently regarded as acute or potential security risks. A broadly effective strategy designed to stabilize this group of security-relevant countries would have its price; crisis prevention and post-conflict work geared to state- and nation-building are long-term and cost-intensive processes. Moreover, the security agenda is giving rise to new forms of networking between development policy and foreign and security policy, while the "MDG agenda" remains, basically, the playing field of the classic actors of development policy.

Three megaprojects of development policy			
	The MDG agenda	The security agenda	The Rio agenda / global challenges
Primary goals	Poverty reduction	Conflict prevention or pacification; prevention of state failure; nation-building; establishment of liberal governmental structures	Safeguarding global collective goods (e.g. the environment, financial architecture, world trade)
Industrialized-country actors	Basically, the actors of classic development policy	Networked foreign, security, and development policy	Networked foreign and development policy plus specific sector policies (e.g. environmental, financial, trade policy)
Priority partners / target groups	Roughly 50-60 LDCs	25 –30 fragile states; central crisis regions	Some 15-20 anchor countries and NICs
Resource needs	Doubling of ODA*	E.g. investments of the international community in civil reconstruction in Afghanistan, roughly US$ 3.5 billion p.a.	E.g. 1.0% of the GNP of the OECD countries to stabilize global environmental goods**

* Estimates presented in the Zedillo Report (www.un.org/reports/financing/)

** Estimates of the German government's "Advisory Council on Global Change" (www.wbgu.de)

The Rio agenda: Pressing global environmental problems, some of the central issues addressed at the 1992 Rio conference, and the development debates over global public goods are the main focuses of the Rio Agenda. A great number of world environmental problems

cannot be solved without the cooperation of countries outside the OECD world. While it is rightly pointed out that there are close connections between poverty and environmental degradation, the global environmental agenda calls for priorities and strategic conclusions that differ considerably from those implied by the MDG perspective. Here the primary target groups would be countries without whose cooperation it is impossible to bring about any major change in global environmental policy. These anchor countries and NICs (which include e.g. China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, and Russia) are not at all identical with the 60 developing countries with relevance for the MDG Agenda or with the societies of the world that are seen as having primary relevance from the standpoint of security policy. Implementing the Rio Agenda is itself a cost-intensive undertaking. The German government's "Advisory Council on Global Change" has calculated that the OECD countries would have to invest, per year, roughly 1% of their GNP in global environmental policy to effectively tackle the growing degradation of the world ecosystem. Moreover, thanks to their economic and political weight, many anchor countries and NICs are of crucial significance when it comes to addressing other central world problems, including the need to stabilize the international financial markets, to establish worldwide rules for dealing with controversial technologies, or to further develop the UN system. Viewed in terms of the logic of the Rio agenda as well as of other global challenges, development policy would have to work closely together with other sector ministries (such as ministries for the environment, science, research, and finances) to develop effective programs for cooperation with these anchor countries.

Strategic options for dealing with the challenges outlined above: Viewed against the background of the major projects referred to above, the question is what strategic options European development policy will base its future action on. The first option would be to embark on a *path of continuity*. In this case the bilateral, European, and multilateral actors of development policy would reject the scenario of distribution conflicts and tensions between the three megaprojects discussed above and continue to work in all three fields. This is a perspective that adheres to established routines and is characterized by high dispersion and low effectiveness. Second, it would be possible to pursue a *strategy of concentration,* with the actors of development policy concentrating on one or two of the megaprojects outlined above. The high priority presently accorded by the industrialized countries to the problem complex of security may, like it or not, imply assigning overriding priority to the security agenda, with the consequence that poverty reduction, sustainable development, and other global challenges are deprived of a measure of their urgency. Third, and finally, it would be possible to embark on a path involving a *strategic division of labor*. This would pose a number of questions bearing on the core competences of the different actors involved in the individual megaprojects as well as on the specialization, cost-reduction, and efficiency potentials of possible patterns of a division of labor.

Strategic division of labor – a conceptual sketch: Without being able here to furnish a complete answer to the questions outlined above, we can note that a strategic division of labor appears to us to be the most promising option.

In view of the fact that the task would overburden the capacities of individual EU member states, one future focus of *European DC* should be the use of development-policy measures to contain international crisis flashpoints. In a networked world "security" is a

European task, and the EU's development policy should therefore gradually be focused on the security agenda. The leading role played by the EU in this field would in no way rule out an integration and mobilization of member-state experiences in specific crisis regions (e.g. France in parts of Africa). The core task of the *multilateral system of DC* – the World Bank, UNDP, and the regional development banks – should be the MDG agenda, the aim being to expand these organizations' specialization advantages in the field. Bilateral DC agencies would participate in tendering procedures for multilaterally funded programs of partner countries or assume sectoral leadership functions in multilaterally coordinated programs. This would make it possible to harness national DC strengths under competitive conditions, without jeopardizing the coherence of a strategic MDG orientation. The *bilateral DC* provided by the EU member states should seek to strengthen multilateral MDG activities, above all by stepping up their targeted financial transfers, by adopting active strategies geared to gaining influence on the further development of the multilateral organizations, and by providing complementary contributions to multilaterally coordinated programs. In view of a situation marked by scarcity of funds, it would make little sense for individual donor countries to implement low-budget activities of their own in "MDG countries" alongside multilaterally focused programs. The core field of bilateral development policy might in the future come to be seen in cooperation with anchor countries, without whose involvement central world problems are doomed to remain unsolved. While a European coordination and focusing of activities as well as cooperation with other international actors is essential here to effectively tackle global environmental problems and other world problems, bilateral cooperation with anchor countries would be in accord with the prominent role played by this country group in foreign and security policy as well as in economic and technological terms. None of the larger EU countries will be willing to forego bilateral cooperation with these centrally important nations.

Dr. Dirk Messner
Director
German Development
Institute

Dr. Jörg Faust
Research Officer
German Development
Institute

The European Security Strategy is available online at the following website: http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=391&lang=EN&mode=g