

## Emerging Powers in a Changing World: Sharing Responsibility for Global Governance in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

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### Conference Report

Considering that mutual understanding and dialogue are indispensable tools for constructing global governance structures, the organisers of the Managing Global Governance (MGG) programme decided to launch an ambitious initiative and provide both the MGG 4 participants and highly qualified German young professionals from key government organisations and think tanks an opportunity to meet directly and discuss important global governance topics. This was the main idea that inspired the workshop “Emerging Powers in a Changing World: Sharing Responsibility for Global Governance in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”, which took place on December 10 at the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE).

The challenging format of the workshop offered a direct dialogue platform for representatives from both Germany and the Anchor Countries represented in the MGG programme: Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa. The organisers’ expectations, as stressed during the welcoming speech by Dr. Thomas Fues (DIE), was to achieve an ambitious outcome in terms of promoting mutual understanding and knowledge of each other. For the first time in the history of the MGG programme this would be encouraged by a direct interaction at the peer level.

After the introducing plenary discussion and two discussion rounds divided into several thematic working groups (World Café), it was intended to close the workshop with an open plenary discussion on the participants’ personal visions of global governance. Of course, such an extensive and intensive programme could hardly be afforded without some in-between breaks, which indeed were scheduled not only as coffee or lunch breaks, but as an extra networking opportunity for all participants, whose number exceeded the organisers’ expectations with a total of 59 registered attendants (21 MGG participants and 38 external participants).

### *Preliminary thoughts*

**Dr. Thomas Fues** opened the workshop by underlining that the main objective of the workshop – i.e. to enhance the mutual understanding between tomorrow’s global governance leaders from emerging powers and from Europe – does not imply a homogeneous world view, nor a general agreement on all issues. He emphasised the decisive role of frankness and openness towards different world visions for trust-building, which is the most important element of effective and successful global governance. Hence the relevance of a peer-to-peer networking platform between the MGG programme participants and the German attendants of the workshop.

Nevertheless, Thomas Fues also expressed his belief in the necessity of a body of universal ethics, in order to achieve what Peter Senge, in his book “The Necessary Revolution”, describes as a new world order of shared prosperity embracing all elements of global society. Aware that this plea for a universal ethical code can be considered in different parts of the world as a Western imposition, the DIE researcher quoted some examples of growing global convergence, such as the huge body of UN conventions and resolutions in the area of human rights, the Millennium Declaration, unanimously passed in 2000 by the UN General Assembly, and the Doha Declaration. Looking back in time, he found that even examples from ancient civilisations can be helpful. A historical character such as the Indian king Ashoka (3<sup>rd</sup> Century BC) can be considered as one of the very first examples of introducing universal value norms in politics, and his system of philosophical principles and political norms on social organisation, based on human dignity and human rights, non-violence and religious tolerance, as well as his intents to establish something like “foreign aid”, still sound strikingly modern today.

After his opening speech, Thomas Fues gave the floor to the panellists of the plenary discussion, which was chaired by him.

### ***How to Share Responsibility: Three different perspectives***

**Dr. Christoph Zöpel**, former Minister of State of the Federal Foreign Office (1999-2002) and former Chairman of the German Society for the United Nations, Berlin (2003-2007), dedicated his efforts mainly to make two suggestions based upon his understanding of the concept of power. After criticising the notion of “emerging power” as imprecise the panellist explained that there are three factors to determine a state’s power: geographical extension, population and military capacity. Considering this, and in order to achieve a democratic sharing of responsibilities on the principle of one person - one vote, Christoph Zöpel advanced the idea of including the world’s ten most populated states – about 65 percent of the world’s population – in the UN Security Council, whereas the rest should be represented only through regional organisations. His second suggestion was related to the security issue. Christoph Zöpel argued that, as long as the disparity between the UN general budget – around 11 billion US dollars – and the US military budget – more than 500 billion dollars – persists, there is no chance of the UN taking responsibility for global security. This is why he suggested that every state should give at least 5 percent of its military budget to the UN as a way of empowering the international institution.

The second contributor of the plenary discussion was **Prof. Dr. Günther Maihold**, deputy director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) since 2004, who depicted the role of the emerging powers from a European perspective. He emphasised that the European Union (EU) is trying hard to reinforce its already existing international image as a civil power with a great deal of experience in regional integration processes. This is indeed one of the most attractive aspects of the way in which the EU approaches emerging powers because, as the panellist specified, every emerging power is also a regional power and consequently interested in regional integration. However, this positive image conceals the fact that the EU is not really an international actor, because it does not act as a unity in many important areas due to the contradictory interests of some of its member states. Even more so, the politics of compromise within the EU – something unavoidable with 27 member states – leads to a lack of international profile and thus to an incapacity to establish priorities. To illustrate this point, Günther Maihold mentioned that the EU currently leads negotiations with Mercosur to reach a commercial agreement, but at the same time announced that it was planning a strategic partnership agreement with Brazil.

Another interesting point discussed by Günther Maihold referred to the different understandings of sovereignty between, on one hand, the EU, which pulls towards a regional supranational organisation, and, on the other hand, the emerging powers, which try to regain national control on several issues. A derivative difficulty according to the speaker is therefore the exceedingly normative conception of global governance at the expense of its operative use.

Last but not least, **Prof. Dr. Enrique Dussel Peters**, Coordinator of the China-Mexico Studies Centre at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), described the impact of China’s growth on Latin American self-perception and on the region’s insertion in the international scene. To start with, he questioned some of the *main stream* concepts mentioned beforehand. According to him, the very notion of “emerging powers” is Eurocentric and even misleading, because in a situation of rising powers, the “old” ones would necessarily decline. At the same time, China must be considered a class on its own, not comparable to any other of the “emerging powers” – actually, China can hardly be perceived as a “new” or “emerging” power. Enrique Dussel also expressed his critical opinion about the general understanding of globalisation and its meaning. Hinting at Thomas Friedman’s book “Hot, Crowded and Flat” mentioned in Thomas Fues’ welcoming speech, the Mexican Professor maintained that the world is as cold and round as ever; that is, time and space *do* matter. Enrique Dussel also underlined that socio-economic events are reversible and, finally, that parliamentary democracy is not a necessary result of globalisation, pointing at some Latin American countries or even at the Chinese case.

This exercise of questioning concepts usually taken for granted provided the necessary frame to understand the asymmetry between China and Latin America, not only in the actual situation, but also regarding both countries’ trajectories. Enrique Dussel explained that China has been growing eleven times more than Latin America during the last three decades. This unbalance, to be explained by the implementation of the Washington Consensus in Latin America, does not allow truly horizontal nor active rela-

tions between these actors. After expressing his opinion about investing in institutions as a way of improving the horizontal relations between different emerging powers, Enrique Dussel argued that the relations between them offer possibilities for both cooperation and conflict, and that we should not take for granted that they will always behave nicely to each other.

The three presentations were followed by a round of several questions, ranging from scepticism about the real power of “emerging powers” and the role and structure of the UN, to appeals for a more ethical understanding of international relations and the claim of non-European civilisational centres.

Responding to the questions, Enrique Dussel expressed an interesting opinion about the role of emerging powers in global governance. Behind the discussion about new powers vis à vis old ones, he said, lies the fundamental question about who will pay for the new global social order. Considering that China stands out among the emerging powers, it could appear that this country should pay more than the others. However, according to Dussel, the last Chinese crisis budgets, amounting to almost 600 billion US dollars, do not foresee any funds for regional or global policies, a point which is coherent with Chinese policies during the last 15 or 20 years. With a similar idea, Enrique Dussel noted that there is a difference between emerging powers trying to establish a common front in trade issues within the WTO, and trying to assume responsibility in global governance matters, something that, in his appreciation, they are not willing to do.

Günther Maihold expressed a very similar point of view by saying that “for Mexico it is important to be at the table in order not to be in the menu”, as a Mexican ambassador to the United States once told him. Apart from provoking spontaneous laughter among the workshop participants, this truth exemplifies the approach of emerging powers towards global governance and international institutions. According to Maihold, Global Governance is seen by new powers as a means of reaffirming their sovereignty, rather than of sharing or taking global responsibilities. This incapacity to perceive the different approaches between emerging and old powers represents the main limitation to the global governance discourse, he said, adding that a small group of states cannot deal with all international problems, and that therefore we need countries whose objectives are not merely to “not figure in the menu”. Another important point stressed by the German scholar was the persistence of the EU in trying to identify regions and to impulse regionalisation processes around the world, while what we do witness today are precisely regionalisation processes, which demand a bilateral rather than a regional approach.

In the last participation of the morning panel, Christoph Zöpel questioned the opinion that global governance is mainly a European concept, especially if we consider that the states which are most in need for a global governance system are the less developed ones. Zöpel argued that a global governance system should be a democratic political system on a global level. According to this logic, all of the over 6 billion inhabitants of the planet would have the same right to participate and to be active globally. This could only be achieved by accepting to share sovereignty. Contrary to the precedent speakers, Zöpel argued that China is ready to share responsibility on a global level – though not on a regional one as it is in itself larger than a region. As such, China, similarly to India, belongs to the states capable of representing themselves in the institutions needed to regulate global governance.

### ***New Challenges, New Actors, New Tasks***

After the coffee break had given the participants the room for numerous lively discussions on the topics of the morning panel and the possibility of expanding their networks, the audience divided itself into five working groups. The thematic rounds organised according to the World Café method with two sessions each, not only generated interesting results, but also allowed, at least in some points, to apprehend the differences of perspective between the MGG programme participants and the German attendants.

**Round Table 1****“Clearing the Air? Climate Change and the Challenge of Adaptation and Mitigation for Modern Societies”**, chaired by Dr. Carmen Richerzhagen (DIE)

The main questions discussed in the two rounds were: What is the role of the emerging developing countries in a new climate regime? How can we tackle the climate change problem? How can a new climate regime ensure justice?

The first round of discussion reflected the real climate negotiations and focused on the different roles and arguments of industrialised countries and emerging developing countries. While representatives from industrialised countries suggested market solutions and argued that emerging developing ones have become relevant polluters and that they have to accept emission caps, representatives from these countries stated that their countries already do a lot and are willing to do more but only on a voluntary basis. Due to the large gap between *per capita* emissions of industrialised and developing countries, they would not accept any mandatory targets. In the second round the discussion was more harmonious and all participants agreed that the industrialised countries should play a leading role and fulfil their targets first. Interestingly enough, adaptation was not discussed in the two rounds although it was raised in the input by Carmen Richerzhagen. It seems that neither industrialised nor emerging developing countries feel really concerned by the point. General issues that were discussed in the two rounds were:

- a) The chance of leap frogging by emerging developing countries should be used
- b) Development rights of developing countries need to be ensured
- c) Capacity is important (who can do more?)
- d) Financial crisis can be seen as a chance to invest in sustainable systems
- e) The strong role of consumers needs to be considered
- f) There is a need for comprehensive regulations (otherwise companies slip through the loophole)
- g) Mainstreaming of climate change in other policy fields should be fostered
- h) Best practices (e.g. Germany’s “Feed-In” Law) should be disseminated

**Round Table 2****“Growing Vulnerability? New Modalities of Security Threats in the Twenty-First Century”**, chaired by Dr. Jörn Grävinholt (DIE)

There was broad consensus that the current state of global security governance is inadequate. It is characterised by a dominance of national interests that influence the capacity and will of states to act and finds its ultimate symbol in the veto power of permanent UN Security Council members. No consensus, nor even any strong preference, existed, however, with regard to any particular direction of reform. This was true even independently from how security is defined, or rather: “framed”; that is, in a narrow fashion and thus more practical and operational; or in a broader way, the concept of comprehensive security, and consequently with a less clear focus on traditional issues of “national security”.

In any case, it was highlighted during discussions that the mere power to declare any one issue a matter of security (the so called “securitisation”) holds far-reaching implications for how policies are devised and implemented. For this and a number of other important reasons, it seems to be decisive how legitimacy for any future arrangement of global security governance can be secured. Without broad and strong legitimacy, a departure from the *status-quo* to a new form of global security governance seems highly unlikely to achieve. But then again, even today’s form of governance, while still largely being accepted as given, suffers from an increasing erosion of legitimacy, thus perhaps gradually lowering the threshold for reform.

**Round Table 3**

**“Trade without order? A New World Trade Order in the Wake of the Doha Round”**, chaired by Enrique Dussel (UNAM, Mexico)

There were several issues resulting from the debate in the two sessions:

- a) There was a general coincidence on the belief that world trade has not been doing well – particularly for poorer countries – in the past, and will suffer in the near future.
- b) There was an agreement that poorer people have little leverage power to negotiate with industrialised countries.
- c) Several participants highlighted the need to include poverty reduction issues in the future trade agenda, i.e. the World Trade Organisation (WTO) requires more coordination and instruments to reduce poverty through trade.
- d) The WTO, world trade and the concept of global governance contradict each other, since the former two do not account for one vote for each country, but rather reflect the weight of the respective country in total trade.
- e) There is little consensus between the emerging powers, specifically on the issue of WTO and world trade.
- f) A group of participants shared the view that there should be a WTO agreement or Doha Round given the overall negative sentiments against trade, and the possibility of an overreaction and protectionism. Any kind of short-term agreement could thus be positive.
- g) It was not clear if China’s socioeconomic performance in the last years should be considered as the result of trade growth, or, on the contrary, if trade was a result of GDP growth in China. The topic is relevant from a conceptual perspective, but also in terms of instruments and overall trade and development policy.

The conclusion of the round table may be summarised as a general agreement on continuing with the current WTO agenda as far as discussions and debates are concerned. However, the participants did not reach a consensus regarding the priorities of the WTO agenda from the perspective of the emerging powers.

**Round Table 4**

**“The International Financial Architecture”**, chaired by Ulrich Volz (DIE)

The results of the discussion were little surprising, as there was a consensus about the necessity to establish a new international financial architecture, but hardly any coincidence on how such new system should look like. There was an agreement on general issues, such as the need for more transparency in the markets, more accountability and more regulations and supervision, but, again, no consensus was reached when it came to more concrete issues, such as who could / should take the initiative to lead the reforms into the desired general direction. Some participants suggested the G20 as a potential responsible actor for doing the first step, as this group has been organising a series of international financial summits and has been putting forward some useful proposals to reform the current system. Others mentioned the UN, which plans to launch similar crisis summits, but it was clear that the final answer to the question of responsibility remained unclear.

A lack of consensus also emerged when discussing the role of current international financial institutions, like the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The participants could not agree if these institutions should be reformed in order to better reflect today’s world order, or if they should be abolished and substituted by completely new institutions. The only agreement reached in the sessions regarding international financial institutions referred to the existing tension between the enforcement measures that these international financial institutions apply to induce reforms and standards in several countries, and national sovereignty.



**Round Table 5**

**“Subverted Sovereignty? Globalization and the Nation State in Transition”**, chaired by Aletta Mondré (University of Bremen)

The general consensus reached in the sessions was that the state as an organisation/political infrastructure has strong staying power and will not cease to exist in a globalised world. Besides, the states provide due process and sometimes democratic principles better than other entities. However, a difference must be drawn between sharing sovereignty and giving up sovereignty, as shared sovereignty and cooperation of states are mutually beneficial.

Nevertheless, there are a number of states which do not fulfil the most basic state functions and do not represent the interests of their population. Thus, taking into account concepts of legitimacy and accountability, we ought to search for the proper source of authority for collective decision-making. In addition, as sovereignty should be understood as ‘popular sovereignty’, state authority should be enriched with representation of interests of other (societal) groups, as not all interests are represented by a state, e.g. political communities are not necessarily bound by territory (diasporas), and minorities might not be represented by “their” state.

Some participants suggested regionalisation processes as the best option to represent interests both at a regional level and below the state level. Voluntary (political) associations could also organise and represent people’s interests, but it was not clear within the audience what kind of associations would be appropriate.

***Rounding off the Workshop***

In the third and last part of the workshop “Looking ahead: Global (dis)order in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century?”, workshop attendants from Germany and from the MGG course had the opportunity to present their own vision on global governance in a series of interview rounds chaired by **Dr. Günther Taube** (Director of Department 2, International Regulatory Framework, Good Governance, Economic Policy, InWEnt-Capacity Building International, Germany). A very wide range of topics could be discussed, some of them dealing with German involvement in global governance issues like climate change, security and peace-building challenges and German commitment with other countries. The most interesting moment occurred when the security topic was discussed. A German participant claimed that Germany should be more active when it comes to its involvement in international security structures, but simultaneously recommended that the German government should limit its goals in this issue, because of the upcoming proliferation of failed states.

This vision was strongly put into perspective by an MGG participant, who, by discussing the case of Congo, argued that the claims for more international commitment should not oversee that the support of regional structures is decisive in solving security problems. The main challenge, he said, is to guarantee that the benefits from local natural resources filter down to local communities, because this would help eradicate extreme poverty, which is a fertile soil for insecurity. The MGG participant strongly stressed the necessity of addressing not only the political, but also the economic interests involved in the region, as trans-national companies extracting and trading with local minerals also bear a great responsibility in regional conflicts. More transparency and regulatory frames for extracting industries would be necessary, he continued. The lack of regulatory and monitoring policies and institutions in some countries could be in part solved by interregional or even inter-organisational cooperation, for example between the African Union, the EU and the OECD.

This comment by one of the MGG participants succeeded in picking up many of the global governance issues discussed previously: coordinated action between global actors and local structures; cooperation between regional organisations; the need for local communities to benefit more from the trans-national trade of local natural resources; the acknowledgment of the importance of non-state actors and the interests for global problem-solving. To put it in a nutshell: many of the pivotal issues of global governance shown together in just one concrete example. A nice way to round off the workshop.